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Ethnography of the state has long been focused on either a state’s reproduction of 
itself or on ‘the people’s’ resistance to it. In both cases, the state is cast as a unified, 
holistic identity that exists in diametric opposition to the people living within its 
borders. There have been some recent attempts to speak back to these assumptions 
(e.g. Navaro-Yashin 2002), but we are still left wih a monolithic image of the state. 
This thesis is an attempt to break down the ‘obvious’ divides between the reified 
concepts of People and State, especially in regards to Arab Middle Eastern countries. 
My analysis is based on 13 months of fieldwork in Damascus, Syria, where I 
witnessed how politics are lived and described in the course of everyday life. 
 This work focuses on popular stories about and interactions with what might 
be labeled global and state politics. Thus I read their stories to not be just narratives 
but narrative actions—a concept I suggest considering as a ‘narraction’ to encompass 
its seemingly dualistic, but practically singular nture. Political narractions in Syria 
often take the form of identity-work or conspiracy theory; this thesis approaches 
these as ethnographic objects and undertakes a more performative analysis of these 
narractions. I suggest that in narracting these storie , Syrians are doing a form of 
relations, making connections and disconnections between the various subjects 
within the narractions (and themselves) in a manner that is highly fluid and flexible 
and can seem somewhat ambiguous (if not in the conventional use of the term). 
     That there can be simultaneous connections and disconnections is not as 
mutually exclusive a state as it would appear and is also one that Syrians experience 
in relation to kinship and friendship. In a comparative turn, I suggest that in both 
familial and political relations, the disconnections (challenges) are not a form of 
‘resistance,’ but are a negative (Narotzky and Moren  2002) aspect of relations that 
are just as essential to the overall construction and maintenance of a relationship as 
the positive ones we are more familiar with (e.g. familial affection or political 
activism). Finally, I argue that this process of ‘making connections’ via observing 
and narracting relationships can provide a broader model of knowledge production 
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A Note on Transliteration 
 
For transliteration of Arabic words, I have followed the guidelines of the 
International Journal of Middle East Studies. However, I have elected to leave 
personal and place names in their most common English forms, or how I saw them 
transliterated in Syria by Syrians (e.g. Alawi and not cAlawi). I have used the Syrian 
colloquial (specifically Damascene) dialect for my translations, which has some 
effect on the vowels; for example, -h often represents ta marbutah rather than the 
classical –ah, and o replaces u where appropriate. Though q is usually replaced by a 
glottal stop in Syrian Arabic, I have, for the most part, included it to prevent 
confusion. I have also changed letters to account for Syrian pronunciation of them, 
e.g. th is often replaced by t or s. For ease’s sake, I have also elected to leave the 
definite article in al- form, even in the case of ‘sun letters.’ When quoting 
transliterations from other authors, I have left the words in their original formats. 
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Figure 1: Map of Syria 
 





This is, above all, meant to be an ethnography of the s ate. When I left for Syria, I set 
out with the grandiose goal of uncovering or maybe discovering all that I could about 
state-formation activities in everyday life. As is the way of these things, what I 
thought I was looking for did not quite match what I found. The Syrian ‘state’ was a 
much more slippery thing to locate than I had imagined, even (or especially) in the 
capital city, where I had hoped it would be most viible. When I finally left 
Damascus, I was less certain of where or even what the ‘state’ was than when I had 
arrived. I have used this uncertainty to my advantage, moving from a standard 
ethnography of the state to a work that problematizes and ultimately questions the 
very existence of the state in Syria (or at least the applicability of the concept as we 
know it).  
  The ‘state’ in anthropology has become, and perhaps s always been, an 
ambiguous concept. On the one hand, it is used as an nalytical tool, providing us 
with a broad framework with which to consider and compare the various processes of 
political power, much in the way that ‘identity’ or‘kinship’ are used (cf. Eickelman 
1989). On the other hand, it is an object to be unpacked using other analytics (e.g. 
methods of governance, class conflicts, etc.). But as much as it is an academic object, 
the state is also an ethnographic one—it is something t at our informants themselves 
identify, interact with, and analyze. We need to consider it as such, but it is important 
that we do so beginning with our informants’ object, rather than our own. For 
instance, I very rarely heard Syrians use the Arabic word for ‘state’ (dawleh) when 
discussing their own political situation (see Chapter 4 for elaboration on what they 
did use). What they explicitly interacted with was somewhat different than what I 
imagined I was searching for. Thus I have attempted here to focus on the same 
objects as my informants and to use their own analyses in order to gain an 
understanding of what and where the state might be in Syria. This ultimately has 
required not only a rethinking of the state, but also one regarding the production and 
(re)creation of social knowledge, amongst Syrians and possibly even anthropologists. 
 
2 
Life in Damascus 
 
Damascus today is a sprawling city of several millions of people. A precise measure 
is hard to make because of the constant motion of pe ple into and out of the urban 
space, from foreign (mainly Gulf) tourists in the summer to the daily influx of 
workers coming to work from their homes in the towns outside the city limits. My 
initial perception of the city when I arrived at the beginning of the summer (well into 
the dry season) was that it was tannish-brown. There was little in the streets, but it 
was somewhat less than I had expected after having been in capital cities like Cairo 
or Delhi. There is very little in the way of greenery, though people reminisce about a 
time as less than 50 years ago where a much-smaller city center was surrounded by 
verdant fields and orchards. There are a few parks here and there, though, and some 
of the larger sports complexes (there were four that I knew of) have some green 
space. The vehicle traffic is bad and getting worse, despite constant expansion of the 
roadways (that often takes an age to complete and occasionally leaves no discernible 
difference between what was made and what was therepr viously). Personal cars and 
thousands of taxis compete for space on the roads. For those who cannot afford these 
options, there are numerous micro-buses that run on fixed routes, which carry 
roughly 13 passengers and cost only five lira (roughly eight American cents). When I 
was in Damascus, there were also three major bus routes, with (relatively) timely, 
large buses that only stopped at specific spots, rathe  than the micros that one could 
get on or off anywhere. Some areas (such as Rukn al-Diin) even have unofficial 
systems where small trucks go up and down hills and c rry passengers for a small 
fee. Damascenes are always moving as they criss-cro the cityscape for work, 
shopping, visiting, or play. Men, women and children of different ethnicities and 
religions sit side-by-side in claustrophobic conditions to get where they need to go.1  
 For those living within the city, different areas of town have different degrees 
of status. For instance, some of the newer areas of town, especially around the hub 
(see satellite photograph, Figure 2) and the northwestern sections, tend to have broad 
streets with trees lining the sidewalks and apartmen  buildings rather than the 
                                                
1 There is some etiquette that has developed in this, especially in micros. Men will usually collect all
the money from the passengers and be responsible for handing out change. If a woman is soft-spoken 
or does not wish to shout, it is also the job of (usually unknown and unrelated) men to relay to the 
driver when she wishes to get off.  
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‘traditional’ Arab, multi-generational house (Bourdieu 1977, Layne 1994). These 
tend to house the middle and upper-middle class Damascenes whose cars line the 
side streets. The area (mantaqa) in the northeast of the city called Rukn al-Diin is 
much less obviously wealthy (and is not even included on the tourist map), with 
winding streets that are steeply inclined as they slowly creep up the side of Mount 
Qasiyoun, which towers over the north side of the city. Rukn al-Diin is made up 
mostly of middle to lower-middle class families, many of them Kurdish. It is known 
for being more violent than many of the other sections of town, a fact that its male 
youth relate with a note of pride, chalking it up to the Kurdish temperament. Seida 
Zeinab sits on the western outskirts of the city and is so-named for being home to a 
mosque said to hold the remains of the Prophet Muhammed’s granddaughter. It is a 
popular Shi’a shrine and there are frequently innumerable Iranians in the area on 
pilgrimages. It is also where many Iraqi refugees have settled and is one of the only 
places I witnessed petty theft—the Syrian officials did not patrol the area as well as 
some others.  
 There are also several other suburbs and sections of town with varying 
degrees of prestige and history (cf. Salamandra 2005). Like in Cairo (Armbrust 1996, 
El-Messiri 1978), some of these are considered to be more ‘authentic’ and Shami 
than the newer sections, and the heart of this centers around Old Damascus (shām 
‘adimeh, alternatively just al-medinet al-‘adimeh, the Old City). Bounded by the old 
Roman walls, peppered with ancient architecture, and metaphorically centered on the 
impressive Ummayid Mosque, the Old City and its inhabitants cover a wide breadth 
and depth of social life. Much of the city’s Christian population resides near the 
eastern gate of Old Damascus in an area called Bab Touma. The western end is 
occupied by long suqs (shopping areas), including the main one of the city, where 
people will come by car, taxi, or micro bus to do their gold, clothing, spice, coffee, 
etc. shopping, Suq Hamidiyya. The tiny streets are b r ly, if at all, big enough for a 
single car to get through, and many of the houses are ‘old’ style, with unassuming 
doors that lead into confusing sets of levels and rooms facing into a central courtyard. 
Some of these houses are breathtaking and belong to the old elite, some who still 
possess considerable sums of wealth. Others were abandoned as their previous 
owners moved to the more fashionable new town apartments and are now occupied 
4 
by those who cannot afford to move elsewhere. Also hidden away throughout the 
small alleys are an ever-growing number of ‘traditional’ cafes serving tea and argileh 
(water pipes); courtyard-ed restaurants serving traditional mezzeh meals with the 
local alcohol araq, sometimes to the music of a live lute player;2 and the occasional 
nightclub where Arabic pop music is intertwined with the latest American hip hop.3 
The clubs are filled with foreigner tourists and expatriates, young Syrian men who 
have a little money to spend and no work in the morning, and occasionally Syrian 
girlfriends, if they can manage to convince their pa ents they are spending the night 
with female friends. The restaurants are frequently packed out, usually by relatively 
well-to-do couples or friends who were out for a fashionable evening, to see and be 
seen (though the really upscale restaurants are in the mountains outside the city). The 
cafes catered to just about anyone, some being trendier than others. The one I most 
frequently haunted sat in the shadow of the Ummayid Mosque and was generally full 
of older men relaxing, younger men and women who either did not have the money 
or the inclination to go clubbing, and the occasional tourist group. The satellite 
television hanging in the corner provided a nice contrast to the bubbling fountain in 
the center.  
 
Locating the State 
 
My decision to locate my ethnography of the state in the ‘everyday’ has stemmed 
from a dissatisfaction with the ways that the state and state-like power are sometimes 
portrayed in anthropological literature. Much of the literature assumes a dichotomy 
between ‘the state’ and ‘the people’4 that obscures as much as it illuminates when 
                                                
2There seemed to be a divide between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ amongst these restaurants, and the 
presence of the live musician was almost always an indication of it being a traditional place. The more 
‘modern’ feeling (and priced) restaurants and cafés more often played recent Arabic pop music. The 
clientele varied between the two accordingly; both catered to the middle class, but the elites generally 
only went to the modern places. Cf. Armbrust (1996) for a discussion of similar divisions of tradition 
and modernity and their impacts on the identity of the Egyptian middle class.  
3 What there were not many of were theatres or cinemas. There was one big cinema (located in the 
expensive Cham Palace hotel) and several small theatres, but neither film nor theatre were very central 
to Damascene public life. Most outings involved food and drink, rather than ‘arts,’ especially among 
the middle and lower classes. This is somewhat of a c ntrast to Cairo, where cinema and theatre seem 
to have a much stronger presence among these classes (Armbrust 1996). 
4 Mitchell (1991) provides a similar critique, though centered around state and society. He suggests 
considering the state as a “structural effect” as amethod around this, but in doing so is still favoring 
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considering where and how ‘politics’ is done. This generally unquestioned divide 
leads to two perspectives on the state. One includes ethnographies explicitly about 
‘the state’ (or state-like processes) that are usually focused on the state’s own 
practices and ideologies. These often rely on the examination of technologies of 
“governmentality” (Foucault 1991, cf. Gupta 2001) and “symbolic languages” of 
power (Hansen and Stepputat 2001) in the acquiring and maintaining of political 
authority; i.e. how a state recreates itself for its c izens.  
 My Syrian informants were quite familiar with many of the ideas within this 
literature, such as the use and monopolization of violence by the state (Alexander 
1997, Hiatt 1989, Jabar 2000, Milton-Edwards 1998, Wedeen 2003) and the control 
of movement, especially vis-à-vis borders (Edwards 1998, Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 
Zureik 2001). Mapping and the drawing of state boundaries are frequently associated 
with state-initiated nationalistic projects (Biggs 1999, Radcliffe 2001) and featured 
heavily in Syrian accounts of their history, as didother state-based attempts at 
encouraging a national identity (including official accounts of history [Anderson, L. 
1991]; privileged statuses [Hajjar 1996]; and appeals to broader ethnic identities 
[Hinnebusch 2001, Lavie 1990]). Surveillance and censorship practices as methods 
of exercising state control (Campagna 1998, Mitchell 1988, Salamandra 2003) were 
regular features of Syrian life. Public rituals and spectacles in Syria, from monthly 
testing of the air-raid sirens to political rallies, also exhibited the state’s attempt to 
make its presence felt (cf. Combs-Schilling 1989, Fujitani 1996, Geertz 1980, Jensen 
2001). 
 Sometimes, however, the state makes appearances in ethnographic works that 
are not directly concerned with analyzing state power and processes. In these—
especially in Middle Eastern ethnography—the state is often portrayed as a distant, 
but powerful figure that has the capacity to harm, help or otherwise influence the 
locality in question, but only does so on its own terms. For instance, Gilsenan’s 
(1996) work on Lebanese narratives includes characters that were involved in state-
level politics (as local Ministers), but were remote compared to the ‘local’ figures 
under analysis. Other references to the state in his work are limited to large-scale 
governmental changes (e.g. moving from Ottoman rule to French rule to 
                                                                                                                                
state-based processes (borders, passports, law, etc.) and private institutions, rather than looking at 
popular portrayals and constructions of state effects.  
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independence) and the state’s ability to interfere with matters of local concern (e.g. 
elections [1996:12], economy, and investment [1996:6]). Similarly, Layne (1994) 
focuses more on local shaykhs in Jordan than on the monarchy. When she does 
discuss the king or state government, they are depicted as coming from a position of 
superior power, able to regulate education (1994:90) or make decisions on treaties, 
the military, and the legislature (1994:144). In her study of domestic government in 
Yemen, Mundy (1995) does not include much about the s ate government except in 
relation to its ability to alter the legal system. For instance, she describes how, while 
local legal systems had initially been premised on a combination of Islamic 
jurisprudence and “common” law, the state disallowed the use of common law in 
courts. Islamic law became the only permitted legal basis, styled upon the state-
centralized authority of “sheikhly politicians” rather than local custom (1995:204). 
These are not, then, just divides, but outright antagonisms between the people and the 
state. 
 My primary concern with most of these works is notthat they are not useful, 
informative or strongly perceptive, but that they are premised on the existence of a 
strong state(-like) authority that has the ability to exert its will over a distinct and 
distinguishable population of citizens. The state-as-subject is granted agency to act, 
think, and desire. And yet there remains the fact tha he state is made by and of 
people—people who exist outside of, as well as within, t e state apparatus.5 They 
may act in the name of ‘the state,’ and they may even have the “discipline” to 
separate their home from their ‘work’ lives (Zaloom 2005), but they too are people. 
Or quite the opposite might be true; Gupta (1995) describes how local Indian 
bureaucrats often had their offices in their homes, showing how the ideal of a 
work/personal division can sometimes be blurred. At the other end of the spectrum, 
we create images of hapless citizens who are generally denied any sort of agency or 
effectiveness in participating in state formation except as passive and dominated 
                                                
5 One of the best examples I have seen where this personal aspect of the state has been portrayed (if 
not explicitly) is Bein’s (2006) article on Ottoman educational policies, where ‘the state’ is used 
interchangeably with names of individual leaders and policy makers in describing what decisions were 
made and why. It was not that ‘the state’ desired or esigned specific things, but that these members of 
the state apparatus did. 
7 
recipients. Unless, of course, they are ‘resisting.’ Whether it is made explicit or not,6 
there is, in much recent political literature, “the discovery of resistance almost 
everywhere” (Brown 1996:730). Such a ‘will to resistance’ (on the part of 
anthropologists rather than our subjects) is premisd on the presence of the 
dominated, the marginal and the subaltern (cf. Ortner 1995, Skalník 1989) and their 
widely assumed desire to resist the forces of politica  hegemony.7  
 However, it can be difficult to determine a clear definition of what some of 
these labels mean, who defines them, and how we are meant to recognize them when 
we see them. Brown (1999:16) suggests that people are “constructed as marginal by 
the expansive states with which they come into contact,” but gives little indication 
when or to whom such a figuration applies. I found that the concept of 
marginalization was not particularly useful for my work on Syria precisely because I 
had difficulties pinpointing who exactly the ‘subalterns’ there might be. Would they 
have been the ethnic and/or religious minorities who ere externalized by the 
cultural hegemony of the predominantly Arab, Sunni culture? The ruralites who were 
historically excluded from official channels of authority and control? The new urban 
poor? The former bourgeois elite? Ortner (1995:182) encourages us to return 
“thickness” to descriptions of resistance by including and acknowledging the 
“cultural complexity of power and resistance.” Whereas she argues that such an 
account will reveal “ambivalences and ambiguities [that] emerge from the intricate 
webs of articulations and disarticulations that always exist between dominant and 
dominated” (1995:190), all it seems to do in the case of Syria is to reduce the 
situation to an analytical mire. This is especially true given that, as we shall see, most 
ordinary Syrians have and are willing to activate connections to the “dominant” state 
apparatus. Can one truly hope to distinguish the dominated from the dominating (and 
thus potential spaces for resistance) amongst people who are not so removed from the 
processes of power as they might originally seem? I would argue not.   
 Indeed, Taussig (1992) questions our ideas about the constitutive power of 
the ‘center/margin’ in the State-making process. He argues that the State has a 
                                                
6 Even if state studies do not explicitly feature ‘rsistance’ as an analytic, many do contain a quiet 
implication that the state exists in opposition to the people under study (cf. Bayat 1997, Mundy 
1995:202-4). 
7 Which is not to say that such analyses are not applicable in some situations, just that we should not 
so readily accept them as the definitive categories. 
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fetishistic quality, especially in that it is (necessarily) composed of both pure and 
impure “sacredness;” in other words, “it is precisely the coming together of reason-
and-violence in the State that creates, in a secular and modern world, the bigness of 
the big S” (1992:116, emphasis removed). This combination gives the State a 
magical quality, much like a totem, where it is a signifier that has erased and become 
more powerful than its signification. It may not exist as a ‘thing’ (“res”) but is reified 
and even deified as a magical entity. And this fetishism has similarities to traditional 
taboos, which, he contends, help to give totems their magical auras by restricting 
access to the totems to an initiated elite. States, too, can be thought of as having a 
limited elite who have access to the workings of politics. But in both cases, he says 
that it is those who are restricted, the marginalized portion of the population, who 
create the power of the totem, rather than the initiated few. “Might it turn out, then, 
that not the basic truths, not the Being nor the ideologies of the center, but the 
fantasies of the marginated concerning the secret of the center are what is more 
politically important to the State idea and hence State fetishism?” (1992:132). Here 
we see that for Taussig, there are centers and margins of power, but he reverses much 
of the common sense approaches to power by suggestin  that the real process of 
creating the State as a reified/deified thing lays precisely in the hands of the marginal 
and not the (apparently) powerful. 
 There are also works that challenge and blur the lines between center and 
margin (or state and people) rather than problematizing our perceptions of where 
creative power lies. Hansen (2005) describes the cas of local Big Men in India who, 
acquired a degree of “de facto” sovereignty, working both within and around the 
state’s legal frameworks. They did not belong to a helpless mass of people, but nor 
were they agents of the state. However, Hansen is more concerned with notions of 
sovereignty and authority and does not explore the implications such figures might 
have for how state and people are conceptualized. Ferguson and Gupta (2002) also 
describe people in ambiguous positions regarding the s ate. Their research concerns 
state agents in India who “swooped down” on local agencies in surprise inspections. 
While acknowledging the somewhat liminal status of these employees, who were 
both agents of the state but also highly localized an distanced by it, the authors 
choose to focus on this as process of “spatializing” the state as a “higher” (on a 
9 
vertical scale) or “broader” (in a model of encompassment) authority. In their work, 
these in-between employees are used to support claims about state actions, rather 
than being a location for the questioning of a state/people divide. 
 Gupta (1995) outright challenges the idea of a distinct state versus civil 
society, arguing that this is a too Western-centric paradigm for the state. Indeed, 
much of my work follows on his, for as he suggests, “rather than take the notion of 
‘the state’ as a point of departure, we should leave open the analytical question as to 
the conditions under which the state does operate as a cohesive and unitary whole.” 
He does so by looking at everyday discourses (of corruption) in India as a space in 
which the state is created and challenged, and how lower-level bureaucratic offices 
are primary sites of popular state construction. In such spaces, ordinary people are 
shown to interact with, navigate, and construct (or deconstruct) the Indian state. He 
focuses on discourses of corruption (usually leveled at these bureaucrats) not only 
because they highlight what different people think norms and standards of conduct 
should be, but also because they “undermine the credibility of the state and to attack 
the manner in which government organizations operate” (1992:389).  
 In a similar vein, Pierce (2006) looks at how corruption requires that we 
rethink our paradigms of the state. While corruption might be seen to be a failure of 
the state in Euro-American terms, he suggests that Nigerians perceive corruption, or 
more correctly what they call ‘oppression,’ “as being the norm, an intergral part of 
governance. This did not make state actors illegitima e in people’s eyes” (2006:899-
900). What he argues through the course of his examination of the historical bases for 
the seemingly corrupt workings of the Nigerian government, is essentially that (in a 
Taussig-like fashion) the state is nothing more than an image with no signifier 
precisely because (contra Taussig) it does not hold any mystifying power over its 
population. It is, here, people, specifically the population of the country in question 
who have the ability to construct the state. “The history of state formation in northern 
Nigeria…is not one of a government’s coming to ‘see lik  a state’ but rather of a 
transformation that enabled it to look like one. The euphemizing quality of the state-
effect never got off the ground” (2006:909-910). The only people to whom the 
Nigerian government looks like a state is outsiders, not the all-important (for state 
construction) insiders, and because of this, “the net result is that ‘the state,’ except in 
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a grossly empirical sense, is an illusion” (2006:911). It is people’s creative power and 
belief in that power, that constructs the state.  
 There have also been several ethnographies based in the Middle East that 
challenge the idea that the state, rather than people, has sole power to create itself. 
Salamandra (2000) describes a social category that gained popularity in Damascus 
that was neither ‘Syrian’ nor sponsored (or even encouraged) by the state apparatus. 
It was instead a sort of grass-roots ‘return’ to a specifically Damascene identity. Her 
account describes how ‘people’ had co-opted what is often described as a political, 
and often state-based, process of identity creation (cf. May, Modood and Squires 
2004). However, though she shows how the state does n t have the sole claim on 
defining its populations’ categories, she does not examine the deeper implications of 
this. Jean-Klein’s (2001) study of nationalism in Palestine takes a further step by 
explicitly challenging the idea that nation-building processes cannot take place from 
the “bottom up.” Rather than having a nationalistic project imposed upon them, she 
shows how Palestinians during the first Intifada were actively and knowingly 
involved in “self-nationalizing.” Their actions of suspending their normal life 
practices (e.g. weddings, picnics and social visits) are shown to be ways in which 
they were creatively involved in the Palestinian national movement while 
simultaneously resisting a foreign hegemonic power. She illustrates that it is the 
anthropologist who insists on glossing these actions as either resistance or nation-
building. For the Palestinians, the two processes can be, and are, one and the same. 
Though writing about a state-less society, she nonethel ss presents a possible avenue 
of escaping the artificial state/people dichotomies that plague our writings.  
 Within and throughout her critique, Jean-Klein (2001) brings up another 
concern that stems from the way in which such studies of nationalism and resistance 
are presented (by anthropologists): “methodological concentration on authoritative 
practices emanating from political and cultural centers...has insistently figured 
nationalism as a category of practice committed by one group (rendered active and 
immoral) against another (passive but innocent)” (2001:86, my emphasis). She and 
others suggest that much of this ‘romantic’ (cf. Abu-Lughod 1990, Ortner 1995) 
tendency stems from a trend to try and account for anthropology’s early collusion 
and intersection with colonial projects (Jean-Klein 2001:84-85), leading to studies 
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that are infused with a “moral self-validation” (Brown 1996:733). Such a criticism 
equally applies to how the state has been approached as an object of analysis. The 
two “groups” in Jean-Klein’s account can easily be re-read here as ‘state’ and ‘the 
people.’ Thus in our unquestioning use of this dichotomy, we rely on and (re)make 
moral judgments regarding the objects of our studies. However, by being aware of 
the moralistic implications of the state/people divi e, we can circumnavigate this 
concern via explicit acknowledgment of the dangers in such a model, rather than 
unthinkingly reproducing a discourse of good people versus evil state.   
 It may well be that some state-centered, resistance or similar studies are set in 
contexts where such analytics are the best possible choices for studying political 
movements. Many examples readily come to mind where p ople (but not the people) 
are in disagreement or conflict with their governmetal figures/institutions. It is only 
that authors do not always question how they choose to position their accounts and 
what the implications of their work might be (i.e. to reify a problematic distinction) 
that I take issue with. Our informants might choose to narrate structural and moral 
divisions between themselves and their rulers, but that does not mean that we, as 
anthropologists, should take their existence for granted. I would suggest that one way 
to handle these various dilemmas is to return to the concept of ambiguity, not as an 
analytic (as Ortner 1995 seems to suggest), but as an nthropological object that itself 
needs to be brought under the microscope.  
 
The Meaning of Ambiguity 
 
It seems that one cannot read an anthropological acount without running into the 
term ‘ambiguity.’ By the same token it is difficult to find a text that does more than 
include it as a descriptive or exegetical device, rather than explaining what is meant 
by it. Sometimes it is used to indicate a situation hat is unclear. Bayat (1998:168), 
for instance, describes the Iranian revolution as having a “remarkable ambiguity” 
which he contrasts with the “clarity” of the Egyptian Islamist movement. He 
attributes the ambiguity of the former to a lack of well thought-out policies and 
amorphous, non-categorizable goals. Similarly Throop (2005:507), in his reading of 
Robert Levy’s Tahitians, shows, and does not question, Levy’s conflation of the 
terms “vague”, “diffuse”, and “ambiguous.” In describing “uncanny” experiences, 
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Throop himself says that they are “an ambiguous variety that actively resists 
categorization” (2005:505, my emphasis). In these cases, then, ambiguity is defined 
as something that cannot be categorized. Returning to the linguistic origins of the 
concepts, both of these situations would seem to fall under the term ‘vague’ 
(something that is not clear in context and cannot be categorized) rather than 
‘ambiguous.’ Vagueness is a fuzzy, indistinct state, nd one that is itself distinct from 
ambiguity.8  
 Ambiguity, according to its definition, is something that is liable to more than 
one interpretation or meaning, or that has two or me specific meanings that make 
sense in context.9 A phrase is ambiguous and not vague when it can be i terpreted in 
multiple ways, rather than none. Anthropologists’ use of ambiguity covers this more 
accurate meaning as well. Piot (1993), for instance, describes how the Kabre of 
northern Togo take advantage of the multiple meanings and interpretations made 
possible by ambiguous statements. An example he gives is a naming situation, where 
a child was named “I feed God” to indicate that his mother had had many children 
die before him (thus returning them to and “feeding” God), but also contained an 
implication that a co-wife was a witch and responsible for the previous babies’ 
deaths. Though direct family members might have known both meanings behind the 
name, outsiders did not and were left to speculate which of the various (discrete) 
possible interpretations was correct (1993:358). Similarly, Rasmussen (1992) details 
the seemingly variable statuses and traits that blacksmiths and Islamic scholars have 
amongst the Tuareg. Each category has certain characteristics that would appear to be 
dominant, but could be inverted. For instance, the blacksmiths’ destructive and 
heretical power could be used for good (e.g. for exorcisms), while the scholars’ 
power, meant to be benevolent, could be used to advance personal, rather than social, 
ends.  
 These are ambiguous figures or situations because they can occupy or enact 
different roles at different times, and thus have the potential to be a number of 
distinct and distinguishable things. As I noted, Ortne  (1995) encourages us to draw 
                                                
8 Thus there is some humor in the fact that anthropologists’ (as a collective) use of the term ambiguity 
falls in between two categories (ambiguity and vagueness) and is thus itself vague, but not ambiguous. 
9 One example provided by Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambiguity) is the famous 
Groucho Marx line where he says, “Last night I shot an elephant in my pajamas,” and, in a play on the 
phrase’s ambiguity, follows it by saying, “What he was doing in my pajamas, I’ll never know.” 
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out the ambiguities in our research, but seems somewhat inconsistent in her use of 
the word. On one hand, ambiguities appear to be ethnographic objects that “emerge 
from the intricate webs of articulations and disarticulations that always exist between 
dominant and dominated” (1995:190). But in another section, she suggests that we 
“introduce complexity, ambiguity, and contradiction into our view of the subject” 
(1995:184), making it out to be an analytic that the researcher would bring to bear on 
a subject. It would seem that at least some of the anthropological confusion stems 
from a question as to whether ambiguity rests with the ethnographers or the subjects. 
In Piot’s examples, the subjects are manipulating ambiguity in order to conceal or 
reveal certain meanings, thus situating the ambiguity as an object, whereas the 
blacksmith/scholar example seems to be ambiguous only for the ethnographer—what 
seems to us to be ambiguous (spanning multiple categories), is not necessarily so for 
the Tuareg. In their categorization of the world, blacksmiths and Islamic scholars 
inhabit their respective categories of ‘smith’ and ‘scholar,’ whose roles do not 
contain any contradiction or awkward interpretations because they are categories-in-
themselves. Rasmussen states that one of her goals in her article is to encourage 
anthropologists to move away from the reification of Western-based categories by 
casually imposing them on subjects. As Scott (1998:347) notes, it is the “[high-
modernist’s] simplifying fiction…that, for any activity or process that comes under 
its scrutiny, there is only one thing going on.” 
 As I suggested earlier, Jean-Klein (2001) presents a way of thinking around 
the problems of ambiguity, suggesting the term “duplexity.” 
 
Duplexity contains no such claims about subjects’ consistency of practice. It 
signals the event, denied in existing discourses, whereby subjects, through 
specific courses of action, address two discrete interests, problems, or projects 
at once….Activists have no need to deny or hide the double-edgedness of 
their activities—to be duplicitous—because they do not view them as 
invalidating one another (2001:92). 
 
I agree with Jean-Klein’s argument that duplexity and mbiguity are different things, 
and will borrow her term when I encounter situations that merit it; i.e. for actions and 
narratives that effect multiple outcomes. However, I will continue to use ambiguity 
when I feel it is more appropriate (though with thecaveat that the lack of clear 
understanding is usually on the side of the ethnographer, not my informants). I 
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suggest that Syrians’ actions and narratives have a fluid, transient quality to them, 
creating two-at-once effects through the rapid shifting between different potential 
meanings (a sense that duplexity implies; Jean-Klein, personal communication). 
Thus, what we might normally perceive as ‘ambiguous’ r vague—a grey, uncertain 
area—might actually be our failing to account for a shifting between black and white.  
 
‘Narr-acting’ the World 
 
I recognize no absolute distinction between discourse and practice; in 
Damascus…social and cultural life takes place in and through language 
(Salamandra 2004:23-24). 
 
One of the first instances of duplexity I wish to address is that of the process of 
narration in Syria. The relationship of word to dee has a long history in 
anthropological scholarship (especially in relation t  ritual, cf. Tambiah 1968), and I 
imagine that what I intend to briefly outline here will sound familiar to many 
researchers who have worked in Arab and Middle Eastern settings.  
 My experience with words and actions in Syria matched that which 
Salamandra describes; discourse and practice were inde d indistinguishable. 
Speaking things and doing things were often the same process. This idea is perhaps 
most visible in terms of religion. ‘Qu’rān’ literally means ‘reading’ or ‘recital,’ but 
speaking or reading the text is never just an act of (what we would consider) reading, 
but also one of exhibiting and demonstrating piety. Or salāt, the daily prayers of a 
Muslim, are not merely recitations of religious canon, but simultaneously “affirm and 
defin[e] the practitioner’s ‘belief’, [and thus] establish a web of social relations” 
(Henkel 2005:500). Praying is also, Henkel suggests, a ransformative process, 
making any place temporarily into a mosque and the person into a Muslim 
practitioner (2005:497).10  
 A number of scholars have also examined the role of speech acts in more 
social settings, especially in the Arab Middle East. Caton (1990:21), for example, 
considers the ways in which “poetry in tribal Yemen is both the creation of art and 
the production of social and political reality.” He looks at a number of different 
                                                
10 Cf. Hirschkind (2001) and Mahmood (2001) for further examples involving Egyptian cassette-
sermon listening and the creation of piety, respectiv ly. 
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forms of (male) poetry used in tribal Yemen and the various sorts of social reality 
that they are involved in creating. Some forms, especially those created during 
wedding ceremonies, outline what it means to be a tribesman, thus asserting the poet 
as a proper tribesman and simultaneously illustrating for the groom (now on his way 
to manhood) what is expected of him. Other forms are central to the process of 
dispute mediation because it is highly persuasive and c lls on (and thus defines and 
asserts) the honor of all those involved in the dispute. A third form that Caton 
discusses involves poets addressing and suggesting solutions for wider social and 
political problems. He argues that for poetry to be considered good, it must be of 
immediate or current social relevance; e.g. love potry is considered to be a man’s 
first forays into poetry and not his best work, where the real masters are those who 
face problematic social and political issues with their poems. Caton finds “that tribal 
poetry is constitutive of social reality in compelling ways precisely because of its 
integration with the forms of everyday and tribal life” (1990:268). The act of creating 
poetry is itself part of being a tribesman. And through this poetry, tribesmen recreate 
an identity for themselves. Interestingly, and somewhat in contrast to my experience 
of speech acts in Syria, poems in Yemen are dialogic, always involving multiple 
participants who will challenge each other and respond with their poetry. Different 
kinds of poetry have different forms of transmission (some are improvised on the 
spot, others are written out), but their audience is almost always other Yemenis (the 
other poet/s included), thus extending their impact and constructions of identity onto 
a broad social landscape.    
 Swedenburg (1995) and Bowman (1994) also examine how words can do 
things, though they both focus on the politically and socially more turbulent area of 
Palestinian nationalism. Swedenburg focuses on how old Palestinians remember the 
revolt against the British in the 1930’s. Interviewees followed the ‘official’ 
Palestinian rhetoric of unity to different degrees, but overall he seems to suggest that 
they would readily speak of how united all the different peoples within Palestine 
were—for instance, that there was no religious sectarianism because everyone was 
Palestinian. Thus these narratives of their memories also included a collective 
forgetting of (some of) the divisions that were present within the Palestinian 
community at the time, though class divisions were sometimes narrated in the 
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remembering of how the elites were not seen to be as involved as the peasants. Part 
of this, he argues, is about reconstructing a solid Palestinian identity in the face of 
Israeli oppression, but part of what is remembered or not is also tied to current social 
organization. For example, during the period of his fieldwork in the mid 1980’s, 
there was a great deal of religious tolerance, especially between Christians and 
Muslims, and even intermarriage. Thus, like how andwhat people (publicly) 
remember is tied to sentiments and ideas that they are trying to present and 
encourage today.  
 Bowman also looks at how Palestinians construct a national identity through 
the use of narratives, but focuses instead on how different experiences of 
homelessness can produce varying understandings of what it means to be Palestinian. 
He looks at works published by an author living in a Lebanese refugee camp, a 
wealthy expatriate living in the U.S., and a Palestinian living in occupied Palestine. 
Despite their different ideas of Palestine and how they portray them, what they have 
in common is that their words create a shared identity for Palestinians based on the 
fact that they all consider themselves to be repressed by the same antagonist (Israel). 
Here, then, a Palestinian identity is negatively created (against Israel), but the divides 
within Palestinians become visible as each author uses his own narrative to define 
and create his own version of Palestinian-ness. Again the audience is interesting here. 
Unlike the Yemeni case, the audience here is often a foreign one, as Swedenburg’s 
work is based on a series of formal interviews with a foreign anthropologist and 
Bowman’s chapter is primarily concerned with three books that have been published 
in the international market. The identities being created here, then, are as much for 
international consumption as local.  
 We see, then, that the idea of speech acts constructing and defining social and 
political identities is not new for this region. Much of the analysis in this thesis is 
premised on similar understandings of the power of words. Like Swedenburg, I will 
look at how narratives of history construct certain identities in the present, and, like 
Bowman, how the cracks and divides in a social ident ty can be seen through 
narratives. However, unlike these two (and more likCaton), I intend to examine 
those narratives which are not (only) intended for a foreign audience, but are also, if 
not more so, aimed at other Syrians. For as he saw th t poetry was a regular part of 
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everyday life, I observed that political narratives-cum-speech-acts were a regular 
feature in Syrian life, if not as stylized. To emphasize the narrative quality of most of 
the stories I heard and to therefore differentiate such acts from other forms of speech 
acts, I suggest the introduction of a single-word term that attempts to encompass but 
still indicate (what we see as) both aspects of narrating and acting: namely a ‘narr-
action’ (and hence narracting, narraction, etc.). I have hyphenated it here to make 
clear its origins and that it is not a typographical error, but will use it as a single word 
throughout the rest of this thesis. I have chosen here to make it a single word (as 
opposed to Jean-Klein’s (2001) “narrative actions”) in an attempt to aid in the 
intuitive understanding that, for my informants, these were not two distinctive things 
that took place at the same time, but rather a single process of speaking and doing. 
The introduction of this term has helped me to more fully comprehend what I 
observed and was told in the course of everyday life in Syria. 
 
 
Methodology: An Everyday Site 
 
One of the practical ways I have attempted to counter my dissatisfactions with 
previous studies of the state and their ‘top-down’ approaches to it or ‘bottom-up’ 
tendencies to avoid paying it critical attention has been by adopting a theoretical and 
methodological stance that is quite familiar to students of resistance—namely via 
examination of the everyday.11 James Scott (1985) popularized such a location for 
studies on resistance and Jean-Klein (2001) suggests to use the everyday as a space 
for examining (re)creative political processes as well. And as she perceived 
Palestinians engaged in processes of “self-nationalizi g,” the same may hold true for 
the (re)construction of the state. Locating my fieldwork on Syrian politics in the 
everyday reveals a ‘state’ that is more personal, less distant, and less of a unified 
agent than most anthropological texts have led one t  expect. The Syrian ‘state’ is not 
always very state-like when viewed from this particular perspective, leaving one to 
question whether or not the term is wholly applicable in this context. My intention 
was and is to observe people (not the people) and see what they make (literally) of 
                                                
11 Indeed, Wedeen (1999) centers much of her work examining Syrian resistance in “mundane 
transgressions” (1999:87). 
18 
other people in and outside of Syria (including those that might be in state-like 
positions). This stance is primarily informed by myinformants, as they did not talk 
about their ‘regime’ in terms of institutions, laws, agencies, constitutions, rhetorics, 
or flows of power that were devoid of people—these were not seen to exist without 
people to interact with and drive them. 
 Methodologically, this has meant avoiding spaces of “g vernmentality” and 
other such sites where the state has often been seen to (re)produce itself. Though I 
could have easily focused on people’s daily interactions with the state vis-à-vis such 
institutions as schools, health centers, police departments, or the Traffic Ministry, I 
have chosen to only include them when they were of interest to my informants’ lives. 
I instead preferred to see how ‘ordinary’ people (i. . not directly involved in the 
structures of ‘state’ authority) chose to talk to me and each other about ‘politics’ 
(siyāseh). I left for the field with no expectation of what (if anything) people would 
tell and show me. What I got was, among other things, identity-work and ‘conspiracy 
theory.’  
 There is a possible critique here about my having perceived “the bottom” (i.e. 
the people) to be more ‘authentic’ than “the top” (i.e. the state) (Ferguson and Gupta 
2002). However, authenticity as such was not an explicit concern of mine, as my goal 
has not been to uncover some sort of ‘truth’ (as seems to be the case of many 
anthropologists, cf. Brown 1999, Briggs 2004, Scheper-Hughes 1996, 2004). There 
are, I would argue, no degrees of authenticity; everything was as authentic as 
everything else, given (what I see to be) Syrians’ methods of knowledge production 
(see Chapter 3). To search for authenticity would, I feel, be to ignore the ways that 
Syrians themselves observe, analyze and create their world. Tellingly, I found that 
when Syrians related political narratives to me, thy would not use the word ‘truth’ 
(al-haqīqah) to describe events or relationships, but rather described their narractions 
as things ‘known’ (macrūf), a thought I shall return to.  
 Hypothetically, I could have sought out informants who inhabit a ‘liminal’ 
state-people space, but there were two major complications with such an idea. The 
first was practical—such people were harder to source than ‘ordinary’ people and the 
few I did meet were often reluctant to talk to me out f fear of my being an American 
spy. Second, such people were usually much better versed in telling people like me 
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what we wanted to hear; i.e. they were more familiar with academic and Western 
discourses on politics, civil society and the like. For instance, I had one person 
describe the violent reaction in Damascus to the Muhammed cartoons printed in 
several European newspapers in 2006 (the Danish embassy in Damascus was 
attacked) as “really” being about political, rather than religious anger. He told me 
that oil prices had recently been raised by the Syrian regime and people had not been 
able to display their outrage. When, a couple of weeks later, people got word of the 
cartoons, they used that as an excuse to vent their frust ation against their own 
government. The informant had spent some time in the U.S. and (implicitly) 
understood that such an explanation would be more comprehensible to a Western 
audience than religious violence. On the other hand, other informants, less familiar 
with Western forms of reasoning, assured me that the a tack was to do with religious 
outrage and was understandable (if somewhat extreme in some people’s opinions) as 
such. Neither interpretation was less valid than the other, and I am sure both believed 
what they said, but the latter felt less tailored to appeal to my sensibilities.  
 There is also the question of why I chose to frame my research in terms of the 
‘everyday’ rather than the ‘local.’ This decision was intentional. ‘Local’ is often 
portrayed as being in contrast to the state, the global, or some other ‘level’ of 
organization. Much ethnography centered on the local takes place in relatively 
containable (if not isolated) settings, such as a vill ge or small community (c.f. 
Gilsenan 1996, Layne 1995, Mundy 1994). Firstly, I did not want to reinforce or 
assume the presence of such ‘levels’ or ‘scales,’ given that much of my work seems 
to challenge the idea that Syrian society is scalar. Secondly, my setting was the 
capital city of Syria, the effective headquarters of the state. There were no real ‘local’ 
levels of governance, no local leaders or semi-autonomous hierarchies. Finally, 
Damascus was not neatly bounded in any way; the physical ‘local’ space included 
several million inhabitants, who were not necessarily  cohesive or organized 
group.12 Even smaller sections of the city were not easily distinguished into localities 
as there was no physical demarcation delineating one fr m the next. Family and 
friend networks extended across the entire cityscape, making it difficult to pin down 
                                                
12 Though, as I shall return to at various points throughout the thesis, Damascenes were, in a sense, an 
ideological category. 
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or compartmentalize people. Thus Damascus itself did not present any obvious (or 
unobvious) possibilities for framing my research in ‘local’ terms.  
 However, ‘local’ might be said to involve a more social, rather than political 
or locational aspect. ‘Civil society,’ or various formal and informal organizations, is 
sometimes considered to be a form of ‘local’ organiz tion (cf. Chatty and Rabo 
1997) that, among other things, acts as an intermediary between the people and the 
state (Kamrava 2001). However, aside from leading me back to the people/state 
complications I have been trying to avoid, none of my informants belonged to 
anything that might be readily classified as a local, ivil society-like organization. 
Hinnebusch (1995) attributes this lack of a strong civil society in Syria to the fact that 
the Bacth Party’s rise to power occurred at the expense of such associations. He 
suggests that Islam is the closest thing to civil society, but indicates that this is 
because religion provides the only real space that allows the disenfranchised to resist 
state power (1995:220-226). Again we are back to the people/state divide. Thus 
neither the concept of civil society nor the ‘local’ proved to be of much use to me, 
either methodologically or analytically. What I instead found useful were everyday 
narractions of the political. 
 
On Identity… 
The Opening Forms 
 
“Before I begin, I should explain to you the different groups13 we have here in 
Syria…” Many of my informants began their narractions with such a statement, 
followed, unprompted by me, by a list of the different social categories they 
considered to be present in Syria: the Kurds, living either in the northeast or in 
Damascus; the Armenians in Aleppo; the different Christian groups—Syrian 
Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Catholic; Aramaics and Assyrians; Sunni Muslims; Shi’a 
Muslims; the Bedouin, both nomadic and settled; Ismaili’s; Alawis; Druze; and even 
                                                
13 Occasionally my informants word use the word jamācah to indicate group, or sometimes majmūc, 
but more often than not, they would use the English word ‘group,’ especially when speaking to me, 
even if the rest of their sentence was in Arabic. In either language, this particular term was used to 
indicate a collection of people, be it a large, such as religion or ethnicity, or a small one, such as a 
circle of friends. To my knowledge it was never used to refer to family unless there was a very large 
gathering (such as at a wedding).  
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some gypsies (gitanes, from the French word—no one seemed to know much about 
them, though one informant speculated that they are related to those in central 
Europe) (see Figure 9, p.157) . Even this is only a partial list, as most Syrians could 
identify a large number of such groups in Syria, though they rarely knew much about 
those outside the ones they themselves fit into. They often knew even less about the 
Alawis or the Druze than other groups, aside from both being very secretive about 
their respective religions (usually cast as distinct from Islam), and that the Druze 
were renowned for their expansive hospitality and moustaches.14 
 When recounting such lists for me, speakers did not seem to make 
distinctions between what I would consider different types of social identity 
categories, such as ethnic, religious, or even linguistic ones. What interested me was 
not so much the specifics of the groups identified as the fact that Syrians themselves 
readily made explicit and thus (re)created these ditinctions between people. There 
were no questions of validity or legitimacy surrounding the creation or existence of 
these divisions; they were considered to be ‘natural’ ( t abīcī) and therefore acceptable 
(a sharp contrast to what we will encounter in Chapter 2). When I tried to ascertain 
what the Syrian word for ‘identity’ was, I had a great deal of trouble doing so. I 
explained to a friend what I wanted to know and the only word he could give me was 
t ā’ifeh, which literally translates as ‘sect.’ But while Syrians did not seem to have a 
ready word for the abstract concept of ‘identity’ as social scientists use it, they had a 
very clear one of the practical experience of it. Identity was not something that was 
theorized about, it was something that was lived, enacted, and narracted. It was, in 
other words, an ethnographic object.15  
 Ortner (1995) urges us not to readily accept the holistic nature of groups and 
to reveal the divisions within them. But it would seem that Syrians are a step ahead 
of anthropologists: once my informants had named (an thus reified) various groups, 
they would turn around and show me just why the group could not be considered a 
                                                
14 Both the Alawi and Druze religions are considered to be sects of Islam, but it seemed that most of 
my informants did not know or did not want to acknowledge that. I had one Druzi informant, and she 
herself said that she knew nothing about her religion except that she had to marry a man who was also 
Druzi. 
15 Salamandra (2004) notes a similar tendency among Damascenes. She suggests that ‘sectarianism,’ a 
common way of examining identity work in the Middle East, is not an appropriate term because, as I 
found, it was a local distinction. She uses “social distinction” as an analytical category instead 
(2004:11-12). 
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(holistic, concrete) Group. They did not need me to tell them about the impermanent 
nature of identity,16 because they were much more familiar with its cracks, divisions, 
and broader unifying factors than I ever could have be n. Someone was Kurdish, but 
(with a note of pride) was Damascene (Shāmī) as well—and perhaps ‘original’ (aslī) 
Damascene. Another person was Sunni, but was also Homsi (from the city of Homs). 
There was a great deal of pride embedded in one’s origins, and I discovered that 
asking after someone’s origins (shu aslik?) was one of the first things one did upon 
meeting someone new. Practically, it meant “where are you from” and more 
specifically “where is your family from,” but the answer spoke volumes about a 
person—what we might call ‘social identity’ was very much a part of a person’s ‘self 
identity’ (cf. Dresch 1984:36).17 Having an answer was important, to be from 
somewhere in particular and thus to be situate-able as someone.18 Being called 
homeless could be an insult. “Why are you dressed lik  that? You look like you’re 
homeless.” Understanding and navigating where they were from and who they were 
was a regular feature of Syrians’ lives. 
 One afternoon, I held what was effectively a two-hour focus group on the 
topic of ‘identity’ at a meeting of the Syrian Debate Club.19 As the Club was, 
essentially, a way of practicing advanced English by discussing various social issues, 
I was able to use it as a forum for holding such a discussion. That it was all in 
English made my job easier, though it did sometimes limit the level of the content. 
The participants, however, were willing and excited to talk, and once they began, 
they continued for the full time without my intervention. The result was an insight for 
                                                
16 This fluidity somewhat parallels Meneley’s (1996) observations that females in Yemen, through 
their regular visiting and socializing, can contribute to the shifting of their family’s status and identity. 
17 The relation between one’s origins and oneself possibly holds the answer to Dresch’s (1986:391) 
critique of academics’ “stress on individual actors…where [as opposed to individuals as automata in a 
structure] there are only individuals, and vertiginously free ones at that.” Asil  implies that an 
individual in Syria is not only composed of him or herself, but of other people as well. Cf. Chapter 7, 
on sharaf and Jean-Klein’s (2000) “cross-embodiment.” 
18 I discovered this the hard way. I spent most of my childhood moving from one state to another, and 
my ancestors came from all over the world. I have never had a fixed “home,” but when I tried to 
explain that to Syrians, they were usually horrified and then unsure how to treat me. Without an origin 
or a home, I became a somewhat uncertain and pitiable figure. 
19 Obviously a pseudonym. A potential limiting factor was the background of the Club—all those 
present were from a socio-economic class that was comfortable enough to allow them to attend one of 
the most expensive English-language institutes in Damascus. They spanned ethnic and religious 
divides, but were mostly from the educated, upper-middle class of Syrian life. Another limit was that 
the host institute and founding members strongly discouraged the discussion of any topics deemed 
‘political’ (or in some cases, ‘too overtly political’ or even ‘too overtly political in reference to the 
Syrian government’). 
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me into how Syrians feel, think about, and do identity. One of the conclusions was 
that it is a confusing topic, and they discovered that hey were often unable to come 
to a consensus,20 especially on terms such as ‘Arab.’  
 The participants also brought up the flexibility and multiplicity of identities 
that each person carries (again beating anthropologists to the punch, cf. Gregg 1998, 
Oomen 2004), and how the idea of groupness is a “contextually fluctuating 
conceptual variable” (Brubaker 2004:54, pace Merton 1972). One informant said: 
 
How we think of our identity can vary. We often identify ourselves against 
another group, especially in terms of wars. If there is a war in Iraq, we 
suddenly become Arabs. If Israel attacks Palestinians, we are Muslims. 
Problems and war in Lebanon has made us think of ourselves more as 
Syrians. 
 
They were well aware of the impact of global, political, and religious contexts on 
their sense of how they categorized themselves. They were also aware of the 
emotionality, Epstein’s (1978) “affectiveness,” of identity (cf. Campbell and Rew 
1999). For instance, another participant pointed out that  
 
Identity depends a lot on what people believe and can depend on the day or on 
experiences. In Syria, we waver a lot based on emotions. Say, today, a 
Christian insulted me. Afterwards I will say I hate all Christians. Or if I saw a 




It would appear, then, that Syrians were familiar with the idea of identity being 
“social relations, not ideology” (Eriksen 2004:93). Rogers Brubaker (2004) 
challenges anthropologists to examine “ethnicity without groups,” but my informants 
were already better at considering identity categori s both with and without groups 
than I was. Given that they had thus pre-empted several of my potential analytical 
moves, I find myself unable to use identity itself as an tool to unpack their 
narractions. Yet, at the same time, because it is an object for my informants who 
readily analyze it themselves, I cannot just adopt it as my object of study. I would not 
be able to contribute much more (if not less) than a reiteration of their conclusions. 
                                                
20 A sentiment most social scientists would be inclined to agree with, I should imagine. 
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Likely I would not be able to do that as effectively as they, for they narract the 
processes of identity with a speed and ease that the laborious nature of writing and 
‘thick description’ could not hope to keep up with. As I struggled to “shift scales” 
(Strathern 1991) to accommodate them doing Arab-ness or Syrian-ness or 
Damascene-ness, they lightly and rapidly flitted through them, as if such a scalar 
perception did not really apply to the way they lived and perceived their world.  
 Rather than be disheartened that my informants seemed to be a step ahead of 
me, I am again choosing to use the fact that my informants were already doing 
reflexive identity-work as my ethnographic object.21 I am choosing to approach 
Syrians’ narractions of identity from a performative stance,22 allowing me to examine 
what (else) they might be ‘doing’ as they are doing a d considering identity. By this, 
I do not mean equating doing identity-work with doing other things like politics; that 
has been explored elsewhere (cf. Hann 1997; May, Modood and Squires 2004). In a 
sense, I intend to move to a model of relations that is broader (and less scalar) than 
‘identity’ or ‘politics’—one that can incorporate both concepts simultaneously or in 
turns (as Syrians so readily do). It is not necessarily  difficult leap for 
anthropologists to consider doing identity as a form f doing social relations—even 
Syrians know that; however, what I am considering is what kinds of social 
connections and disconnections Syrians make when they narract ideas of identity. It 
is my hope that introducing a model of scale-less and fluid social connections (a field 
where social knowledge more generally is produced) will enable me to move beyond 
what Syrians themselves (to say nothing of anthropologists) already do. Fluidity 
becomes crucial here, for “social ‘permanence’ [is] the effect of constant repetition of 
social-corporeal instantiation” (Jean-Klein, in press); in other words, relations 
(including identity-work ones) are not so much “material artifacts” as things that are 
constantly being (re)produced. Thus “imagined communities” (Anderson, B. 1991), 
be they ethnicity-, religious-, or state-based, become communities that are constantly 
in a process of being re-imagined. 
                                                
21 Contrast this to Bhaba (1994) who argues that identity is a thing ‘done’ by relating to the Other, 
rather than as an ethnographic object done (by informants) for its own sake. 
22 Bhaba (1990:3) argues that we need an “understanding of the performativity of language in the 
narratives of the nation.” I would say the same is true of state, identity, and other such categories. 
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 Thus, accounting for fluidity and emphasizing the consistently temporary 
aspect of relating to self and other does away withthe problem of contradiction by 
embracing it. People are never still, meaning that any narractions involving people 
will have to shift to reflect both the ever-changing subjects as well as the ever-
changing narractors. With their narractions, Syrians re constantly (re)positioning 
others in relation to themselves (rather than the opposite which is how it is often 
phrased). In other words, people do not necessarily belong to a particular pre-existing 
group, but rather create one around themselves. When many people consistently do 
so, they generate the effect of a collective group, if one that is as likely to fracture as 
it is to remain whole. Thus, at any given moment, a individual can belong to many, 
diverse groups, depending on how they place those others in relation to themselves. 
Groups as a potential collection of people might precede individuals (i.e. ndividuals 
learn from others what categories have been enacted before), but they cannot precede 
people. This, I argue, is the bases for social knowledge in Syria: a concept that 
involves positioning people ‘inside’ or ‘outside,’ making connections and 
disconnections. But connections and disconnections d  not always have to be 
mutually exclusive. Sometimes they are the same thing and are both necessary to do 
a particular relation;23 in these moments it is only the anthropologist, concerned with 
her personal schemata, who sees them as being distinct (and ambiguous). Adopting 
such an approach is, I feel, a strong way in which to approach the narractions, 
identity or otherwise, that I encountered in Syria as my informants negotiated their 




While sitting at lunch Alia24 mentioned idly that she had heard that 
the Jews had been responsible for President Kennedy’s assassination. 
I rolled my eyes and told her that Arabs were always saying that. She 
misunderstood me and asked if I thought all Arab ideas about the 
                                                
23 “Every relationship is built on connection and disconnection; there would be no link if there were no 
differentiation” (Strathern 2005:167 note 32). Or, as Jameson (1981:41) suggests, “Difference is the 
distinguishing of two phenomena from each other, their structural separation, the affirmation that they 
are not the same, and that in quite specific and determinate ways, is also a form of mediation [defined 
as ‘establishment of relationships’].” 
24 I have changed the names and incidental details of my informants to preserve their anonymity. None 
of the details changed have an impact on their ethnographic significance.  
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world were wrong. I told her no, I just meant that they always blame 
everything on the Jews, at which point she threw back her head and 
cackled in acknowledgment.  
 
Alongside identity-work, another type of Syrian narraction that I encountered took 
the form of what I was first inclined to call ‘conspiracy theories.’ Conspiracy 
theories, as narratives of intrigue and power, have likely been around for as long as 
there have been power struggles. However, it is only recently that they have become 
a focus for academic studies. Hofstadter (1965) considers the historical presence of 
conspiracy theory and how such theorizing related to a ‘paranoid style’ in political 
thought. Jon Anderson (1996) briefly describes how c nspiracy theory is a 
performative style of political analysis, and involes a process of “entextualization” 
of personal narratives into a more expansive “meta-narrative.” However, his 
description of them as “premature entextualizations” makes them out to be too 
‘early’ or uninformed. Pipes (1996) specifically looks at Middle Eastern conspiracy 
theory, but focuses more on official rhetoric than popular stories. He is openly 
critical about the validity of the theories and conspiracy as a form of theorizing. 
Marcus’ (1999) edited volume returns to the idea of paranoia, though this time 
highlighting it as ‘reasonable,’ especially in the post-Cold War era. One of the major 
problems in most of these works is that there is a sense of dismissal of conspiracy 
theorizing as a valid process or analytical approach to power and politics. While 
taking their subjects seriously, the authors still convey an image of the ridiculous—
labeling something as paranoid already sets it a cert in distance from those of us who 
would like to consider ourselves both rational and not paranoid. Even 
anthropologists, with our long legacy of dealing with alternative, but valid systems 
(e.g. witchcraft, Evans-Pritchard 1937) relegate these alternative knowledges to being 
only valid in particular (Other) settings and somehow being shown up by 
Western/anthropological knowledge (e.g. Hellinger 2003). As Boyer (2006:331) 
notes, 
 
the dynamic of the dialectical anthropology of conspiratorial or 
‘spectral’ knowledge often takes the form of a process of exposition of 
ideological reason by critical reason, a process that seeks to validate 
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the former’s basic rationality even while asserting the latter’s power 
of rational correction or perfection.25 
 
 Another problem with many studies of conspiracy theories is that they tend to 
be grounded in Euro-American settings, rooting them in both a specific contextual 
‘tradition’26 and a moral figuration27 that underlies any attempts at assessment (c.f. 
Davis 1971, Knight 2001, Marcus 1999, Melley 2000). However, some 
anthropologists have begun stepping outside such a framework. West and Sanders’ 
(2003) volume looks at conspiracy theory’s relation t  (primarily non-Western) 
“occult economies.” They begin by providing a definition that tries to dodge some of 
the more negative associations that conspiracy theory t nds to have, suggesting that 
conspiracy theories (and theorizers) “concern themselve  with the operation of secret, 
mysterious, and/or unseen powers…[and] that there is more to power than meets the 
eye” (Sanders and West 2003:7). Such a definition resonates strongly with my 
experience of Syrian conspiracy narratives, though I am somewhat put off by the 
volume’s over-riding emphasis on multiple modernities (vis-à-vis discourse on 
transparency, cf. Lilley 2001 who approaches conspiracy theory from an auditing and 
accountability framework) and the treatment of “conspiracy ideas as discourses that 
construct truths in contradiction to the (also c nstructed) truths of discourses of 
transparency” (Sanders and West 2003:15, emphasis in original). Conspiracy 
theorizing here comes off as somewhat reactionary—indeed, what is this if not a 
return to an academic love of ‘resistance’ (cf. Briggs 2004)—and obsessed with ‘the 
truth,’ which the anthropologist is able to reveal as uncertain (c.f. Parker 2001:200). 
Silverstein (2000:8), in contrast, moves away from a resistance stance, suggesting 
that conspiracy theorizing is a form of “vernacular knowledge production…[that] 
reinforces state power at the very moment of its greatest challenge.” He recognizes in 
it the potential for duplexity, allowing for it to be a process by which people narract 
                                                
25 In other words, anthropological knowledge inherently “generate[s] others: ‘our’ knowledge 
contained a difference between ‘theirs’ and ‘ours,’” (Strathern 1995:162-163). 
26 One might argue, though few in this field have, that t e tradition underpinning this theorizing is 
concomitantly being reproduced by the process of conspiracy theorizing, but that remains a project for 
another day. 
27 In a correct/incorrect or reasonable/irrational sense more than a good/evil one.  
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both disconnections from and connections to their state.28 Parish (2001:8) also 
emphasizes the importance of knowledge, suggesting that “conspiracy theorizing 
[might] also become a way of assembling possibilities and information, rather than 
recovering a truth, in a culture obsessed with connections and interpretation” (my 
emphasis). And as I suggested in the above section, I would argue that Syrians are 
people who are explicitly concerned with making “connections and 
interpretation[s].” Perhaps identity-work and conspiracy theorizing are not so 
disconnected as they might seem on the surface, at l ast from a performative 
analysis.  
 Despite, then, what our informants might be doing, t is often academic 
portrayals of conspiracy theory that defines it as a search for the Real behind the 
simulacra, we who are “combin[ing] radical doubt wih the sense that the truth is out 
there” (Stewart 1999:17). Such an understanding might not be wholly appropriate in 
the case of Syrian conspiracy theorizing, but it does speak volumes about the 
practices of anthropologists and other social scientists themselves. Nancy Scheper-
Hughes (1996, 2004), for instance, attempts to trace out the invisible economies that 
underlie a number of organ trafficking conspiracy theories. She is, herself, searching 
for the ‘real’ underpinnings of her informants’ narratives. While offering an 
interesting exploration of global power, she does not substantially provide us with 
much more than her informants did, resting her (anthropological) analysis on the 
same basic ‘information’ and knowledge. In a sense, her work is an extension of 
theirs, just with the advantage of mobility, rather than taking a further analytical step. 
 Further, she ultimately relies on the same assumptions as her informants—
that there is a reality, a truth, that might be out of sight butthat can be uncovered. 
Then again, this is probably true of social science more generally. K. Brown (1999) 
lauds Karakasidou (1997) for her continued attempts to uncover the truth despite all 
the odds being stacked against her. M. Brown (1996:731) and his research partners 
found themselves confounded by murky facts “even as [they] tried to get to the 
bottom of things” (my emphasis). Scott (1985) urges us to look for what people really 
mean or are really doing (i.e. resistance) in the course of their everyday lives. I 
                                                
28 Though he, as so many others, situates his work in ‘extreme’ settings—amongst violence and social 
upheaval in the Algerian civil war in his case, amongst subalterns or dispossessed for many others—
rather than as an everyday process set in a ‘stable’ political context 
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present this not as a critique of anthropology, but at our lack of reflexivity for failing 
to address how our work and that of conspiracy theorizing might not be so 
methodologically or analytically different. Indeed, as Boyer (2006:337) suggests, it 
often turns out that “one mode of conspiracy and transparency—ethnography—has 
sought to reveal another.” We should therefore takecar  not to casually dismiss the 
validity of conspiracy theorizing as an analytical form, nor should we assume that 
our work is somehow superior because it is based upon ‘more’ information. There is 
a touch of irony to all of this: it would appear tha  anthropologists are quite ‘cynical’ 
(Žižek 1997, cf. Navaro-Yashin 2002) in that, while w  would be the first to assert 
that there is no ‘real’ truth, we continue to act as if there were. 
 And all this is to say nothing of popular ideas on c spiracy theory. In 
popular (Euro-American) culture, there are certain assumptions that the term brings 
to mind.  Conspiracy theories (and theorists) are fringe elements of society—they are 
a discourse of the disenfranchised who do not belong t  any sort of mainstream 
political process (subalterns again!).  In fact, this is a theme repeated in academic 
works on conspiracy theory as well, where it is the marginalized populations who are 
depicted as using conspiracy theorizing as a form of resistance (cf. Briggs 2004, 
Humphrey 2003, Parker 2001). In either case, ‘normal’ people do not engage in or 
fall for such wild tales, which are perhaps composed of facts that are true in isolation, 
but make connections that are not rational, much less v rifiable.  There is no way to 
test a conspiracy theory because of the very hidden nature of what it proposes. And 
in a ‘modern’ world, where we are raised with and reliant on a scientific method that 
holds that nothing can be true unless it can be tested and verified, these theories hold 
no water. Except that this neat division between ration l and irrational is even 
somewhat vague in our own scientific thought. For, as Bateson (2000:74-75) says, 
scientific hypotheses are as likely to be based on “wild hunches” that are later 
formalized through analysis and testing as they are to be based on anything more 
rational and less “mystical.”  
  So where can I go from here? Many of the ‘political’ narractions I 
encountered in Syria seemed to fit the bill of a conspiracy theory. Indeed, in their 
more reflexive moments, some of my informants would laugh over their own 
tendencies to see conspiracies in everything—they anticipated and already engaged 
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in the potential ‘critique!’ However, just because Syrians were able to laugh at 
themselves did not mean that they took themselves any less seriously,29 but it is 
another reason why I can neither simply extend their own arguments nor rely on 
paranoia or other such analytics. Syrians are reflexive about their theorizing, and I 
must account for that. Nor can I rest on analytic stances that look for the 
disenfranchised (and thus take the analysis to one of r sistance), mainly because in 
Syria, these are not fringe narractions. I found that e same or similar narractions 
were repeated across a vast number of social and cultural lines (including class, 
religion, generation, and gender). Perhaps one could argue that the vast majority of 
the Syrian population could be classified as ‘fringe’ due to their distance from the 
processes of power, but I have already dismissed such an option.  
 And, as I noted earlier, Syrian narractions often had more to do knowledge—
or more correctly, a form of knowing—than with ‘truth.’ Like identity-work, 
conspiracy narractions seemed to embody a performative ct, one that was not solely 
concerned with (re)presentation of politics but with the ‘doing’ of social relations in a 
political vein. I would argue that this is not such a great leap, and it is one that has 
been nearly made before, if not quite so explicitly. Michael Gilsenan’s (1982:75-92) 
description of miracles in a Sufi order somewhat parallels conspiracy theory: 
miracles, he says, may appear to be sequences of mundane events, but from a certain 
perspective become miracles. To deny that the miracles are indeed miracles, or 
rather, to be unable to see the miracle beyond the mundane, serves to position one 
‘outside’ the group composed of those who see the miraculous. So we have here an 
instance where the ability or willingness to see (and momentarily connect) what is 
unseen is, at the same time, a process of doing social relations. 
 The only problem I have now is how to deal with the moral ambiguity with 
which the term ‘conspiracy theory’ is saturated in English.30 I find I am hesitant to 
use the term at all, given how laden it is, so willavoid the problem by generally using 
‘narraction’ instead. Syrians’ narractions contained suspicion and doubt, were about 
power, and assumed that there were things that took place out of sight. As such who 
                                                
29 I am reminded of the adage that the world does not cease to be funny when you cry, any more than 
it ceases to be serious when you laugh. 
30 Honestly, what is the first thing that comes to mind when you hear the phrase ‘conspiracy theory’? 
Illuminati, the JFK assassination, the film starring Mel Gibson? 
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would not initially read these as conspiracy theoris? I did and therefore bring it up in 
order to delineate how what I am doing is different from what has come before. In 
the end, what I hope to show is that such narractions (whether they appear as 
conspiracy theorizing, identity-work, or something else) are a way to engage in 
politics vis-à-vis creating boundaries of inside and outside, doing relationships, and 
connecting (or disconnecting) the dots31—whether they be visible or no.  
 
 
* * * 
 
 
My intention here is not to deconstruct the state, in full post-modernist vein, into 
nihilism. Whether or not there is such a thing as ‘the state’ is irrelevant; what is 
important and, I argue, the only thing we can actually engage in, are the relations that 
people make to it and each other. I am suggesting that to assume a universal form for 
the state brings us dangerously close to imposing a Western, liberalistic scheme of 
rule onto systems that may or may not fully fit into such a rubric. My preconceptions 
of what a state should look like did not quite fit my observations of how people 
conceived of and ‘did’ their state in Syria. In fact, I had trouble separating people 
from state, making it difficult to perceive them as being in the kind of opposition that 
many social science works take for granted. It may well be the case that countries 
throughout the world have developed or adopted state-like procedures along the 
Euro-American model, but it is not sufficient to assume that all situations have 
everything (or indeed much at all) in common. This t esis, then, is an exploration of 
another way to consider the state in Syria, relying heavily on a model of knowledge 
production that is premised not on theory, but on the ways in which Syrians 
themselves construct and know their world. 
 I would ask the reader to approach this thesis as I approached my 
ethnographic fieldwork: with an open mind. We can never truly enter into any 
endeavor completely devoid of expectations or preconceptions, but what is 
remarkable about anthropology is that it always encourages us to try. To help that 
process, I intentionally avoid the use of certain terms throughout the course of my 
                                                
31 A metaphor that I came to on my own, only to afterwards find that Jean and John Comaroff 
(2003:297) had already used such a metaphor in relation to conspiracy theory—if only briefly. 
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writing.32 In some instances, the lack makes their presence mor obvious, but I hope 
that it also helps to problematize the issues and even illustrate how certain terms may 
not be necessary. More than anything, it has been an exercise to force me into 
thinking outside the box, rather than allowing me to asily slot my findings into the 
handed-down molds that the literature has provided m . I have had to consider and 
think about what I observed and was told in different t rms, which (I hope) has 
helped me to see what Syrians were creating rather than what I expected. To this end, 
I have tried not to use the word ‘state’ or other terms readily associated with the state, 
such as ‘citizen’ or ‘civil society,’ except where citing or explaining relevant 
literature. In that light, I would also ask the read r to set aside the idea of the ‘state’ 
for the time being and see what might be found instead.  
 The chapters are laid out as if they followed a “scalar” plan, moving from the 
global to the local. I did this intentionally. There are moments when the 
dis/connections that I draw out double back or seem out of place, where the relations 
I describe do not seem to consistently match the “scale” that I have placed them in. I 
hope to illustrate with this jumpiness that, anthropol gical preconceptions 
notwithstanding, middle class Syrians organize their world in their own way, one that 
does not necessarily match up with ours, adding further support to the idea that we 
may need to rethink our (scalar) models, at least in relation to Syria. Part I, then, 
deals with the ways that Syrians interact with and narract ‘foreigners,’ historically 
and today. Part II looks at the way that Syrians do the same with their own regime, 
and Part III does the same for relations between ordina y people in Syria.   
                                                
32 Cf. Reed’s (2003:19 n.3) description of the “literary practice of Oilipo…[that] advocate[s] an 
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2. “Outsiders” on the “Inside”: Yesterday and Today  
 
Much of this thesis is devoted to examining how Syrians (itself a constructed 
category) relate to other people and momentarily make or remake group boundaries; 
in other words how they position other people as ‘in ide’ or ‘outside’ certain 
frameworks through their narractions. Historically and presently, there are a number 
of arenas in which potential ‘outsider’ figures (they are neither insiders nor outsiders 
until they are made to be so) have come into contact with people who, for 
convenience’s sake, I am temporarily calling Syrians. All of these different 
interactions have an impact on the ways that Syrians engage with and understand a 
wider global context in relation to themselves. With that in mind, this chapter will 
briefly explore the history of Syria, both ‘real’ and narracted; the centrality of borders 
(including linguistic ones) within that history; how Syrians seek and acquire 
knowledge on foreign ‘peoples’ and places; and how all of these play a role in how 
Syrians do relations with people today. 
 
A Historical Glance at External Figures in Syria 
 
Strathern (1991:94) has suggested that there is a “par doxical sense…that ‘if only 
one knew’ one could fill in the historical details of how things…were transmitted 
between different populations, but one would not in fact be adding substantially to 
the knowledge of social process.” Obsessing over history as a hermeneutical device 
has its dangers. She goes on to argue that “the new qu stion instead becomes the 
process by which local social forms developed” (1991: 4), which I would take to 
include a degree of historicity. Though set in a different time and location than 
Strathern’s work, this thesis is nonetheless concerned with “local social forms” that 
developed and are developing in Syria. What I am therefore looking for in a reading 
of history is to see where Syrians have previously connected themselves with (or 
disconnected from) other people in order to see who has been made into insiders or 
outsiders and how.  
 Another reason why I consider it important to include this section is because 
informants would frequently narrate their history/ies to me. They used history as a 
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way to highlight an ideal era (‘what was’), to explain the loss of that idyllic status in 
terms of an event (‘what happened’), and how both of t ese now impact their current 
situations as Syrians, Arabs, Muslims, or whatever lse they might be now (‘what 
is’). I, on the other hand, am attempting to examine these accounts to see how it is 
that Syrians’ historical narratives are also a process of doing relations with people in 
the present.  
However, there are two (hi)stories here that I willbe presenting: the 
narractions of my informants and the history according to various (usually European-
authored) textbooks.33 Though the former is vastly more interesting for my work 
here, the latter has its place as well, in part to highlight the points of digression in the 
narractions, where what was recounted to me did not always match that which was 
recorded elsewhere. The texts also provide some sort of g ounding that is somewhat 
less controversial for my readers.  
I will begin my history at the point at which most of my Muslim informants 
began theirs: the reign of the Ottoman Empire. Occasion lly I would be told stories 
about earlier historical periods, but usually in the context of religious history, where 
people would describe the life of the Prophet Muhammed or Christians would tell 
stories of early saints. However, these were often pr sented as merely light or 
educational stories, lacking the non-verbal clues that signaled the sort of intensity 
that conversations beginning with the Ottomans often had. The major difference in 
content was that the more recent stories narracted the presence and actions of 
(thereby creating) various groups that are still regularly encountered today (versus 
the Romans, who are no longer extant). It is with the Ottomans, therefore, that I 
begin. 
 
                                                
33 My informants were familiar with textbook history, though usually the official Syrian version 
learned in grade school, which I did not have the opportunity to study in depth. What little I knew of it 
was second hand; for instance, one informant recalld n instance of being punished in class for 
insisting that a schoolbook was wrong. It had said that Syria had won the 1967 war with Israel and he 
did not think this was the case (many Euro-American texts would agree with him). 
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A Textbook History 
The Ottoman Empire 
  
The Ottomans ruled over Greater Syria (Bilād al-Shām) from 1517-1918 and formed 
a state dominated by Turkish leadership, “but it was not Turkish in any exclusive 
racial sense…[the difference between the different Islamic people] was never a 
distinction so deep as to destroy the sense of whatthey had in common as Muslims” 
(Hourani 1981:7). For Hourani, it seems that religion had a unifying power that 
overcame any other social divides, a proposition that Syrians did not necessarily 
agree with: Kurdish informants often told me that they considered Kurdishness to be 
more significant than religious divisions, and differences between sects of Islam were 
readily highlighted as distinct categories. Further, not everyone living under Ottoman 
rule was a Muslim, hindering any absolute religious cohesion.  
 The Ottoman empire encompassed many different geographic regions and 
religious communities who were ruled over by a singly royal family, enacting “an 
ideal of rule common in later Islamic history…the id al of the absolute ruler” 
(Hourani 1981:9, cf. Ibn Khaldoun 2005:107-108). Underneath this family, there was 
no structural exclusion of any Muslim, regardless of origin, to gaining rank and 
power within the hierarchy. This was especially true on local administrative levels, 
where strong families (such as the Azem family in Damascus), local lords, or 
nomadic sheikhs gained recognition as local leaders as long as they acknowledged 
the authority of Ottoman rule and paid the appropriate tribute and taxes. In 
Damascus, the power base rested almost solely in urban leadership, a trend that 
continued to exist as a basic form of governance through the French mandate as well 
(Khoury 1987:3). The Turks incorporated non-Muslims into the empire by protecting 
their freedoms to worship as they chose. The millet (nation) system was instituted by 
Sultan Mehmet circa 1450 CE. Under this system, the Sultan selected and appointed 
religious leaders for each of the major “book religions” (Muslim, Jewish, Orthodox 
Christian, and the Armenian church). Because the Sultan appointed these leaders, 
their loyalty to him was guaranteed. The millets were a way to manage populations of 
different religions by granting them partial autonomy, and the religious leaders were 
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made responsible for points of religious and domestic law in their communities 
(though cases were arbitrated in Sharica law courts in cross-millet conflict) 
(McCarthy 1997). Damascus, as a major religious center, and Aleppo, as a major 
trade center, flourished under Ottoman rule, even while other urban centers began to 
decline by the end of the eighteenth century (Hourani 1981:9-13).  
 But life for the Ottoman rulers was not without its complications. In the 
nineteenth century Kurdish and Bedouin chiefs in the countryside began to slowly 
accumulate a degree of power that challenged that of the Ottomans (Hourani 
1981:49-51). There was even an uprising in Damascus against Ottoman rule in 1831, 
sparked by the imposition of a new personal tax on Muslims that was added to those 
already in place under the auspices of Islamic law.The Ottoman governor who had 
imposed the new levy was killed and the rebels briefly took control of the city until a 
new governor was assigned. He made peace with the rebels, and agreed not to push 
through the tax law (Schatkowski-Schilcher 1985:41-43).  
 In the latter days of Ottoman power, there was a slowly-increasing European 
presence throughout the Middle Eastern and North African regions, initially focused 
on trade. European nations began to set up consulate  and become involved in local 
politics, favoring and protecting different (usually minority) ‘groups’ when 
convenient (e.g. the French intervention during the massacre of Christians in 
Damascus in 1860; or the close relationship between th  British and Druze 
populations in Lebanon) (Hourani 1981:63-5). The European presence also led to 
intellectual changes among the population itself, with translation of French and 
English books and journals, re-organization of teaching and military policies (cf. 
Mitchell 1988 for an extensive analysis of this process and its effects in Egypt). New 
ideas about ‘society’ began to spread, in particular  
 
the idea that it should be organized on a basis of nationalism, of a sentiment 
of a national loyalty and unity in which members of dif erent religious or 
social communities should join; a nationalism explicitly secular but having, 
like everything else in the Middle East, a concealed religious element34 
(Hourani 1981:16).  
 
                                                
34It is unclear whether Hourani’s “concealed religious element” reflects the ideas growing at that time, 
how people adopted it despite its intended format, or his own retrospective opinion of it. 
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Serb and Greek populations initially began to pull away from the empire in order 
to form their own nation-states, followed by Armenia , Arab, Albanian and 
Kurdish ones. 
 The population of Greater Syria had also begun to resent their Ottoman lords. 
As early as 1914, there were worries of Ottoman corruption, and “many high officials 
were suspected not only of normal corruption but of dispatching fortunes abroad” 
(Longrigg 1958:48) (an accusation that resurfaced in current times in narractions 
about corruption in the highest echelons of the Syrian regime). There also were a 
number of Arab nationalist35 movements that appeared in the years before World 
War I, usually located abroad and peopled by expatriates from Arab territories.36 It is 
doubly interesting that this nationalist sentiment was initially organized from a space 
external to Syria, usually in a European setting where authors of such movements 
witnessed nationalist sentiment there. Some of the best known of these organizations 
were al-cAhd and al-Fatāt, which gained strength from the growth of a distinctly 
‘Arab’ resistance to Ottoman/Muslim rule (Petran 1978:52). 
 Dislike for the Ottomans was compounded by the dispatch of governor-
general Jamal Pasha to forcibly take control of Syria in 1914. Under his rule, there 
was an economic crisis, mass starvation, and calls to provision the army when people 
could not fend for themselves. He was also given th ti le ‘The Bloodshedder’ as he 
implemented a number of political massacres in an attempt to bring the Arab 
nationalist (and thus inherently anti-Ottoman) leaders under control. This included 
hangings on May 6, 1916 in Damascus and Beirut that have come to be called 
‘Martyrs’ Day’ and the places where they occurred ‘Martyrs’ Square,’ names still 
used today. Nevertheless, Hourani implicitly points to a European basis (and not 
local nationalist sentiment) for the fragmentation that followed the fall of the Empire, 
ultimately culminating in the seemingly random carving-up of Bilad al-Sham in the 
1916 Sykes-Picot agreement (a similar, if unreflexiv , argument that my Syrian 
informants echoed).  
                                                
35 Petran (1972: 57) puts forth the idea that much of t is nationalism, as it filtered down to the more 
general (versus the educated) population, picked up a religious quality—becoming more of a Sunni 
Muslim nationalism, with occasional overtones of fanaticism.  
36 Though this was not necessarily always the case, as Khoury (1983:95-6) argues that secular 
Arabism was “first planted by some Syrian Christians involved in an Arabic literary revival in the last 
half of the nineteenth century.” 
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The French Mandate 
 
However, the people of this region were ready to ge rid of their Ottoman rulers-
turned-oppressors and hoped that the end of World War I would bring them 
independence. But the Sykes-Picot agreement, generally ratified by the international 
world at the San Remo (Italy) commission in 1920, gave France a mandate over 
Syria and Lebanon and Britain the same over Palestine and Iraq. Ostensibly, their 
presence in these nascent states were meant to lastuntil the latter were strong enough 
and had the frameworks to stand on their own (Hitti 1958:238-41). The people of 
Syria did not accept this decision and rallied togeher to create a government for 
themselves. Led by Hashim al-Atasi, they wrote and implemented a constitution that 
detailed a federal system under the rule of King Faisal, but this rule was soon 
dissolved as the French marched into Damascus. Yousef al-Azmeh  (who remains a 
hero today, with his own statue and square in the New City of Damascus, Figure 3) 
led a ragtag set of forces to hold the French back, but the Syrians were massively 
outclassed and defeated in a matter of hours (Petran 1972:59-60).  
 
 
Figure 3: Yousef al-Azmeh Square, Damascus 
 
 The French initially set up a number of previously non-existent economic, 
political, and public service frameworks throughout Syria (and Lebanon), focused on 
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road and railroad building and the introduction of a new currency tied to the French 
lira . For administrative purposes, the French divided up the already-fragmented Syria 
into four smaller ‘states’—centered around Damascus, Aleppo, the Druze population 
in Jebel al-Duruz, and the Alawi population in Latakia (Hitti 1958:242-4). The 
resentment of this “dismemberment of geographic Syria” was compounded by the 
institutionalization of differentiation,37 as “the French…recruited officers and men 
for the local forces…disproportionately from the Druzi, Alawi, and other minority 
communities, and favored the minorities in public appointments even at the highest 
levels” (Petran 1972:61, 62). (Seale [1988:16-7] similarly notes a trend of French 
preferential and ‘protective’ treatment towards such minority groups). The French 
methods of rule throughout the early 1920’s was mostly geared towards the greater 
good of France and neither the good nor the eventual independence of Syria, further 
contributing to Syrian ill-will. With French rule, Syrians experienced oppression, 
repression, corruption, loss of language (French was officially placed on par with 
Arabic), economic problems, and a lack of public health care. All of these factors 
combined provided the groundwork for the revolution of 1925 (Petran 1972:63-5).  
 “Nationalism” (watanīya) was present in Syria, but was complicated by the 
recent historical situation.  
 
No Syrian could find a national identity in truncated and partitioned Syria. 
The national movement insisted on the reunification of geographic 
Syria…Arab unity then meant primarily Syrian unity. At the same time, by 
their very existence the artificial frontiers acquired a certain reality while 
truncated Syria gradually developed a personality of its own. Moreover, from 
a practical point of view, nationalists were compelled to concentrate on 
removing internal barriers within French-mandated Syria, and to fight France 
for national rights, while their brothers in Palestine confronted the British 
(Petran 1972:66). 
 
Thus we see, in conjunction with an Arab nationalism, the beginnings of a more 
specifically Syrian sense of identity, prompted by the realities of the ways in which 
political lines had been drawn. The leaders and people faced a situation where they 
were engaged in the seemingly contradictory processes of unifying and connecting 
people (in doing Arab-ness and Syrian-ness) and of diversifying and disconnecting 
                                                
37 Though, as we have seen, the pre-mandate era was not free of differentiation, both informally with 
different religious and ethnic divisions and officially with the millet system. 
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(in making distinctions between Syrians and other Arabs) (cf. Jean-Klein 2001). And 
“although nationalism was clearly a rising star befor  the war, it was the French 
occupation of the Syrian interior in 1920 that ensured the dominance of the new 
ideology” Khoury 1987:97). 
 The revolt of 1925-7, then, erupted in part because of the growth of a Syrian 
identity. However, the fight for independence itself potentially had an impact on the 
way these sentiments developed. The uprising lasted for two years, beginning 
amongst the Druze in their ‘state,’ and then spreading to Damascus, Aleppo and 
Homs. Because it started with a religious minority, the rebellion stood the chance of 
being centered around a religious cause. However, it instead took on a trans-sectarian 
quality, gaining supporters from a wide spectrum of religious backgrounds and from 
all walks of life from prosperous merchants to peasant  (Khoury 1987:205-7). Thus, 
rather than supplementing or recreating one particular religious identity, the Druzi 
revolt simultaneously reinforced and (re)created a broader, Syrian one (Petran 
1972:66).38 The exception to this was the Alawi community which was well-placed 
in the French military and chose to maintain some distance from the separatists 
(Seale 1988:18).  
 However, much of this action was centered around a desire to modify, rather 
than overthrow the French system, with former urban le ders attempting to reassert 
their role as intermediaries between the overlords and the general populace (Khoury 
1987:165). The struggle certainly did not result in an independent Syria. Not long 
after, the already unpopular reputation of the French was heightened when they 
ceded the area in northern Syria around Alexandretta to Turkey in 1939 (Hitti 
1958:244). The Second World War introduced a new set of complications into 
Syria’s status. “In the first years of the war…many nationalists in Syria and other 
Arab countries put their hopes in Axis victory,” because such a victory would mean 
the end of French and British domination in the region (Petran 1972:77). Though 
technically granted independence by Free France in 1941, nothing had really 
changed—foreign powers were still running the country in all but name, until Syria 
formally broke off relations with France in 1945. France retaliated by bombing 
                                                
38 Though Khoury (1987:164) reminds us that the Druze rebel leaders had had previous ties to 
Damascus’ politics and were already “familiar with and sympathetic to the nationalist creed of Syrian 
unity.” 
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Damascus, which stirred up international outrage and pressure for the full removal of 
the foreign presence. A year later, the final evacuations were carried out and Syria 
had, for the first time, full autonomy (Hitti 1958:247-9). With such a black history, it 
is hardly surprising that Syrians often do not rememb r the period of the French 
Mandate fondly.  
 A number of political parties had formed under French rule, often specifically 
pro-Syrian in nature. The National Bloc arose in the late 1920’s, composed of 
educated men with a secular, urban background, who wanted the independence of 
Syria. This Bloc “steer[ed] the course of the independence struggle in Syria until its 
completion,” but was ultimately revealed to be ineffective in actual leadership apart 
from just resisting the French rulers (Khoury 1987:248-284). Another group that rose 
up after the National Bloc had fallen apart was the Bacth Party, headed by the 
Damascene schoolmasters (i.e. learned men) Michel Aflaq, a Christian, and Salah al-
din Bitar, a Sunni Muslim. It was an especially appealing party for the young and the 
dispossessed, giving them an opportunity to speak out against the French occupiers. 
The party struggled to find its place, moving in and out of power, splitting into 
different factions, and wielding varying amounts of influence throughout the region. 
After gaining its independence, Syria briefly unified with Egypt, which caused the 
country and the Bacth party to lose a great deal of power and respect. The question of 
whether to split with the Egyptians and, once the split had occurred, to reunite, drove 
a deeper wedge between different factions within the Bacth Party. There was a series 
of successive governments in Syria as coup after coup t ok place. The final one was 
in 1963, when a small contingent of Bacth Party members took control of the 
military, Damascus, and the country. There were fivinitial members of this team, 
several of whom featured heavily in the intra-party power struggles over the next 
several years. One of the youngest, and the one who finally won out was Hafez al-
Asad. 
 
Syria in the Cold War and Beyond 
 
In and around this time of internal strife, the effects of the Cold War were extending 
to the Syrian borders. In 1954, Syria, ostensibly allied with the USSR, received 
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armaments from them. 39 The Bacth party in Syria had adopted an anti-imperialist, 
anti-Western stance and was officially a socialist party (if not exactly an ideological 
match of Soviet communism) and thus was an obvious ally in the Middle East for the 
USSR. The USSR, for the Syrians, provided a powerful sponsor that was not 
historically involved in colonial schemes and that supported the nationalist 
tendencies of the newly-forming country. A British-U.S.-Iraqi conspiracy to launch a 
coup against the Syrian government in 1956 (fearing that Syria was on the path to 
becoming a USSR satellite) was discovered and outraged the Syrians, providing them 
further incentive to ally with the Soviet block (Golan 1990:140-3).  
The presence of the USSR in the Middle East not only involved supplying 
arms to their allies, but also information, and in May 1967, the Soviet president 
informed the Egyptian envoy in Moscow that Israel was planning an attack on Syria. 
Nasser took this news as a green light to attack, thus providing one catalyst for the 
outbreak of the 1967 war. (Others included the 1966 Israeli invasion of Jordan, 
border skirmishes and an air battle between Syria and Israel in early 1967, and 
Palestinian attacks on Israel [Seale 1988:126-128].) Part of the Soviet reasoning for 
providing such information may have been to strengthen the Atassi regime in Syria 
with whom they were friendly, in order to counteract the political unrest growing in 
Damascus. By providing an outside threat (Israel), the USSR could hope that Syrians 
would unite under Atassi, while the involvement of Egypt would keep Israel at bay 
and prevent actual war from breaking out. There was also the hope that the situation 
would discredit the U.S., as the sole supporters of (purportedly) aggressive Israel 
(Golan 1990:58-62). We then see a historical precednt of Syria being manipulated 
by a superpower for reasons that had nothing to do with the good of the Syrian 
population, a theme that reappears in Syrian narractions of current politics.  
 In 1970, the competition for power within the Bacth Party come to a head, 
with Hafez al-Asad ultimately gaining control. He was willing to maintain relations 
with Moscow, but “for many years to come he jealousy guarded Syrian 
independence by refusing to enter into a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty” (Golan 
1990:145). Following the 1973 war with Israel, Egypt turned its back on the Soviet 
                                                
39 The Middle East, though, was not high on the list of Soviet priorities, except in terms of economic 
competition with both communist China and the capitalis  West, maintenance of friendly borders for 
the USSR, and the blocking of European and Japanese oil interests (Golan 1990:1-3, 16-7). 
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Union and looked to the U.S. for support. Syrian-Russian relations improved 
accordingly as both agreed that Anwar Sadat was a traitor for having done so—Arab 
leaders could also use divisions to their advantage. Though Asad needed Soviet arms 
and support to match Israel (Syria’s ultimate enemy), he was very careful to keep his 
distance, not wanting to sacrifice Syrian autonomy (Seale 1997:69-71). During the 
1990-91 Gulf War, Syria joined the American coalition, but more out of worry that if 
Kuwait fell to Saddam Hussein, Syria would be the next target (though long-standing 
tensions between Syria and Iraq likely played a part as well.) However, at the same 
time, the defeat of Iraq meant that there was virtually no hope of an Iraqi-Syrian 
alliance, the only combination in the region that could realistically have posed a 
threat to Israeli power. Thus the Cold War had a profound effect on shaping Syria’s 
history as an independent state. It came into political being in a climate of conspiracy 
and superpower confrontation, while balancing dependency on foreign aid with 
independence (Seale 1997:73-6). When Hafez al-Asad died in 2000, he was 
succeeded by his son Bashar as president. 
 
“Glory Days”: Syrian Narratives of History  
 
As informative as such a backdrop is, examining narractions of history is actually far 
more useful for my task—though seeing where and how t ey line up with the 
‘textbook’ versions can provide insights as well.40 More than this, however, speaking 
about history has great implications for the present and how people position other 
actors or groups in the narraction in relation to themselves (c.f. Alonso 1994:387). 
Thus, even ‘doing’ (via relating) history can be a w y of doing social relations, 
creating insiders and outsiders and making connections. Gilsenan (1996:296) found a 
similar pattern in narratives of personal history in Lebanon, specifically from one 
informant describing his past: “What my friend was doing in repeating his stories 
was to constitute his own ta’rikh and sira (history and biography). The two 
narratives were not about a past, but about his powers in a constantly acted-upon 
present” (my emphasis). Gilsenan’s observation equally applies to a realm of broader 
                                                
40 Though this may tell us more about ourselves than our informants, in seeing where and why we 
would expect things to be present in a ‘history,’ where they might diverge from what our informants 
would expect, and what these gaps might indicate.  
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social relations, where the focus is not only on personal history recreating the 
present, but on how groupness and collective identity is produced and reproduced in 
the present using popular41 historical narractions. While individual narractions might 
vary from one person or day to the next, their general form was often the same: the 
progression from an idyllic (if not wholly perfect) past through a phase of shattering, 
ultimately resulting in a world of official fragmentation. My informants decried and 
condemned these divisions, despite their own description of the different categories 
of people living in the region of Syria. The primary differences seem to be that the 
official version did not necessarily match the ‘natur l’ divides and thus were 
artificial, and that one was imposed upon the population and not something that 
people adopted and lived themselves. 
 
As I mentioned above, in Damascenes’ narractions, history began with the Ottomans. 
Interestingly, the rhetoric here was not of a ‘foreign power,’ but a set of leaders who 
united the entire Bilad al-Sham under the common flag of Islam.42 The narracted 
history described how, in those times, there were no identity conflicts; all people 
were part of a holistic entity that did not discriminate or draw arbitrary lines between 
neighbors. The only distinctions between people were city- or village-based ones—
whether you were from Damascus or Beirut or some littl -known town, far-removed 
from the sophisticated centers of urban life.43 Even relations with people of other 
faiths, my Muslim informants assured me, were relaxd—there was no persecution of 
them; they were allowed and encouraged to practice their religion and peacefully co-
exist with everyone else. The presentation was a picture of harmony, freedom and 
tolerance. Though further back in time and not usually included as part of the 
historical narraction, a similar image was occasionally reiterated in stories of Salah 
al-Din—the man who halted the European, Christian invaders. Kurdish friends 
especially (and perhaps ironically given the current t sions with the Kurdish 
                                                
41 I wish to stress the popular nature of these histories, as they can vary quite strongly from those 
which (I heard) are represented by the official domain, especially in such places as primary school 
texts. 
42 The conversations that emphasized Islam as a unifying actor were invariably those I had with 
Muslim informants. Similar conversations with Christians often did not begin with the Ottomans, or 
did not emphasize (or positively portray) the religious factor.  
43 It should be noted that all my informants were city-folk in that they had lived all or much of their 
lives in Damascus. 
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community in the region more broadly) were proud of the fact that Salah al-Din, 
despite being Kurdish, created and maintained an Isl mic empire, one that would 
neither exclude people nor create rigid social divisions. He could have created a 
Kurdish world. But he did not precisely because there was no ense of Kurdish 
identity as being an important issue—it simply did not matter.44 Ottoman rule had 
maintained such an identity (problem)-free world. Again, given the millet system, we 
can see that is was not a world devoid of distinctions between people, but rather was 
described as one that was without problematic divisions.  
 Which is not to say that everything was ideal. TheOttomans were also known 
for their vicious methods of putting people to death (khazu’—sliding people onto a 
sharpened pole from the groin to the head—was a popular one); their ‘Wall of 
Heads,’ composed of the heads of those who had contested Ottoman power; and their 
hoarding of gold while only a select few local families prospered. However, this 
negative side of their rule often only came up in very specific moments. For instance, 
informants would relate such things to me when we were sight-seeing and came 
across a memorable monument, or when they were explaining the origins of a 
particular common phrase (as khazu’ has become, indicating being in an 
uncomfortable position for a long period of time, such as an airplane ride). In 
contrast to that, descriptions of Ottoman rule as apositive, unifying era of history 
could come up in conversation at any moment. It could be presented as history, but it 
was also regularly brought up in seemingly unrelated political, religious and identity 
conversations concerning the present. In these settings i  was, among other things, a 
dramatic comparison that served to emphasize the (sructurally) divisive nature of 
society since the time of the French and British occupations of the Arab Middle East.  
 The primary difference between this history and the description of Ottoman 
history presented previously is that the narracted version is much shorter. It does not 
delve into the various conflicts and divisions within the Ottoman Empire, nor the fact 
that the empire was breaking up from the inside before the end of World War I. 
                                                
44 Alexis deTocqueville (2003:700-702) argued that “equality naturally divides” people into small 
groups because they have no officially designated pr -eminence over each other and thus tend to 
divide along “artificial and arbitrary” lines to try and distinguish themselves from the masses. 
However, in cases of aristocracy where there are institutional divides in place, people already know 
who they are and do not have to distinguish themselve  in other ways. Taken in this light, the Ottoman 
millet system pre-created the divides between people, thus making other (i.e. identity) issues of no 
concern. 
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There are certainly parallels in the ways that both sets of narractors emphasized the 
harmony within the region under Ottoman control, but for my informants, that was 
where the importance ended. If narractions of history are indeed not (just) about the 
course of events in the past, but are also an act of addressing the present, then in 
emphasizing only the unity of the Ottoman era, what Syrians were doing was 
engaging with today’s international politics. The Ottomans no longer exist as such 
(though it would be interesting to see how the narractions would change if they did). 
What does exist in the physical space that the empire occupied is a series of much 
smaller countries, determined by lines on maps that the occupants of that space had 
no real hand in drawing. It is perhaps this lack of involvement that makes the 
divisions perceived as artificial.  
In saying that the Ottoman days were so wonderful, Syrians were also saying 
that today is less so, because there is no longer the same sense of potential unity, thus 
imbuing the narractions with an implicit moral commentary as well. What, or rather 
who destroyed that unity? The French and the British governments. The Ottomans 
may have been outsiders, but at least they had a commonality in being from the same 
region and sharing a common religious tradition with the majority of people (Islam). 
They were therefore narracted in these instances as being, at least partially, ‘insiders.’ 
The Europeans, on the other hand, were much more ‘fr ign,’ i.e. very ‘outside.’ And 
these countries still exist today, meaning that the narractive othering taking place 
applied not only to historical Britain and France, but to these peoples and countries as 
they exist today as well. The positioning of the Frnch and British as outsiders in a 
historical mode, did precisely the same thing for them in a current one. There was 
and always has been, these narractions assert (and thus create), an unbridgeable gap 
between the British and the French and (some form of) ‘Us.’  
For there was an ‘Us’ being created here that was not limited to Syrians living 
within the modern borders of Syria, but included all the people of this region who 
formerly lived as one people and were forever divided by colonial powers. Speaking 
of the unity-that-was was a way to generate a regional sense of identity, a common 
‘group’ that theoretically does not exclude any of the region’s original inhabitants 
(thus externalizing the recently-arrived Jewish-Israeli population). But at the same 
time, the narractors were knowingly situating such a unified identity in the past. It 
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was a glorious past, but the reality was that the world had moved on. Without 
explicitly saying it—or even directly hinting at it—in invoking a unified history, 
Syrians were emphasizing the fact that it no longer existed. They were quietly 
acknowledging that, even if it was not their fault, the lines were drawn and what was 
(remembered as) a single field is no longer so. And, vis-à-vis the tacit 
acknowledgement of their existence, these divisive lines were reaffirmed and 
recreated by the very narractions that would seem to condemn them. 
 The narracted histories did not, of course, stop a the end of the Ottoman 
Empire. However, I feel that these more recent histories are better described in terms 
of the ethnographic contexts in which they often came up. Before I turn to that, 
however, there is one last analytical point I would like to raise here: namely another 
discrepancy between the ‘authorized’ history and the narracted histories. The latter 
tend not to feature the Soviet Union in any way, despit  the military connections 
during the mid-20th century. Instead, in Syrian post-independence (andcertainly post-
perestroika) narractions, America and Israel were effectively the sole external 
players. There is the possibility that Syrians did not really perceive the events of that 
era in  ‘Cold War superpower light,’ but rather as a regional dispute, ultimately 
between Syria and Israel. The Soviets were inconsequential players in the face of 
Israelis as the major political, military and moral threat. America would almost 
naturally be included with Israel, because it had much closer and more unilateral ties 
with Israel than the Soviets ever did with Syria. Another possibility is that this 
absence may be due to the fact that the Soviets are no longer a coherent group that 
can be connected or related to. My informants’ narractions were of the present, and it 
has been more than ten years since the collapse of th  Soviet Union. Israel remains 
the strongest threat in the region and America is now the world’s only superpower. 
Again we encounter the idea that retellings of history are actions that enact the 
present more than the past.  
 
 
Changes: Narracted Divisions and Inside/Outside 
 
There were two specific arenas that Syrians often used to provide examples of how 
and why the Ottoman era was so positive and unified: movement and language. Most 
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obvious compared with the restrictions of today, was the freedom of movement. 
There were no lines on maps dividing the region into distinct realms. There may have 
been local, magisterial districts, but in the eyes of the people living there, these were 
purely administrative in nature. Ultimately, the whole of the area was part of one big 
country that allowed full freedom of movement to its population. There was no need 
of a passport to go visit one’s relatives in Beirut or Amman, no official borders 
between family and friends living in different areas. Equally important was language 
and communication. Different friends told me a number of times that under the 
Ottoman regime, all of Bilad al-Sham spoke in one dialect of Arabic, that while there 
might be some local accents or inflections, the langu ge was nearly universal. How 
and why these aspects changed and the results of that change were, for Syrians, 
indicative of larger processes at work. What had been informal and momentary (the 
narracted differentiation of people into groups) had become formal and permanent 




With the end of the Ottoman Empire, my Syrian informants explained, the French 
and the British came and carved up the entire region without any consideration for 
the people living there. This led to a great deal of trouble; in fact, much of the area’s 
current troubles can be (and are) tied back to this random division of Bilad al-Sham. 
Lines were drawn where there had been none previously; borders (hadūd) were 
thrown up that restricted and continue to restrict movement.45 As of June 2005, 
Syrians could cross the Lebanese border with only their Syrian identity card, but to 
get to Jordan, they had to have a passport. And the restrictions did not necessarily 
stop once one had successfully crossed the border. A group of us were traveling in 
Jordan, consisting of a Palestinian-Jordanian male, a brother and sister pair of 
Jordanians, their Syrian cousin (bn khālthun), a tourist from New Zealand, and an 
American anthropologist. We decided to take a scenic route through the country and 
drive along the Dead Sea coast. When we got to the highway, we were stopped by a 
                                                
45 In a way, this process of line-drawing and the way it is described nearly prefigures my entire 
argument: seemingly arbitrary divisions (and between and within the divisions, inclusions) were 
drawn by people that resulted in the repositioning of the world. 
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policeman who asked to see our identification. After doing so, he said there was a 
problem with the Syrian. He told us that Syrian young men were prohibited from 
traveling along this highway without the correct permissions. The guard explained 
that this was actually at the Syrian government’s isistence, as leaders were worried 
about young men trying to go visit Israel by crossing the sea. Permission from whom 
remained a little unclear, but the guard was fairly adamant about not letting the 
Syrian man through until his cousins stood surety for him (ydamanu calayh). He 
seemed dubious but was finally convinced. I was somewhat skeptical about the 
whole situation, but if any money changed hands, I id not see it (and I was looking). 
Practically speaking, travel from one place to another within Bilad al-Sham 
was no longer a simple process, as Syrians insist it once was. During the time of my 
fieldwork, the borders were a complicated set of check-points and posts, which could 
be daunting for those unfamiliar with how to get through them (or how much money 
to ‘hide’ in the pages of your passport to ensure a speedier trip). For instance, 
crossing the Syrian-Lebanese border as a Syrian involved filling out a form bought 
from a nondescript corner store; handing that form and your identity card to an 
officer at passport control; and then passing through a security checkpoint where 
bored, but well-armed guards scanned through car trunks and luggage before waving 
you through. And there was a new feature on my third visit in June 2005 (i.e. after 
the Hariri bombing and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon)—an 
additional mukhābarāt (secret police) checkpoint beyond the normal one, where they 
wanted to review all the paperwork and cars once more. At this point you could then 
drive the six kilometers to the Lebanese line, where you went through a similar 
process of paperwork and identity checking. The whole trip from Damascus to Beirut 
could take anywhere from two to three hours, depending on what day you were 
traveling, how much traffic there was, how important you looked, and if you were 
familiar with and willing to engage in the bribery s stem. And of course, this time 
was extended by visits to the massive Duty Free Shop in the no-man’s land46 
between the two borders, replete with imported technology, alcohol, luggage, and a 
full-scale grocery store. Courtesy of Rami Makhlouf, whose name we will re-
encounter in later chapters. A trip to Jordan was just as obstacle-ridden, though with 
                                                
46 I use this term pace Navaro-Yashin (2003), for I do mean it to imply a dead and uninhabited (versus 
unrecognized) space.  
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a much less impressive Duty Free store. And yet, th complications of travel 
notwithstanding, travelers went back and forth for business and to visit, impeded but 
not dissuaded by the formality of the borders.  
 Borders and border control have been identified and analyzed as state-driven 
methods of nation-building (Radcliffe 2001) and as an indication of sovereignty and 
authority via spatial control of people moving into and out of (Zureik 2001), or 
within a territory (Edwards 1998). They provide instances in which a state can create 
a definition for itself as well as set up a visible, symbolic, and effective instance of its 
authority (Donnan and Wilson 1999). The border police are the first or the last 
indications that one is crossing boundaries of authority, and who mans these borders 
and decides what laws to apply to people crossing them points to and helps to create 
power. However, borders can also be instances where pow r can be (discursively) 
undermined or a lack of power made obvious. In Palestin , for instance, Palestinians 
were responsible for supplying the guards at border ch cks, which would ostensibly 
have implied that they had a measure of power. The reality however, was that they 
had nothing more than an image of authority, which was undermined by the well-
known secret that there were Israeli guards posted out of sight who actually 
authorized anything the Palestinians ‘decided’ (Zureik 2001).  
 In Syria, these seemingly invisible processes of power consolidation were 
well-known phenomena. Syrians were aware of borders b ing a clear delineation of 
the government’s jurisdiction, though as the case of the Syrian in Jordan, sometimes 
that jurisdiction could extend beyond the official boundary-line. In terms of these 
narractions, what ‘happened’ was that several external powers came into a formerly 
idyllic and unified territory and began to arbitrarily draw lines on a map. Authority 
has a place here, in that my Syrian informants did not feel that these Europeans had 
the authority to do what they did without input from the people within those borders. 
But they did it regardless, and as a result people in Damascus had come to face 
previously non-existent complications when trying to visit family in Amman. Again 
we see that while the Ottomans may not have been identical to the people living in 
the area that is now Syria, at least they were perceived as being closer than the 
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new(ish) intruders.47 On a very basic level, then, what such narractions of history did 
in the present was to create a division between the ‘European’ world and, by proxy, 
most of the Arabic-speaking world (as colonization t ok place more than just in 
Bilad al-Sham).48 This process, as identity-making often does, has both connective 
and disconnective effects. The ‘Arab World’49 was (momentarily) created as a 
somewhat-bounded and unified group that has come to exist in contrast50 to a 
‘Europe.’ Sham is the closest of those inside, because people could and regularly did 
trace out and maintain family lines across the area, making these connections not 
only ‘conceptual’ but also ‘inter-personal’ (Strathern 2005). So, narractions-as-
doing-relations made connections with other colonized Arabs, and disconnections 
from European powers. The latter were (re)created as ‘foreigners’ (ijānib). 
 There were further complications surrounding the border issue in Syria, 
making it that much more difficult to determine who might have been inside or 
outside, even in a strictly political-geography sense. While I was looking at a Syrian-
made map of Syria, I saw two areas of contested space. One was the area along the 
border of Turkey that France gave to Turkey during the Mandate era. On the map, the 
area was marked out as hadūd mu’uaqetah (temporary borders), despite the fact that 
the territory had not belonged to Syria at any point in its independent period. The 
other area of contestation was the Golan Heights (al-jolān). This space was not even 
delineated by a temporary border; rather, the whole of the Golan was included within 
Syria’s hadūd dawlīyah (state borders). Even in ‘official’ and seemingly permanent 
divisions between people, there were discrepancies and flexibility. But while 
permanence seemed to be the hallmark of the ‘state’ (i.e. the temporary border 
presents a challenge to it and the occupied territory s portrayed as permanent), it was 
this very insistence on rigidity that was disagreeabl  to the people living there. What 
existed under the Ottomans was a broad field that people themselves could define 
                                                
47 I am choosing here to overlook long European presence in the region. For instance, no one every 
brought the Crusades up unless speaking about Salahal-Din and his ability to unify the region (or 
unless I specifically asked). Even then, the Europeans were only in the story by proxy, not as a focus. 
48 There is the potential for an inclusion of all post-colonial societies here, but I take the lead of my 
informants who would consider Indians, East Asians, South Americans, and the rest as distant (if not 
more so) from themselves as Europeans. 
49 Cf. Navaro-Yashin (2002:73-74) for a critique on theanthropological use of such regional 
terminology. 
50 ‘Opposition’ might seem to be the obvious word to use here, rather than contrast. However, I avoid 
it because I wish to avoid putting any sense of this being an ‘active,’ clash-of-cultures sort of 
opposition.  
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and divide in momentary “flashes” (Navaro-Yashin 200 ). But in both cases, the 




The break-up of the unified world of Sham was not limited to big governmental 
processes such as redrawing maps. Though my informants decried the European 
division of the region and the subsequent emergence of groups of ‘locals’ that 
eagerly stepped in to perpetuate the divisions (i.e. past and current national 
governments), they too would actually momentarily separate themselves from others 
with narractions on language itself.51 One of the clearest examples of this was the 
way in which people spoke of Arabic speakers from North Africa. One professional, 
upper middle class informant told me that she had been to a meeting between various 
officials in the Arabic speaking world. However, when she met someone from 
Morocco, they had to converse in English because they could not understand each 
other’s Arabic. My informant just shook her head, bewildered at how “strange” 
(gharīb) and “different” (mukhtilifīn) they were. And though everyone understood 
the Egyptian dialect, that was, they assured me, only because Egypt had the largest 
Middle Eastern film industry. Thus, this discourse on language almost immediately 
challenged the integrity of any ‘inside’ that would claim to hold all ‘Arabs’ equally. 
North Africans might be Arabs, but they were also external, because without the use 
of a foreign tongue or the mediating influence of the film industry, people from the 
two areas could not necessarily communicate. In some moments, then, North 
Africans were created as insiders (as Arabs), but were also narracted as being 
different. And while in the process of creating a Them, the same process affirmed a 
more select sense of Us in contrast. Neither grouping (as all insiders or as sets of 
insiders and outsiders) superceded the other, and both creations were momentary, 
needing to be constantly (re)created by narractions t  obtain the effect of 
permanence.  
 Contrast this approach to Ortner’s (1995), where she urges anthropologists to 
look within (resistance) groups for, what are effectively, sub-groups and divisions 
                                                
51 Cf. Haeri (1997) on language’s appropriation as a symbolic capital of the state in Egypt. 
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within them. In doing so, she adds a scale, with the entire resistance group being at 
the top or the most broadly encompassing. She argues that this will reveal the 
ambiguities of our informants’ lives.52 However, I would argue that applying such a 
scalar model to the Syrian case would be an artificial imposition. They did not 
necessarily see their shifting identities existing i  different scales (excepting perhaps 
‘importance’ scales which varied from person to person). And while making other 
people both insiders and outsiders at the same time may seem ambiguous, it is only 
so for the (already self-externalized) researcher. We read multiple meanings into their 
narractions and look to isolate them in the hopes of transforming an uncertain 
observation into a clear interpretation of one thing or the other. But there was nothing 
grey about this for my informants—they comfortably and rapidly switched between 
and engaged simultaneously (what we see as) multiple meanings (blacks and whites, 
to complete the metaphor). Or, to change metaphors, if people were dots, then there 
could be lines drawn that join two dots (connections) as well as lines drawn that 
divide the same dots (disconnections). Indeed, the same narractions could do both. 
And there was nothing uncertain or ambiguous about that to my informants. 
 Such linguistic divisions were also at work closer to home, though it was 
more often a case of differing accents rather than di lects. As I mentioned, one of the 
common refrains I heard when people were speaking of their Ottoman history was 
that there was once no real distinction between the spoken Arabic language 
throughout Bilad al-Sham. Now, however, people have developed a degree of pride 
in the regional differences between their spoken dialects (cāmīya’s). Making fun of 
the way that other people, especially in other countries, spoke was a regular pastime, 
and always ended with the assertion that Shami (Damascene Arabic) was the best. As 
a foreigner intent on learning the cāmīya over standard Arabic, it often took me some 
time to get adjusted to how people from outside Damascus spoke, and sometimes my 
Syrian friends had similar difficulties. Accents had become a ready way to determine 
where someone was from, even within Damascus. Immigrants to Syria from other 
countries were easily recognizable by their speech and would be treated accordingly 
(e.g. Saudis who were likely to buy a lot and tip well might have received better 
                                                
52 Donnan and Wilson (1999:13) suggest a similar idea, saying that “international borders highlight 
ambiguities of identity.” I suggest that, in the Syrian case, the ambiguity is on the part of the 
researcher, not Syrians. 
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service in some restaurants, but equally might have been snubbed for being Saudi). 
And the accent was not something that could always be easily faked—an Iraqi friend 
said that while he could have passed as Lebanese prtty early on, it had taken him ten 
years to be able to speak like a Damascene and even now it was sometimes difficult.  
 So, (re)tracing and reinforcing the political lines of the ‘artificial’ borders, 
there has developed a differentiation between the various cāmīya’s, and people enjoy 
poking fun at others. But in a reflexive moment, one i formant told me: 
 
We all talk in different ways now and that is because we are different 
countries. It is sad that we believe we are so different now, that there are 
differences between us that weren’t always there. It is because the foreigners 
separated us and none of the ‘sons of bitches’ (ibnā’ sharamīt) in power want 
to give that power up, which would be necessary if we all got together again 
like it used to be. So they have said that we are not the same and now we are 
forgetting the old days and have started to believe them. 
 
Language differentiation, then, was an indication that people were beginning to think 
of themselves as Syrian or Iraqi or Jordanian, whereas 100 years ago, (supposedly) 
there would have been no fixed differentiation and no one would have seen 
themselves as belonging to such categories. But the process of separation into distinct 
states was so effective that people became proud of their (newly created and thus 
‘artificial’) differences. When I visited Jordan, I was asked if I spoke Arabic. I 
laughed and said that I spoke Shami. My Damascene friend gave a huge laugh, patted 
me on the shoulder, and said “That was a perfect answer.” 
 It is, of course, difficult to verify what, if any, differences there were in 
spoken versions of Arabic throughout the region in the time of the Ottomans. But 
regardless of the historical validity of their narractions, what is central is that Syrians 
(and people from throughout the region) frequently brought up cāmīya in 
conversation and just as regularly derided other ways of speaking Arabic. But they 
were reflexive enough to understand that language, s such, had become a key point 
in the creation (or affirmation) of new identities, a fact that they were not always 
comfortable with. The theme that was implicitly repeated here was that the ‘sons of 
bitches’ in power had no right to foster a sense of difference in the people throughout 
the Bilad al-Sham region, especially since it was for no other purpose than their own 
gain. There was a critique here as well, a quiet challenge to the legitimacy of the 
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regimes that existed at the expense of the ‘natural’ nity of the larger population (see 
Chapter 4). And in this, they were returned to the issues of artificial borders and 
reminded of the role that foreign intrusions into their world had to play in this.  
 
 
External Figures in Syria Today 
Media: A Window to the Outside 
 
Above are outlined a variety of ways in which, historically and narractively, the 
international world has appeared inside the boundaries of Syria. However, much of 
this tended to revolve around ‘big politics’ and therefore does not necessarily apply 
to the ways individuals interacted with the international in the course of their 
everyday lives. But people, not just governments, engaged with and felt connected to 
the world beyond Syria. Some of the experiences were first-hand, such as when 
Syrians married a foreigner, worked or studied abrod, r had businesses that took 
them to other countries, though these opportunities w re generally only available to 
the mid- to upper-classes. However, there are other modes of engagement that are 
more widely available, with the Media being one of the primary ones. While some 
Syrians I spoke to sought to make the Media a two-way exchange of culture between 
‘East’ and ‘West,’ until now it has remained a one-way window, giving Syrians (and 
people from this area more broadly) an insight intoWestern life. But as such, it gives 
Syrians the opportunity to engage in observation and comparative analysis to try and 
make sense of the world beyond their borders. From news to fashion to pop music, I 
observed Syrians availing themselves of a number of media technologies to get a 
glimpse and understanding of (what becomes (re)constructed as) the ‘other side.’ 
 One of the most traditional and longest-term sources of such information is 
print media. There are many different daily newspapers printed in Syria, most in 
Arabic, but some in English as well. For the most part, these detail political and 
social life in Syria and often have pages devoted to housing and job advertisements. 
However, one counterpoint to the monochrome papers is the colorful and immensely 
popular high-life magazine Layalina. Layalina is issued monthly (though you never 
know which month’s issue you will find when purchasing one from a newsstand), 
and as of 2005, is now being printed in English in addition to Arabic. It is almost 
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solely devoted to picture collages about the goings-on of the rich and famous, 
reviewing the biggest and best weddings in Damascus, parties for ambassadors, 
restaurant openings, fashion shows, and the like. Th re is also a large section where 
the magazine’s photographers go around to restaurants and nightclubs and take 
pictures of the clientele (most of whom are middle to upper middle class), which the 
readers will then set about perusing, looking to catch sight of themselves or someone 
they know.53 However, Layalina also contains articles about the world beyond Syria, 
sometimes via foreign recipes or interviews with prominent foreigners in the Syrian 
community. One issue also included an interview with Jennifer Lopez and a six-page 
section called ‘Layalina Airlines’ about the history of and modern life in Canada.  
 Another technology of experiencing the Western world—one that is rapidly 
gaining in popularity—is the internet. Most of the tourist guidebooks on Syria (for 
example Lonely Planet Syria nd Footprints Syria and Lebanon, published in 1999 
and 2001 respectively) assure the traveler that there are virtually no internet cafes in 
Syria. However, by 2004, this had drastically changed—there were at least five 
within a ten-minute walking distance of my house in the Old City. And while many 
of these catered to foreigners, the clientele would ften include just as many Syrians 
(mostly in their late teens to early 20’s, many of them university students) as non-
Syrians, checking e-mail, chatting on instant messenger, or just surfing. While there 
are a wide number of Arabic websites, most of these people would have e-mail 
accounts and messenger programs running in English, even when speaking to other 
Arabic speakers. E-mail especially is regularly used to pass on cute little pictures of 
love and friendship, or jokes of all kinds, from toilet humor to political cartoons, 
often centered around various international political figures. And while some people 
relied on public cafes for their internet access, it was becoming more common to see 
it in people’s homes as well. It was much slower and more expensive than connection 
in the cafes, but despite that, no small number of my middle-class friends had signed 
up for it (or were getting it illegally by using a shared log-in and password). And 
towards mid-2005, I saw a billboard advertisement showing several young men and 
                                                
53 And this is not limited to women, as one might expct. I had three separate male friends approach 
me and tell me when I had apparently shown up in one of the issues, much to my surprise. Though 
much of this may have been limited to the middle class ranges; for these would be the people most 
likely to spot themselves or someone they knew in the picture section. 
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women sitting in front of a computer and smiling, announcing the plan to have 
internet available to everyone in the near, if unspecified, future. While internet 
ostensibly provides more than unidirectional access to other people, there were many 
more Syrians who read and used sites written by and for Westerners than there were 
Westerners logging on to sites written by Syrians. One partial exception to this is 
Joshua Landis’ site SyriaComment. He is an American professor (hence it is a partial 
exception) from the University of Oklahoma who runs a well-known blog where he 
posts current events in Syria. Though in English, Syrians are welcome and 
encouraged to post their responses on it, creating  space for dialogue.  
 However, internet and print media notwithstanding, the most popular mode of 
access to the rest of the world by far was satellite television. From Al-Jazeera and 
BBC news to Rotana music videos and Channel 4 movies, satellite plays a substantial 
role in everyday life. Nearly every house in the city and many small business shops 
had a television set up with a satellite box attached. Five years ago, owning a satellite 
dish would have been enough to get a person fined, f not jailed. Which is not to say 
that people did not have them anyway; they were just well hidden (see section on the 
secret police in Chapter 5). But now they have been l galized, so there is no more 
need to hide them under sheets during the day. The curr nt difficulty is trying to get 
the codes to unlock the various different channels without paying the international 
(and therefore expensive) rates. For about 200 lira (approximately $4) every couple 
of months, Syrians would purchase a card from a locl dealer that provides hundreds 
of channels, including stations from Egypt, the Gulf, Turkey, and Europe. In the 
home, televisions are run almost constantly in the background, whether or not anyone 
is even in the room paying them the least bit of attention. Music videos are quite 
common for such backdrop noise, usually Arabic pop artists, though occasionally 
with an American song in the line-up.54  
 But it is news and Western television and movie programs that allow Syrians 
a ‘real’ glimpse into Western life (hayāt gharabīyah). Al-Jazeera occasionally 
provides a Middle Eastern view of the Western world, while Saudi-based (though 
rumored by Syrians to be American-funded) al-Arabiy gives a more Western-
                                                
54 It is not at all unusual to see ‘Eminem’ scrawled on walls throughout the city—he is so popular that 
one Syrian friend asked me to transcribe his lyrics for her so that she could understand what he was 
saying. 
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oriented perspective. The BBC channel is in English, but such high-class venues as 
the Health Club (Salamandra 2004 describes this club in some detail) regularly 
played it on one of their three television screens. More popular still were the 
American television and movie channels that convey a more ‘cultural’ (seqāfi) 
image, especially of the United States. Oprah Winfrey is on every day, as are a 
number of soap operas—they do not have a chance of edging out the local Ramadan 
mini-series, but have large numbers of faithful devot es throughout the rest of the 
year. There are children’s cartoons (both American and French) dubbed into Arabic. 
And there is Channel 4, which plays nothing but Hollywood movies 24 hours a day. 
One of the most popular films, judging by how frequntly it is repeated and how 
many people reference it in everyday conversation was The Godfather. (Indeed, I 
remember one evening spent sitting in a café in the Old City with the entire place 
spellbound as this movie played on the satellite TV overhead.) Such movies had an 
impact on Syrian perceptions of America—I was asked time and again by Syrian 
friends how difficult it was to live under a massive Mafia crime scene and the 
violence, drugs, and murder that were involved in such a regime. Despite my 
protests, they assured me they knew that was how things were in America.  
 Television, and these various media more generally, l ow Syrians to get a 
sense of what is happening in the rest of the world an  to generate an image of that 
world according to their own observation of it. Through such observation, they come 
to know the rest of the world, and are able to make comparisons between what they 
see there and what they live in the course of their own lives. The differences become 
apparent to them, enabling them to speak of (and thereby recreate) the Western world 
as something distinct from themselves. Syrians can see, laid out side-by-side, how 
Canadian cultural life is sharply distinct from Damscene high life. The window, 
then, can also be a door, from which Syrians take material that they can use to draw 
the lines of inside and outside. This process holds true not only for Westerners, but 
for other Arabs as well, as mini-series (muselselāt) and films from Egypt and the 
Gulf show how similar or different life can be there, too. These windows, then, 
provide ways of seeing, making, and thus knowing the world. 
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International Presence Inside Syria 
 
The Media may provide a window into the international world, but Syrians also have 
other, direct experiences of foreigners living in and visiting Syria. Historically, ijānib 
(foreigners) were indications, when not the actual bringers, of problems in Syria. 
They brought economic complications in Ottoman times, carved up Bilad al-Sham 
into colonial-like territories, entwined Syria in iternational power games, and 
involved themselves in maintaining unpopular, dictatori l regimes. However, these 
stories and histories mainly deal with Western powers, not other countries in the 
Arab world, nor those further east in Asia. But peol  from these other countries are 
also present in Syria and provide another way to consider the process of connecting 
and disconnecting. Syrian narractions of their experiences with various outsiders call 
into the question what is meant by ‘foreigner,’ who is narracted as external to Syrians 
(in contrast to the relatively bounded space of ‘Syria’), and why. The borders 
between social categories are revealed to be much more fluid than those between 
countries. And, if even lines on maps can be impermanent, then what might that say 
about lines amongst the people living in the areas on the maps? We are returned, 
then, to many of the ideas brought up in the identity section of the introduction, 
including the shifting, narracted quality of connections and disconnections between 
people. 
 Before attempting to look at the place of outsider Arabs in Syria, it is worth 
briefly noting how Syrians experience other, non-Arab, non-Western foreigners. 
These are the outsiders who were most likely to be described in Syria as ijānib, along 
with people of American (North or South) or European origin, i.e. the people most 
consistently (re)created as outsiders. One of the most obvious instances of this was 
the Filipino worker. There were a number of agencies that worked between the 
Philippines and Syria to contract women from the former to work as house maids and 
servants in the latter for a period of usually two to three years. These young women 
could often be seen walking with their employers, juggling children and shopping 
bags, and often wearing hijāb. Sometimes in the evening, they would take strolls 
through the city parks together in their break hours. Only Syrians in the upper 
echelons of society could afford to ‘have’ a Filipino girl in their house, as they were 
responsible for paying the girl’s wages, as well as visas and plane tickets. Having a 
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Filipino girl was a mark of prestige—for instance, while sitting in a fancy, but 
popular restaurant, I was astonished to note that some of the families had brought 
their maids with them. A friend of mine scoffed and assured me it had nothing to do 
with giving the girl a day out and everything to do with showing off their wealth to 
the rest of the restaurant’s clientele. Despite the close working and living 
arrangements, there was no love lost between Filipino employee and Syrian 
employer. Accusations of lying, theft, and sexual abuse/promiscuity were regularly 
exchanged on both sides. Syrians described these girl  as poor, desperate, and lacking 
in appropriate moral behavior, setting them firmly as outsiders. 
 While the vast majority of Syrians did not employ f reign workers in their 
homes, the idea worked its way through the levels of society that these East Asians 
were not trustworthy and not like ‘Us.’ These foreigners were almost viewed as 
second-class humans, a belief not aided by the number of East Asians working in the 
streets, selling collections of cheap trinkets and clothing. This perception of East 
Asians had the unfortunate side effect of spilling over onto all people of East Asian 
origin. One way to call someone stupid was to call them ‘Mongolian’ (mongoli) and 
China was seen as a backwards and uncivilized place(see joke, pg. 125). This 
stereotyping made it difficult for foreigners from this area of the world traveling or 
studying in Syria— it was quite a scandal when one f my informant’s uncles 
married a Thai woman. Similarly, people of darker skin, mostly Africans, were 
generally stereotyped as being thieves and criminals and are still associated with 
slavery (though it is unclear in most people’s minds how much slavery existed in the 
history of the region). One English teacher (British, but of Arab descent) asked his 
students if they knew what a slave was. A common answer was, “black men.” There 
were not many people with very dark complexions in Syria, and the few there were 
tended to be refugees from Sub-Saharan countries and far too frequently fit the bill of 
untrustworthy foreigners. The exceptions to this were the African-American 
basketball players that were hired to play on the Syrian basketball team, but they 
were usually well-distinguishable by their tall, athletic physique and their expensive, 
trendy clothing (they were still outsiders, but closer to Syrians than the African 
outsiders). In a sense, these East Asian and African foreigners were made to be more 
foreign than Europeans or Americans. Though narractions of Euro-Americans were 
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often negative in tone, at least there was a degree of historical connections between 
the areas—it was not uncommon for middle class Syrians to speak French, English 
or, increasingly, Spanish. There were points of connection amidst the disconnections. 
In contrast, there was (perceived) to be a lot less connection with the populations of 
countries further east or south, making for a greater distance and positioning them as 
more external to ‘Syrians.’ 
 
Ultimately, though, Syrians’ reactions to such distant foreigners usually involved an 
off-hand disdain or dismissal. However, Syrian feelings towards people from other 
Muslim and Arab countries tended to be much more heated and emotional. The 
initial reaction whenever discussing non-Syrian Arabic or Muslim populations 
(especially in front of an American foreigner) was to make claims of brotherhood and 
solidarity, such as “We stand by Palestine because they are our Arab brothers!” or 
“Our Islamic brethren in Iran will show Bush a thing or two!” But the further Syrians 
proceeded into such conversations, the more these declarations of association broke 
down. In describing other Arabic populations, my informants came out with what 
amounted to: “Palestinians are not nice people. Iraqis re not nice people. Kuwaitis 
are not nice people. Libyans are not nice people. And even Syrians are not nice 
people.” While this left me wondering who were nice people, it also illuminated a 
sense of distance between countries that are frequently considered (by outsiders and 
sometimes insiders) to be bastions of solidarity.55 Iran, for instance, was viewed with 
pride as a force to be reckoned with, politically and militarily, but the constant 
Iranian presence in Damascus (home to a number of Shi’a pilgrimage sites) coupled 
with Iranian tourists’ inability to speak either Arabic or English generally made them 
a point of frustration in Syrians’ everyday lives.  
 In fact, the only petty crime I witnessed in Syria happened at one of these 
sites—a mosque built to honor Seida Zeinab, the prophet Muhammed’s grand-
daughter. In the course of an hour, two other girls with me—one a Syrian—had 
mobile phones stolen out of their pockets, one of which was stolen in the shrine 
itself. As I entered the shrine, a Syrian woman (by her accent) warned me to hold on 
to all of my things, because there was a lot of theft taking place. Funnily enough, she 
                                                
55 Though the inability of the Arab League to come to any sort of agreement on anything has been 
well-documented.  
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only noticed me because her young daughter had looked up at me and asked 
“ ijnabīyah?” to which I laughed and responded “eh, ana ijnabīyah” (yeah, I’m a 
foreigner). Two things struck me in that moment. One was that a girl of perhaps five 
years, knew the word for ‘foreigner.’ It would seem that the doing of identity and 
narracting foreign-ness was so explicit that even young children picked up on it. 
Secondly, I found it interesting that a Syrian woman would warn a ‘foreigner’ about 
the danger of theft from other ‘foreigners.’ That I understood Arabic was certainly a 
factor, for it made me somewhat less of an outsider than the other foreigners who 
were stealing and did not understand Arabic. The lin s of who was inside and who 
was outside in this moment were certainly ‘ambiguous’ (from the anthropologist’s 
perspective). This Syrian woman, through her helpful warning, was distancing 
herself from the Iranians (i.e. thieves) and was connecting with me as potential 
victim of the other outsiders. But, she was also constructing me as an outsider, a 
foreigner who would benefit from her local (insider) advice. A single warning, one 
action, effected (at least) three temporary connections or disconnections. But then we 




Despite being a big draw for Iranian tourists, the ar a of Seida Zeinab is mostly 
populated with expatriates from Iraq—another problematic category of people in 
Syria. While Syrians professed outrage at the American nvasion of and continued 
involvement in Iraq, they were not pleased with the massive surge of Iraqi refugees 
entering into Syria. In the way that Syrians talked about them, there was a sense of 
“They are our cousins, but we would really prefer i they stayed in their house next 
door rather than moving into ours.” Part of the problem were Syrians’ impressions 
that large numbers of the Iraqi population taking up residence in Damascus were the 
lowest of the low, sweeping into an area en masse and ruining it. For instance, it was 
not uncommon to run across Iraqi prostitutes, identifiable by their skin-tight and 
“tastelessly” (ma lau tacmeh) low-cut clothing (versus the high society Damascene 
women who might wear similarly revealing, but more ‘classy’ clothing) and their 
harsh Iraqi cāmīya. They could be seen anywhere from private functions—where 
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older family members such as mothers, aunts, and uncles acted as madams and 
overseers—to strolling through the gold sūq, looking to buy and sell gold or to attract 
a wealthy gold merchant.56 The general Syrian opinion, then, was that most of the 
Iraqis that came to Syria were from the prostitute/criminal/drug-dealer sectors of 
society. It was difficult to determine the accuracy of these statements, but via their 
narractions Syrians positioned their Iraqi neighbors into these categories, thereby 
creating both a national and a moral distance between themselves and the Iraqi 
‘outsiders.’  
 One of the effects that this influx was said to have had was that 
neighborhoods that were once nice have fallen into ruin. A friend of mine lived in a 
largely run-down, lower-middle class area on the edge of Damascus called Jeramana. 
He told me that it used to be a beautiful area, a sfe neighborhood with friendly 
people, a good place to raise children. However, he told me, in the past couple of 
years, it was overrun by Iraqis and “went to hell” as a result. It is not that he 
witnessed his neighbors doing anything illegal, but his everyday experiences with 
them left him with a bad impression:  
 
They’re very inconsiderate, they are stupid people (jadbān) who don’t think 
and don’t care about the people they live with. Some Iraqi neighbors of mine 
were trying to set up a chimney for themselves, but were idiots and while they 
were putting up theirs, they broke mine, and then th y didn’t even tell me 
about it or help fix it. Another day the same group was cleaning their chimney 
and were so cheap and stingy (bakhīl—quite a negative and disapproving 
term) that they decided to do it themselves rather t an hire a professional, 
even when they don’t know anything about cleaning chimneys. And then they 
were so stupid that they cleaned out my chimney, but there were no bags set 
up in my house to catch the soot and so I woke up one morning and my house 
was covered in black powder. And they didn’t stop when it didn’t seem to be 
working in their house, but continued going and covered my house more than 
once. My wife is pregnant, she got very upset and started crying because she 
had to clean up the house because of their idiocy. And they didn’t help. One 
even yelled at her for crying when it was their fault (zanbhun)! 
 
These examples were, he told me, indicative of Iraqis in general. This friend’s sister 
also assured me that she was nervous to go visit her brother in Jeramana. When she 
would go, she would drive the long way, going around most of the area on the 
                                                
56 Iraqis, though, are by no means the only variety of pr stitutes in Syria. Moroccan, Egyptian, and 
Russian women are the other common nationalities, with the first two generally being employed by 
gentlemen’s clubs and the last more often free-lancing in more popular night clubs. 
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highway and entering it only at the very last minute. She would prefer to add an extra 
15-20 minutes onto her trip rather than take the shorter route that went through the 
neighborhood.  
 The rapid increase of Iraqis (along with other outsiders) has also involved 
them buying up large amounts of property within Damascus. The swelling of the 
buyers’ market has resulted in driving up prices of h using to an almost unaffordable 
level. Middle and lower-middle class Syrians looking to upgrade into a nicer house 
suddenly find themselves unable to do so. The situation is even worse for young men 
looking to marry and start a family—the majority of them cannot hope to afford the 
massively inflated prices of homes without years of w rk first. 
 Such a situation hardly seems to be limited to Syria. The world over, concerns 
about immigrants have often been centered around the loss of jobs, the degradation 
of living areas, and the inflation of living costs. Similar narractions of frustration and 
resentment are nearly universal in these cases, especially amongst the working 
classes. The newcomers are stigmatized and figured as outsiders. However, what 
strikes me as somewhat different about the Syrian case is that such narractions of 
division exist alongside others of connection. Iraqis, as Arabs and Muslims, are also 
narracted as being insiders—indeed, they are directly described as being family! Two 
points of interest arise out of this; one is that we see again how the narractive process 
can create both connections with and disconnections fr m the same people. However, 
this use of both (associative) kinship labels anddisconnective narractions implies 
that processes of doing kinship might be as problematic (for the anthropologist) as 
identity-work. There may be a ‘darker’ (i.e. disconnective) side to kinship as well, a 




Iraqis are not the only focus of this duplexitous Syrian positioning—Palestinians, too, 
occupy a similar position. There is not nearly as large a Palestinian population in 
Syria as in Jordan, but they are present nevertheless. A middle class woman living in 
a relatively affluent area of the New City told me that literally half a block down her 
street was a HAMAS headquarters. For obvious reasons, I never went and asked, but 
the mukhābarāt headquarters at the other end of the street may have been an 
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indication that she was correct. When discussing the Palestinian situation, Syrians’ 
first reaction was often to curse the Zionists for driving the poor Arabs out of their 
homes. But relatively little probing brought people to reflect on how it was partially 
the Palestinians’ fault for being greedy in the first place and selling their land to the 
Zionists at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. And 
now they are said to take up space in other countries and expect people to pander to 
them and their cause, making economic (vis-à-vis further contributions to the 
housing situation) and political problems for the hosts. But one informant told me 
that while most Syrians and their regime would liketo get rid of the Palestinians in 
Syria, any overt action against the Palestinians, could lead to a war. Memories of the 
1970 war between the PLO and King Hussein in Jordan (a war into which Syria 
entered on behalf of the Palestinians) provide historical support for how things could 
go wrong. It is not so much that the Syrians wish to aid Israel, as that they want an 
end to the problems that Palestine make for them, even if unintentionally. Like Iraqis, 




Some of the most bitter Syrian feelings towards the population of another Arab 
country were those directed against Saudi Arabians. In fact, throughout my 
fieldwork, I cannot recall a single time Saudi Arabia was brought up where it did not 
generate anger or disgust. This emotion sometimes ext nded to other Gulf states, but 
was mostly concentrated against the Saudis. Here th resentment was largely 
economically-based. It was said that the richest of Saudis buy summer homes in 
America and throughout Europe, but middle class Saudis (still far richer than their 
Syrian counterparts) would come to Damascus and Beirut, buy up the best property, 
and flaunt their wealth. There was a Saudi presence within Damascus throughout the 
year, but during the summer months their numbers jumped significantly. When 
walking down the street, all the best cars, Mercedes, BMW’s, American-make 
SUV’s, and basically any car that seemed to be shiny and new almost inevitably had 
a Saudi license plate. One could spot a Saudi family from some distance away as it 
usually involved one white-robed man with a white head cloth followed by a train of 
half a dozen or so black-covered women. The donning of hijāb is common in Syria, 
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though frequently involves only covering the hair and wearing concealing, if 
fashionable (moda), clothing. The Saudi women, in contrast, were fully covered, with 
no hands showing and not even eye-slits on their face coverings. Tellingly, such 
groups were often to be seen stopped around the city’s various ATM’s. Syrians’ 
reactions to them got to be fairly predictable, involving, at the least, disgusted shakes 
of heads and mutterings under the breath, when not outright rude hand gestures. And 
it was always acceptable to cut off Saudi cars while driving because, “Well, they’re 
Saudi.”  
 There was also a moralistic disdain towards these outsiders:  
 
They make everyone think they are so devout and religious. But they come 
and show off their money, and everyone knows that teir women would be 
the first to throw off their veils and the rest of their clothes given the 
chance.57 The men are a bunch of hypocrites who come here to drink and 
womanize. 
 
I was assured that Damascus’ gentlemen’s clubs catered almost solely to Saudi 
clients, who would come and throw massive amounts of money into dancers and 
alcohol. The business at these places all but died in the winter months when the 
Saudis were not around. And sometimes Saudi men did ot come to Damascus just to 
watch women dancing, but to find another wife. “A man will buy his new wife a 
house here, take care of her financially, and come to see her every couple of months. 
But she will usually not go there, because he often already has a wife there.” For a 
long time, this was an easy way for Syrian women to come into a very wealthy 
lifestyle, but it was more and more becoming a practice that Syrians frown upon. The 
money, the hypocrisy, and the play-boy attitudes that have no regard or respect for 
Damascus or Syrians lead the people of Syria to resent and outright dislike their 
Saudi neighbors. As one informant said: “If there is one country in the world that 
everyone can agree to hate, it’s Saudi Arabia.” Saudis are usually not discussed in 
terms of the Arab or Muslim heritage, but those connections are present when 
Syrians attack Saudis on a moral stance; such insults would not be effective if the 
Saudis did not partially share a moral code with Syrians. However, explicit 
                                                
57 Navaro-Yashin describes a similar rhetoric of moral corruption based around women who veil in 
Turkish secularist discourse (2002:71). However, though Syrians might have questioned the individual 
practice of embodiment of virtue, they simultaneously a serted that modesty was a virtue that should 
be enacted (properly). 
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references to Saudi Arabians were generally very negative and disconnective, 




Through these various narractive stances, Syrians distanced themselves from other 
neighboring or ‘Arab’ nationals. The process of this d fferentiating often resulted in 
Syrians being portrayed as somehow superior to the t r party, be it morally or 
socially. This creation of an insider superiority became particularly obvious in the 
ways the Damascene middle class discussed the people of Lebanon, especially those 
living in the capital. There was some degree of awein their descriptions of Lebanon 
itself (before the Israeli bombings and invasion in 2006)—the beauty and grandeur of 
Beirut; how buildings and roads were actually built; and that people loved and took 
care of their own city. Syrians lauded the Parisian-style refurbished downtown, the 
cafes and restaurants, the malls, the nightclubs.58 Before the Hariri assassination and 
the subsequent tensions between the two countries, traffic between Damascus and 
Beirut was constantly flowing, with wealthy Damascenes going to shop or see 
doctors in more pricey Beirut, and Lebanese coming to Syria to take advantage of the 
lower prices on many kinds of goods and clothing. But (and there was always a but) 
it was said that while Lebanon and especially Beirut may have had the appearance of 
style and class, hidden beneath the glitzy façade ly a more troubled reality. The 
cracks showed, like the still-visible bullet holes smattered across buildings from a 
war over 20 years past. My informants told me that e new buildings and roads were 
largely funded by Gulf59 (mainly Kuwaiti) money and one of the major highways 
was actually built by the Syrian military. While visiting Beirut, it was pointed out to 
me how the majesty of the Promenade butts right up against some of the poorest, 
most run-down areas of town. Syrians said that the Lebanese drove fancy cars and 
wore fashionable clothing, but lived in empty homes b cause they had driven 
themselves into massive debt to maintain the image that they were living the high 
                                                
58 This varies somewhat from the other descriptions of Lebanon that we will encounter in the section 
on Rafik Hariri in Chapter 3. In terms of narracting, the primary difference between the two was the 
context; the descriptions I have included here came up of their own accord, while those in Chapter 3 
came up specifically when we were discussing Rafik Hariri and his death. 
59 Again, this is a somewhat different telling than that which we see in discussions on Hariri. 
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life. There is a saying in Syria that neatly compares the Syrians’ perceptions of the 
‘personalities’ of the two countries: “If you want a pretty wallflower for a wife, 
marry a Lebanese woman. But if you want a woman who ill take care of your 
home, raise your children well, and be eternally loya , marry a Syrian.”  
 These were, in the eyes of some Syrians, the defining qualities of the 
Lebanese—an obsession with presentation at the expense of substance,60 a sham of 
prestige to hide, even from themselves, the fact that in their collective heart, they do 
not know who or what they are. Lebanon, as some unified thing, is not at all 
unified—it is, and perhaps has been for quite some ti , described as stuck in an 
angst-like identity crisis. In a sense Lebanon actss a representation of the post-
Ottoman Bilad al-Sham. The country was described as being what I can only call a 
ball of tension, a people without the ability to accept each other and live in peace. 
And, Syrians said, they lack a powerful enough political apparatus to force people to 
deal with their differences regardless of their moral and social inclinations to not do 
so (unlike Syria which was said to have a strong enough regime).61 “The Lebanese”, 
Syrians sighed, “really just cannot take care of themselves” (al-libnāniyīn ma biqidru 
yidabbaru cala hālhun abadan). The tone of the conversations often had the sense of 
talking about an errant younger sibling, one that needed to be protected from him or 
herself. There was a fondness to the narractions, but also a lack of patience with and 
some scorn towards the superficiality of the situaton . After Hariri died and Syrian 
troops left Lebanon, it was assumed in Syria that it would just be a matter of time 
before Lebanon eroded into one big mess again, affirmed, in Syrians’ opinion, by the 
conflicting rallies and further bombings that took place in the following months. 
Afterwards, Syrians were hesitant to travel to Lebanon for any purposes, worrying 
that anti-Syrian sentiment might have served as the one thing to (temporarily) unite 
the Lebanese, and could therefore have dangerous consequences for Syrian citizens 
traveling there.62 Here too, Syrians, in talking about the problems of Lebanon, were 
                                                
60 This is a sharp contrast to the idea that morality, honor, and piety are embodied and enacted though 
one’s appearance (Gilsenan 1996, Mahmood 2001).  
61 Which is an interesting (if perhaps unintentional) reproduction of Ibn Khaldoun’s (2005:107) 
description that “by dint of their nature, human beings need someone to act as a restraining influence 
and mediator in every social organization, in order to keep its members from (fighting) with each 
other.”  
62 Indeed, while walking near Hariri’s grave in Beirut in June 2005, I came across some English 
graffiti on a wall, saying “Fuck you Serya” (sic). 
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recreating themselves as superior (perhaps less flashy but with more ‘soul’) to their 
neighbors, creating the Lebanese as outsiders, even wh  the two countries have 
historically and physically been very close. 
  
* * * 
 
These examples, then, underline how ordinary, non-politician Syrians interact with 
and narract foreigners in Syria and the inhabitants of other, nearby countries. In the 
international realm, it indicates how Syrians feel other populations relate to them. 
The citizens of the U.S. and Western Europe were potrayed as strong and 
interfering, who were not like Syrians but were at le st familiar. These were 
outsiders, but ones that were observable and knowable through historical 
remembering and current Media venues. Eastern Asians and Africans were narracted 
as being very external, foreign by both cultural and moral standards. Other Arabs, 
Muslims, and Middle Easterners were narracted as being both insiders (especially in 
an ideological capacity) and outsiders (they created potential problem areas within 
Syria) in different moments and sometimes in the same moment. Thus, in the course 
of observing and narracting other countries and their populations, Syrians 
momentarily place these other people in relation to themselves as insiders or 
outsiders. At the same time, this connecting and disconnecting also serves to 
(re)create and define ‘Syrian’ as a category, a colle tion of people who are all 
insiders by virtue of having something in common against these outsiders. Thus, they 
are (re)affirming their Syrian-ness, however artificial and thus illegitimate they may 
also claim it to be. But it is important to bear in mind the fluidity of this whole 
process, the momentary-ness of the relations it creates. Without constant and 
continued affirmation, these lines of connection and disconnection would no longer 
cease to exist, practically or ideologically. Narractions that performatively place 
people as inside or outside can and do shift, identti s do not (or perhaps, hould not) 
have rigid boundaries. Unlike the newly created state  who now deny people a say in 
the (partial) construction of their selves, narracted identity-work still allows for 
flows, changes, and individual agency in the production of social categorization.  
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3. Relating with the Outside: Narractive Position(i ng)s 
 
 
The previous chapter considered how explicit identity-work (through narractive 
creations of categories such as Lebanese, Iraqis, Europeans, etc.) served to situate 
other people in relation to my (Syrian) informants. However, the objects of these 
narractions were often people, physically or through technologies, present in Syria, 
where Syrians’ “interpersonal” interactions with them provided examples of and a 
basis for (re)making more “conceptual” dis/connections (cf. Strathern 2005). In other 
words, abstract social categories like Iraqi or Palestinian were rendered more tangible 
through the presence of Iraqis and Palestinians in Syrians’ everyday lives. At the 
same time, these interpersonal encounters helped to inform and create Syrians’ ideas 
of what being Iraqi or Palestinian involved and how that then was distinct from being 
Syrian. 
 This chapter, however, will focus on how Syrians relate to potential outsiders 
who are usually located outside Syria and are not ‘br ught in’ as much through 
popular forums like Layalina, but instead through ‘politics.’ Rather than examining 
Syrians’ (explicit and self-aware) identity-work, I will explore the ways that 
conspiracy narractions, usually prompted by events in recent history, performed 
similar sorts of connections and disconnections as identity-work, even when they 
were explicitly about (for Syrians) politics or political analysis. Though concerned 
with specific events, middle class Syrians’ analysis of them often rested on broader 
conceptualizations of the (hidden) nature of political-economic power and the 
intentions of those who wield it. Even more important than intentions, though, were 
the methods through which power was obtained or expanded; Syrian concerns with 
morality began to come through in these narractions, where morality seems to be 
more of an adherence to a proper ‘aesthetic’ (Jean-Klei , in press) than to a given set 
of permissible and forbidden actions. Finally, what I hope to convey via the re-telling 
of these narractions is a return to the idea that, despite their seeming attempts to 
create something solid and foundational (i.e. uncovering the ‘truth’), there is 
nevertheless a sense of fluidity that underpins thee conspiracy narractions and what 
Syrians are effecting through the telling of them. I suggest that this constant motion 
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presents a challenge to one of the ways in which ant ropologists have come to 
conceptualize knowledge production and may demand a rethinking of our own 
theoretical underpinnings.   
 
Israel, the Jews and 9/11 
 
One of the most common narractions that was related to me, especially early on in 
my fieldwork, was that of the destruction of the World Trade Center on September 
11, 2001. These narractions would almost invariably involve my informants, from all 
walks of life, asking my opinion on what had happened that day, usually followed by 
their version of events, and always came to the same conclusions. My informants 
related to me that, despite what all the Western television stations63 had shown, it 
was not Arabs or Muslims who had perpetrated the 9/11 bombings. Instead, some 
combination of the American government, the Jewish-American community, and 
possibly the Israeli state itself were the culprits. Western news agencies either did not 
know what was known to the Syrian news teams; or they were afraid to publish what 
they knew, because they were heavily influenced by and accountable to the 
perpetrators themselves. For anyone who was willing to look, they told me, there 
were major discrepancies in the official statements, i dicating that someone (or more 
than one) is hiding something. Further, the very obvi usness of the Arab and Muslim 
community as the villain made them the least likely to have actually done it. This 
community would have been able to guess that the blame would have fallen on them 
and would not have been so foolish as to set themselves up to be punished (a point 
reiterated when Rafik Hariri was assassinated). However, a clever enemy of the Arab 
and Muslim peoples would also know this and might have utilized such a prejudice. 
Effectively, a third party could safely attack the U.S., resting assured that the country 
would jump to the conclusion that the terrorists were Arabs or Muslims, thus 
                                                
63 Which are all considered to be owned or heavily influenced by American and/or Jewish interests. 
Indeed, immediately following one informant’s suggestion that the Jews had destroyed the World 
Trade Center, another friend responded that the reason the Jews were doing so well throughout the 
world was because they had good public relations and h d taken full advantage of their access to the 
international Media to promote themselves and their cause.  
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ensuring that these latter communities lose face in the international realm.64 In this 
light, I would argue that such narractions are therefore distinctly not concerned with 
countering a lack of transparency (as West and Sanders [2003] would have it), 
because official representations that are too transp rent are automatically suspect. 
And the emphasis on the loss of face here is quite similar to the ways Syrians engage 
in interpersonal relations as well as international ones, a thread I shall return to in 
Chapter 7.   
 When relating their take on the events of September 11th, my informants 
rarely offered much in the way of motives, as if they were too obvious to really need 
stating. When I pressed them, they would often describe how the Jews, especially 
Israelis and Zionists, hate the Arabs and would no oubt love to see their foes 
destroyed or thrown into chaos (not necessarily a difficult task, if we take into 
account how Syrians describe the Lebanese and, as we will see later, themselves). 
When accounting for America’s involvement, they would explain the “commonly 
known” fact that the Jewish community has a great dl of political clout in the 
U.S.65 and that America generally has a protective attitude towards Israel. And of 
course, they said, oil is, as it has been for some ti , a driving force for much 
political action in the Middle East.  
 In different settings and conversations, though, I learned that some Syrians 
did not consider the tragedy of September 11th to exist in isolation, but thought it was 
indicative of and related to a much broader concern with the United States’ and 
Israel’s intentions towards the region. Much of the assessment was founded on a neo-
imperialistic model, with Syrians foreseeing their land being swallowed up in a 
Greater Israel, or perhaps a Greater America, or some combination of both. But even 
in these dire predictions, there were warnings that t e Arabs and Muslims of the 
region would seek to defend themselves. For instance, shortly after Hariri had been 
killed, a married, upper-middle class informant told me that: 
 
                                                
64 As an aside, my experience of such interpretations of the events of 9/11 are in no way limited to my 
Syrian informants. I have heard any number of variations on this theme in the US and the UK and 
from other (mostly European) friends since 2001. 
65 A theme that historian T. Fraser (1989) has noted, specifically the political clout of the Jewish 
lobbying groups within the US throughout the 20th century, including putting pressure on President 
Johnson to take up French slack in military sales to I rael (1989:85) and the near blocking of President 
Reagan’s sale of military arms to Saudi Arabia (1989:163-70). 
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 America and Israel are working towards making the entire Middle East their 
turf (sic).  They started in Iraq, now they’re getting a hold in Lebanon, and 
they’re looking at Syria next. And this is happening despite the fact that they 
should have learned from the Lebanese civil war not to get involved in this 
area—remember, 150 U.S. Marines were killed in a single explosion in an 
attempt to land on a Lebanese beach. 
 
Similarly, while sitting in a relaxed, Old City café, a younger, lower-middle class 
man explained to me that,  
 
The Americans and the Israelis are working towards getting as many 
countries on their ‘side’ as they can. Through war, peace, or money, they 
have Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, much of the Gulf, and Saudi Arabia. 
However, they are a bit worried about Iran and probably will not try a war 
there because they know that they will lose—the terrain in Iran is much like 
Afghanistan and the U.S. military has already proved that they can’t fight 
well in that kind of terrain. Also, Iran has one of the biggest armies in the 
region and there’s also the fact that Iran and Syria a e allies, and if there’s war 
in Iran, Syrians will flock there to help.  
 
 The inclusion of the possibilities that America and Israel could incur severe 
losses in the case of outright war was not taken to mean that the two nations would 
give up on their goals of domination. Instead, they ave had to find more subtle and 
hidden ways of gaining power in the region. The attack on the Twin Towers was one 
such instance, but there have been others, especially recently. In April of 2005, a 
mosque in New York City shocked the Muslim world by allowing a woman to lead 
prayer, not just in front of women, but in front of men as well. Debate raged between 
Muslims in Syria as to whether or not this was an acceptable practice, with some 
asserting that under no circumstance was it allowable for a woman to pray in front of 
a man, much less lead men in prayer (though it would be acceptable for a woman to 
lead a congregation of solely other women). Others argued, however, that “it is better 
that a human being (ibn ou bint adam) lead a prayer than a beast (wahash),” meaning 
here that it was preferable for a woman who was well-educated in Islam to lead the 
prayer than an uneducated man—as explained by an older gentleman educated in an 
Islamic madraseh (school). However, while I was visiting a female friend in her air-
conditioned, New City apartment, her husband assured m  that the whole incident 
was about something much more sinister: 
 
There are reputable [if unspecified] sources that say that this woman was 
being sponsored by the American government and Jewish groups within the 
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U.S. specifically to undermine Islam in its pure form. Along with that, the 
American. government has funded the publishing of a new form of the Qur’ān 
called the al-Furqaan [which, I was told, is another name for the Qur’an] that 
they are sending out to schools all over the place, in luding Kuwait and other 
Gulf states. It is not a correct version, though, and teaches incorrect things, 
like neither jihād nor the veiling of women being a necessity in Islam.66 They 
are working to destroy the real meaning of Islam by spreading this and so 
destroy us from the inside. 
 
That the U.S. and Israel are out to conquer, subvert or destroy the rest of the Middle 
East was a fact of Syrians’ everyday lives. That the rest of the world does not know 
about their intentions was no real surprise, because world leaders—i.e. the 
perpetrators—keep their actions and intentions wellhidden.  
 
(Re)Arranging the Globe 
Analyzing Politics… 
 
These narractions provide an example of the ways in wh ch my Syrian informants 
talked about incidents and political relations across the globe. While Syrians were not 
direct actors in these stories, they did have a vested interest in and a grasp of such 
events and their hidden motives. The according of blame and enacting of revenge 
after the September 11th attacks could, and did, have great repercussions on the 
Muslim and Arab communities. That is, of course, assuming that there is any such 
thing as a Muslim or Arab community. But I would argue that is precisely what these 
narractions do—they serve as an expression/creation of some kind of connection 
between all people who might call themselves Arab or Muslim, in contrast to some of 
the disconnections we saw being done with the narractions in Chapter 2. I shall return 
to this point below.  
 But first, I would like to take a step back and examine the perhaps more 
readily comprehensible idea that these narractions are a form of political analysis. 
They are a space in which Syrians could engage in global politics via creating and 
involving themselves in a discourse of its workings (to which they had little access 
                                                
66 What struck me as interesting in this particular commentary was that the speaker was a Sunni 
Muslim whose wife did not cover, despite being also being a devout Muslim. In other moments, both 
assured me that physical veiling was not necessary for women—it was instead the action of modesty 
(rather than vanity) that was important to be maintained, more than the appearance of it. This, 
however, was not a very common view. 
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otherwise). Through the course of their narracting, to me and each other, Damascenes 
examined what had happened as presented from a variety of sources, assessed the 
context of that representation and the reliability of the sources, and finally drew 
conclusions based on their assessments. They even looked for what might seem to be 
unrelated incidents that lent further support to their conclusions, verifying and 
validating their ideas with external evidence.  
 This process, I would argue, is not so distant from my own experience of 
research, analysis and writing as a budding anthropologist. Jon Anderson (1996) 
agrees that this style of narrative (what he chooses to label as conspiracy theory) is a 
form of political analysis, but one that “proceed[s] from too little information, from 
information that is imprecise, where too little is known. …What is unknown or 
lacking…is a clear indication of the context of what is known” (Anderson 1996:96-
7). However, according to Syrians’ descriptions, it is actually the Western world that 
is making judgments based on too little information; it is they who are not taking the 
full details and context into account. While an American might call a Syrian a 
conspiracy theorist for concluding that it was the Americans and the Jews who 
brought down the Twin Towers, a Syrian would call the American naïve for not 
being willing to face the corrupt and often conspirato ial nature of politics by blithely 
accepting the reports blaming Osama bin Laden.  
 For that is the underlying understanding here: the knowledge that politics and 
political-economic power can (and frequently do) corrupt. That those in power are 
willing to use whatever means, regardless of how immoral they may be, to achieve 
their goals. If the best way to ensure that Arabs and Muslims are internationally 
disgraced is to kill over 3,000 people in a very momentous way, then the powerful 
movers and shakers would not hesitate to do so. But they would have to keep it 
hidden, because even they would not be wholly free from rebuke if they were 
discovered. Immorality, especially amongst politicians and the world’s elite, is to be 
expected. However, that these narractions make certain assumptions about the 
corrupting power of politics is no more or less than what Syrians could (or would) 
tell you themselves. And though they might laugh at themselves in moments and 
acknowledge the conspiratorial aspect of their theories (see pg. 19), they do not need 
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to be told that what they are doing might be a form f political analysis; they already 
know that.  
… and Making Connections 
 
The violation of moral boundaries others could not, r dare not, 
breach was one of the characteristic images of an important man of 
power’s social role….[Great beys (local men of power)] were figures 
who highlighted the moral demands and bounds that sould not be 
crossed by ‘ordinary’ men in sexual and familial life. They were the 
contrast term by which the acceptable could be unambiguously 
avoided (Gilsenan 1996:190-1).   
 
Once again it is not enough to merely re-present Syrian analyses. In doing so, we are 
no more the external, objective observer than are ou  informants, for we are still 
participating. Instead we must shift to participate in the anthropological knowledge 
process, rather than that of our informants (if indee , they are so very different). Thus 
do I return to my analysis of the performative aspects of these narractions. 
 On a very explicit level, the above stories are founded on an understanding of 
global relations. They contain the idea that the United States and Israel, indeed most 
or all of the world’s Jewish population, are close allies. Powerful figures within these 
countries can and do work together to secure the best future for themselves. It also 
rests on and (re)creates the notion that the non-Israeli Middle East is set apart from 
America and Israel; there is both a physical and ideological gap between them. As I 
hinted above, the text of these narractions creates a sense of unity between the 
victimized ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’ population. The description of American soldiers 
landing in Lebanon and being killed was spoken of in proud tones, as if, in this 
moment, there were no distinctions between Syria and Lebanon (thus creating the 
situation where there were none). The concepts of America and Israel, on the other 
hand, in their conniving and harmful intentions, places them ‘outside’ the unifying 
boundary that creates Arabs and Muslims as being insiders. The differences within 
this regional community that we saw being created in the last chapter are not present 
in these narractions; instead we see connections between all Arabs and Muslims in 
contrast to a broad and distinctly ‘foreign’ coalition.  
 Importantly, the different sets of insiders and outsiders we have seen created 
in the different narractions are not contradictory, for connections and disconnections 
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can be maintained at the same time. Further, I am not suggesting that there is a 
nesting or hierarchy of social categories that repeat themselves, fractal-like, at 
different scales (cf. Strathern 1991). Everyone has t e potential to be made into an 
insider or an outsider without hierarchical organiztion (how can they be if the 
situating of someone as inside or outside is a momentary effect?). Fractals, though 
infinitely repeating, require moving further away or closer in to examine the different 
scales. For Syrians, I would argue, everyone is within a single field and within 
equidistant reach of the effects of narractive dis/connections.  
 Returning to the narractions of 9/11, we see that,while they position the two 
factions (Arab/Muslim vs. American/Israeli) as very disparate categories based on 
alliances and motivation, morality also plays its part in distinguishing them. The 
kinds of people who would perpetrate something like the September 11th attacks are 
highly immoral figures. They, whoever they might be, are narracted to exist outside 
the bounds of common humanity and its tendency to preserve life.67 By associating 
these immoral acts and actors with the leaders of America and Israel, the speakers 
were actively positioning the leaders beyond the bounds of what is morally 
acceptable. Not only were ‘they’ out to get a momentarily unified ‘us,’ ‘they’ 
attempted to achieve their goals via sneaky and immoral means. The insider group, 
then, was not just a reactive connection that existd in contrast to a common enemy, 
but was also an active one because the insiders shaed and adhered to a certain moral 
code that was illuminated by those who had broken it. The narractors claimed, using 
these narractions, the moral high ground. Jean-Klein (in press) insightfully suggests 
that morality is not so much a framework (as I have thus far engaged with it here), 
but a process that must be continuously enacted and recreated (much like social 
categories). Narractions such as those I have presented here can, in this light, become 
a way of actually doing morality, as the speakers are delineating and condemning 
‘immoral’ acts and are thus asserting their own moral status.  
 
                                                
67 This is partially reflected, I feel, in the fact that many of my informants were uncomfortable 




Uncertainties68 of Power 
 
However, while from one angle these narractions contain a clear delineation of who 
holds the power and who is connected to whom, the si uation becomes somewhat 
more uncertain when examined from other sides. While t e general acknowledgment 
in these narractions was that America and Israel are far more powerful figures than 
their Arab/Muslim counterparts, the stories also contained a sense of Arab/Muslim 
strength. The foreign powers, in having to rely on secretive methods of attacking 
their enemies, were portrayed as lacking the military might to truly destroy the united 
Arab population. My informants recalled the places and times that this foreign 
military power had failed in the face of Arab or Muslim might. The foreigners were 
not as infallible as they might have thought.  
 This representation and display of oneself as strong is not uncommon in 
Middle Eastern ethnography. It is often described as being a method of maintaining 
one’s (and one’s family’s) honor and social image while avoiding unnecessary or 
unwanted conflict (cf. Dresch 1989, Gilsenan 1976). While Syrians did not say that 
they actually expected any conflict, the potential for it was there, because these two 
groups—the insiders and outsiders—were being created as oppositional and not just 
distinct. But Syrians narracted themselves as being capable of dealing with such a 
threat. This pride at being powerful included other Arab populations as well, 
especially the Lebanese and loosely the Iranians. They are made to be not merely 
united as victims of a common enemy, but as a group that also exists under its own 
volition. They empowered themselves by declaring that ey were not just a passive, 
reactionary collection of people, but an active anddangerous one.  
But these narractions, while describing the Israelis and Americans as weaker 
than commonly thought, were also constructing them as immoral and clever. They 
had moved from brute force to the more subtle methods of trying to make their 
opponents lose face. Gilsenan (1996) suggests that, in Lebanon, using cleverness to 
undercut an overbearing, superior opponent was an admir ble skill, but only effective 
                                                
68 I use this term hesitantly, trying to avoid Reed’s (2003:19 n. 5) critique that some anthropologists 
“set about critiquing anthropological representations that rely on idioms of totality, unit and presenc  
by highlighting what they take to be the ambiguous, continually deferred and transient.” What I wish 
to illustrate here is neither an idiom of totality or transience, but rather how the two can be contained 
within a single instance. I would critique instead the strict adherence to either absolute.  
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when used in a face-to-face situation where one could twit the other and leave 
them standing with no reply. Here, the victims (i.e. the insiders) did not occupy a 
superior position (in relation to standing in the global community—though they have 
set themselves up as equals in terms of military capability). And the Israeli/American 
deviousness went behind the backs of Syrians, rather than facing them head on and 
giving them the opportunity to retort. Being clever might be laudable, but only in the 
right situations.  
 There are further unexpected (dis)connections within these stories as well. 
My informants once again pre-empted anthropologists, in that they were well-versed 
in how to examine the sub-divisions within a seemingly unified group (Ortner 1995). 
They implicitly called into question the actual existence of a firm alliance between 
Israel and the United States. The interpretation of the events of September 11th 
contain an unstated accusation that the Jews (and select U.S. politicians) attacked 
American soil. The goal may have been to discredit the Muslim world, but the action 
killed thousands of Americans. In narracting these divides, Syrians were observing 
and recreating lines of disconnection between two outsiders, disconnections that did 
not directly involve the speaker or anyone in the sp aker’s ‘inside’ (for the course of 
this narraction), which we will encounter again below. 
 The fluidity with which connections and disconnections were made reflects 
several things. They point to an uncertainty about the exact nature of politics today, 
as to who really holds the power. But there is nothing wrong with being confused, the 
narractions seem to say, because everything of consequence happens out of sight. 
Performatively speaking, there was never a constant or permanent dividing line 
between who is inside or out; any such divides were constantly in flux, being made, 
remade and unmade, sometime in the course of a single narraction. Within, as well as 
across, accounts, the nature of the world and the ways in which Syrians related 
everything to everything else was subject to change. This process was not ambiguous 
for Syrians—they had no problems effecting multiple connections or disconnections 
at the same time for they did not see them as multiple processes. The effects of these 
narractions are momentary and multi-sited, coming and going as quickly as the words 




And Making Connections, Take Two 
 
What I have outlined above shows how such narractions of international practices 
and motives recreate and reposition figures across the globe. But they also have a 
further connection-making capacity, one that is much more ‘everyday’ and personal. 
My understanding of this other aspect stems from the fact that, as I mentioned in the 
opening description of the September 11th attacks, every time I was involved in a 
discussion, my Syrian informants would ask me my opini n. Or, even if they did not 
outright ask, they would probe to see what my reaction would be. Frequently, this 
questioning would take place the first time I met a particular person. Even at the 
time, I felt as if they were ‘sounding’ questions, a  if people were using them to 
gauge their opinions of me. The following are brief excerpts taken from my 
fieldnotes in moments where I was faced with such questioning. I always answered 
honestly and was not sure if there was a ‘correct’ answer or what it might have been. 
 
In the midst of conversations ranging from the problems of being a working 
woman in Syria to her dislike of French vampire films, Haya mentioned, 
almost in an offhand manner, the silliness of the idea that a man living in a 
cave in Afghanistan could bring down the Twin Towers. She suggested that 
the Jews, on the other hand, were much more powerful than that. She quickly 
moved on to another topic, but I noticed her eyes had been on me the whole 
time, with a slight smile on her face.  
 
Without warning, Alia, a single, retired woman, turned and asked if I thought 
Arabs really perpetrated the attacks of September 11th and I said yes, I 
thought it was Osama bin Laden—he had said so, after ll. She didn’t 
respond, but just nodded slowly with her eyes narrowed, giving me the sense 
that she was disagreeing and had made some judgment of me. 
 
Within an hour of meeting me in her spacious and lavishly-decorated sitting 
room, Abeer turned and asked me what I thought about September 11th, 
specifically the idea that it might have been staged by the Americans 
themselves, with Osama bin Laden only acting as a scapegoat. She seemed 
rather amenable to the idea, nodding as she mentiond the possibility. I said 
that I didn’t really know, but hoped not. She merely nodded at me. 
 
 All of these women were older than I, well-educated and from middle class 
backgrounds. With later reflection, I realized that my responses to their probing led 
them to position me (in relation to them) as a somewhat naïve, younger, American 
woman. I was external to them and to their knowledge. However, by broaching the 
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topic at all, they were creating a space for connection between us, where I could 
move in to occupy a position as a younger woman who could (and possibly wished 
to) be educated by those with more experience of the world. They established me as 
an effective pupil, bringing me ‘inside’ to a degree, and indicated that I was (made) 
trustworthy enough to discuss sensitive political issues with. This ‘political talk’ 
served as an opportunity for them to assess and position me, and not just in 
subsequent ‘political’ conversations, but in all aspects of life. Indeed, each woman 
spent much time explicitly instructing me in all manners of things, from how to 
balance career and home life, to how to negotiate the Syrian medical system, to what 
to wear during Ramadan. Politics, then, could even serve to inform the state of 
everyday relations—engaging the political opened up room for engaging non-
political life. And with time, it even allowed me to begin to assert myself in a role 
that was less prominently that of the student in need of teaching. My age kept me in a 
somewhat more minor status, but my foreign-ness and my growing ability with 
politics and how to discuss it contributed to a slow change in how people 
(specifically these women) related to me. For instace, I was finally able to challenge 
them on some of their hypothesizing, such as the instance I presented in Chapter 1 
(pg 19). 
 
The Death of Yasser Arafat 
 
There was perhaps only one major event during my stay in Syria that did not elicit a 
massive wave of debate: the death of Yasser Arafat. There was no need to discuss it, 
because it was obvious to everyone that the Israeli leaders had had him poisoned. 
This would seem to provide further support for the idea that it is only the unobvious 
and the hidden which are really worth discussing in depth—there is no use in 
theorizing over what is plain to see.69 Instead the talk surrounding Arafat focused on 
two other broad, but related issues. The first was ho his successor would be—one 
friend informed me that the Israelis would likely release one of their Palestinian 
political prisoners so that he could run for the prsidency. After years of having him 
                                                
69 Compare this to the description of September 11th, where what was too openly visible was the 
official representation and therefore suspect. Here, what is obvious to everyone is invisible in the 
official version, again making the official representation unbelievable. 
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in prison, they had him well trained and he would therefore make an excellent puppet 
leader. In such conversations, my informants were again positioning Palestinians as 
insiders, people with a shared background and enemies, somewhat of a seeming 
contrast to the way Syrians narracted Palestinians when discussing their presence in 
Syria.  
 However, not all of the accusations of hidden activities were directed against 
the Israelis. After the initial outcries of sorrow and claims of brotherhood with the 
Palestinians in their loss, there was a great deal of t lk about the scandals 
surrounding Arafat, including those he and other high-level Palestinians were 
involved in and those that sprung up after his death. The central concern here was 
money, how it was used, and the struggle for it afterwards. The narractions, here 
compiled from the narrations of two informants,70 posited that the Palestinian leaders 
were more interested in money than their supposed cause of an autonomous 
Palestine. Each of the leaders was said to have vast sums of money in foreign 
accounts, money that they could have used to help tir people, but instead kept for 
themselves. They would meet in Sharm al-Sheikh in fancy hotels with air 
conditioning and nice food, talking about the state of affairs while their people were 
starving to death. Arafat was perhaps one of the worst, as (so middle class Syrians 
said) he was the ninth richest man in the world, having taken much of the money 
donated to the Palestinian cause and put it into his personal bank accounts. After his 
death, an Israeli group of officials began confronting other leading Palestinians about 
Arafat’s accounts, but the Palestinians refused to respond.  
 And this greed extended beyond the official leaders. After he died, I was told, 
Arafat’s wife began publicly screaming at the Palestinian dignitaries in France. She 
accused them of trying to take his money and insisted that he was not dead yet. 
However, as righteous as she sounded, it was believed to be a façade, because she 
actually wanted the money for herself. She was described as a “vulgar” (ghalīzeh) 
woman who managed to get all the money in the end, though there was hope that 
other, newer Palestinian leaders would try to take it from her and use it for the cause 
as it was intended. And a further critique of her arose when we saw Arafat’s wife and 
ten year-old daughter on television and my married female friend watching it with 
                                                




me tutted and said, “Their daughter is very pretty, but that’s strange because Arafat 
was so ugly and his wife is not only ghalīzeh, but she’s not at all attractive (halweh) 
either.” 
 The commentary on secretive Israeli involvement in Arafat’s death and the 
setting up of a more amenable regime in Palestine is hardly surprising, given other 
narratives that externalize Israel. But here again we see the complexities of the 
positioning of other ‘groups’ that are both like the narractors and not—specifically, 
the Palestinians. The death itself might have been attributed to meddling foreign 
powers, but what it illuminated were the scandals that hese powerful Palestinian 
leaders were involved in—in effect, they were corrupt. And we encounter here a 
situation where there was a complication (for the anthropologist) in trying to 
determine exactly who was being other-ed. Just as ‘America’ did not seem to always 
mean all Americans, but sometimes instead referred to a subset of powerful ones 
(who would be willing to organize an attack on their own country), so here 
‘Palestinians’ seemed to refer to elite members of the Palestinian movement. 
Palestinians were narracted to not always be a unified category. But by the same 
token, in creating distance from the leaders of a place—as Syrians are doing with 
their morality-work—there is the possibility for a lesser, but parallel distancing from 
the population of that place as well. The general ‘P estinians’ after all, allowed their 
leaders to hoard and squander the money intended to help the entire population and 
did nothing to stop it.  
 The narractions create a highly dynamic and constantly shifting set of 
alliances, of incorporation and separation. In the course of two tellings we can see a 
differentiation not only between the taken-for-granted categories of insiders and 
outsiders (Muslims and Jews) but also between Syrians and Palestinians, a 
disconnection that is made within the same narraction as the Arab-solidarity 
connection. Or perhaps it can be read as a case of insiders being made to include 
those Arabs without vast amounts of wealth but with a strong sense of morality 
versus outsiders as the rich and powerful who were illing to sell out their beliefs to 
further their personal gain. Or perhaps it is both at once. The fact that this shifting 
seems confusing and muddled emphasizes the point that et nographic writing and 
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our tendency to break things into discrete compartmen s can be more hindering than 
it revealing. 
 There are three other points worth noting here. One is that in combining the 
various positionings of the above analysis, there em rges a moment where the 
Palestinians were set up as being very much insiders with Syrians (and, by extension, 
other Muslim Arabs), and that the corrupt Palestinian officials at the top originate 
from that otherwise moral population. This configuration highlights a concept of 
power’s tendency to corrupt and that there is, in a sense, an expectation of this 
corruption.71 But the stories of Arafat’s scandals reveal that it is not only distant and 
very foreign persons who are susceptible. Even people ‘like us’ (and maybe even us, 
ourselves?) who currently hold the moral high ground were liable, in fact likely, to be 
corrupted if placed in the right circumstances of pwer and wealth. Morality then 
becomes a more complex concept, with it being uncertain if people are defined by 
their strength of morals, or if the morals that peol  abide by are determined by who 
and where they are in society. And it certainly retu ns us to the idea that if morality is 
not constantly being enacted (as it is obviously was not by Arafat and his 
companions), then the actors will slip from a positively moral status.  
 The second thing that I wish to note here is the importance of appearance. 
Appearance, what was made visible and what was kept out of sight, has been present 
in various forms throughout the examples I have givn thus far. It will continue to be 
so throughout and I will attempt to unpack it more thoroughly in other places. 
However, I wish here to merely draw attention to the fact that my (female) informant, 
in the context of ‘talking politics,’ thought it important to include an assessment of 
the physical appearance of Arafat, his wife and his daughter. It was not the first or 
last time I heard such a commentary. Indeed, one friend told me that Hilary Clinton 
would never become president because she was not attractive enough and she had 
bad taste in suits. She went on to say that Bill Clnton had been a great president, in 
no small part because he was so handsome. Perhaps an emphasis on the physical 
appearance stems from the importance in this region that a leader has a physical 
presence (Gilsenan 1996:3-4; Layne 1994:146). 
                                                
71 Similarly, Ibn Khaldoun (2005:133-138) argues that dynasties become “senile” after three 
generations, and are prone to lying, weakness and cowardice 
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  Or perhaps this is also a more gendered way of engagi g in politics, for it was 
always my female informants making such comments. It parallels a way in which 
women engaged with each other in everyday life. Alternating flowering praise and 
scathing critique was one of the primary forms of social interaction among women. 
While attending a wedding, one of the groom’s nieces, of an age with me, told me 
that I was very pretty, but her cousin was far prettier han me. She also disapproved 
of my outfit of trousers and a nice top. She and all of the close relatives of the 
marrying couple were decked out in ballroom gowns, with their hair professionally 
done and faces made up exquisitely. My hair too had been professionally styled, but 
everyone was quite willing to tell me that it was not a very nice style on me. Weight 
also seemed to be an all-important indicator of a woman’s quality, as it was 
inevitably commented on, with the loss of weight (nahfāneh) being greeted with 
delighted cries (from both the speaker and the one who has lost the weight), and the 
gaining of weight (samnāneh) was addressed in a disapproving tone, but was usually 
(mockingly) laughed off. Salamandra (2004) neatly describes the antagonism that is 
frequent in female socialization, challenging the traditional anthropological 
representations of a loving and harmonic harem of women. As she notes, “relatively 
young, unmarried women from elsewhere find relationships with Syrian women 
difficult to form and also nearly impossible to maint in” (2004:64), a sentiment I was 
well-familiar with. I found that younger women and ol er, married women were 
much easier to get on with than women of my own age, with whom there was a 
constant sense of challenge and competition. And appearance was an all-important 
tool in the course of these encounters. It was not that these Syrian women were being 
unfriendly, but more that the negative aspects of their relationships (as important to 
the relationship as the positive part) were sometimes a bit difficult for a woman 
raised outside of Syria to understand and engage in (see Chapter 7 for elaboration on 
the duplexity of affection and challenging in everyda  relationships). With this in 
mind, I might suggest that awareness and critique of appearance was indeed a way 
for women (and men as well—they were not totally isolated from these challenging 
interactions) to engage in politics.  
 There is one final point I would like to make, in reference to a single line in 
the narraction of corruption: “After his death, an Israeli group of officials began 
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confronting these leading Palestinians about Arafat’s accounts, but the Palestinians 
refused to respond.” In this depiction, the Israelis were the only ones trying to hold 
the corrupt Palestinian leaders accountable for thei actions. Though the speaker was 
trying to emphasize the immorality of the Palestinians’ actions, by choosing to 
describe it in this way, he was also making (if possibly without meaning to) a quiet 
moral judgment about the Israelis in this instance. If hoarding and stealing funds is 
made out to be morally bad here, then the attempt to make the conspirators 
accountable becomes morally good. This moment was one of the only times I heard 
the Israelis presented in a positive light; through the course of this description, my 
informant was creating a positive connection with the Israelis via a set of shared 
morals that would discourage hoarding. Granted, the connection was not a 
particularly strong one and was much negated by the ot r narractions, but it is small 
moments like this that emphasize the very fluidity of relations. It points to the idea 
that multiple connections between and lines around ‘dots’ (i.e. people) can exist 
simultaneously. Some might argue that these are competing narratives that create 
competing connections, but I would argue that both c nnections and disconnections 
exist as potentials and can both be enacted by anyone at the same time or in turns. 
(Love-hate relationships are hardly an uncommon concept.) This duplexity also 
indicates that relations must constantly be maintained or risk becoming non-
connections (i.e. being reduced to merely potentials, neither connections nor 
disconnections). In this vague area of potentiality, there is no relating, no sense of 
positioning between two objects, merely the possibility of lines along which 
dis/connections can be engaged. There are no primord al connections between 
people(s), but only potentials that are either enacted or not, and these can and do exist 
in a field of multiplicity. 
 
The Death of Rafik Hariri  
 
One of the sensible follow-ups to looking at Arafat’s death is to look at the next 
major death incident that occurred while I was in Syria: the former Lebanese prime 
minister Rafik Hariri. I was sitting in a friend’s shop in a bustling sūq the day the 
bombing in Beirut occurred. Someone phoned him and told him to turn on the 
satellite to the news, where we watched the aftermath. Nearby street vendors and a 
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steady stream of clients poured into the shop through t the day, checking for 
updates and quietly sharing thoughts on what had happened. Unlike the Arafat case, 
everyone was talking about and debating who had killed Hariri. Arafat’s death had 
been in a hospital and relatively quiet. In contrast, the Hariri assassination was 
unexpected, public, and very clearly politically motivated, but as far as Syrians were 
concerned, there was no immediately obvious guilty party, no one group that would 
want him dead. They began to line up suspects and analyze each one’s motives, 
finding arguments and counter-arguments for all of them. Throughout the course of 
that first day, the Israeli and Syrian governments were the first to be considered as 
potential assassins. This then shifted to suspecting the Israelis and the Americans 
working together, and ended with Syria being ruled out as a suspect and factions 
within Lebanon (possibly aided by Israel) joining the list of potential conspirators. 
The inclusion of Lebanese people was based on an ide  that there were camps in both 
Lebanon and Israel for whom war was a justification f r keeping up large armies and 
weapon stockpiles. In an ironic turn, various customers told me, shaking their heads 
ruefully, that such groups would actually be willing to work together in order to 
ensure a status quo of official and popular tensions and an on-the-verge-of-war 
status.  
 By the time I left the field in summer 2005, there was no real resolution in 
Syrian minds as to who had ctually killed Hariri. The only conclusion that Syrians 
would draw (and even this with caveats and hesitations) was that, logically, the 
Syrian government was not involved, if for no other reason than they would be the 
first ones blamed in such a situation and ultimately stood only to lose by the death (in 
terms of global repercussions), a logic that we also saw applied in the Twin Towers 
case.  
 Here again, the narractions created a sense of inside and outside. There was 
the association of certain Lebanese groups—that elsewhere had been considered 
‘inside’ as either Muslim or Arab—with the ultimate enemy of Israel. Syrians’ 
theorizing worked to distance Syria from Lebanon and call attention to the uncertain 
moral stance of Lebanese factions that would abandon their principles to achieve 
their goals. It created (by identifying) hidden connections between Lebanon and 
Israel, meaning that perhaps the former was not to be so readily trusted. Of course, 
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this repositioning of Lebanon as something distant from Syria was also a 
reaffirmation of the rocky relations between the two countries (or some parties within 
Lebanon) in the aftermath of the Syrian involvement in the Lebanese civil war. But I 
would argue that these narractive accusations were not only the restating of official 
and historical tensions. The tension and the divisions were being actively created as 
Syrians narracted the countries into certain positions, but did so within and around 
narractions that also (re)created a pan-Arab unity i  he mourning of the loss of one 




In and amongst all of this hypothesizing as to the perpetrators’ identity were stories 
about Hariri and his life, much like in Arafat’s case. However, these stories were (at 
least initially) very positive, even coming from Syrians, whom he was supposedly 
working against.72 Awestruck, middle class Damascenes told a tale of his rags-to-
riches history, and though people criticized him for being so rich (one informant 
claimed he might have been the fourth richest man in the world), they explained that 
he gave a lot to his country, and put himself and his own comforts last. He did not 
impoverish himself, but he did things for Lebanon, including rebuilding parts of 
Beirut and funding something like 30-40,000 students to go study abroad. At first the 
Lebanese grumbled that he had sent a small army out of the country, but many of my 
university-educated Syrian informants considered it a wise idea, as it ensured that 
there would be an army of well-educated Lebanese who would be able to return to 
their country and help secure its future, rather than creating an ultimately useless 
generation of gun-toting jedbān (‘idiots’—indicating the required military service 
that young Syrian men have to attend). Though it may have also been a comment on 
the quality of Syrian higher education being below European or even Lebanese 
standards.  
 On a more personal level, Syrians, especially but not only women, told stories 
about the romance of Hariri’s life, a fairy-tale love that spanned the ages of time. 
They told me how he and his current wife were in love many years ago when he was 
                                                
72 Various commentators emphasized the good, working relationship between Hariri and the Syrian 
government, even though they were striving for different things. 
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still poor, but because she had belonged to a wealthy family, they had not been 
allowed to marry. They had both married someone els, but after he got his fortune, 
they each divorced their respective spouses so that they could finally be together. 
Generally newspapers were full of praise for Hariri’s works, and the streets were full 
of public sympathy for his loss. He was lauded with praise, while emotions ran high, 
his death creating a pan-Arab sense of outrage and unity. He was every Arab’s hero, 





At the same time, other, darker stories began circulating, closer to those that appeared 
after Arafat’s death. A different image of Hariri began to emerge. While sitting with 
him in his second home in the mountains, one upper-middle class Christian 
informant, with scorn apparent in his voice, told me that the guy (zelemeh) was a 
multi-billionaire who had had investments in all sort  of suspect ventures. One of his 
projects had apparently involved the filling in of some of the sea along the coast and 
making himself a wide stretch of new beach-front property, which he could sell at his 
whatever prices he wished. This drove down the prices of what had formerly been 
beachfront property. My informant considered it awful that someone would do that, 
ruining not just the land value of the previous beachfront, but also all of the 
sentimental value that many of these places had for pe ple who had spent their 
vacations there. And all to make some money.   
 Other rumors began to circulate about his marriages, whispers that he had not 
just divorced his first wife, but had effectively sold her to a Saudi Arabian man for 
millions of dollars. And, echoing the themes of appearance surrounding Arafat and 
his wife, one Sunni friend, whose husband had just bought them a new apartment, 
told me with a shake of her head that Hariri’s second wife had spent quite a bit of 
time in Paris at his expense and had quite a bit of plastic surgery done. Given the 
amount of lipstick she had been wearing to the funeral, my informant suspected that 
the most recent was lip surgery. It was either in the process of healing or had gone 
horribly wrong and hence the lipstick. This display of vanity, rather than a more 
subdued grief, is apparently a faux-pas at Muslim funerals, and my friend was 
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disgusted. But this disapproval then spread back somewhat onto Hariri himself, for 
being so foolish at having chosen and loved such a s allow, selfish, superficial wife.  
 Such narracted personal attacks are similar to the methods that Gilsenan 
(1996:52) describes his Lebanese informants using to discredit and shame their 
opponents, especially narractions of a morally upright man being able to shame his 
opponent, who is then refigured as the less capable and moral man. However, 
whether it is just Hariri who was the object of Syrians’ attack or whether this 
negativity extended to the Lebanese population more generally was unclear. Either 
way, this created a substantially different positioning than the narractions of praise, 
setting Hariri (and at least other rich politicians like him) as partially immoral and 
corrupt, thus backlighting what a proper man should do (not destroy that which 
belongs to everyone for personal gain) and also what a proper wife should not be 
(vain, especially in moments of sorrow). The inclusion of these famous figures in the 
roles of the morally inconsistent helps to form a sense of what proper morals that all 
good Arabs should adhere to—by being described as not doing so, these figures (and 
perhaps the people they represent) were being sharply disconnected from Syrians. 
And again, we see the theme that power can and does corrupt anyone.  
 
Son of the City73  
 
One of the most direct critiques of Hariri came noti  stories of praise or rumors of 
shame in his financial and private lives, but in the form of humor. Navaro-Yashin 
(2002:23, 25) notes how humor can play a pivotal role in creating space for people to 
                                                
73 ‘Son of the City’ (ibn al-medineh) is, in Damascus, a term that implies classiness, good breeding, 
and a certain amount of wealth. It is a term of respect, and one I usually heard from middle class 
informants who were describing their social superiors. It pointedly did not refer to only financial 
superiors, because the nouveaux riches who were originally from the countryside were not included in 
this category. However, it was not limited to people from Damascus, as it could also be applied to 
those from other cities, especially Beirut. This is an interesting contrast to the term ibn al-balad (son 
of the country) in Egypt, which refers to a certain type of people considered to be ‘real’ Egyptians who 
have certain characteristics and traits, but only come from Cairo (and usually specific neighborhoods 
within Cairo). Ibn al-balad, unlike ibn al-medineh, generally refers to a lower socio-economic class of 
person and can be either a positive (in a ‘salt of the earth’ way) or a negative term (indicating somene 
who is backwards and unsophisticated) (El-Messiri 1978). Both are an ideal(ized) form of identity, 
though, and can be played on to emphasize the effects of wealth and corruption (Armbrust 1996). Both 
also have something to say about modernity and relations with the West, where an ibn al-balad is 
someone who maintains his traditions over Western ones, while an ibn al-medineh would likely be 




articulate their concerns, and is an “orally produced popular fiction [that is]…one of 
the most effective arenas for the production and consumption of discourse on local 
culture.” However, I feel it is no great leap to sub titute ‘personal and national 
politics’ in place of her ‘local culture.’ Looking at political humor as an ethnographic 
site becomes especially appropriate in the context of this thesis, because it is an 
unofficial and often indirect language of politics. Humor, like conspiracy theories, 
assumes that invisible connections will be made, i.e. that both speaker and listener 
will pick up on and understand the (same) unsaid context. Via humor, political 
critique can be disguised as something that, to an bserver, is not particularly serious. 
Humor also allows for the changing of names and places that relies on a shared 
knowledge of process and context that will allow both speaker and listener to know 
who the joke is ‘really’ about. However, even though it is hidden, such humor can 
still be hazardous if the wrong people (i.e. those in power or who are the butt of the 
jokes) are made aware of its existence.74 Mobile phones, especially SMS messages, 
are an increasingly popular forum for sharing and spreading humor in Syria. Given 
the widespread presence of mobile phones, jokes could travel across vast networks of 
people in very little time. But this is particularly dangerous, as SMS messages can be 
traced and decoded if the powers-that-be have any influence in the mobile phone 
companies. Iran recently experienced such an instance, when the president 
accidentally (maybe) received an SMS joke about himself. The incident was 
followed by a judiciary investigation into SMS conte  and several arrests of those 
caught passing on uncomplimentary or political humor essages (Tait 2006).   
 Returning to Rafik Hariri, after the Mehlis report n UN’s investigation into 
the assassination came out (strongly implicating several members in the upper 
echelons of the Syrian government), I sent an email to some friends in Syria to see 
what the general opinion of the report was there. One replied by sending me the 
following joke, written out in the colloquial Syrian dialect (nb. ‘son of the city’ (ibn 
al-medineh) is a term implying class, refinement and wealth): 
 
                                                
74 As Wedeen (1999:45), ‘mundane transgressions’ suchas humor, rumor and gossip are ways of 




Once upon a time, a ‘son of the city,’ Fouad, went to the countryside and 
made an agreement with a farmer to buy a donkey for 100 dollars and said 
he would come to collect the donkey the following day. 
At the meeting the next day, the farmer said, “Forgive me, sir, but I have bad 
news. The donkey died.” 
Fouad replied, “No problem, give me my money back then.” 
The farmer said, “But I spent the money.” 
Fouad: “Still no problem. Just give me the dead donkey.” 
The farmer asked him, “But what do you want to do with a dead donkey?” 
Fouad: “I want to raffle him off.” 
The farmer: “Is it possible to raffle off a dead donkey?!” 
Fouad: “Yeah, why not? I won’t tell anyone that it’s dead. Wait and see.” 
After a month passed, the farmer met Fouad and asked him, “What happened 
with the dead donkey?” 
Fouad: “I raffled it. I sold five hundred tickets that cost two dollars apiece, so 
in the end, I made $998.” 
The Farmer: “And no one figured it out [that the donkey was dead]?!” 
Fouad: “No one figured it out except the person who on the raffle, so I 
refunded his two dollars.” 
And the days passed, and Fouad grew into a man and, in time, became the 
prime minister of Lebanon… 
 
 So here, then, in the face of international pressure and the results of a report 
that indicated that Syrian officials were most likely involved in the assassination of 
Hariri, a joke began to make the rounds that portrayed the former Prime Minister as a 
liar and a cheat. He was and had always been, according to the joke, an immoral 
figure. A pseudonym was used, but the details, especially when taking into account 
that the joke itself was a response to my request for in ormation on the Hariri report, 
would make it clear to any Syrian that it was referring to Hariri. He went from being 
poor to being one of the richest men in Lebanon, but the joke seems to say that this 
ascent was not without its victims. But there is also an undertone of another critique, 
one towards the people of Lebanon themselves, as suckers who trusted him with their 
money and their country. Fouad may have been a thief, but the people themselves 
were the ones who were foolish enough to give him money for a dead donkey. 
Indeed, in such a light, Fouad/Hariri is cast as a clever city boy, playing on the 
ignorance of the rural folk. However, as we have seen, cleverness is only a positive 
trait when properly enacted, not against country bumpkins who are substantially 
inferior (that this joke was being circulated amongst urban Syrians who do consider 
themselves socially superior to people from the country is relevant here). This 
humor, then, turns the Hariri worship on its head, instead making him the butt of a 
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barely veiled criticism. And the Lebanese themselves came under fire, for being such 
fools to have let him take advantage of them. The rich Arab figure was distanced 
from Syrians by his act of immorality and inappropriate cleverness, the Lebanese 
people themselves were also being positioned as different from and more foolish and 
naïve than the (Syrian) speakers.  
 
Inside or Outside? 
 
Such Syrian criticism of a Lebanese figure and Leban se people creates a 
disconnection between the two general populations (rather than just between one’s 
general population and the other’s elites), with the Syrians setting themselves up as 
‘wiser’ in more-than-slightly condescending manner.75 This moment steps away from 
a unified-Arab sentiment and instead shifts back to one that is based on state borders 
(as we saw in Chapter 2), despite (or in spite of?)how artificial people may claim the 
delineation of Bilad al-Sham is and was. Syrians were presenting/making themselves 
as something distinctly separate from the Lebanese. Jokes were not the only moments 
that challenged the solidarity of the Arab world, for there was a similar shifting of 
perspective in the way Syrians talked about their Lbanese ‘cousins.’ Indeed, the 
family metaphor is appropriate, for one urban informant, when I asked her about the 
difference between the situations in Syria and in Lebanon, hesitated and then replied,  
 
Countries are like families, and not all parents rai e their children in the same 
way. Governments are like the parents and the people like the children, and 
they vary depending on how much the ‘parents’ are concerned with taking 
care of the people or taking care of themselves. 
 
That my question prompted her to answer in terms of family indicates that she saw 
some connection between the two countries’ statuses and family. However, the two 
were made out to have different sets of parents. Inerestingly, though she was not 
comfortable in answering further questions on this opic, I had the distinct impression 
that when she spoke of parents prioritizing themselves above their children, she 
meant Syria and not Lebanon. In either case, her description of the countries situated 
                                                
75 Though this joke and the superior tone within it seem to disregard the reality of the Syrian situation 
in regards to their own leaders’ finances, it is something that they are always aware of (see section on 
Syrian Criminals, Chapter 4). Indeed, it is, perhaps, their own awareness of the fact that they are being 
swindled that they feel allows them to be critical of their blind neighbors. 
 
95 
them as being both similar and dissimilar—the Lebanese (in this moment) were both 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ Syrians’ circles of closeness and relation, with all the 
complexities and complications found in familial relationships.  
 The feel to these sorts of conversations was very much one of older siblings 
or cousins talking about a younger, more childish relative, one they loved and were 
responsible for, but were not always proud of. Almost as if Lebanon, between the 
war and its “superficial” population, was somewhat of a black sheep of the Arab 
family. Again, this points to a (re)creation of connections, via narracting Syrians and 
Lebanese to be members of the same family, but also disc nnections, where the two 
populations were made into distinct groups with onebeing far superior (in their own 
minds) to the other. Though even this arrangement was not always certain, for there 
were moments when Syrians also positioned the Lebanese i  ways that made them 
superior to Syrians—saying, for instance, that the Lebanese people loved and cared 
about their capital city (and Syrians do not), and suggesting that the Lebanese 
government takes better care of its ‘children.’ This variation illustrates the 
complexity of the relations between the people of the two countries and that the 
relationship between them is not concrete in people’s minds. It is a constantly 
shifting and highly variable dis/connection, always being rediscovered, reconsidered, 




Through the course of this chapter, I have touched on issues concerning morality, 
cleverness, and assumptions about corruption and the conspiratorial processes of 
global politics. I have also attempted to present and elaborate on a variety of ways 
and types of dis/connections that my Syrian informants made via their narractions of 
various other people. Often the connections or disconnections were made between 
the other party and the (Syrian) speakers, but sometimes they were narracted between 
two parties that were not Syrians (e.g. Americans and Israelis being portrayed as a 
single group, or Israeli and Lebanese factions acting as one to kill Hariri). Most 
importantly, I have tried to emphasize the shifting and impermanent nature of these 
connections and disconnections and that no one is byond the reach of connectability. 
In other words, people as far from the everyday encou ters of Syrian lives as George 
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Bush, Tony Blair, or Ariel Sharon are just as capable of being included in Syrian 
narractions (and thus being connected to or disconnected from) as Bashar al-Asad or 
one’s neighbor.  
 Another way to think about the connections and disconnections produced by 
Syrian narractions might be as a process of relating. In connecting to or 
disconnecting from other people, narractors are positioning those other people in 
relation to themselves (or each other); they are implicitly saying how these other 
people relate to them and are therefore creating that specific state of relations, even if 
only for a moment. The regularly repeated performance of specific forms of relations 
is what gives them a permanent feel. It is not necessary for the other party to 
reciprocate this relating, in a sense making these connections ‘partial’ (to borrow a 
term from Strathern 1991). However, as much as they engaged in observing and 
analyzing, Syrians always expected that they too were under observation and 
analysis—expected that other people were always situating them in relation to other 
people. The narractor was also always potentially a subject in someone else’s 
narractions (a thought I shall return to more fully in Chapter 7).  
 What might the broader implications of connections a d disconnections as a 
form of relating might be? In positioning other peole using narractions of identity 
and political conspiracies, Syrians have a way of knowing the patterns of social 
relations, even as they are creating them. Therefore what I would argue is that what 
these narractions do is construct knowledge. This is hardly a new idea. According to 
Hegel’s phenomenology (1977:52-53, emphasis in original; cf. Lindholm 1997:753), 
 
Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the 
same time relates to it, or, as it is said, this something exists for 
consciousness; and the determinate aspect of this relating, or of the being of 
something for a consciousness, is knowing. 
 
Hegel is speaking in terms of consciousness, but a simple change of term from 
“consciousness” to “a person” is not an unreasonable interpretation. He argues that 
“knowing” is an aspect of the process of relating. He explains further that one can 
never know a “being-in-itself,” but only how it exists for oneself, i.e. how it relates to 
oneself. In terms of the doing of social categories, I read this as saying that we can 
never know or define social categories except as they relate to us. Whether or not the 
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social categories exist as beings-in-themselves is irrelevant, because we (as Syrian 
narractors or anthropologists76) can never know them as such, because the moment 
we makes something an object of our analysis, we begin to relate to it and can only 
know it according to those relations (cf. Bourdieu 1977 and Mitchell’s reading of 
him, 1988:51-52). The object is thus only created when it is made into an object by 
someone attempting to know it. For all intents and purposes, social categories do not 
exist until we narract them, and they do not exist after we have turned our attention 
elsewhere.  
 If, then, what I have been describing is ultimately a process of knowledge 
creation, it is worth comparing it to other models of knowledge production currently 
in use in anthropology. One of the most common metaphors associated with 
knowledge is that of the fractal, made popular by Marilyn Strathern (1991). There 
seem to be two slightly different, but related readings of the fractal. Wagner 
(1991:162) provides one; he “define[s] the concept of a fractal person in contrast to 
singularity and plurality…[a] person who is neither singular nor plural.” A fractal, 
for him, is a solution that is neither zero nor 1, neither nor anything discrete in 
between. He cites the Siane (from the Melanesian area) use of the word ‘father’, 
which “is not necessarily identified with a so-called primary kin term here, and is 
neither singular nor plural. The term has a fractal implication, equally applicable to 
both situations” (1991:162-163). In other words, it can apply to both situations, but is 
neither. However, it is not necessary to invoke a fractal image here. Indeed, a Syrian 
informant once told me his hypothesis of people and Go . He drew a square with 
sides of 1, and then asked me what the hypotenuse’s length was. I replied the square 
root of 2. He nodded and said that within the discrete space of a box with area 1, 
there was a diagonal that was infinite. He was refer ing to the fact that the square root 
of 2 is complex number, extending infinitely beyond the decimal point with a 
sequence that never repeats itself (contrast this to the fractal that does repeat its 
                                                
76 Jean-Klein and Riles (2005) note how human rights organizations have co-opted the spaces and 
practices of anthropologists studying human rights. The case of Syrian observation strangely parallels 
that—as I have noted in several places, I realized in Syria that all of my informants were far more 
experienced participant observers than myself, and were also well ahead of me in terms of analysis. 
Jean-Klein and Riles encourage authors to see “what anthropological encounters with human rights 
contribute to the development of our discipline” (2005:174). In a similar turn, I hope to allow Syrian 




pattern). And beyond complicating his argument by the introduction of such a term 
as fractality, I do not think Wagner’s understanding of fractal fits in the case of 
Syrian relating and knowledge formation. Here we have encountered narractions 
which are both (and not ‘neither’) actions and narrations. We have seen that doing 
relations involves both connections and disconnections. They are only ‘neither’ one 
thing nor the other when they are not currently being activated, and then exist only as 
potential connections. But none of this seems to requi  a complicated image like a 
fractal. 
 Another interpretation of the fractal metaphor is as an image that repeats itself 
at different scales, where one can zoom in or out and the image will never become 
less (or more) detailed. Maurer (2002:660) takes up this image and argues that 
“knowledge is produced through shifts in scale, leve s of abstraction from a 
‘reality.’” However, there are a number of reasons I feel that such a metaphor falls 
apart in dealing with Syrian narractions (and possibly is revealed to do so more 
generally). My first concern is about the rigidity of such a model (cf. Harvey 
1996:46). Fractals may be infinite, but they are immobile; as a mathematical image, 
they are based on an equation that will be drawn out and iterated in set and 
predictable ways. Social knowledge is much more fluid than that, with ‘solutions’ 
(i.e. connections or disconnections) appearing and disappearing in rapid order and in 
no definitive pattern. There are some dis/connections that are more likely than 
others—the ones that are repeated regularly enough to ain the appearance of 
permanence—but these can be contradicted, changed, or made to disappear.  
 Secondly, the concept of scale is equally problematic, for if, as I have 
suggested, all people are within equal reach of a narractor’s relating ability, then 
deciding which relations belong to which scales becomes somewhat arbitrary. This is 
especially the case if anthropologists and social sientists are the ones determining 
where and what the scales are. One could argue that the scale could be determined by 
which subjects are involved in particular narractions, but such an approach would be 
quickly become bogged down with the need to be constantly redefining the scales. In 
Syria, people and relations all seemed to be on a much more level field. 
 Thirdly, if knowledge is produced through shifts in scale, it begs the question 
of who is shifting: the informants or the anthropologist or both? If it is the 
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anthropologist, whose scales is she shifting through, her own or her informants? How 
does she know (if all knowledge is relational anyhow)? And as far as informants 
shifting, I would argue that this is not the case for Syrians. Following on Hegel and 
my informants’ narractions, it is not the narractors who are moving; what is being 
moved are the social relations around that person. It is the speakers who are at the 
center of this process, not the field. Syrians thems lves have the ability and agency to 
position their world around them, rather than being situated within it. The same, I 
would argue, equally applies to anthropologists.  
 My final contention with this model is Maurer’s reading of it, where he 
suggests that knowledge is generated through the “lev ls of abstraction from a 
‘reality.’” My reading of this is that it too rests on a Hegelian view where there might 
be some ‘truth,’ but we can only know our (relational) version of it. As 
anthropologists, then, it would seem that in making someone else’s knowledge our 
object of study, we are now at least two degrees remov d from the initial truth. I 
disagree. I do not think that we can ‘stack up’ leve s of knowledge in this fashion. If, 
practically speaking, our objects of study do not exist until we turn to examine them, 
and if the same holds true for our informants, then everything begins and ends at a 
base level of non-existence. This is especially true given the momentary nature of 
narractions; the knowledge that is my object is not currently being maintained as far 
as I can be aware (i.e. my informants are not at this moment relating their narractions 
to me). Therefore, there is no longer a ‘level’ beneath the one I am engaging. In 
addition to this, if we consider the implications of the term ‘narraction,’ we see that 
the passing on (and simultaneous creation of) knowledge is as much an action as it is 
an abstraction (narration) and so thus becomes a ‘being-in-itself’ (‘reality’) even as it 
becomes abstract. By thinking in terms of abstraction and reality, a divide is put in 
place that does not account for the duplexitous nature of my Syrian informants’ 
narractions.   
 Thus the fractal model of shifting scales falls apart in the case of Syrian 
narractions and their creation of social relations a d knowledge. What I need is 
another metaphor that will allow for the problems noted above. One image that 
seems quite useful is that of a field, an open and level space that is without scales or 
levels and has no lines pre-drawn into it. It needs to account for the individual motion 
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of informants and anthropologists and their abilities to observe, analyze, and relate 
other people. It must be able to handle the idea that multiple people are always doing 
these relations at the same time, and that a person can be as much an object of 
someone else’s knowledge as they are an actor narracting their own positionings. 
And it must be able to reflect the temporariness of this process. What I suggest is a 
model loosely premised on the children’s game ‘Connect the Dots,’ though 
somewhat modified. In my version, objects of narractions are the dots and the 
connections and disconnections are the lines drawn that connect (or separate!) the 
dots. Drawing the lines symbolizes the process of relating through narractions, and 
thus doing knowledge. Dots can be people (as in Syrians’ narractions) or they can be 
other people’s narracted lines (as in the anthropologists analyzing what Syrians’ 
narractions are doing). Importantly, there are no numbers assigned to the dots to pre-
determine which should be connected or disconnected. Everyone has a pencil and the 
lines are self-erasing, accounting for the constant n rracting by multiple actors and 
the temporary quality of the whole process. It is, of course, not a flawless model, but 



















4. Challenging the “Regime” 
 
I was sitting at a friend’s house in one of the lower middle class areas of the Old City 
having an Arabic-English lesson and, as we so often did, we were using ‘talking 
politics’ as a basis for practice. During the English half of the lesson, she began to 
discuss the government in Syria and used the word “regime” to describe it. I was 
curious about this choice of term and she said that it was the best translation for the 
word that she would have used in Arabic: nizām. I asked her if, in Arabic, the word 
had a negative connotation, as it does somewhat in English, when referring to ruling 
forces. She told me that it could, but usually did not; it was more neutral than that—it 
also translates as ‘system.’ So it is with that conversation in mind, that I use the word 
‘regime’ here. I take it to refer to the ruling group of Syria, but without the common 
negative slant that it often has in English.  
  
The first section of this chapter is effectively a follow-on of the conspiracy 
narractions of the previous chapter, in that it explicitly navigates the hidden and 
immoral politicking of major global figures in relation to Syria. However, what makes 
it slightly different is that it not only speaks to Syria’s relations to external powers 
(which serves to recreate a ‘Syria’), but also to Syrians’ relations to each other (thus 
challenging the unity of a ‘Syria’). From there, I will move on to examine other 
experiences with, narractions of, and ways of narracting the regime, looking at how 
they are similar to forms of ‘doing’ politics and ientity-work that are also doing 
relations and connections. I will take these connections and disconnections a step 
further though, and see how they also challenge the Syrian regime. Some of the 
analyses presented below may have the feel of “resistance” studies. However, when 
taken in conjunction with Chapters 5 and 6, I hope it will become clear that this is not 
exactly the image I wish to present.  
 
America, Israel, and the Asads 
 
Everyday narractions of immorality are not limited to engaging with a realm that is 
already (in the anthropologist’s view) ‘external’ to Syria. Indeed, some of the most 
common narractions related to me about the hidden machinations of the international 
world involved Syrian actors in some form or another. Or perhaps it is better said that 
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stories of Syria and its creation and development as a distinct identity feature major 
global figures, challenging academic notions of discernible ‘scale.’ I heard a variety 
of such narractions over the course of my research, nd eventually I began to feel that 
each description of the ‘historical’ events of Syria was not a different tale nor even 
different versions of one tale, but that every telling was a different piece of the same 
story. As I listened to my informants telling me thse stories, I began to see how all 
the little parts might fit into a larger framework. I saw the places where different 
versions overlapped, and I was able to connect and reposition them (in my head and 
more literally in my fieldnotes) into a single narrction. As I was connecting these 
threads (or dots) into a single story, I realized I was reproducing the actions of my 
informants—I was constructing knowledge by relating various objects to each other, 
and, as was the case with many of my informants’ indiv dual narractions, I was 
recreating the lines that someone else had drawn to use as my isolated objects. But as 
I suggested in the last chapter, this was not a ‘scale shift,’ but rather my taking 
Syrians’ narractions as objects-in-themselves and pro ucing my knowledge about 
them accordingly. I have chosen here to present the fully assembled version of the 
narraction in order to attempt to show how the temporariness of individual narractions 
can be repeated by single and multiple individuals and thus gain the effect of 
permanence. The result is a popular (hi)story that is ‘known’ (macrūf) by everyone (or 
at least, all of my informants). 
 This narraction is, first and foremost, the story f how Hafez al-Asad came to 
be the leader of Syria and begins roughly in 1967. Though Asad is the primary 
character, it does not feature Syria alone, but includes Israel and the United States 
(despite the fact that Syria was much more involved with the Soviet Union during this 
Cold War era). At the heart of the story lie money, r sources, power, and the Golan 
Heights. Rather than telling the narraction in my own words, I will try to let my 
informants speak more directly. The completed version below is an assemblage of 
many different voices that span over the course of an entire year. It is a story 
compiled of narractions, so I include the narractive differences where they appear. If 
the style of the telling changes, it is because it was never presented as a complete 
story. Stylistically, I use the first person to indicate moments when my informants 
switched from a purely conceptual to a more personal narrative, tying their own and 
family histories into the greater story. Allowing myself to shift through these styles is 
the best attempt I can think of for representing the very diverse voices of the 
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informants who shared (and created) their knowledge with me. From upper-middle 
class Sunnis to working-class Shi’as to Christian gold merchants, my informants 
covered a wide range of economic, religious, social, n tional, and educational groups 
within Syria. And yet the story was always the same, regardless of who was telling it.  
 
‘How Asad Came into Power’: A Narraction 
 
“In 1967, Syria lost control of the Golan Heights to Israel. Hafez al-Asad was the 
Minister of Defense at the time. The Israelis were dropping bombs in the area, but 
Hafez declared that the region was lost and the troops had to pull out before even o e 
Israeli soldier had set foot in it. He gave it up before it had even begun to be taken, 
despite the fact it’s defensible. Only a few residents stayed and tried to defend their 
homes, but most aside from the Druze (who stayed and acquiesced to the new Israeli 
regime) moved closer to the safety of Damascus. The Isra lis moved in and had no 
trouble taking a virtually undefended area. Hafez al-Asad gave up the Golan Heights. 
 “All this is macrūf. My cousin was in the military at the time, working in the 
Golan, in the Special Forces. He and his company had moved into Golan to a high hill 
where they could see a long distance. They reported back their position and said that 
they saw no sign of Israeli soldiers in the area. They were then given the direct order 
to fall back to the border of Syria. They assumed that it was because the leaders 
wanted to send in regular military and not put their Special Forces in danger, but 
when they arrived, they were given a month’s prison e tence for having gone beyond 
the bounds of permission. The military leaders didn’t want anybody in there, Israeli 
presence or no.  
 “What was the result? In return for giving up the Golan Heights, Hafez al-Asad 
was helped into power and allowed and even aided to stay there, by the Americans 
and the Israelis. The U.S. could have ousted Hafez l-Asad, but on condition of a 
stalemate with Israel, the regime was allowed to remain. Even during the Lebanese 
civil war, the regime working with the Americans—we only went in there because the 
U.S. gave us the ‘green light’ to do so. They didn’t want to get directly involved, but 
they didn’t want Lebanon tearing itself apart either, so they used the Syrians.  
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 “And it wasn’t just Asad who came to power because of hidden American 
support, but his entire Alawi clan from up in the mountains,77 even though they don’t 
deserve it—they’re cowards. My father personally saw v rious regiment leaders who 
were Alawi take off running from the front lines during war, running away from the 
battle. What an injustice it is that many of these same cowards later became very high 
officials when the Asads came into power, because he populated his bureaucracy with 
people from his own religion. So all these backward, cowardly people are in charge of 
the country now, just because the U.S. and Israel decided to put them in power. 
 “The surest sign that those in power here always were and still are working with 
the Israelis and Americans, is that today Syrian soldiers patrol the edge of the Golan 
border and do not allow other Syrians to cross it. I did my army service by the border 
of Israel, where we could wave at the Israeli soldiers on the other side, but weren’t 
allowed to let Syrians by. Regular (i.e. non-military) Syrians aren’t even allowed to 
get near that border without permission, so the regim  can make sure that no idealist 
with ideas of returning the Golan to Syria can get into the area to make trouble. 
Basically they are ensuring that Golan remains in the hands of Israel.  
 “Why? It’s all about compromise. Asad makes sure that hat area remains in 
Israeli hands and he is assured that he will not be removed from power by any 
external sources—it is not in America and Israel’s be t interest to have a new leader 
in power as long as they can control this one. There’s this unofficial peace, or at least 
ceasefire, and that’s why the U.S. will leave the Asads in power, and why the regime 
doesn’t have to respond to international calls for democratic reform. And while the 
press might say that Syria and America/Israel are at odds, that’s only because they 
feel they have to, and no one actually believes it. Most Syrians don’t actually think 
that America would ever invade Syria—in fact, things are much better than they 
appear on the surface between the two countries and Syria doesn’t do anything 
without consulting the U.S. first. And it’s the same thing with Israel—the Asad 
regime is probably having personal talks with Sharon, they’re just secret. It’s smarter 
that way. Really though, all of the governments in this region, including Syria, are 
working together to keep things in the state of pretend war that they are in now—it’s 
macrūf that it’s to everyone’s advantage if there is no open peace. That way all the 
                                                
77 Cf. Kymlicka (2004:155) who says of Eastern and Central Europe: “it is typically the majority that 
feels it has been the victim of oppression, often at the hands of their minorities, acting in collaboration 
with foreign enemies.” 
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powerful people can continue to make money and it gives them justification for 
keeping up the strong military force that lets them stay in power.78  
 “That’s what the Asads gain—the assurance that the U.S. and Israel will not do to 
them what they did to Saddam Hussein in Iraq and give the Alawis and the Bacth 
party an excuse to maintain a strong military. But what exactly does America stand to 
gain by getting involved in Syria like this? It’s a well-known secret that Syria actually 
does have quite a large oil reserve out near the Iraqi border. If you drive up there at 
night, you can see all of the burn-off towers from the drilling sites. But no one knows 
about it outside of Syria. The regime controls it and makes all the money off of it, by 
selling it to the Americans without telling anyone. They keep all the money and the 
U.S. gets the oil. It’s a good deal for both of them. They hide it and keep it secret, but 
everyone here knows the truth. It’s macrūf.”  
 
Exposing the Regime 
 
One possible analysis, possibly an overly predictable one, would examine this 
narractions in terms of understanding what is about. S ch an interpretation would 
likely read it as a way for the disenfranchised Syrian population to discursively 
engage in a process of political power that they do not otherwise have access to. They 
might be powerless, but at least they are ‘in the know.’ It would argue, in a 
conspiratorial vein, that “power sometimes hides itself from view, but…conspires to 
fulfill its objectives” and can sometimes “produce visible outcomes” (Sanders and 
West 2003:6). Power, here, seems to refer to political-economic capital and is 
accompanied by agency to effect desired outcomes. The narraction would thus expose 
(rather than create, as I would argue) a structural Us versus Them dichotomy, which 
all power and agency resting in Their hands. We might even say that these narractions 
actually are a form of “everyday resistance” whereby middle class Syrians were able 
to challenge the legitimacy of the regime by associating its members with the ultimate 
enemies of Syria, namely the U.S. and Israel. Not only are the Asads guilty by 
association, they might also appear as puppet-figures, who were created and whose 
string are pulled by these foreign countries, thus making them illegitimate as leaders 
                                                
78 Wedeen (2003:696-7) notes a similar situation in Yemen where a national spectacle involved the 
display of tanks suggesting “Yemen’s defense forces might have domestic uses for the tank” (my 
emphasis). This also traces back to Ibn Khladoun (2005:40), who asserts that in the workings of society 
“authority exists through the army.” 
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in the popular conception (cf. Lavie 1990). All that ordinary Syrians have is their 
moral superiority and outrage. 
 One major problem with such an interpretation is that it is predicated on the 
idea that Syrians who are not involved in the government are distinctly separate from 
it, a stance that may or may not be wholly appropriate and an idea that I will return to 
in Chapters 5 and 6. To get around this, I would like to examine the narraction instead 
in terms of what it ‘does.’ Once again, I find it helpful to consider this narraction in 
the light of making connections, doing relations, and constructing knowledge. 
However, to consider such a possibility requires that we first approach this concept of 
the “disenfranchised” and turn it on its head somewhat. 
 Many analyses of ‘political’ topics, such as conspiracy theory, the state, 
relations between the global and the local, etc., quietly assume that anyone not 
directly involved in the processes of power is somehow ‘external’ to that power, or at 
best, on the “margins” of it (Tsing 1993). The ‘insiders’ are the few, the elite who 
‘possess’ power79 and usually the know-how to use it. They exist in co trast to the 
disenfranchised masses, who are outside trying to look in, partially leading to 
modernity’s concern with transparency (cf. West andSanders 2003) and the ensuing 
accountability (cf. Maurer 2002). However, in a sen, my Syrian informants did not 
seem overly interested in transparency or in making the Syrian regime accountable, at 
least not in the “official” sense that we are used to ealing with.80 They expect 
corruption and hidden power, and while they did make moral judgments, there was 
rarely the sense that they were morally outraged rathe  than just frustrated. 
Transparency and accountability are perhaps, then, more a concern of the already 
privileged, if by privileged we mean people who have the ability to impact their 
objects of study—bankers, international organizations, governments, academics, etc. 
To those of us busy being ‘objective,’ the people who are not involved in the 
processes that we are so desperately trying to transpar-ify are the ones we delimit as 
‘outside’ or marginal. However, though ordinary Syrians were aware that they were 
not involved in the political machine (officially), they did not live their lives as if they 
considered themselves to be ‘external’ people. In other words, the government 
                                                
79 See Strathern (2004, 2005) for a consideration of whether and how the conceptual can be owned or 
possessed. 
80 While not seeming to be concerned with the regime being made accountable on official levels (i.e. 




apparatus is not the central framework for their lives; if anything, it is external to 
them, indicating that perhaps social scientists (and politicians, theorists, etc.) need to 
consider the possibility that how we conceive of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ may not 
accurately reflect people’s lived experiences and kowledge.  
 If, then, Syrian speakers are ‘inside’ as far as they see themselves, how do 
they relate the figures in this narraction to themslves? Where and how might these 
figures feature in their own lives? Once again, America and Israel are very foreign, 
being created as manipulative and interfering outsider , intent on ruling the Arab 
Middle East in one form or another. But the other major actors according to the 
narraction are from the Syrian regime, and through their connections to the outsiders, 
are also (re)created as being somewhat external to my informants. Not only Hafez al-
Asad specifically is disconnected, but the entire Alawi sect. They are accused of being 
cowards, of running “in the wrong direction…towards a further loss of face” Gilsenan 
1996:198), rhetorical devices that would be used to insult and discredit an enemy or 
an object of ridicule. Indeed, even Hafez al-Asad used this rhetoric, saying of the 
1963 Bacth revolution that the officers at the Air Force base he took over “could have 
resisted—the forces at their command were stronger than my small unit. But they 
were cowards” (quoted in Seale 1988:77, my emphasis). Cowardice, as a negative 
quality, serves to distinguish the speakers from their subjects along moralistic lines. 
 But it could be argued that this division merely follows the lines of political 
power in Syria, perhaps merely reaffirming a People/Regime antagonism. However, 
there is one other relevant category of people in the narraction, only briefly 
mentioned—the Syrian Druze who were living in the Golan Heights when it was 
‘lost.’ They were said to have accepted Israeli rule without a fight. Indeed, some of 
my informants claimed that the Druze were much happier to live under the Israelis, 
even though they were technically still Syrian. The Druze, I was told by one Sunni 
informant, are the “cousins” of the Jews, so they gt along well. Such an assessment 
not only places the Golan Druze population ‘outside’ (or at least, more outside than 
other Syrians), it also creates a disconnection betwe n ‘Syrians’ and the Druzi people 
who still live in Syria. Or, conversely, if the Syrians and Druze are somewhat 
connected by both being Syrians, and the Druze and the Israelis are “like cousins,” 
there is also a possible connection being made between Syrians and Israelis, though it 
is a distant relation. So not only have we seen moments that challenge (as well as 
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moments that assert) a Muslim or Arab category, but now we see the same happening 
with ‘Syrian’ as well.  
 
Entextualization, Contextualization, and More (Dis)Connections  
 
What did vary in this narraction as compared to the oth r ones I have explored thus 
far was the regular inclusion of familial and therefo  personal histories intertwined 
with the rest of the stories. Anderson (1996) argues that this is a process of 
entextualization where there is a regular incorporati n of small events into a grand 
“meta-narrative”—of conspiracy theory in his case:  
 
Entextualization moves from speculation to institutionalization, as context is 
sloughed off, leaving only a purified text than can stand on its own, tell its 
own story or confer meaning on less exalted stories by associating them with 
its own. Entextualization is how we arrive at the broader significance of things 
(1996:97). 
 
Personal and familial histories could thus be seen as relating to a broader meta-
narrative, granting them a degree of importance they may not have had on their own.  
 However, I would argue that the personal stories ar  also part of a Syrian 
process of contextualization. That I encountered similar narractions described so 
many times in so many different settings indicates that it was common knowledge, as 
my informants themselves kept insisting. And while th entextualization of personal 
stories into the broader one may have been part of what was going on, it also felt as 
though the personal stories were a way to bring such a massive and distant story into 
some sort of comprehensible and tangible form. Individual connections in the 
narractions offered a way of validating such a grand d abstract analysis. 
Punctuating a description of international intrigues with “My uncle was there and saw 
this” and “My grandfather’s brother was thrown in prison because he knew that” 
provided concrete ‘proof.’ This was especially important when talking to a dubious-
looking anthropologist (or to people with a dispositi n to doubt). So while little 
stories were made remote and slotted into a larger “m ta-narrative,” it is possible that 
the reverse was happening simultaneously, that this big, distant theory was made all 
the more real because flesh-and-blood stories could be pulled down out of it and 
presented as evidence.  
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 Performatively, these personalized narractions can also be read as another 
instance of making connections, of individuals using interpersonal connections to 
position themselves in relation to expansive political scenes—right in the middle of 
them, in fact. Perhaps these people are not as “marginal” as we might have thought. In 
this contextualizing sense, personal stories did not o ly act as a form of validation, but 
they also ‘did’ relations between specific persons a d families and the broader 
situation. The soldier witness is, for the speaker, ‘inside’ because he is family. But 
even while the regime is somewhat external to the speaker in the narractions because 
of their cowardice, the soldier complicates this distance. The soldier is mplicated in 
the regime by virtue of his being in the regime’s military. He is external to the regime 
officials (he was jailed after all), but is internal because he depended on them for his 
livelihood. In fact, the money that he brought in supported his family and has 
ultimately helped to care for the narractor himself. Whether the narractors like it or 
not, then, they connect themselves to the regime as well, and the regime is moved 
‘inside.’ So these personal stories, whether entextualized or contextualized, are also 
another way to do relations. My informants did not have to tell me about their or their 
family’s ties to the regime. They chose to include th se stories, which, intentionally or 
otherwise, showed me how they were connected to the regime that they (seem to) so 
despise. 
 
The Gold Industry: In and Out of the “Regime” 
 
From the machinations of global politics, I am now going to take a drastic turn and 
move to look at the realm of economics. However, rather than approaching how the 
regime is engaged through national-level economics, I intend to focus on a form of 
everyday finances—specifically the gold trade—to see how experiences and 
narractions of gold can be as much a part of relating to the regime as those of 
international conspiracy. As throughout much of the Middle East, gold is a very 
common form of wealth in Syria, usually as women’s jewelry. It is portable and 
substantive, and because it is tied to the global marketplace rather than the country-
issued currency, it is a more risk-free currency. When the value of the Syrian lira fell 
rapidly in the early 1980’s, gold shop owners were some of the few Syrians whose 
wealth did not decrease proportionally because theirs was an international currency. 
Further, because interest-making on money is forbidden in Islam, there is not a great 
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deal of bank use in Syria. Gold is not immediately useable to purchase daily goods 
(pieces must be sold off in a gold shop for cash), and so it can serve as a form of un-
spendable savings. At a wedding, the families of the bride and groom will heap piles 
of gold jewelry on the bride as gifts, to give her a savings for herself and her family, a 
custom that I observed at both Muslim and Christian weddings. 
 
 
Figure 4: An internal alley in the “Gold Suq” 
 
 The gold shops themselves are individually owned and operated, but a large 
number of them are concentrated in what is unofficially called the ‘Gold Suq’ (Figure 
4), which lies several streets behind the main shopping sūq (Suq Hamidīya) in the Old 
City. The shop owners are mostly (about 75%) Christian in this area and are arranged 
into a loose guild that works to keep the prices uniform and theft to a minimum. Each 
shop is fairly small, roughly 3 by 4 meters, and filled with rows upon rows of 
bracelets, earrings, pendants, and a smattering of full jewelry sets, most locally-made, 
but some imported from the Gulf or occasionally even Europe. 18 and 21 karat yellow 
gold is the most popular, though there is also some white gold and pieces of lower 
quality. The silver trade is completely independent and those dealers are located 
elsewhere; similarly, the gold dealers do not usually handle jewels. An average 21 
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karat bangle can range in price from about $100 US for a hollow one up to $200 US 
for a heavy one.81 The price per gram of gold varies by the day, fluctuating according 
to international market prices. News of daily prices quickly filters by word of mouth 
and mobile phones from shop to shop in the morning.  
 An average day will see a very regular flow of customers, mostly from the 
lower to middle classes, some buying and some selling, moving from shop to shop, 
bargaining, pleading and calling on Allah to get the best price as the owners do the 
same. Some find a shop they trust and become regulas, sometimes coming in several 
times a week to exchange back and forth. Most of these customers are women, since 
the jewelry will often be (ostensibly) their property. The majority of them are Muslim, 
and move about the streets in degrees of cover often (though not always) inversely 
proportional to their financial status. Sometimes they come alone, more often in pairs 
or small groups of family and friends. Men do come in as well, though frequently 
either with their wives or fiances. Occasionally goldsmiths or their representatives 
will drop by, exchanging old gold for new, sometimes coming down from Aleppo, 
which has a higher concentration of gold makers than D mascus. And once in a great 
while, someone will come looking for something slightly more illegal. But overall, a 
day in a gold shop will see some very large sums of money changing hands, largely 




Aside from being one of the primary ways to store wealth, gold is a common theme in 
Syrian storytelling. According to popular legend, when the Ottomans had to leave the 
greater Syrian area after World War I, they did so in a hurry, but the landowners fully 
believed that they would be returning to their homes. So rather than take all of their 
wealth and possessions with them and risk losing everything to bandits, many of them 
buried caches of their gold—in the form of coins—in secret locations throughout the 
country. When they never returned, all record of where the gold was hidden was lost. 
                                                
81 A full set of bangles in Syria is six, a number that, I was told, varies according to local custom—in 
parts of North Africa, a full set would be seven bangles. 
82 Which is not for a lack of trying. One shop owner, Issam, informed me that the government once 
tried to impose a 10% sales tax on all gold, but the guild rose up and protested vehemently, saying that 
to do so effectively cut out their profits and the subsequent rise in gold prices would then drive 
everyone to Lebanon. This was one of the few examples I heard of the regime actually bowing to a 
public outcry, and the tax was shortly removed. Issam aid they are planning to try and reinstate it, bu  
at the much more acceptable rate of 1% of the sale.
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But vast troves of wealth still remain buried in the earth, waiting to be found. While I 
never met anyone who had actually found such a stash, there were stories about 
farmers who had done so while plowing their fields or people who had while 
exploring in caves; these stories were quite popular among a broad range of middle 
class informants. No one, as far as I knew, actively went out hunting for this buried 
treasure, but there were a number of people who were certain they knew where some 
was and were just waiting for the opportune moment to dig it up without being 
noticed. It is hard to say how much truth there wasto these stories, but there was 
certainly some, because a Presidential decree some years ago declared that any such 
hoards found are supposed to be taken to the regime and melted down, basically 
“contributing to the regime’s cash box,” as one informant put it.83 To make sure that 
any gold found would be turned over to government officials, the buying and selling 
of the Ottoman coins was made illegal and anyone caught trafficking in them, even as 
few as three or four coins, could face a hefty fine, prison time, and the loss of their 
shop in the case of gold dealers.  
 However, despite such legal restrictions, I got to see a number of these coins 
in a gold shop. Each one is small, less than an inch in diameter and is made of 22 
karat gold. They cost roughly $100 US (5,000 Syrian lira) apiece. The buried finds 
were reputed to contain hundreds, if not thousands, of these coins, but shop owners 
tended to keep their collections small, usually holding no more than 15-20 at a time, 
and even then only at irregular intervals. Most customers never knew of their 
existence, and of those who asked about them, it was only those with personal 
connections or credentials who managed to convince the shop owners to trust them. If 
someone came looking without such references, the dealer would calmly tell the 
customer that he did not have any, nor did anyone he knew, and remind the customer 
that trade in the coins was illegal. “You can never b  sure when they might be secret 
police, sent around to try and catch us out. It’s a dangerous business.” The owner of 
the gold shop was a Christian who sat on the wealthi r side of the middle class named 
Issam; he said that he had never dealt with a massive trove, though he would know 
how—“If you can’t leave the country, your only real option is to melt it down and sell 
                                                
83 Note that the UK has a similar law, specifically the Treasure Act, whereby any large troves 
comprised of silver or gold, buried with the intentio  to be recovered, and with no known owners or 
heirs is considered to be property of the crown. The finder and land owner are generally rewarded with
some form of compensation, though the specifics of this are ultimately up to the Secretary of State. 
(Treasure Act 1996) 
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the unmarked gold at the market rate. But if you can get it out of the country, you’ll 
make a small fortune because people will pay for the antique value.” Issam mostly 
dealt small-time, with the same couple of people. These coins are the hardest form of 
currency; their value has not changed in almost one hundred years; and aside from the 
gold shop where it was purchased, it was almost impossible to turn back into cash—
the ultimate savings account, if necessarily secretive. I asked Issam if it was so 
dangerous, why he dealt in them.  
 
Because it’s really a shame to hand them over to the regime and have them 
melted down. They’re historical, antiques, part of our history and they just 
destroy them. And then they don’t even give people the money for them. 
You’re just expected to hand them over for nothing, which is stupid. If it’s 
your land and you find them, you should get to keep th m. Or sell them. Or at 
least get something for them. I mean, it’s a bit of a black market forthem, but 
that’s the regime’s fault. If they hadn’t made it illegal, people would be doing 
it openly and there would be a lot more gold and money changing hands. It’s 
especially not fair for people who maybe have some coins because they’ve had 
them in the family for years. Maybe my great-grandfather worked for the 
Ottomans and some of the coins became family heirlooms. Now, if I want to 
sell them, I can’t, even though I didn’t find them in the earth, even though they 
were always in my family. It’s not fair—with this law the regime is stealing 
from its own people. 
 
 And while, as I said, no one was actively searching out this gold, it remained 
in the background of people’s lives as a get-rich-quick scheme. Sometimes there were 
strange forces at work, stopping any discovery of hidden gold—one friend assured me 
that she knew there was gold buried in the foundations of her rather typical house in 
Rukn al-Diin (see Introduction for a description of this area). Her aunt had married a 
man who was well-versed in the mystical arts and he had pointed to a corner of my 
friend’s room and told them there was gold buried there. My friend and her younger 
brother began to dig a hole to see. But when they got to the depth of about a meter, 
blue flies began to appear as if by magic out of the ground so, terrified, they quickly 
refilled the hole. As they told me these stories, I looked for a gleam in their eyes that 
would indicate they were joking with me, but both looked at me in dead earnestness, 
and their parents nodded solemnly in agreement. For a family on the slightly lower 
end of the middle class, finding such a treasure would no doubt be a godsend, a way 
to solve their financial difficulties.  
 However most stories of treasure stayed away from the mystical. Usually it is 
the regime, not mysterious flies, that keep people from getting access to the gold. All 
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sorts of people ‘knew’ where there was a cache, but were hesitant to dig it up because 
the regime was watching like a hawk, ready to swoop d wn and claim the wealth for 
itself. One informant told me that while he had been on an archaeological dig, the 
caretaker of the site had told him that he knew there was buried Ottoman gold just 
beyond the site. He had found a couple of pieces, which indicated there were likely 
more nearby. The problem was that the regime knew that he knew something and had 
been watching him nonstop, so he was unable to dig it up. But the moment they had 
their backs turned, he intended to get it and make his fortune. Similarly, many people 
who told such stories had given a great deal of thoug t to the matter, indicating they 
took the idea of gold discovery rather seriously. Specifically, many of them had very 
detailed plans as to how they would smuggle their theoretical treasure out of the 
country. 
  The stories where people actually did find gold often involved someone 
stumbling upon it by accident and then losing it all o the regime. One that was told to 
me, with an interesting twist, was the following: 
 
A couple of months ago, a farmer was trying to make n irrigation pool, 
diverting some water into a little hole in the ground. But for some reason the 
hole was not filling as it should have been, no matter how much water was 
poured in. He decided to investigate and began digging, and soon found a 
treasure trove. However, he knew if he went to the authorities, they would 
steal everything. So he went to Damascus and demanded a visit with the 
President himself. There was a lot of grumbling about it, but he insisted that he 
had something very important to say and he would only talk to the presid nt. 
Finally he got his audience and told Bashar about the gold, but the president 
only asked him why he hadn’t gone through the proper channels. The man 
explained that he had heard those channels were peopled with corrupt thieves 
and he was afraid if he had gone to them, they would have taken it all and left 
him with nothing, despite it being on his land and his discovery. So what did 
Bashar do? He gave the man a reward of a million lira ($20,000) for bringing 
it forward, and promptly confiscated everything else, the worth of which 
would have been far more than a million lira. So the president left him with 
something, but still cheated him. 
  
Nerve-Wracking Deals  
 
Not long before I left Damascus, I had the chance to l arn a little more about the 
Ottoman gold by witnessing a black-market transaction. The deal itself was actually 
part of an international chain of commerce, beginning in Syria and moving on to 
Turkey. In Turkey, owning such coins is not illegal, nd there are some ‘clans’ that 
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still use the old lira (coins) as part of a bride price, supplied to would-be grooms by 
international dealers. One day, one of these dealers pproached Issam’s uncle and 
asked him to procure some coins for him (the two had known each other previously, 
though had not done business before). As Issam did not have any coins in his shop at 
the time, Issam and his uncle became middle-men who would gather coins from 
trusted contacts in Syria and then pass them on to the dealer. They managed to gather 
42 and brought them into the shop while I was there, immediately hiding them. 
Issam’s uncle, who was sweating profusely and looking very nervous, went back 
home, while Issam kept his cool and stayed in the shop to make the deal. He said that 
everyone in the chain of the deal was really on edge, from the initial owner of the 
coins (a family friend) to the international dealer. If, even after ten years, someone 
within that line-up had a falling out with the rest and decided to rat about the deal, all 
of them could wind up in prison. Needless to say, Issam eyed up many of the male 
customers coming into the shop that day rather suspiciously, not trusting anyone to 
not be a member of the secret police.  
 Shortly afterward, the dealer walked in and handed Issam 240,000 lira (a little 
less than $5,000) and took the gold. Issam was still worried about being caught with 
the money, but less so than with the gold. A little while later, a young man came to 
pick up the money (minus Issam’s commission, which was no more than he would 
have made off of bangles or other jewelry). Issam sid he was probably the son of the 
man who had been the source of the coins in the first place. Once the deal was over, 
Issam visibly relaxed and called his uncle to let him know that all had gone smoothly. 
Later on, the international dealer called back and sked if Issam could produce any 
more, having decided that Issam was a trustworthy and reliable partner. Issam called 
his uncle and they began to see what more they could do, and a new set of business 
relations was born. I asked Issam at the end of it why he acted as a middle man if the 
money he took was not really worth the risk. “Like I said, the laws are stupid. I’m not 
going to worry about breaking a pointless law. It’sas good a business as anything 
else, so why not?” 
 
Gold Motifs  
 
There are several motifs that become apparent in these stories of Ottoman treasure. 
Most simply, this gold was a get-rich-quick dream, the solution to all one’s financial 
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problems, provided one was clever enough (a positive quality against a stronger 
opponent!) to spirit it away from under the eyes of the watchful regime. However, as 
narractions, they also critiqued the regime’s laws that would take away something 
found on personal property with only minimal (if any) compensation. The 
dissatisfaction with and questioning of the fairness of the laws created a gap between 
the Syrian population and their largely unresponsive regime. Further, in Issam’s case, 
his and the entire chain of black market gold dealers’ r fusal to abide by these laws 
because they were “stupid” (as well as being another source of income) effectively 
challenged the authority of the regime to make and enforce some kind of legal order. 
And breaking the law, in this case, was not seen to be an immoral act, as various 
narractors depicted the regime figures as “thieves” who effectively stole what they 
considered to be private property from the Syrian people to line their own pockets. 
Throughout these stories, there was always very much the sense that it was the regime 
that was actually doing something illegal by taking away the gold from its finders, or 
that legality and illegality lost a clear sense of de inition since everyone seemed free 
to disregard the laws. The narractions then were challenging and even testing the 
moral capacity of the regime. 
 The refrain of the regime being made up of ‘thieves’ or ‘criminals’ also came 
up in a number of the above narractions, where officials were described as being 
involved in activities that are legally or perhaps morally ‘wrong.’ Through their 
narractions they depicted the regime as challenging its own authority as a law-maker 
by telling the population not to do something and then turning around and doing just 
that. But the story about the farmer adds something interesting to the mix—it includes 
President Bashar, someone that many stories and storytellers hesitated to involve so 
explicitly; the lines of dis/connection would usually be cut before reaching him. It 
exhibits a reoccurring duplexity in the ways that Syrians talked about their 
president—he was both dissociated from the ‘thieves’ that populate the ranks of his 
bureaucracy and placed firmly amongst them. Here, the farmer thinks, (somewhat 
naively, according to the narractor), that going straight to President Bashar will be the 
solution for unfair treatment and corruption. He obeys the laws, but goes straight to 
the top, thinking it will be uncorrupt. Bashar, the president of the country, is 
ultimately willing to take the time out of his busy day to meet this poor farmer and 
hear his story. But in the end, he still rips the farmer off, giving him substantially less 
compensation than the farmer could have gotten had he taken the gold to be sold in 
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the black market. The president then becomes the epitome of his criminal 
government, perhaps all the more so for being somewhat two-faced about it. But at 
the same time, there remains the fact that he was generous enough to give the farmer 
some money—and no small sum, by Syrian standards, which is more than the farmer 
would have ever received if he had gone through the proper channels. It would seem, 
then, that in the end, everyone who handled the wealth got a cut of the money.  
 So in one story, the president has both a ‘bad guy’ and a ‘good guy’ aspect to 
him. Rather than being a point of complication, such a dual sense fits smoothly into 
the model that I have heretofore been proposing, namely that by incorporating the 
concept of motion into our analysis, we can account for such multiple, shifting 
connections. Through these narractions and the process of illicit trading, the regime 
itself is set apart from ‘other’ Syrians. The ‘inside’ in this instance becomes those 
who were not involved in regime’s policies, who were more likely to be ripped off 
than to do the ripping off. President Bashar, as a singular leader figure, is both 
connected to the rest of the regime and distanced from it. He is, the narractions 
seemed to say, related to both the regime, but also to Us, in that he is generally a nice 
guy and cares about the popular welfare to an extent.  
 But there is a further moral complication. Several people in the narraction took 
a share of the wealth, but no service was done in rturn as would be morally proper. 
Everyone involved, then, from the farmer up to the pr sident was tainted by this 
immorality, by failing to follow the proper aesthetics for the circulation and earning of 
money (cf. Maurer 2002). It would seem that all humans might be subject to 
corruptive forces; we all have this connection between us. 
 
The Thieving Regime 
Eating Resources 
 
Gold is not the only currency the Syrian regime deals with in a secretive manner. 
Syria is not well-known in the Middle East as a place that has much in the way of oil 
reserves or many natural resources at all. Neverthel ss, as I mentioned in the section 
on the American-Israeli-Asad conspiracy theories, there is the “well-known secret” 
that Syria actually does have natural resources, including a fairly large oil deposit out 
near the Iraqi border, in an area of the country called l-Jazīra (‘The Island’ referring 
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to the region of Northeast Syria between the Euphrates nd the Tigris Rivers).84 On a 
tourist trip up to the north of the country, I saw  number of natural gas burn-off lights 
glowing in the distance as we drove up the main highway in the area. On top of oil, 
there are (supposedly) large amounts of salt and jewels as well, but it is really the oil 
that is the most important—as mentioned, it is saidto be what keeps America’s 
interest in Syria strong, what keeps the whole power system of the Asad regime in 
place.  
 But, while taking a trip to the desert oasis of Palmyra, a well-educated 
Damascene friend of mine who had worked for as a geolo ist for an oil and natural 
gas company in Syria told me,  
 
The fact is that politics and business go hand-in-ha d. A couple of years ago, 
large amounts of natural gas deposits were discovered in the al-Jazira area. At 
that time, the government decided to open up bidding to the international 
community to see who would get drilling rights for it. There were three 
companies that bid—an American-Canadian company, a French one, and a 
Syrian national one. For political reasons, they initially decided to go with the 
American-Canadian group over the French, and not surpri ingly, French-
Syrian relations declined after that. However, with the political problems 
between the U.S. and Iraq, they ultimately decided to go with the Syrian 
company, after which point American-Syrian relations also soured. So, you 
see, it’s all connected. If you don’t help the busine ses of other countries, 
they’re going to start ‘hating’ you, at least publicly. 
 
 Political involvement in natural-resource economics was also described in 
more sinister ways, ones that reflected not just international relations, but also 
people’s understanding and resentment of their own government. One day, I asked a 
Kurdish informant if he wanted an autonomous country fo  the Kurds. He replied that 
he would love to see it, but that it would never happen. The Kurds, especially in Syria, 
are highly concentrated in al-Jazira, which contains the best oil and salt deposits in the 
country and is a breadbasket for the country. There are massive numbers of wheat 
fields in the area, and farmers also grow a wide variety of grains, beans, fruits and 
vegetables. Much of this land was nationalized several decades ago, to the anger of 
the population there. I met one family who, over coffee, pulled out a stack of papers 
that were titles to several large tracts of land, which they felt had been unfairly stolen 
from them by the Bacth party. The theft had left them living in a small house in a 
small village with no real source of income, rather than working their own farmland 
                                                
84 Wedeen also makes mention of oil reserves recently located in Syria (1999:28). 
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and living a much wealthier life. A friend of mine working in the German Embassy in 
Damascus told me that many people from this region pr duce such entitlements, 
though it is hard to be sure of their validity. But because of the land’s high 
productivity, my Kurdish friend told me, the regime will never give it back to its 
original owners. This also has the broader effect of ensuring there will never be a 
Kurdistan, as the Syrians will fight to keep it within their borders. Here, we see a 
narraction where the inside/outside lines become even more select, where the inside is 
limited to people of Kurdish background, specifically those living in al-Jazira and 
who have had their land stolen from them.  
 Where, I asked, does all the supposed money made from these deals and lands 
go? To high-level officials who keep it in European bank accounts (like Arafat and 
other corrupt Palestinian leaders), I was told. Oneinformant told me that Fodor’s 
realistically needs to re-examine its list of the top en richest people in the world, 
because, he suggested, four or five of them would probably be Syrian. “I mean, the 
vice president of the country has nine billion dollars in liquid assets alone that he 
keeps in a number of European banks.” Another, unrelated informant told me that 
Rifaat al-Asad, the exiled brother of Hafez al-Asad, had been pardoned by Bashar, but 
has chosen to remain abroad, because he was living in the lap of luxury from money 
that he was given by his brother and/or stole from Syria. One of the only good things 
he did for the country, a Christian informant told me, was to build a road up to a 
Christian shrine on top of a mountain near Damascus, in order to make it accessible to 
pilgrims. Of course, this was after he and a company of his men landed a helicopter 
up there and robbed it of all it was worth. 
 
There was also the story of Basel al-Asad, the brothe  of the current president, 
who was being groomed to take over the presidency after his father, but died 
in a car accident. After his death, it came to light that he had had over $15 
billion in a Swiss bank account, a gift from his father. The problem was that 
he died wife- and child-less, and the bank said that his money would be forfeit 
without any obvious heir. So the Syrian regime quickly ame up with a 
number of (falsified) documents to prove that he had indeed been wed, to 
ensure that the money returned to Syrian hands. Or, rather, Alawi hands.  
 
The narractor shook his head in anger—“the entire deficit of the country was less than 
what that one man had in his bank account.” He cited th se examples as proof that the 
country does indeed have natural resources like oil and gold, but that the government 
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hoards it all for itself.85 And hoarding is decidedly not a virtue; it is not a part of the 
“aesthetic process” of doing morality (Jean-Klein, in press). This is similar to 
elements of Islamic banking where interest charging is banned, so that wealth can 
grow through circulation (cf. Maurer 2002 on Islamic banking). To be accused of 
being stingy (bakhīl), of keeping wealth to oneself is a fairly hefty accusation (c.f. 
Dresch 1989:59), even when leveled in (partial) jest.86  
 It is worth briefly noting that though Jean-Klein ( press) outlines it nicely, 
casting morality as an aesthetic process is not necessarily an intuitive matter. I would 
argue that the basis for such a claim stems from the fact that it is only in the relating 
(i.e. telling) of a story, even if only to oneself, that the actions figuring in the story 
attain a moral status. The actions (or suspicions) within the story can be portrayed in 
multiple ways, thus allowing for multiple moralistic judgments. It is in following the 
proper aesthetic forms of relating (narracting) the story, that the actions within it 
become moral or immoral. An actor involved in the story may well know how he or 
she will be cast in the later telling of it (from personal experience of having been a 
teller of stories, as we all are) and thus may have a s nse of how he or she will be 
judged (and thus whether the action is morally good r not). However, this surmising 
already involves a telling of the tale to oneself, thus producing knowledge (cf. Barth 
1990) and already engaging in the aesthetic moral process. Such an understanding of 
morality would account for why, even today, Robin Hood and his merry men hold a 
morally superior status to a common thief who might steal in order to share the money 
with a group of lawless bandits (where the money might be for drugs, debts, 
gambling, hoarding etc.—see The Damascene Robin Hood in Chapter 7).  
 However, returning to the regime thieves, the focus of many of these 
narractions was not so much that there were natural resources in their country, but that 
despite technically being a Socialist country, ordinary Syrians never saw the profits of 
any of these resources. “The regime has control of everything and they don’t share 
                                                
85 Vom Bruck (2005:8) briefly mentions how similar rhetoric in Yemen served a delegitimizing role 
there. 
86 I discovered this the hard way. Early on in my fieldwork, I was walking home with some groceries 
and was invited to have tea with some friends. They instantly began poking through my bags asking 
what I had. When I did not immediately offer the contents to them, they began taking them, teasingly 
calling me stingy. When one saw my frustration, she leaned over and quietly told me that I was 
supposed to offer what I had, to be polite. So I sighed and told them to help themselves (tfaddalu). 
They grinned at me, said “no thank you” and put everything back. Lesson learned.  
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anything with the Syrian people.” One upper middle class friend originally from the 
city of Homs put it very eloquently: 
 
There is a real feeling here like the regime is a mother eating her own children 
(mitl umm, hiya cam takul awlādha). I, and others, feel that the people in 
power, the Alawis, the Bacth party, have taken advantage of their positions. 
They got very rich based on the work of the ordinary people (il-nās al-
c
ādiyyīn) while doing nothing for us. They robbed the country—took all the 
resources and sold them to make money for themselves only. They’re eating 
us, the people, the land. And they give us nothing back. 
 
The image of a mother eating her own children is a powerful one. Gilsenan 
(1996:308) describes a similar metaphor used in Lebanon by an informant who felt 
that his family had intentionally profited from his mistakes when they should have 
been restraining and taking care of him. In both cases, there is the notion that (older) 
family members are doing the eating, turning the notio  of care-taking and 
responsibility on its head, as it is these same people who are meant to be f eding, not 
eating their ‘children.’ We return to the idea, then, that a country is like a family, with 
the government being the equivalent of a parent, and one who can profit from the loss 
of its children. This is a seemingly sharp divergence from many of the ideas we have 
been encountering in this chapter, where the regime has been externalized or 
disconnected. But despite being a critique, this image of a ‘mother eating her own 
children’ decidedly connects the regime to its population. Distance, disconnection and 
differentiation notwithstanding, the regime is (also) very close to Us—as close as 
family, even if they are irresponsible or criminal. Which is not to say that the 
distancing and disconnecting from the regime are any less powerful. The instances we 
have seen where the regime is positioned as wholly outside (beyond even the limits of 
family) are not invalidated by the regime also being positioned as inside. We are not 
looking at two sides of the same coin, I would argue, but at two different ways for 
people to relate to the regime that occur in (shifting) turns: one a connection, one a 
disconnection. The regime is never r ally family, but then again, it is never really not 






Family Business   
 
So again we encounter the theme of the Syrian governm nt being made up of 
‘criminals’ and ‘thieves.’ My informants would not always directly call the figures in 
these sets of narratives ‘thieves,’ but there were moments they did make such 
references explicit. For instance, while talking with an informant about the sense of 
national pride that a country’s flag can inspire, h said that the Syrian flag was only 
associated with various government buildings (where they frequently hang). Because 
everyone knew that those buildings are full of “thieves” (harāmiyah), people began to 
correspondingly hate the flag as well, indicating that perhaps not only the heads of the 
regime are outsiders, but also civil servants. Criminality also frequently came up in 
relations to Syrian business, which was said to usually be directly related to the 
regime. Little shop owners and self-employed people would frequently have to deal 
with a wide number of officers and bureaucratic officials, a process that involved no 
little bribery (see Chapter 5 for more on bribery). 
 But big business was where the real crime was said to take place, specifically, 
the businesses of Rami Makhlouf (encountered briefly n Chapter 2). Makhlouf was a 
regular household name in Syria, one that everyone knew, but no one could really put 
a face to. He is a young man, in his mid-thirties at the time of writing, and is one of 
the wealthiest men in Syria. There are two mobile phone companies in Syria: Syriatel 
and 94 Areeba, and this one man was rumored to own b th (indeed, most Syrians 
scoffed at the pretense of two companies, when they were in fact the same company 
with the same rates and same promotions, under the sam  management). He also 
owns the Duty-Free shop at the Syrian-Lebanese border. I recently read on a website 
that a decree was passed concerning Makhlouf and a business deal with Mercedes. 
Previously, the car company had dealt with Syrian middle men who were responsible 
for the distribution of all spare Mercedes parts in Syria. However, the new law stated 
that if Mercedes wants to deal in Syria, they must abandon their original partners and 
work with Makhlouf instead (Landis 2004). And the BBC website printed that, 
“according to a human rights activist, one member of parliament is serving a five-year 
prison sentence for criticizing [him]….Mr. Makhlouf is a key [economic] figure. 
Analysts say no foreign companies can do business in Syria without his consent” 
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(“Who’s Who in Syria’s Leadership” 2005). The regime itself was willing to make 
concessions to him. In fact, there was one joke that illustrates his perceived influence 
in Syria: 
 
Bashar al-Asad went to Lebanon to visit Emile Lahoud, and he was stopped on 
the border by the Lebanese Army; the private asked for a form of ID, as he did 
not know who Bashar was. Upon seeing that the ID was from Lattakia87, he 
asked: "Hey, Lattakia! Are you related to Rami Makhlouf?” 
 
Another version went around where the Syrian President was trying to get some 
official paperwork done in Syria, and it was only upon recognizing that Bashar was 
related to the Makhlouf family that he was allowed to complete it with ease. And 
indeed, the two men are related. Aside from both being Alawi, the two are first 
cousins (Makhlouf is Bashar’s ibn khāl, mother’s brother’s son). There was no doubt 
among Syrians that Makhlouf got so rich at so young a  age because of the heavy 
patronage and favoritist law-making of his cousin. Thus the biggest commercial 
business in Syria was tied very firmly to the regime.  
 There was also no question as to whether or not big business in Syria was 
considered to be criminal. There were daily gripes about the cost of mobile phone 
lines, and how they were fixed in order to get the most money out of people. When I 
first arrived, the system was such that to buy top-up cards (which most people used), 
one had to buy according to units used as well as time. For instance, one could buy a 
400 unit card and it would last eight days. If eithr the units or the time expired, one 
had three days to top up before the line was disconnected, meaning a new one would 
have to be bought. It ensured people bought top-ups on a regular basis, regardless of 
whether they needed them or not, a fact people wereaware of and upset about. 
However one day, while walking through the Old City, I saw that, overnight, a 
number of small garbage bins had appeared at strategic places throughout the 
neighborhoods. These bins were attached to walls and were obviously an effort to 
encourage people to clean up their city. I looked more closely at one and saw that it 
had a small Syriatel logo on it, which I took to mean that the company was trying to 
do something positive for its country. Several days l ter, I asked one of my friends 
who lived in the Old City about it and he groaned in isgust. He said it was awful that 
the company was doing that, that the ‘thieves’ were pretending to give something 
                                                
87 Lattakia is a region along the Northwest coast of Syria, from where the Alawi clan hails—which both 
Bashar al-Asad and Rami Makhlouf belong to.  
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back to Syrians; everyone knew that they were stealing nd just doing this to make 
people look the other way. So even an apparent act of generosity can be (or can be 
received as) something ridden with bad intentions; it can be a lie, a cover-up. or a 
cold-hearted deception. Another friend (driving with his wife and children on the way 
to one of the said restaurants) assured me that it w s a common practice to do nice 
things as cover-ups: 
 
All of the restaurants outside the city make a great ex mple. They look nice 
and fancy, but the owners really don’t care at all about the restaurants—that’s 
why the service is always so bad. Why? Because they are just fronts for illegal 
operations, they are a way for the owners to show the world that they are 
making money legally, while really they are running drugs or smuggling or 
stealing underneath. 
 
Once again, the regime, and those closest to it, were s en to be involved in immoral 
actions, leaving their moral authority in question. Indeed, it seems that their integrity 
and honor as moral people is outright being challenged by these narractions.  
The Mafia 
 
Some of these descriptions had a very Mafia-esque feel to them. Indeed, while it was 
initially somewhat of a shock, by the end of my research I was no longer surprised at 
the regularity with which Syrians referred to their r gime as being a ‘Mafia.’88 The 
term was pejorative and usually invoked the image of a powerful core family that 
monopolized control over money, resources, and the administration of violence. 
Rather than existing on the fringes of society and getting involved in politics only by 
secretly infiltrating or conspiring with the government (Navaro-Yashin 2002:172-3), 
the criminals were the government/regime. Listening to Syrians talk about their 
‘Mafia,’ I got the impression of a Mafia that was very much like the one I have seen 
in movies such as The Godfather or Goodfellas, with the same Hollywood 
extravagance: constant engagement in illegal activities, front companies and 
restaurants, heavy ‘drug’-trafficking, unswerving loyalty within the family, 
membership being restricted to family, living beyond the law, living in fabulous 
luxury, and the use of cinematic levels of violence and bloodshed, often with no more 
instigation than a personal dislike. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, The Godfather is a 
                                                
88 I do not know if it was done intentionally, but David Lesch, in his bibliography of Bashar al-Asad, 
directly compares Bashar to Michael Corleone from the Godfather movies (2005:2). 
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very popular film in Syria, though it is hard to say whether they have borrowed 
elements of the cinema to embellish their views of their regime, or whether they 
merely liked the film because they feel it so accurately catches the image of the world 
they know.89 Either way, one informant summed up his opinion succinctly:  
 
There are Mafias in power all over the Middle East, but the biggest one is here 
in Syria, with one family ruling everything. They are merciless, killing and 
throwing people in prison without hesitating. They don’t care about their own 
laws. And nobody but the Alawis can really get involved in the ranks. 
 
 Like talk of criminals and thieves, the term ‘Mafia’ came up in a variety of 
situations, usually dealing with finances and resources. Below are several 
ethnographic excerpts that featured the rhetoric of Mafia. 
 
A lot of the ‘new money’ in Syria comes from the Revolution, where big 
landowners, like my grandfather, lost their land to the regime. So the old 
families lost a lot of money and it basically all wound up with the Mafia 
families—the Alawis. For example, my brother wanted to buy a villa out in a 
new suburb. The guy selling it questioned him about where all of this money 
to buy a villa had come from. So, in return we asked how an early-retired 
military officer had managed to come to own so many villas on a salary of no 
more than 3500 lira a month. That shut him up. 
 
Syria is going to hell. The economy, industry and agriculture have been ruined 
through mishandling. And there is massive corruption—I mean, we’re run by 
a Mafia. Bribery is everywhere because wages are not high enough and there’s 
a massive brain-drain because anyone who has the intelligence or money gets 
out of the country. Because there are no good jobs here for people, unless you 
can work for the regime. And you can only do that if you know someone, are 
related, or are rich enough to buy your way into a position. 
 
But talk about the Mafia is also a way of explaining why there has been no change or 
reform in Syria, addressing the resource control that t e regime exerts.  
 
I would like to maybe change things here, but it would be impossible because 
the regime here is like the Mafia. Syria does have resources, but no one knows 
about them because the family in power has control of everything and shares 
nothing with the Syrian people. 
 
[In Beirut with Syrian friends]: Yeah, the city here looks really nice. 
Construction actually gets done instead of just staying as scaffolding for years 
                                                
89 Reed (2003:60-61) describes the use of American cinematic names being adopted by gangs in Papua 
New Guinea, including one gang that called themselves the ‘Mafia,’  indicating that there may be a 
broader trend of incorporating foreign fictional elements (or at least portrayals) into everyday 
discourse. The Mafia seems to present a particularly romantic option.  
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and years. The problem in Syria is not that there is not the money there, just 
that it all gets sucked in by the Mafia and that even if there were people who 
cared to make a difference, they could not raise or keep the funds to do so. 
 
 After a while, I began to be curious about the terminology. One afternoon, 
Alia (one of the older women who had asked me about September 11th) and I were 
having a Sunday picnic and a drive in the hills outside Damascus, not talking much, 
just listening to a Frank Sinatra cassette. At one point she said that she had heard he 
was part of the Mafia. I replied that I had heard something like that. She then went on 
to say that they have an even worse Mafia in Syria. As she spoke fluent English and 
would often automatically translate complicated words into English for me, I asked 
her what the Arabic word for ‘Mafia’ was. She said there was none, it was just Mafia. 
I told her that a lot of people had mentioned the idea that the Syrian regime is a Mafia 
to me, and she said “Of course, that’s because that’s what we have here. Everyone 
knows.”  
 Here, then, is another instance of narractions that c llenge the regime’s 
superiority. Or rather, while it openly acknowledges the regime’s control, it 
challenges the moral underpinnings of the ruling group. The use of the term Mafia 
moves beyond mere thieving, into a somewhat darker image. The regime is made 
(out) to be a highly insular, self-serving family, one that is undyingly loyal to itself, 
but has no care for the rest of the population. Andit is presented as violent, sometimes 
senseless, and always merciless, with a willingness to literally shed blood to retain its 
place in society. As the regime, the Mafia is visible in Syria, rather than being a 
shadowy set of figures running in the background of society. But, as we have seen, 
what is visible is not always considered to be trustworthy. And it was narracted to 
exist outside the moral boundaries. The regime is greedy, hoarding all of its wealth; 
its members take what is not theirs and offer nothing in return; and while there are 
moments of justified (or justifiable) violence, the regime engages in senseless, purely 
self-serving violence90 that leaves people in fear of one another and their leaders. 
Here, then, is another example of Syrian narractions that disconnect the regime from 
the narractors.  
                                                
90 Examples of this would include the 1982 massacre at Hama and the numerous disappearances of 
suspected dissidents (cf. Lindisfarne 2000:39-45 for a fictional, but realistic account of political 
imprisonment). Such descriptions of this violence as being unjustified exists despite, or perhaps in sp te 
of, official rhetoric that would paint it as the contrary (cf. Wedeen 1999:32-49). 
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 David Kideckel (2004:140) notes that the Romanian ‘Mafia’ was composed of 
“informal paternalistic personal networks of clients, cronies, and kind.” Oppression 
and violence are not the only aspects of a Mafia—it also entails certain 
responsibilities, working in a patron-client style of favoritism that Kideckel suggests 
somewhat resembles a parent/child relationship (2004:14 -1).91 While I would 
question the applicability of a patron-client framework in the ways that Syrians 
transacted in their everyday lives, the concept of a parent/child relationship reflects 
how Syrians themselves described their regime and thus may be more appropriate.92 
The Mafia (as parent) is responsible not only for its own family, but for everyone 
living within its territory (i.e. its children). As long as the children/population accept 
the authority of the parent/Mafia, they will be protected from external drugs, gangs or 
violence. The relationship may be an uneasy and sometimes unwanted one, but it is 
effective nevertheless. In this light, Syrians’ narracting of the regime as a Mafia had 
both disconnective and connective aspects. The Mafia regime was both outside and 
inside, both like and not like ordinary Syrians. We ar  again returned to a shifting set 
of connections and disconnections within a single metaphor. The field of relations 
refuses to hold still. 
 
Indirect Languages of Politics 
An Archetype: The Bank Manager 
 
The past several sections have focused on Syrians’ use of direct descriptions of the 
regime and the ways in which those descriptions both challenged the Syrian 
leadership and connected it to the population.93 The final sections of this chapter, 
however, will look at other types of political languages, ones that are sometimes less 
immediately obvious that they are ‘political’ in nature. Loosely borrowing from 
Lavie’s (1990) exploration of the place of allegory in the formation of (a political) 
                                                
91 I shall return to the idea of an intersection of patron/client and parent/child relations in Chapter 7. 
92 Interestingly, the only relations I saw that might clearly fall under a patron-client rubric tended to be 
within family networks, where there was usually a more widely recognized distribution of power (with 
fathers and older male relatives positioned at the op of the hierarchy). Non-familial relations of favors 
seemed to occur between people of relatively equal status; they may have possessed different kinds of 
capital, but the ultimate transactions appeared to be f roughly equivalent value (cf. the sections on 
wasta’ in Chapters 5 and 6). 
93 Salamandra (2004) notes a similar trend whereby challenging is a central part of doing relations in 
Damascus, a through I shall elaborate on more fullyover the next several chapters.  
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identity, I will look at how a popular archetypical figure in Syrian political discourse 
is involved in a similar process.  
 Throughout my fieldwork, I encountered several archetypal figures that slowly 
developed over the course of numerous storytelling sessions. They were rarely 
associated with specific individuals, though indiviuals would occasionally be 
vaguely likened to specific archetypes. Similarly, the archetype figures themselves 
were not wholly concrete; what seemed to be diverse images would become a 
composite of a single one; one figure might contain plural figures. These archetypes 
served, in some instances, to allow the speaker to broach politically sensitive topics 
via a safe (as one never could be sure when the secr t police were listening) and 
‘invisible’ manipulation of metaphor and common knowledge. One such figure is 
relevant to my discussion here. Though I encountered him in different forms, it is to 
the description and story of what I am calling ‘the Bank Manager’ that I now turn. 
 
Here in Damascus, things are a mess. Nothing is very w ll-organized and 
everything is poorly run. Many of our problems today are because of all the 
immigration into the city. Lots of poor farm folk came flocking to the city 
looking for jobs. This led to huge problems because this city was not designed 
to handle such a large population—look at it now, with all the neighborhoods 
expanding in all directions, most of them poor. And there are suddenly a lot of 
unqualified people here, edging out people with class, good origins, and 
education. I mean, a backwater farmer comes out of his village in the middle 
of nowhere and ends up in the city. Before he knows what’s happening, he is 
made the manager of a bank. He has no idea how to run it or what he is doing, 
but he suddenly has power and wants to use it. His instinctive reaction is to fill 
all of the positions beneath him with people from his own village, because 
they are all he knows. Not surprisingly, everything is a mess in the bank 
afterwards—he doesn’t know what he is doing and no one working under him 
knows what they are doing because they are all just backwards farmers at 
heart. 
 
 Here, then, we have an image of a country bumpkin coming into the city,94 
gaining a degree of power, and making a mess of things because he has not been 
educated to be able to handle himself in such a situ tion, nor do his origins (aslhu) 
provide him with the natural potential (cf. Vom Bruck 2005, Dresch 1989). It is 
                                                
94 This urban versus rural divide is hardly uncommon in much of the Middle East, with each group 
usually describing themselves as being superior. Ruralites often will consider their urban counterparts 
as corrupt and immoral—this is even true of people in towns, as Meneley (1996) shows how the people 
of Zabid consider other Yemenis from big cities such as Aden or Sa’na to be immoral. Shyrock and 
Howell (2001) note how elite Jordanians rarely interact with (or wish to) rural tribesman; indeed the 
tribesman in Jordan are often considered to be backwards. The same holds true for urban descriptions 
of Yemeni tribesman (Caton 1990). 
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perhaps not surprising that these stories were told by middle class people of the 
city, people with a long family history of being from—if not Damascus itself—at 
least a city (one person who told me a story along this ven was my friend from 
Homs). These stories were often told over tea in their air-conditioned, New City 
homes or in trendy cafes or restaurants. The bank manager is a dismal character, 
portrayed as incompetent and ineffective. Yet at the same time, he is pitiable; it is 
not his entirely his fault he does not know how to do the job that has landed in his 
lap. He is out of his depth. Whereas, the story seem  to say (though does not do so 
directly), someone from the city would have been a much better candidate, 
because he would have been more likely to have been properly trained for the job 
and city etiquette, and have an appropriately dignified background. What this 
story does, then, in terms of inside and outside, is to set people from the country 
(rīf) as distinct and external to people from the city (cf. Salamandra 2004:12-14). 
And they are not just external, but are narracted as being somewhat less civilized, 
a time-tested dichotomy central to Ibn Khaldoun’s (2005) theory of political rule 
and society, hundreds of years ago.95  
 However, I did say that this was also a method of ‘talking’ politics. For 
this to make sense, both the speaker and the listener had to be aware of certain 
facts, otherwise the effect was lost. Fortunately for most Syrians (if somewhat 
unfortunately for fresh anthropologists), all the necessary background was 
common knowledge. First, they had to understand the significance of the choice of 
the bank, as, say, the Ministry of Tourism would not make as strong in impact. 
For much of recent history, the only bank in Syria was the National Bank of Syria, 
a national institution. So one had to know that to talk about a high-ranking official 
in the bank hierarchy was effectively to talk about someone that the ruling regime 
put in place. If the highest level servants of the regime are less than competent, 
that says little for the regime as a whole.  
 The bank also serves as a double entendre, for it invites association to the 
idea of money, and the (absolute) control the regim was said to have over it. Not 
only does the regime ‘steal’ and hoard all the country’s wealth, they then proceed 
to manage it incompetently. And in case it was not clear enough that it is the 
regime being implicated, there is the second bit of knowledge one needed: namely 
                                                
95 Though he seems to also bear a healthy respect for the ‘Bedouin’ peoples, describing them as 
stronger and more courageous than their more sedentary counterparts (Ibn Khaldoun 2005:91-95). 
 
131 
that the Alawi people have, for a long time, been a tough, but poor set of mountain 
farmers. In Syria, as in many places throughout the world, there is the belief that 
people living up in the mountains have nothing, live poor, and deal with the 
harshest conditions, while the people living in valleys and the cities are well-off 
and have the luxury to indulge themselves in occupations beyond hard labor. The 
city folk are therefore refined, cultured, and educated, while those from the 
mountain villages are tough and ignorant, certainly not fit for the delicate 
maneuverings required to rule. And as we have seen from the previous narracted 
histories, the Alawis came out of the mountains, took power (if only with the help 
of foreign conspirators), and promptly began to fill all of the high-ranking 
positions with their own people.  
 The city versus country divide suddenly doubles as a religious-ethnic one. 
In a duplexitous process, all non-Alawi city folk were narracted as insiders, while 
the mountain Alawis were made into outsiders. But not only were they outsiders, 
they were outsiders who were incapable of handling the positions they took. The 
regime’s authority is once again being discursively challenged, this time on the 
grounds of ineptitude.  
 One last interesting note. While the narraction of the bank manager seems 
to say that city folk (and thus non-Alawis) would be etter prepared to handle the 
position of managing a bank, it is an idea that I never once heard made explicit. In 
fact, the distinct absence of such a statement struck me as far more telling than its 
inclusion might have done. But I shall return to this lack in Chapter 6. 
 
The Power of Laughter  
 
Humor can be another excellent, but indirect way of ‘talking’ politics and in Syria 
is also very much a part of the everyday routine of socializing. Lisa Wedeen 
(1999) has looked at the various ways in which humor in newsprint walks the line 
between what is politically acceptable. Using political cartoons, she argues that 
“the popularity of political satires and cartoons ad the prevalence of jokes 
unfavorable to Asad tell us that although Syrians may not challenge power 
directly, neither do they uncritically accept the regime’s version of reality” 
(1999:87). She casts them as an everyday form of resistance that also upholds the 
state through its adherence to the official censors. I fully agree that there are 
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deeper political connotations within humor, but it also spans broader territory than 
just censored cartoons, and it is primarily the ev ryday forms of humor that I will 
address here—mostly in the form of jokes and joking that criss-cross the social 
landscape.  
 The majority of joking is not political in nature. For instance, the city of 
Homs is effectively to Syria what the Deep South is to the United States, with 
equivalent numbers of ‘dumb Homsi’ jokes—for example, in one joke, a Homsi 
man finds a genie (jinn) and is granted one wish. He asks for the jinn to build a 
bridge from the desert to America. The jinn shakes his head and tells the Homsi to 
ask for something simpler, because such a bridge would be nearly impossible. The 
man then asks the jinn to make all Homsi’s wise and knowledgeable. The jinn 
says, “I’ll get to work on that bridge.”  
 There are similar jokes for the Bedouin, as well as sheikh and priest jokes, 
simple puns, and language games. And there is the gam  of picking on whomever 
is present96 that might seem the most susceptible (cf. Gilsenan 1996). In the case 
of this young, unmarried female anthropologist, there was no end of joking about 
marriage, with mothers and fathers laughingly saying they would marry me off to 
their sons. Or most of these moments were at least half in jest. But overall, 
exchanging jokes (and picking on people) seemed to form a core part of any social 
gathering, especially if there was not a television.  
 Of course, there were a great many jokes that werepolitical in nature. 
Some were fairly clear to the uninitiated, some were more complex and only made 
sense if you had the appropriate background knowledge. Some were directly 
critical of individual figures, some were vaguer. But what they tended to share 
was this indirect quality. For those “in the know,” hat was left unsaid and how 
cleverly the ‘real’ comment was disguised were what m de the joke funny. To see 
how the politics, identity, challenges and connections/disconnections aspects can 
work in humor, I will give three popular jokes that I heard and explanation where 
necessary. But I will not attempt to analyze them, in order to maintain a 
faithfulness to how the humor part works, i.e. they were not meant to be translated 
into direct speech or explained. The jokes I have sel cted to include here tie in to 
the themes I have been discussing throughout this and other chapters, including 
                                                
96 Again, cleverness is acceptable when directed against n opponent who is present to be able to try 
and defend him or herself. 
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oppression, violence, identity-work, corruption, and Syrians’ own reflexivity. I 
hope it will be apparent at this point how and why t ey are humorous. (N.b. the 
president’s last name, Asad, means ‘lion’ in Arabic.) 
 
There was a lion out in the wilderness and a hunter decided he was going to go 
take care of it. He loaded up his weapon and went out, t ok aim and shot, but 
missed. The lion came over, a bit upset, and told the man that he had two options: 
the lion could eat him or it could fuck him. The man thought about it, and selected 
the latter. The next day, he was really upset about the whole incident and decided 
to go out and try to kill the lion, now partly in revenge for what had happened. He 
aimed, shot, and again missed. The lion came over and offered the same options 
as before. The man was really upset, but again took the latter. The next day, he 
readied himself, dead set on killing the lion now, furious over the shame and 
humiliation. He found the lion, took a slow deep breath, carefully aimed, 
shot…and again missed. This time the lion came overand said “I’m beginning to 
think that you’re not coming out here to kill me…” 
 
There were two Sunni men who were interested in gettin  involved in politics, in 
getting ahead, so they decided they wanted to join the Alawis. They petitioned to 
do so and were told that they could, but that they ad to swim from the beach to 
an island. It wasn’t necessary that they do so, but they should try to help each 
other out, so they could both get ahead. If and when t y arrived on the island, 
they would be allowed to become Alawi. So the two men stripped down and 
began to swim. They swam, but after a time it became pparent that one of the 
men was a better swimmer than the other, and he eventually reached the island 
first. When the second arrived, he was very tired an  put up his hand to ask for 
help up to shore, but the first kicked him instead an said “Fuck you, you Sunni 
dog (kis ikhtak [lit. your sister’s pussy], ya kelb sunni).” 
 
An international commission was doing a poll to determine people’s reactions to 
having the electricity being cut (qatcit kahārāba). They first went to an American 
and said, “What is your opinion on power outages?” He replied, “What does 
‘electricity being cut’ mean?” They then went to a Chinese man and asked him the 
same question. He replied, “What does ‘electricity’ mean?” Finally they went to a 








5. Living the Regime (For Good or Ill) 
 
The previous chapter examined some of the ways in wh ch Syrians engaged their 
regime in an apparently negative fashion, using narractive techniques to challenge 
and test the regime’s political and moral authority. Interestingly, as Jean-Klein (in 
press) points out, the Arabic word for challenge (ith adad) stems from the same root 
as the word for border or boundary (hadd, pl. hadūd). As we saw in that chapter, the 
process of doing relations, creating boundaries of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ was also 
similarly a process of challenging. In this chapter, I intend to explore other ways in 
which Syrians engaged their regime during my fieldwork. The duplex nature of 
Syrians’ relations with their regime reappears, as I examine how their lived 
experiences engendered both connections and disconne tio s. Navaro-Yashin 
(2002:119) has examined the role of public life in the recreation and maintenance of 
the Turkish state, but she somewhat limits herself to examining what are obviously 
‘statist’ moments, i.e. instances where the population, by incorporating various state 
symbols into their actions, becomes “more statist than the state.” In her account, she 
addresses how the public adopts official-like discourses and symbolism in a move 
that reifies the state as the state.  
 However, while Navaro-Yashin looks at how the state is constructed in 
obviously intentional ways, I intend to continue looking at the ways the state is 
engaged (or not) in intentional, but oblique ways. We, as anthropologists, can never 
know a priori precisely what practices or transactions we are obs rving. Moments 
that appear to be casual might be highly political, and moments that appear ‘statist’ 
might be anything but. Most of the examples I will explore here are everyday 
experiences where Syrians found themselves dealing with their regime in manners 
that were expected for them, but somewhat unexpected in the anthropological 
literature (though I will examine expected moments as well). By this I mean that the 
politics is not only popularly experienced in voting, rallies or hanging up posters of 
the president (cf. Wedeen 1999), but also in bribery, connections, the payment of 
taxes, and even in the space of homes.97 These everyday encounters and the ways 
                                                
97 Handler (1988) similarly encourages us to look for signs, discourse and narratives of nationalism in 
non-political contexts as much as in ‘big’ political moments. While I very much agree with his 
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that people narracted them provided spaces where politics was ‘done’ (or not)—
where connections were made, knowledge was (re)created, nd the degrees of the 
regime’s distance ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ was constantly renegotiated.  
 
Playing the Game: The Places and Spaces of Official  Rhetoric 
 
Lisa Wedeen (1999) provides a thorough account of the official and popular uses of 
rhetoric and symbolism during Hafez al-Asad’s reign in Syria. She suggests that the 
“cult of Asad,” as an officially constructed entity, served to recreate the regime 
through the engineering of and the active ability to enforce compliance and 
obedience in the Syrian population (i.e. the development of a “politics of ‘as if’”). 
She primarily focuses on regime-directed aspects of he cult, while looking at the 
popular consumption of this official rhetoric and how its subversion could be a form 
of resistance. Similarly, I shall begin this chapter by looking at such subversive uses 
of expected political spaces, but without presupposing either a statist/resistance 
framework or that what Syrians were doing lined up with what observers might think 
they were doing. I also intend to see how everyday experience and understanding of 
regime paraphernalia provided further spaces of connecting to or challenging the 
regime.  
 
An Exchange of Rallies 
 
With the death of Rafik Hariri in 2005, relations between Syria and Lebanon took a 
sharp turn away from their previous state of a quiet, but stable tension. Not long after 
the assassination, there were a number of political rallies in Lebanon, some 
demanding the removal of Syrian interference from Lebanese politics and some 
supporting Syria’s presence. Inspired by the Hezbollah-led, pro-Syrian rally in 
Beirut, a corresponding rally took place in Damascus in March 2005 to support 
President Bashar al-Asad in his decision to remove Syrian troops from Lebanon. 
Estimates of the number of attendees ranged from tens to hundreds of thousands. 
                                                                                                                                
sentiment, I am not wholly convinced that any moment that activates or narrates nationalism could 
truly be considered anything but political in nature. Perhaps it is not, or would not be described as, 
explicitly ‘political’, but I would argue that by ‘doing’ politics (vis-à-vis nationalism), it becomes 
political, even if only in the analyst’s eyes. 
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Syrian (and Bacth) flags were waved, slogans were chanted, and the president himself 
stood watching and waving from a nearby balcony. Major businesses and schools 
were closed; many small businesses closed out of respect. Prior to the rally itself, 
small spontaneous parades—caravans of six or seven cars—drove about the streets 
wildly, with the men (I saw no women in these parades) cheering enthusiastically, 
waving flags, and honking horns in a manner not dissimilar to the car parades-cum-
road rallies that escort a bride and groom to their n w home after their wedding. 
Similarly, younger groups of shebāb (young men) wandered through the streets with 
flags. I passed one of these smaller gangs while waking in the Old City, and one boy 
(whom I had never seen before) turned and said to me in English, “America, get 
out!” before walking on. The streets were all but empty aside from these enthusiasts, 
leaving the city feeling eerily abandoned despite being midday on an otherwise 
normal Wednesday. Many of my Syrian friends were distraught when I told them I 
was considering attending the rally, saying that they were sure it would not turn 
violent, but if it did, it was the last place an American should be. They were so upset, 
that I decided not to go out of consideration for them. However I watched news 
reports of it, read internet and newspaper comments on it, and asked my friends who 
saw it to describe it to me (one of whom was Egyptian and thought the whole thing 
rather funny). 
 Wedeen (1999:68) remarks that rallies in Syria were known for having 
mandatory attendance. School students were bussed in, as were civil servants and 
employees of other big businesses. My informants, too, said that such was the case of 
regime-sponsored rallies. They were not so much demonstrations of actual loyalty as 
part of the job description. And yet, most added, the one in March 2005 was 
somewhat different. One informant estimated that possibly as many as half of the 
demonstrators were there of their own free will.98 But by the same token, many other 
people chose to stay home. One of these latter, a small business owner of a shop in 
the Old City, said that he had chosen to take the day off. It was best if he closed his 
shop, to give an appearance of support and respect, but used it as an excuse for a rare 
holiday. He said he felt bad for some of the employees of bigger corporations. “I 
                                                
98 Though there were other Syrians who were more cynical. An anonymous reply on Landis’ (2005) 
SyriaComment blog post for the day read “In the last fourty years, there has'nt been a real spontaneous 
gathering except when the great poet Nizar kabani died. And i think everybody Knows that (sic).”  
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don’t believe in what they’re saying at that rally and most of them don’t either. But I 
get the choice to go home because I’m my own boss. They’re stuck.” And yet he 
chose to close his shop, indicating, as Wedeen would contend, that the regime was 
able to enforce its will upon the population via a politics of ‘as if,’ whereby people 
still felt compelled to play by the rules of the game. But Syrians themselves were 
also aware of this coerced complicity. A lower middle-class university student who 
lived who lived with his parents and brothers in a ‘tr ditional’ house in the Old City 
(See Introduction, pg. 3) told me that  
 
Every one of those shopowners who closed because of th  rallies is a 
‘motherfucker’ (sic). They don’t do it because they support Bashar, but 
because they’re cowards (jubna’). They’re afraid that the mukhābarāt will 
notice and then they’ll be in trouble. They’re afraid to lose what they have, so 
they just go along with the crowd. And it’s the regime’s fault. Everyone 
knows someone who disappeared in the night for disagreeing and so people 
are afraid and do what the regime wants. 
 
This expectation of observation also provided a possible explanation for the boy who 
told me to ‘get out.’ I told a friend about that inc dent and she said not to worry, that 
it was likely that the boy had a father or an uncle who worked for the secret police 
and he was hoping that if he was reported saying such things, he might put himself in 
good standing for a career in the secret police.  
 We can read a number of different connections into these various experiences 
of the pro-Bashar rally. For those who attended the demonstration, there were strong 
connections being made, whether ideological (for thse present voluntarily) or 
practical (for those whose attendance was mandatory). The regime became ‘insiders,’ 
as Syrians asserted their pride and loyalty, thereby actively (re)creating themselves 
and the regime as ‘Syrians.’ The smaller, groups driving about the city were making 
similar connections. For those like the shopowner who took the day off, the 
connections were somewhat less clear-cut. He was decidedly disconnecting himself 
from the regime and those participating in the demonstration, dismissing the 
spectacle as a charade. Yet, by choosing to close his shop, he was still participating 
in the regime’s spectacle by keeping to the expected forms. He was challenging the 
authenticity of the regime’s organized affair, but was acceding to the expectations of 
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a ‘good citizen.’99 The informant who disapproved of the shopowners wa 
disconnecting himself from the regime, rally participants, and the complicit 
bystanders. He was challenging not only the regime, by not attending, but also the 
authenticity of the shopowners, by declaring that te latter were cowards for refusing 
to stand up for what they claimed to believe (which would presumably require a 
shopowner to keep his shop open). He did admit that disconnecting from the regime 
could be dangerous. The final commentator, who assured me that the scolding I 
received was nothing more than a boy creating job options for himself, was herself 
identifying the various connections that this demonstration brought to light. She 
realized that much of the demonstrating consisted of pe ple doing what they felt they 
were supposed to in order to best connect themselves to the regime. But the rally not 
only created a space for ideological dis/connections t  be activated, but also for 
personal ones. A rally, and the warm-up to it, were as much about job options as 
about political idealism.  
 That personal connections had a part in a political rally was not uncommon. 
There were a number of other, smaller demonstrations that took place while I was in 
Damascus, on various issues from protesting regime policies to supporting the 
Palestinian cause. However, regardless of what their original topic was, the rallies 
had a remarkable ability to become declarations of support for Syria and Bashar. This 
was, according to one friend, “because there are two plain-clothes mukhābarāt 
present for every one actual demonstrator. When you find the crowd suddenly 
chanting for Bashar instead of for Palestine and several people are giving you 
piercing looks, it is best to switch your cries too.” Not that my friend really cared 
much either way. In fact, he was frequently puzzled by his foreign friend’s attempt to 
try and understand the actual meaning of what people were chanting about. He was 
perfectly content to stand around and chat idly with other ‘demonstrators.’ Finally, 
exasperated at being constantly questioned, he explained to me that “you don’t come 
to these things to protest or demonstrate. You come t  meet girls (or boys).” 
                                                
99 Of course, it stands to reason that he also closed for more practical reasons. Given that the rest of 
Damascus would also expect shops to be closed, there would likely be no customers coming out to 
shop. Such a possibility widens the scope of the ‘as if’ politics, whereby the population, via its 
experience and understanding of the regime, creates the very outcome (i.e. the shops being closed for 
the rally) that the regime wishes to see (i.e. shop being closed) vis-à-vis their expectations (i.e. that
shop owners will hold to the form of closing for the rally because it is ‘dangerous’ not to). 
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Demonstrations, it appeared, were some of the few socially acceptable situations 
where young men and women could come together to meet without a chaperone. It 
was, in fact, a disconnection par excellence.100 These young men and women were 
physically positioned in an explicitly ‘political’ setting, and yet what they were 
‘doing’ was as apolitical as it could be. They were using politics as a forum to do 
their personal relations. As I suggested, we cannot always take for granted the nature 
of what we are observing—just because a thing appears to be an official state 
occasion, does not mean it is (only that) for our informants (cf. Navaro-Yashin 
2003:107).   
 
Poster Plastering and Flag Waving 
 
The pro-Syria campaign did not end at the official demonstration. Around the time of 
the rally, a number of posters and billboards began to appear throughout Damascus. 
One of the boards that I saw had several proud-looking young men and women101 
saying “kilnā mack, yā Bashar”—“We are all with you, Bashar.” There was another 
one in Bab Touma square in the Old City that said “Proud to be a Syrian,” though 
only in English, which left me translating to some of my friends what it meant. There 
were posters too, photographs of President Bashar and some with Hafez al-Asad. My 
friend who had decided to close his shop and take the day off said that the day after 
the demonstration, a man had come to all of the nearby shops distributing such 
posters and Syrian flags free of charge. The owner had taken one of each, but had 
declined to hang them in his shop. 
 Wedeen (1999:75-6) notes the prevalence of such “cult” paraphernalia, 
including various icons of Hafez al-Asad, that tendd to be displayed in all major 
institutions, many small businesses, and a large percentage of taxis. She describes a 
somewhat functional aspect for the hanging of such images, saying that, while not 
putting them up was not a punishable offence, having them visible might have 
                                                
100 This, in fact, rather similar to Wedeen’s (1999) notions of ‘as if’ interactions with the regime, 
whereby people are appearing to comply with the regim ’s policies and actions but are also subverting 
them. However, whereas Wedeen sees such moments as political resistance, I would argue that this 
case is not so much one of resisting the regime, but of people co-opting ‘political’ moments for their 
own, non-political purposes. 
101 Interestingly, none of the young women in these advertisements wore headscarves. Nor did the 
President’s wife, when she appeared in poster images. 
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encouraged police officers to look the other way in the case of minor violations (e.g. 
receiving a traffic ticket). However, one of the first things I noticed upon arriving in 
Damascus was the relative lack of such images compared to what I had envisaged 
based on her description. Only half, perhaps less, of the taxis had pictures of the 
president on their back windows, and an even smaller percentage of businesses did. 
One informant told me that Bashar had actually forbidden the hanging of such 
posters; biographer David Lesch (2005:3) makes a similar comment on the new 
president’s distaste for cult iconography.  
 Aside from sheer amounts of it, there was a further distance between father 
and son in terms of iconography. The official “cult” of Hafez al-Asad described him 
as “the country’s ‘premier’ pharmacist, teacher, doctor, and lawyer within a single 
election campaign” (Wedeen 2005:40). John Borneman (2004:18) describes how 
leaders of “totalizing” regimes often portray themselves as scientists, authors, etc. as 
a way to key in to the ideals of modernity as well giving themselves a sort of 
“transcendent” quality. In contrast to this, Hafez’s son was sometimes referred to by 
the Syrian population (as opposed to official rhetoric) as “Dr. Bashar.” This title was 
not in jest, but out of what felt like a genuine resp ct for his degree in 
ophthalmology.   
 Throughout much of the Middle Eastern area, being a learned man is a highly 
respected position, and is a quality that is traditionally expected in leaders. For 
instance, the sayyids in Yemen are people who trace blood descent from the Prophet 
Muhammed. Under the former Imamate in Lower Yemen, only a sayyid could 
become the Imam; however, it was not enough for him to erely be of the proper 
bloodline. He also had to be properly learned and pious (vom Bruck 2005), and 
usually “had to be a mujtahid, capable…of forming new law by extrapolation from 
scripture, a skill which only the leaned can judge” (Dresch 1989:161). This learning 
usually referred to religious learning, rather than more “intellectual sciences” (Ibn 
Khaldoun 2005:371) that include forms of non-religious education and instruction. 
Learned men more generally are also afforded respect, for even rulers should have 
“respect for the religious law and for the scholars who are learned in it,…thinking 
highly of religious scholarship, belief in and veneration for men of religion and a 
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desire to receive their prayers, [and a] great respect for old men and teachers (Ibn 
Khaldoun 2005:112).  
 A doctor, though, does not fall under this rubric of religiously learned, nor 
does a pharmacist or lawyer. But in Syria, religious education is not the only variety 
that is respected. Four-year university degrees might not have meant much, but 
advanced degrees and certain professions do, especially if the person has studied or 
worked abroad. People were always impressed upon hearing that I was working on a 
PhD. And being a British-trained doctor earned Bashar a similar respect. At the same 
tim there were also accounts that compared Bashar with his deceased brother Basil 
and declared that in some ways Basil would have been a better leader. Basil, it was 
explained to me, had done all of his military service and was much more militaristic 
in nature than his younger brother. The sword is just as important as the pen in 
matters of rule, though a leader who possesses both would be ideal (Ibn Khaldoun 
2005:213, Messick 1993). 
 Returning to the posters, I do not wish to give th impression that all such 
presidential iconography had disappeared from the walls and buildings of Syria. It 
was still quite numerous with many examples depicting Hafez and with an occasional 
image of Basil.102 On the walls of the ancient Roman amphitheatre in Bosra, there 
was a larger-than-life size photograph of Bashar al-As d (Figure 5). When walking 
into the main entrance of the University of Damascus, one was greeted by a 
similarly-sized visage of Hafez al-Asad. One of the primary things I noticed about 
the photographs were the poses that the men were in. Maria de Bella (2004:38) 
describes the way that Mussolini would select and edit photos of himself before 
allowing them to be distributed to the public, always choosing the ones that showed 
him with a strong jaw and an intense gaze, upholding the image of a ‘commander.’ 
The mass-distributed pictures of Bashar were similar in style, with Bashar, who 
somewhat lacks the strong chin of his father, gazing up and off into the distance, 
looking somber and dignified, as if deep in thought like a learned man would be. He 
                                                
102 This resembles, if does not exactly match, the use of uch pictures in Mussolini’s Italy. Di Bella 
(2004: 34) describes how images there frequently portrayed a ‘trinity’ of the ruler, his deceased father 
and his sons. In Syria, there was a trinity effect, including the dead father, but Wedeen (2005: 60) 
argues that only Hafez’s dead son could be included because he was no longer a potential threat. 
During my fieldwork, I saw many posters that included Hafez, Bashar and Bashar’s children, but 
never all three together. And photos with Bashar and his children always included his wife as well. 
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did, though, look somewhat more relaxed and open when pictured with his wife and 
children—or with the “children” of his country (see Figure 8 below).  
 
 
Figure 5: Poster of Bashar al-Asad at Bosra 
 
 Hafez’s pictures (Figure 6), on the other hand, ha taken on an almost 
grandfatherly aspect (cf. Schoeberlein 2004 for a description of a similar process 
with Lenin in the USSR). His head is tilted slightly down, as if he were speaking to a 
young child, and the gaze is focused straight out at the audience. A hint of a smile 
plays across his face, giving him a kind and benevolent perspective. Given the former 
“cult” rhetoric of Hafez as the country’s father (Wedeen 1999)103 and that he has now 
died and passed on the country to his son, the assumption of a (loving) grandfather 
role would seem to be appropriate, though I never hea d him described as such. 
Interestingly, I also never heard Bashar, either in official rhetoric or everyday 
descriptions, mentioned as being Syria’s ‘father,’ as if he were less qualified and 
                                                
103 Wedeen (1999:52), borrowing from Joseph’s (1994) (see below, Conclusion pg 236) ideas of 
“patriarchal connectivity” that the use of family rhetoric in the Syrian regime attempted to create a 
sense of familial connections between Asad and the population. As metaphorical ‘family members,’ 
then, regime and population would be extensions of each other and thus inherently bound together and 
implicated in the creation and maintenance of each other’s identities. However, as Joseph herself 
primarily applies this term to brother/sister (and not parent/child) relationships, I think Wedeen’s 
casual use of it might be somewhat too liberal withou  further ethnographic analysis along these lines.  
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perhaps too young to fill that position.104 Indeed, Shyrock and Howell (2001:247) 
note that in Jordan, when Abdullah II became the king in 1999 that he described 
himself as a ‘brother’ to the population, to continue the idea that his father had also 
been the country’s ‘father.’ But father-like or otherwise, these portraits were given 
little room in private spaces. Indeed, it was becoming more common to not see such 
photos even public in places such as restaurants; if they were present, they were often 
in unobtrusive, out-of-the-way areas where they were not readily visible. 
 
 
Figure 6: Hanging of Hafez al-Asad on a building in Damascus 
 
 Slightly more complicated was the use of flags (calim, pl. aclām). Unlike in 
America, where seeing an American flag hanging in fro t of someone’s private home 
is nothing out of the ordinary, in Damascus (initially) the only places I saw Syrian 
flags were in front of state ministries, unfailingly accompanied by Bacth party flags. 
As I mentioned earlier, this led to informants feeling that there was no sense of 
Syrian nationality invested in the flag (as occurs in other countries), but rather an 
association with the thieves who worked in the ministries. The flag was a symbol of a 
regime that Syrians wished to distance themselves from. Yet, that was not always 
quite right. I had another friend who insisted that, while he hated the regime, he also 
                                                
104 Bashar was 34 years old when he became president of Syria. The Syrian constitution had 
previously stated that a person had to be 40 years old to become president, but it was rapidly changed 
to an age of 34 years directly after Hafez’s death.  
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believed that there could be a ‘Syria’ that was “bigger than (akbar min) the regime.” 
He said that he wanted to buy and fly a Syrian flag, to show pride in being Syrian. He 
shook his head and said that he could not, because of th peer pressure. If he was 
seen flying a Syrian flag, people would assume that he was a part of or working for 
the regime. They would misunderstand his intentions and as a result, lose all trust in 
him. Likely they would no longer speak to him. The ability to ascribe meaning to the 
symbol of the flag has, then, been almost co-opted by the population, despite or 
perhaps because it is a form of symbolic capital controlled by the regime. Ordinary 
Syrians have transformed the artifact of the flag into a connection with the regime. 
By not hanging a flag, my friend was disconnecting from the regime, but at the same 
time was making connections between his peers and himself (cf. Jean-Klein 2001 and 
popular hegemony). He was connecting himself with his neighbors over the regime 
and his hopes for a Syria beyond the regime. The flag, through the everyday making 
of connections, was thus made predominantly into a symbol of the Asads and the 
Alawis.105 The absent flag, on the other hand, became a symbol of the outsider tatus 
of the regime and the insider one of those not involved in it. Syrians, then, had 
substantial agency to (re)make symbolic capital, and more broadly, to define and 
order their world. 
 As a small postscript, when I first arrived in Syria, I was struck by how many 
more images of the Presidents Asad I saw than Syrian flags. However, by the time I 
left just over a year later, I was struck by the reve se. Indeed, on a return visit in June 
2006, I was surprised to see a number of Syrian flags being hung outside private 
residences and small shops (Figure 7).106 Pictures of the president on taxi windows 
had come down and been replaced with Syrian flags. Flags covered billboards, 
figuring local athletes in the foreground. Suddenly it seemed as if there was now an 
option for connecting not only to the regime, but to he country itself, whereas the 
two had been somewhat separated previously. In one cas , the two were equated,107 
with Bashar standing proudly before a crowd of Syrian-flag waving people, and the 
                                                
105 In a somewhat similar fashion, Navaro-Yashin describes how a ‘flag campaign’ in Turkey used a 
state symbol, but was actually organized (and thus somewhat co-opted) by popular media companies 
(2002: 127-30). 
106 This may have had something to do with the sheer number of flags flying about the city more 
generally, in honor of the World Cup. Restaurants ad streets were littered with foreign flags, but there 
was almost always a Syrian one nearby as well.  
107 An equation that had to be made, and might just as easily “collapse” after the fact. 
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slogan reading “God Defends Syria” (Figure 8). These newfound connections to a 
“bigger” Syria created a new, more positive space for people to connect to the 
regime. But as this is very much a recent and on-goi g movement, I was not able to 
observe what changes in relating might have been eff ct d.  
 
 









Al- Mukhābarāt —The Secret Police 
 
One of the central, if invisible, figures in all of these interactions with regime 
propaganda was the agent of the secret police, waiting and watching, ready to report 
the slightest misconduct. Their job is to observe and make connections—analyzing 
what they have witnessed or heard and using that information to uncover potential 
threats to the regime. Memories of friends and family embers disappearing in the 
night because of the secret police haunt Syrians’ imag nations. Wedeen (1999) 
describes how it was necessary for all political talk hat might be considered a contest 
to the regime’s power or authority to be “hidden.” Hidden can mean, for her, either 
taking place out of sight and earshot of possible spi s (i.e. in a private home or other 
safe place that the mukhābarāt theoretically cannot enter) or by using subversive 
forms of conversing that relied on the audience understanding what was not being 
said.108 And indeed, these describe many of the ways that I experienced people 
engaging in Syrian politics, using allegorical jokes or talking in whispers. Before I 
left for Damascus, a Syrian friend warned me that no o e would ‘talk politics’ with 
me there. I arrived somewhat worried by this, but fo nd that just the opposite was 
true. Salamandra (2004:5) also remarks in her ethnography of Damascus that there is 
a “general assumption, shared by Syrians…that foreign researchers are spies” and 
that she was regularly accused of being CIA. Thus I was surprised at how readily my 
informants would enter into political conversations with me. It assuredly helped that 
this contact had introduced me to her family in Syria, so I was not utterly unknown. 
And her family was more familiar with social scienc as a form of study and could 
assure their friends that I was not a threat. Even so, other people that I met 
independently of these were equally comfortable speaking with me. When this same 
friend came to visit me part way through my study, I told her about my confusion at 
everyone being so willing to talk to me. She said that part of it might stem from the 
fact that, although I might be CIA, I was definitely not working for the Syrian 
                                                
108 Wedeen (1999:147) goes on to describe how Asad was considered to be ‘all-seeing,’ leading people 
to internalize their surveillance and always act as if they are being watched. What she does not 
necessarily account for is that this is not only true of the regime. Ordinary Syrians are also always 
watching each other and are always aware that they are being watched by family, friends and 
neighbors. Thus her Foucauldian-like reading of surveillance may not be so much a distinct political 
phenomenon created by the Asad regime, but perhaps is a broader socio-cultural trend (see Chapter 7). 
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mukhābarāt. Syrians might not like foreign spies, she said, but they were far more 
likely to be afraid of their own.  
 And people were certainly wary of them. My informants told me that 
anybody could be a member of the secret police: waiters, the not-so-subtle men 
wearing all black and carrying pistols on the street, ven taxi drivers. In fact, when I 
was taking a course on the local dialect, my class c me across the phrase ‘ma lau 
tacmeh’ (‘tasteless’ or inappropriate). When trying to give an example of something 
that would fit this description, the Syrian instructor said, “Like talking politics in a 
taxi, because you can never be certain your driver is not mukhābarāt.” Another 
informant assured me that at least 19% of the population belonged to or worked for 
the secret police: “You can’t trust anyone outside of your immediate family, even 
your extended family could be dangerous.”109 People were therefore very aware of 
their surroundings. They would not necessarily limit what they were saying, they just 
made very sure they were not being overheard. For example, one afternoon in a 
relaxed, Old city café, a friend and I were discussing politics, and he wanted to bring 
up the topic of the Syrian regime. Before doing so, we changed where we were 
sitting (we knew the owner and so had free reign to move as we pleased) to an area 
that was set back from the rest of the café and gave a good line of sight to observe 
anyone that might be listening in. Another day, a girlfriend and I sat in a café in a 
fashionable district of town talking about the secret police. Though she brought up 
the subject herself, she still spoke in English, kept her voice to a whisper, and 
constantly looked over her shoulder to make sure that no one was listening. “Even 
the walls have ears,” she told me.  
 Walls, telephones and even email apparently had ears. Many Syrians believed 
that the mukhābarāt’s strength was enough to allow them to monitor all manner of 
communication, including every e-mail that was sent and every phone call that was 
made. I imagined this degree of monitoring must have required a massive amount of 
man-power and time, but my informants assured me that the regime had it. In fact, a 
Kurdish informant told me that the regime was so intent on maintaining its 
surveillance that speaking in Kurdish on the phone was actually illegal. He said there 
was some official reason given, but the real reason was because the people listening 
                                                
109 This family aspect of talk about the secret police is something I shall return to in Chapter 6.  
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in to the conversations could not understand the langu ge and so could not 
effectively keep tabs on what was being said.110 Even one’s home one was not 
entirely safe. I attended a party one evening where the conversation turned political 
and heavily critical. Early into the conversation, the owner of the apartment crossed 
to the windows and closed them, despite the warmth of e evening. Several others 
nodded approvingly. He looked at me, said “yimkin mu dhurūri, bas…” (“maybe it’s 
not necessary, but…”) and shrugged. 
 But at the same time, I had other informants tell me that the power of the 
mukhābarāt had been much reduced since Bashar al-Asad came into power. There 
was no distinctive class or education element to this (at least amongst the various 
middle classes), for some wealthier, well-educated p ople would be dismissive about 
the current power of the secret police, while others were still very nervous, and the 
same spread held true for the lower middle classes a  well. I would frequently see 
people making jokes about the secret police, including one employee at a popular 
café mocking a group of them who had come in the previous evening. He mimicked 
their behavior by alternating strutting around—all puffed up with self-importance—
with acting like an obtuse ape. His audience laughed and slapped their knees 
appropriately, appreciating the joke. However, he had been a properly deferential 
waiter the night before when they had actually been pr sent. But stories and fears 
aside, how present were the secret police in Syrians’ lives?   
 The first-person experiences that my informants had with the secret police 
and recounted to me often seemed to be pretty harmless. And despite my friends’ 
assurances that the mukhābarāt were far more interested in Syrians than in 
foreigners, several of the narractions involved or revolved around a foreigner. For 
instance most foreigners, especially those living in rented rooms in the Old City, 
could expect to receive a visit from the secret police within the first month or so of 
their residence. An agent would come by, usually without any warning, and take 
down a variety of information about the foreigner (all of which was already recorded 
at the Immigration Ministry). It was a small nuisance for the foreigner, but provided 
a space for interaction between the agent and ordinary Syrians hosting the foreigner 
                                                
110 Such a Kurdish-specific surveillance was said to be particularly central to the mukhābarāt, given 
the amount of unrest and the occasional tendency towards uprising amongst the Kurdish population, 
especially in the Northern areas of Syria.  
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(i.e. the owner of the house). In the first house I was living in, the father of the family 
was less than pleased at the intrusion of the secret police into his house. The agent 
came up to my room and I met him in the hall. A younger female cousin of the 
household stood by, ready to translate. The father, who was not a tall man, was also 
present, standing over the shoulder of the agent, kenly watching his every move. 
The agent clearly felt the antagonism and was somewhat put off by it, trying to get 
through all the information as hurriedly as possible. When he asked for my date of 
birth, I told him—at this point my birthday was only several weeks away. Upon 
hearing that, the father seized his opportunity to quietly harass the agent by breaking 
into a happy birthday song, singing as loudly as he could, clapping vigorously, and 
dancing wildly across the area in which the man was trying to conduct his ‘serious’ 
work. I giggled delightedly, but the agent pursed his lips and frowned, obviously 
annoyed but unable to say anything to disrupt the perfectly legitimate display of 
excitement over a birthday. It was only later that I made the connection between this 
moment and some of the clever ‘playing’ that Gilsenan (1996) describes, whereby 
one individual uses his wit to invert the obvious social hierarchy and is most 
successful when the other is left unable to retort. The agent, despite holding a 
frighteningly superior position in the official ranks was at a loss to regain control of 
the situation. And by his general hostility and his joking actions, the father was 
indicating a sharp demarcation (disconnection) betwe n the two individuals. 
However, there was also a connection between the two men, in that, for the play to be 
effective, the two had to share a common code of decency and appropriateness. That 
the point of the song was initially lost on me, butwas not lost on the mukhābarāt 
agent, indicates that I was the one who was outside their shared code of social 
conduct. And yet I (unintentionally) moved myself ‘inside’ by joining in the fun and 
laughing. 
 In a somewhat less humorous situation, I also managed to get another Syrian 
caught up in an interaction with the secret police. I had a Syrian friend whose 
husband, through a line of wasta (‘connections’), helped me to get a visa extension 
(see Chapter 6). One evening while sitting around at their house, the husband told me 
that a friend of his had been told by another friend who worked in the Passport and 
Immigration Ministry that the word on the street was that I knew someone in Syria 
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who had been in Israel. My first thought was to be impressed by the chains of rumor 
that had managed to find their way from some informant on the street through several 
Ministries and workplaces to finally find me. My second thought was confusion, 
because the rumor was not true. My third thought was orry, as to who would have 
said such a thing and what the consequences might be. My friend’s husband told me 
not to worry, but just to be careful. In retrospect, I realized that the warning had only 
partially been intended for me. It had also been somewhat directed at my friend’s 
husband, quietly warning him to not be caught making inappropriate connections. By 
warning me in a friendly way, he was ensuring that I would not accidentally get him, 
or anyone else in the chain of wasta in trouble. Activating the wrong connections 
could be problematic for all involved. 
 It was not only in the context of foreigners that Syrians encountered the secret 
police. Those interactions involving only Syrians carried a great deal more weight, 
for the dangerous party was not a foreigner who was bound to leave the country 
sooner or later (thus taking most of her potential for trouble-making with her), but 
was the Syrian himself. For instance, I had a friend who used to work as a clerk in a 
foreign embassy in Damascus. Part of his job entailed handling money in both Syrian 
and the relevant foreign currency. He told me that, one day, the secret police called 
him in for questioning and accused him of illegally exchanging currencies on the 
black market. My friend denied the claim and said there was no proof of that; the 
only money changing he had done had been under the auspices of embassy functions. 
They relaxed, but demanded that he help his country by spying on the embassy 
workings for them. He said he did not have access to anything even remotely 
classified and would be of no help, but they said that even the colors of the guards’ 
shoes could be useful. He was confused, but they told him that they were the 
professionals and to let them decide what would or would not be of use to them in the 
intelligence agency.  
 He said that the mukhābarāt usually question all such employees at regular 
intervals, but most employees wanted nothing to do with them, as he had ultimately 
refused to help them. But at the same time, he said with a sigh, “there are a lot of 
people who, like monkeys, grab whatever bananas they se  and hand them over to 
the police for some extra money.” He, in his narracted version, had staunchly refused 
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to submit to the tactics of the mukhābarāt, creating a disconnection between him and 
the regime vis-à-vis their police. They had enough power over him to physically 
compel him to come to the meeting, but did not have any legitimate way to coerce 
him into working for them. But he acknowledged that there were people who, like 
foolish monkeys, agreed to help out of the desire to make some extra money. 
Through his scorn of their actions, he distanced himself as much from his fellow 
employees as from the actual regime agents. The greedy mployees were narracted as 
being connected to the regime by choice, and the narractor externalized all of them. 
 People’s wariness and dislike of the mukhābarāt served to set the regime as 
outsiders, while connecting and uniting non-regime Syrians through their combined 
disconnections and (returning to flags) their ability to collectively alter the meanings 
of regime symbols. The secret police also gave the population moments to further 
challenge and test the regime. Syrians could mock regime figures (if behind their 
backs) or openly interfere with them by temporarily upending who had control of a 
situation. And if they found themselves having to co perate in minimal fashions, 
they could choose to do it grudgingly. But what we begin to get a hint of here, which 
I shall explore in Chapter 6, is that sometimes non-regime people can be implicated 
in regime activities (i.e. the “monkeys”). Once again, we see the ins and outs shifting, 
with no connections (or disconnections) as permanent or clearly delineated as they 




Private homes, as I noted above, were one of the few places where people felt they 
could safely discuss politics—as long as the windows were closed. The regime could 
not intrude upon the sanctity of the home without very good reason. “‘Intellectual life 
under dictatorship’…not only exists, but may even thrive, especially in the privacy of 
one’s own home” (Wedeen 1999:148, citation removed). And in Yemen, the home is 
not only private,111 it is also autonomous: “the house is the first leve  of government, 
closed to the shaikh’s policing, save in the case of murder…[which] invites outside 
authority inside. Otherwise, to enter the walls of a house the sheikh must be invited” 
                                                
111 Cf. Marcus (1986) for an examination of the ideal versus practical experience of privacy. 
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(Mundy 1995:56). And yet, despite that theoretical autonomy, we saw how the secret 
police in Syria expected to be allowed into citizens’ homes for registration purposes 
without making an appointment. They wielded their authority by appearing when 
they so desired and gaining entry without protest; the father was able to use indirect 
means to assert his authority in his home, but did not have the direct authority (or 
maybe the desire) to make them leave. Perhaps we could label this an ‘extreme case,’ 
but it was very common for anyone who welcomed foreign rs into their homes. In 
this section, I intend to show how the ‘home,’ rather than being a place of protection 
and isolation, can very much be a space of interaction and sometimes contestation 
between the regime and its population. Even in moments where such tension is not 
explicit, homes and aspects of them can still featur  heavily in the processes of 
politics and identity. The house, so central to studies of Middle Eastern and Arab 
culture and society (Bourdieu 1977, Layne 1994) is not so sacred or private as we 
might like to assume (c.f. vom Bruck 1997, Jean-Klein 2003), nor is the 
neighborhood surrounding it.  
   
The Price of Living in Syria  
About the House 
 
The classic image of an ‘Arab’ house (if it is not a tent), is of an inward-facing 
structure, with rooms enough for multiple generations and extended family members. 
The house is always shifting, an active process of realizing potentials112 (Bourdieu 
1977, Layne 1994, Mitchell 1988). It contains a mejlis or guest room—slowly being 
formalized into a salon—that is somewhat offset from the rest of the house, where it 
can be realized as a gender-defined space if and when necessary (Gilsenan 1982). As 
mentioned in the introduction, there are such houses in Damascus, though they are 
mostly limited to the Old City; some are palatial in nature, remainders of Ottoman-
era wealth. Most are less glamorous, however. The original inhabitants of these 
homes have, for the most part, long since left; having money, they moved to the new 
and fashionable apartment complexes of the New City. Many of the old houses’ new 
inhabitants are recent immigrants to Damascus, who moved into the available space. 
                                                
112 A process that sounds not too far removed from my image of “connecting the dots.” 
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Some are now also being bought by wealthy owners wishing to (re)generate a sense 
of the Old Damascus ‘majesty’ (c.f. Salamandra 2004 for this process in Damascus, 
vom Bruck 2005 in Yemen).  
 I knew only two Syrians who lived in these old style homes. Despite the room 
for housing multiple families, one lived alone with his mother. His family was ‘old 
money,’ and had owned the house for hundreds of years. They had once (according 
to him) owned most of what is now the bustling Sūq Hamidīya. His home was a third 
of the size it once was, having been split between three brothers two generations ago, 
but still has sixteen rooms and a very large and tastefully decorated courtyard. They 
had stayed because the house was a sign of their wealth and onetime political 
influence and prestige—a prestige that means littlenow, at least in official circles. 
The other person I knew lived in a much smaller home that was rickety and covered 
in hasty repair-work. It too had a courtyard, but the fountain was never turned on 
except when one of the sisters-in-law was cleaning it. My friend was one of eight 
children, seven of whom were male. His family origins were in what is now 
Lebanon, and though the family had been in the house for over 50 years, they were 
not its original occupants. His parents were still al ve and living in the house, along 
with the oldest two brothers, their wives, and children. My friend said that he and at 
least two more of his brothers would likely continue to live there as well. They 
remained in this house, not necessarily from choice, but because of economic 
necessity—they were not living in poverty, but nor were they middle class. They had 
no options to go elsewhere. 
 Most of my friends, however, lived in the New City, in apartments that had a 
very different feel to them compared to more ‘traditional’ homes. Smaller in size, 
there was generally only one sitting area (replete wi h television), which was not 
usually separate-able from any other part of the house. Sometimes the apartments had 
a small courtyard if the occupant was lucky enough to be on the ground floor, but 
most people had to make do without. These homes usually only housed a single 
family of parents and unmarried children and would be passed down to whichever 
child seemed most in need of it. Outlying suburbs were usually composed of 
apartment buildings like these, though there were also massive, multi-family ‘vill āt’ 
(sing. villa)  being built in these communities. But these were very expensive, and the 
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vast majority of Syrians could not afford such houses; only the odd foreigner, the 
elite, or the nouveaux riches could.  
 
Immigrants and Emigrants 
 
These massive costs reflected a growing housing problem in Damascus due partially, 
as I suggested to in previous chapters, to the recent influx of foreigners and Syrian 
villagers into the city. The immediate economic impact on Syrians was that this 
population inflation dramatically drove up the cost f housing. One friend had bought 
a new home a couple of years ago in a suburb of the ci y and said that the same 
apartment would now cost at least twice as much. Another informant said that her 
father had previously owned a house allotted to him by the military while he was 
employed in the army. He sold the house some years ago, to make a little extra 
money, but my friend grumbled saying that he would have been better served had he 
waited and sold it now, because it would probably make three times as much as it had 
then. While these inflated costs have had a number of conomic impacts, it was 
perhaps most damaging for those who do not have houses of their own—the youth of 
today.  
 One evening, a friend (who was in her early 20’s) and I were walking around 
her development—an upper middle class suburb called Meshrou Dummar. She had 
been talking about her boyfriend and thoughts for ma riage, when we passed some 
new apartment buildings. I asked her how much they cost. 
  
Oh, about 5,000,000 ($100,000 US) lira for one likethat—it’s probably like 
ours [two bedrooms, a kitchen, a small eating area, and a living room]. But 
that’s the problem…how is someone supposed to buy a house like that when 
he first gets a job? We don’t have banks and loans like you do and not 
everyone’s parents have the money to buy them a place these days. Like 
Rabica [her boyfriend], for example. We really want to get married after we 
finish university, but how can we? Where will we live? He won’t be able to 
afford a house for years and by then, I’ll be too old. [“So what will you do?” I 
asked.] Well, he’ll probably go get a job in the Gulf somewhere. He’s very 
smart and can maybe get a good job. He can go for five years and maybe I’ll 
go join him there in three years, even though I don’t want to live in Saudi 
Arabia. But maybe he can make money faster there, and then we can come 




The high cost of housing, then, had many implications, especially for young couples 
who wish to get married and have children. While it is and historically has been very 
common for younger girls to marry older men who have had time to develop some 
financial security, there is a rising trend for dating amongst the Syrian youth. Young 
couples fall in love and want to marry, sometimes with their parents’ permission113 
and sometimes with their disapproval, but because there was no option for 
mortgages, they did not have the opportunity to do so unless their parents were quite 
wealthy. They would simply have no place to live.  
 Young Syrian men, aware that the job options within Syria were limited and 
did not pay as well as they needed, considered their only option to be to head abroad 
for work. Usually this involved a young man having or finding connections in a Gulf 
country, and living there for several years in the hopes of making more money than 
he could in Syria. I heard a number of stories related to this work emigration, some 
very positive—one informant’s uncle stayed away for thirty years because the pay 
was so good. But not always—this same informant’s brother returned within months 
because his employer treated him as something less than human, a blow to his pride 
that he would not accept. And while getting to the Gulf was usually the most 
accessible option, many young Syrian men also dreamed of getting to Europe or 
America. This usually, though not always, required the young man’s family to have 
some money to begin with, enough to get him there. His other option was to be lucky 
enough to find a foreign woman to marry him and take him home. And while young 
men dreamed of getting out to make a fortune, their families feared and hated it. 
“We’ll never see him again. He’ll get to America and he won’t ever come back. 
That’s how it always happens.” It was a refrain I heard more than once in reference 
to emigration.  And it was almost always young men involved; there was no 
equivalent pressure on young women.  
 What we see, then, is that immigration, foreign or Sy ian, into the cities, has 
contributed to the migration of Syrian and Damascene youth out of the country. 
This loss of the younger generations reflects a perceived flaw in Syria, in that the 
country does not have the wherewithal to provide its population with work that will 
                                                
113 In my experience, marriages of love were generally more common among the Christian population, 
but there was the sense that they were becoming more popular among the Muslims of my generation, 
especially among the middle and upper classes. 
 
156 
be sufficient enough to supply the basic necessitie of life (such as a place to live). 
The unspoken criticism here was that the regime’s inability to provide for its people 
was resulting in a ‘brain drain’ and the loss of sons to the rest of the world.  
 
Running from Home (and the Military) 
 
If the housing problem were not enough, the regime then adds a further impetus for 
its young men to flee—the mandatory military service that all men have to fulfill. 
Service lasts for two and a half to three years, depending on how much time was 
spent in summer training camps during school years. A man can postpone his service 
by entering into university, but this is only a temporary reprieve.114 The ‘recruitment’ 
is not so rough as Michael Taussig (1992:23) describes for Columbia, where young 
men are constantly required to carry proof of their completed service or risk being 
whisked off in the night, but Syrian men were usually found and brought in. I knew 
many young men doing their best to dodge the servic by various methods, and those 
I knew who had done their time had nothing good to say about it. One recalled for 
me time spent lying face down naked in the snow as a drill and having mice nibble 
on his toes as he slept. Another told how he witnessed his commander taking more 
than his fair share of the bread, depriving the soldiers of their full rations for no other 
reason than to feed his pet cow. I was told that one of the worst parts was being 
subjected to no end of humiliation (zall) by the officers who, by all accounts are 
socially, culturally, and mentally inferior.  
 Not surprisingly, a good number of the officers are Alawi, providing further 
fuel to narractively (re)create the divide between Alawis and all others. There are not 
many legal ways for a man to get out of his military service—being an only son is 
one way to get exempted. For those who do not have that option, another route is to 
leave the country. While it has been possible to pay one’s way out of service (badal) 
since before 1964, the prices have increased drastically since then (Batatu 1981:341-
                                                
114 The temporariness of the delay can vary though, depending on how long a student manages to stay 
on the university books. I knew one student who managed to draw a four-year degree out to seven 
years, just in an attempt to avoid his military service. 
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343).115 I was told that there was a relatively recent law that states that if a man 
spends five years working in the Gulf and pays $5,000 US to the Syrian government, 
he will be exempt from his service. If he goes anywhere else outside of the Gulf, the 
same general rule applies, except that he must stay out for ten years and pay $10,000 
US. This law also provides a way for those who formerly emigrated without doing 
their service to be able to return without risk of being thrown in jail upon entering the 
airport. Though, it goes without saying that if a boy’s family has enough money and 
knows the right people army service will not be a necessity. I, in fact, knew of two 
men in such a situation, both of whom were somewhat hesitant to tell me, lowering 
their voices and grinning awkwardly. One’s father was a very wealthy businessmen 
who knew the right people, and the other had an uncle who was a very high-ranking 
official in the mukhābarāt. Less fortunate men were aware of these inconsistecies 
and resented them. 
 There is a theme in the above complications of living in Syria that ties back to 
the regime. Due to a lack of financial support for its population and an uneven 
requirement to endure the humiliation of military service, young men find themselves 
forced to leave the country, if they can afford to do so. Families are split and it is 
always uncertain if the sons will be seen again. And if this were not insult enough, 
many of the new suburbs were originally designed for upper echelon members of the 
military (read: Alawis). They were given new houses and villas that are well beyond 
the official salaries they were meant to be making. Corruption was narracted to as 
rampant and at the expense of the general population.  
 Further, as these former peasants flocked to the ci y, they served only to ruin 
what had once been a fair town.116 As one older man whose family had been living in 
Damascus for several generations (though ironically was originally from what is now 
Saudi Arabia) said (in English): 
 
                                                
115 Members of non-Muslim millets were also given the opportunity to avoid military conscription 
when it was first instituted by the Ottomans in themid-late 19th century by paying a tax (Douwes 
1999), though this was not adopted after independence. 
116 Salamandra (2004:13) also notes this tendency among Damascenes to be highly resentful and 
dismissive of the influx of Syrian ‘foreigners’ (ghurbatliyyeh) into Damascus. She suggests that much 
of the ‘Old Damascus’ identity negotiation is a way for the urbanites to deal with the demographic 
shifts and the concomitant reversal of power from the urban elite to a rural one.  
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At least immigrants from other cities bring their own customs and add to the 
life and culture of Damascus, but the villagers bring nothing beneficial with 
them. They just take everything and make it their own and in the process 
destroy the idea of what Damascus was. I mean, look at those vegetable 
markets outside of the mosques on Fridays. You never used to see that in the 
city, but it was really common out in the villages. And now they’ve brought 
that tradition here with them and they block the sidewalks and make 
everything ugly when we’re trying to go pray. I used to remember walking 
around the city with my father, going to restaurants, and everyone knew 
everyone. Everyone knew that this was the Qabbani table and that was the al-
Abyad table and so on. Now everything is cold and impersonal because of all 
these strangers, these backwards village folk. And they have no…power. Not 
power like political (siyāsi) power, but real power—power like the old 
Damascene families had, power of education and background, proper 
upbringing and prestige.117  
 
The ‘outsider’ Alawis were physically (if not socially or ideologically) moving 
‘inside’ the Damascene sphere and ruining it, abusing their ill-founded and sub-par 
‘political’ power and giving nothing back. In these moments of living and housing, 
the Alawis, and thus the regime itself, could not be (made) more ‘different’ than Us.  
 
Inside the House 
 
But the regime’s presence in living one’s daily life was not restricted to house 
availability, the military or emigration. Sometimes it became even more personal and 
invasive; a decidedly one-sided ability of the regime to penetrate those more ‘private’ 
spaces of life. And one-sided it was President Bashar lives in a very nice district of 
the New City called Maalki, by far one of the wealthiest sections of town (see 
Introduction, also Salamandra 2004 for in-depth descriptions of location and elitism 
in Damascus). The house is not particularly separated from the rest of the residential 
area and lies on one of the major routes from the city to the popular outing spot of 
Mount Qasiyoun. What separates it from the rest of the surrounding area is the fact 
that the entire street is covered by security guards d essed in black suits, sunglasses, 
obvious earpieces and most likely hidden firearms (rather than the very obvious sub-
                                                
117 This statement somewhat challenges Salamandra’s (2004: 1) observation that “a shift has occurred 
in the understanding of what is considered elite,” moving from an emphasis on education, access to 




machine guns that various other street military guards will carry). This equivalent of 
the Secret Service patrols the street at all times.  
 Most of the time, cars wishing to drive up to the mountain or beyond have no 
problem…the guards do not even give them a second gla ce. However, one night 
while driving with some friends to the mountain, one of the guards stopped us at the 
entrance to the street and told us to turn around and find another route. It was the first 
time any of us had experienced such a thing. The driv r grumbled and said it was 
likely because of his car, an old Skoda hatch-back. He said that if we had been 
driving in a nice car, the guards surely would have let us pass, regardless of the hour. 
He then surprised me by saying that it was just the guards, that “if Dr. Bashar knew 
about this, he would fix the problem immediately.”118 The physicality of the situation 
speaks to an activated power, a physical imposition on movement, regardless of the 
potential kindness and understanding of the leader himself. The guards, as 
representatives of the regime, had the ability to restrict us from entering the space of 
the regime (as embodied by the President and his hou e). This is in decided contrast 
to the secret policemen in the preceding section, who had the full right and ability to 
enter into general Syrians’ houses. However, at the same time, my friend’s take on 
the situation returns us to the uncertainty and duplexity in the ways that the regime 
was presented, with the president himself often beig a figure of greater confidence 
than his subordinates. Though the guards would prevent us from moving into the 
president’s physical ‘inside,’ he himself would allow it ‘if he only knew’119 (indeed, 
even the house owners ultimately ‘chose’ to allow the police into their homes, if 
perhaps under slightly more duress). Bashar was seen to better epitomize the 
hospitable host,120 thus returning us to a sense of morality, where by quietly 
                                                
118 Wedeen (1999:99-100) suggests that political cartoons would often hide critique in forms that 
depicted the president as being the solution to all society’s ills, but is unaware of what is wrong 
around him and therefore does not act. She suggests that they are farcical, allowing criticisms to slip 
by the censors. That may be true in some cases, but does not necessarily account for the fact that 
ordinary people themselves will sincerely espouse sch a belief as well.  
119 I find myself returned here to Strathern’s critiques of context and the ‘if only one knew’ philosophy 
towards it. 
120 A number of informants stressed the importance of hospitality as one of the ‘best’ (morally) 
qualities of the ‘Arab’ peoples. While I was in Jordan, I stayed with the family of a friend in Amman. I 
only stayed with them two days, and they made me promise to return, because they had not had the 
time to properly guest me with the traditional three days of eating and luxury. Even the bitterest 




associating hospitality and being welcoming of guests or passers-by, my informant 
was activating a line in the process of morality. And Bashar, as a now-made-morally 
sound figure becomes (like) an insider and is more c nnected to ordinary Syrians 
than he is to the faceless, nameless members of therest of the regime. 
 Such a statement, however, did not necessarily only point to the virtue of 
Bashar, for hospitality and houses are complex processes throughout much of the 
Middle East. Meneley (1996), for instance, describes how central the everyday 
patterns of women’s visiting and hosting are for ideas of familial honor and status in 
the Yemeni town of Zabid. Rather than just being a sign of female solidarity, she 
shows how regular visits (or the lack thereof) and the etiquette within them are 
highly competitive as well. These visits both reflect and reinforce social hierarchies 
within the towns, and reciprocity in them is key to determining who is equal to 
whom. The receiving of visitors in one’s home (or pssibly allowing them to pass on 
your street) shows how honorable or well-thought of a certain family is—the more 
people attending, the better, and it is perfectly acceptable to invite women of lesser 
status to one’s home and to give them gifts they cannot repay. However, to not accept 
an invitation or to not visit another family’s home spontaneously is to make a 
statement and create a hierarchical division between th  two families, as a woman 
will not visit the home of someone she considers to immoral (i.e. prostitutes) or of an 
inferior status. Thus, to speak of someone’s hospitality in receiving another person 
(or, in the Syrian case, allowing them into one’s extended space) is not only to 
acknowledge them as honorable, but simultaneously to acknowledge a hierarchical 
division between potential ‘host’ and ‘guest,’ especially when the host (i.e. Bashar) 
would not be likely to return any possible invitations made by the guest (my 
informant). 
 Shyrock and Howell (2001:263) note similar themes surrounding hospitality 
and generosity (karam) in Jordan: “karam is intimately related to power, and this 
relationship tends to be indirect and unstable, with power corrupting hospitality or 
hospitality depleting the power it serves.” In their article, they explicitly relate ideas 
of generosity and hospitality to state processes, arguing that the concepts of the 
‘house’ and house politics present a way of thinking about state politics in the Middle 
East. “Political power [becomes] a quality that can be measured most accurately in 
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the formal, highly stylized exchanges that occur betwe n guest and host, giver and 
taker, protector and protected, patron and client” (Shyrock and Howell 2001:254). 
They too discuss the competitive aspect of hospitality nd the unequal relations it can 
reflect and engender if one side is unable to recipo ate (or the other is unwilling to 
reduce their station by accepting such an invitation). Thus, to relate politics to the 
house and family (as shall be continued in the following chapters) is perhaps not such 
a wild analogy. By the traditions of host and guest, Bashar al-Asad is created through 
my informant’s statement as someone who (despite his underlings) is both a moral 
and honorable individual, but one who is also in a hierarchically superior position. 
And expanding on this, we could even consider the regime as a house(hold), with 
certain rights and responsibilities and fully embroiled in the regular, competitive 
politicking of house life. In this sense, then, we begin to encounter the idea that the 
regime may not be so much ‘above’ the rest of the population, but rather is 
incorporated through such statements as merely one of many ‘houses’ that people 
interact with, a theme I shall return to in the following chapters. 
 Keeping with uncertainty, Bashar’s moral status, even on a personal level, 
was no stable thing either. Our destination that, night, Mount Qasiyoun, is known for 
its expensive cafes and its beautiful views overlooking Damascus, by day or night. 
There is one main strip that contains all these cafs, a number of smaller coffee 
stands, some benches and a walkway in places. To get up there requires driving up a 
number of winding roads that trace up the back of the mountain. Due to these 
secluded spots, Qasiyoun has also earned a reputation for being somewhat of a 
‘lover’s lane;’ at night, young couples would drive up the mountain and park 
somewhere out of sight to do the things that young lovers do, illegal though it might 
be. There is joke, however, about the president and Qasiyoun:  
 
The president and his wife decided to get away from all the pressure and so 
took a little jaunt up to Mount Qasiyoun to do what people do up there. 
However, after a while, along came some police and knocked on the car 
window, intending to give the offending couple the requisite fine. The officer 
saw that it was the president, but said “Sorry, Mr. President, but laws are 
laws.” So the president nodded his head, chagrined, and went with the officer. 
They went down to the station and the officer wrote up two tickets, 500 lira 
for the president and 1000 for his wife. The presidnt said “Why is it 500 for 
me but 1000 for my wife?” The officer replied “This is the first time for you 




Given the centrality of women in the process of ‘doing’ morality and ‘honor’ (sharaf) 
(a subject I shall return to in more detail in Chapter 7), that the president’s wife had 
been up on the mountain fooling around three times with what was obviously another 
man, had strong implications for Bashar’s personal honor and morality. Perhaps he 
was not so morally perfect as the ‘if he only knew’ rhetoric painted him. Or perhaps 
he was both. Or maybe it shows that he too was vulnerable in the same ways that 
ordinary people were, making him just like them. 
 Coming back to the idea of who can enter whose space, I turn to a final 
example, an instance where the regime not only enter d into a house, but became 
what was this supposedly private sanctum. Not long after I met my friend Abeer, she 
was telling me about how her daughter’s husband was in opera school and so always 
off in Italy for long stretches of time. Though their flat was not enormous, she and 
her husband had decided to separate one area from the rest and convert it into a small 
studio for their daughter, her husband, and their coming child so that her daughter 
would not have to live in a house on her own. But Abeer had not been able to make it 
as nice as she would have liked.  
 
Really, I can’t make any big changes to my house. Why? Because the r gime 
owns my house, not me. My husband and I bought this hou e when we got 
married, but then Hafez al-Asad made a decree that declared my house and 
most of the block now belonged to the regime. We didn’t get any choice or 
say in the matter, and no warning. The whole block was supposedly given to 
the Ministry of Education, and they said they were going to change the it into 
a school. But I think there was a hidden agenda somewhere, because the 
population of this neighborhood hasn’t grown at all to need a new school. 
And anyhow, there is already another school right around the corner that has 
been closed for a very long time—if they really wanted a school, they could 
have just used that. What I think happened was there was an official in the 
bureaucracy—they were known criminals who got Asad to sign the decree 
without saying why and wanted to use it for some snaky thing or another. 
We tried to petition the courts to get it lifted, but it they had no power in the 
matter because it was a decree. Only another presidential decree ould change 
it, and while Bashar stopped the talk of some myster  ‘school,’ he has done 
nothing to give the people of this block back their homes. [There was a look 
of disappointment on her face at this point, somewhat sad and confused as to 
why Bashar had not fixed the situation.] Some of the people in the block 
caved in and left, but no one in our building—we’re standing strong. Our only 
real hope is that there is a clause in the law (somewhere) that says that if a 
presidential decree has not been carried out within 20 years of its 
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pronouncement, then it becomes null and void. [“How l ng has it been?” I 
asked.] They took our house 19 years ago. 
 
And Abeer is no poverty-line citizen; she is from an old, well-known and well–
respected Christian family, educated, polished, and a major figure in the Christian 
Orthodox community. But the regime had no respect for her wealth or prestige and 
took away her very house. And by the time I had left, they had rolled into their 20th 
year and nothing had been achieved in returning possession of the apartment. She 
was angry and bitter, but somewhat resigned as well. She continued to live in her 
house as if it were her own, while knowing better. She understood that she had no 
power to change her situation (she had tried). Thisdenial combined her lived 
acceptance seems to hearken back to Žižek’s (1997) Cynicism (cf. Navaro-Yashin 
2002), where people are aware that a thing is constructed or unreal, but continue to 
live as if it were ‘real.’ Abeer certainly was cynical about the situation.  
 But her situation and her narrating of it speak to a great deal of relation-doing, 
connection-making, beginning with the potential of a (dis)connection between Abeer 
and the regime. There were elements of conspiracy in her narraction, indicating some 
hidden motive at work that was primarily for someon else’s benefit. The thieves 
rhetoric was reiterated, as well. Using these tropes, she distanced herself from the 
regime. In other words, she disconnected the regime from the world of her ‘inside.’ 
However, at the same time, the situation was such that, whatever she did, there was 
an active connection between her and the regime, in that the latter actually owned the 
space in which she moved everyday. Whether she liked it or not, she and the regime 
were connected (a connection she herself recreated by narracting it). And again we 
see a process of challenging taking place, where Abeer was challenging the moral 
legitimacy of the regime by narracting another insta ce of its thievery. It was taking 
something of value and giving nothing in return, thereby failing to adhere to the 
proper moral aesthetic. We see another example of a duplexity, where they were both 
connected and not. And in the end, all supposed or imagined ‘barriers’ between the 
‘public’ and ‘private,’ between the ‘inside and the ‘outside’ were lost in a sea of 




Resisting the Regime? 
 
Throughout the course of the past several chapters, I have been seeming to fit into a 
rather predictable pattern whereby, except in situations where Syria was set against 
an international backdrop, the ‘people’ of Syria have been set in contrast to the 
Syrian regime. The narractions I have presented have, for the most part, illuminated a 
‘natural’ and obvious divide between the rulers andthe ruled. To be sure, there were 
moments of ambiguity, or at least of competing narractions that portrayed the 
‘regime’ in a positive light. I am well aware of the simplification and have used it 
intentionally, following the styles and tropes of many ethnographies and studies of 
the state. There are two problems with such an analytic l stance, which I shall 
attempt to break down in the following two chapters. The first is that in doing so I am 
pretty well managing to reify the very existence that I would like to question—i.e. 
that of the regime. In the first section, I examined p ople’s use of a variety of identity 
discourses to negotiate relations on a variety of scale . That people were able to think 
with several sets of identities, such as ethnic or religious ones, that extend beyond the 
boundaries of a country is nothing new. However, when I turned my attention to 
politicking and connection-making within the Syrian borders, the use of identity, 
morality and other such concepts were premised on, and thus (re)created a substantial 
disconnection between the people and the regime. Partially this is a reflection of the 
gap that my informants themselves were creating, but I am no less responsible for 
making the divisiveness explicit than they were (because I am making my own 
connections and urging you to make similar ones). I chose to take this tack because 
to ignore it or try to dress it up as something else would miss the very real point that 
Syrians did feel themselves to be distanced from their leaders. They framed it in 
terms of identity politics (they are Alawi and we ar  not), corruption, criminality, and 
the like and expressed it via narractions and humor. If they sometimes were willing 
to praise their regime or figures within it, that perhaps reflects the idea that people are 
not all bad, that everyone has positive qualities. But nice as Dr. Bashar might be, he 
was still not one an ‘insider.’ But in the process of disconnecting from the regime in 
such ways, Syrians were also  assuming and thus creating a insider group, making 
connections between all those who felt the regime to be distant from them. 
 
165 
 Secondly, throughout these last two chapters in particular, I have focused on 
the ways the some of these narractions served to ‘challenge’ the regime, testing its 
moral, ideological and effective power. Perhaps the obvious suggestion here is that 
this challenging was a form of popular, discursive ‘resistance.’ On the surface, I 
appear to be re-presenting a nearly classic case of a disenfranchised and powerless 
population attempting to resist an all-powerful and oppressive ruling class. However, 
appearances notwithstanding, I am instead choosing to follow a more recent trend to 
examine the other sides of resistance. Wedeen (1999), for example, looks at how, in 
doing what appears to be resistance, Syrians were often engaging in and thus 
reproducing the very official dialogue that they were resisting against. She suggests 
that Syrian resistance lay in their transgressions, their turning of the regime’s 
discourse on its head, but nevertheless still operating within and limited to that 
framework. Navaro-Yashin (2002: 129) decides to move away from studies of 
resistance altogether and “examine [the] practice of active support for the state on the 
part of the people… studying public participation in and perpetuation of, rather than 
resistance to, state power.”  
  I have avoided, and will continue to avoid, the us  of the term all together. 
To use resistance as an exegetical tool is the surest way to reify the kind of 
regime/people divide I am ultimately hoping to avoid. It is a gloss that fails to 
account the degree of political duplexity I witnessd in Syria. Thus, to counter the 
trend that has appeared to characterize my work so far, in Chapter 6, I will explore 
the ways in which ‘the people’ distinguish themselves from themselves, thus now 
challenging the ‘We’ that began to seem so apparent in the last several chapters. I 
will also look at the ways in which the regime itself, in these moments, becomes not 
so much a thing-above-and-beyond, but just another on  of a whole set of Others. As 
such, they are no more distant, and perhaps sometimes less so, than other groups of 
Others. Indeed, Salamandra (2004:20) suggests that Damascene identity claims are 
not (just) resistance to the state, but are in fact as often directed at other Syrians than 
the regime. In Chapter 7, I will return to the concept of challenging, incorporating it 
with ideas of connection and disconnection being part of the same process. Looking 
at a slightly different set of dots, I will suggest an alternative way of thinking the 
practice of ‘challenge,’ one that moves away from concepts of resistance. 
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Challenging, as will be seen, is not necessarily (or only) a resisting of power, but 






















Figure 9: Caricature by the late Naji al-Ali 
 
This final section diverges somewhat from the trends of the previous chapters, which 
focused primarily on the ways in which “ordinary” Syrians dissociated and 
disconnected themselves from the regime. In the next two chapters, I aim to expand 
on the ways that Syrians and the regime are also always connected/ing. I return to the 
idea that this seemingly ambiguous relationship is not a space of ambiguity for them, 
but is rather indicative of certain ways in which Syrians do “national” (and perhaps 
other types of) relations, i.e. with difference. 
 
 
Upending the Scales: Who are Syrians? 
Who are the ‘Insiders’? 
 
In the introduction, I presented a fairly neat listof he different kinds of people that 
Syrians described as living within Syria. However, in the intervening chapters, we 
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have seen many examples where people could and did hold and narract seemingly 
opposing descriptions of the world. I have suggested that these are not so much 
inconsistent as reflective of the fact that people can maintain multiple ways of 
relating to similar people. I intend to return to that list now and to the fact that 
Syrians’ thought it important to engage in such identity-work. Having engaged in 
explorations of how ‘Syrians’ differentiated themselves from other nationalities (thus 
relating to the world and (re)creating themselves as Syrians) and how they did so 
from the ‘regime’ (thus relating to the regime and (re)creating it as external to a 
unified populace), I am now turning the same sort of analytical focus onto the thus-
far assumed category of ‘Syrians.’ For, while my informants were constantly 
activating connections between themselves as ‘Arabs,’ ‘Muslims,’ ‘Christians,’ 
‘Syrians’ or ‘non-Alawi Syrians,’ they were also activating disconnections within 
and between these categories, momentarily making themselves into different things. 
Equally, they would define themselves in contrast to such major categories, finding 
instant camaraderie in being Kurdish and not Arab, in eing Communist and not 
Bacthist, in being an ‘atheist’ (kāfir , lit. ‘unbeliever’ or ‘infidel’) instead of a believer 
(mu’min) (with ‘atheists’ being a rather small group, mostly comprised of youth, 
though not always). Sometimes this could even include whether or not someone was 
Syrian ‘at heart’ (bi qalbho, f. qalbha).  
 We have seen the ways in which this works in regards to the Alawi sector, a 
category of people that was othered and distinguished as a distinct ‘sect’ (t ā’ifeh). 
Not only were they regarded as backwards mountain folk, they were also members of 
what, at different points in history, had been considered a heretical religious group by 
doctrinal Sunnis. Thus Alawis (and the regime that is widely composed of and thus 
equated with them) were distant and external to people from the city and the more 
orthodox versions of Islam. Or, if the narractor of a particular story was Christian, the 
Alawis became just another variety of Muslims, automatically distinguished from the 
Christian ‘inside.’  
The Bedouin too were made to be a very remote (physically, socially and 
culturally) group of people. While sitting at the bus station early one morning, a 
Syrian friend pointed to an older man sitting by himself and said quietly, “Look, a 
Bedouin.” I looked over and asked my friend how he kn w. He said, “See the way 
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he’s dressed? And he has his siloq (headscarf) tied in the Bedouin way (bil-t ariqah 
baduwīya).” The man was dressed in baggy dark trousers and a loose shirt. His iloq 
was a red-and-white checkered pattern, though I had to take my friend’s word on the 
method of tying. “leiki ‘adeish asmar huwa. biyshteghel tūl al-youm bil-shams. nahīf 
huwa bas qawī ktīr. (Look at how dark he is. He works all day in the sun. He’s wiry 
[lit. skinny] but so strong.)” The note of awe in my friend’s voice was unmistakable. 
From the way he spoke, I realized that the Bedouin ma was as every bit as foreign 
to my friend as he was to me. He was a mysterious fig re, and seemed, for my friend, 
to have something of the ‘noble savage’ about him.  
 But this city versus country divide was not the only kind of social division 
amongst ‘Syrians’ that was narracted and thus activted. For instance, the first family 
I lived with (with the father who snubbed the secret police agent) thought of 
themselves as not just Christians, but more specifically Aramaic Christians. In 
practice, they would exhibit this primarily through the use of language, especially the 
older generation for whom Arabic was a second languge and Aramaic their first.121 
While I was staying there, the oldest daughter of the household got married. The 
week before the wedding, there were endless parties and gatherings, ranging in size 
from only the dozen or so family members who lived in the neighborhood to a 
massive party with the bride’s and the groom’s extended family, amounting to nearly 
60 people packed into the courtyard. Songs were a regular part of these festivities 
and, though my Arabic was not very strong at that point, I realized I was having more 
trouble understanding than I could account for. On seeing my confusion, the 
translator-cousin from the secret police story came over and explained that they were 
singing in Aramaic. I asked her if she also spoke it, and she shook her head, saying 
she understood it, but did not speak it. That seemed to be the case for most of the 
younger generation. When I asked her if she considered herself to be Aramaic, she 
assured me that she did and that one day she would probably learn the language. 
Another member of this family, when asked, said that he was only Arabic because 
the regime said so. They considered themselves to be different from not only the 
                                                
121 The family had originally lived in the small town of Macloula some 45 minutes by bus outside of 
Damascus. They still had a home out there, that they would go stay in for weekends or summer 




Muslims of the country, but also anyone who might fit into the category of ‘Arab.’ 
They as a ‘people,’ (shacb) considered that they had been in the area long before the 
Arabs had come in conquest and so were more original or indigenous (casilna aktar 
min hadol) than the Arabic population.  
 Being Kurdish often involved similar sorts of narractions. I had a number of 
Kurdish friends (most living in Rukn al-Diin, see Introduction), all immensely proud 
of their Kurdish heritage. One said that while her pa ents spoke Kurdish, she did not 
(cf. Hann 1997), because they never taught it to her. Unlike in the Aramaic case, 
however, the parents never spoke Kurdish with their children, so my informant did 
not even understand it, aside from a couple of words like ‘mother,’ or ‘hello.’ 
Geographically, Kurdish is much more widely spoken in the northern parts of the 
country. Until very recently, many people of Kurdish descent, especially those in the 
north, did not even receive Syrian identification cards, meaning that not only would 
they narract themselves as distinct from other people living in Syria, they were 
officially segregated as well. To share a Kurdish-ness brought people together, gave 
them an instant bond that put them at their ease mor  than with an unfamiliar Arab. 
One evening in a taxi, a Kurdish friend was talking lightly to the driver and in reply 
to something the latter had said, my friend laughed an  called the driver ‘Kurdish,’ 
which is sort of a joking insult, but one with hints of pride when coming from a 
Kurdish person. The man looked over at my friend an said that he was Kurdish, at 
which point the two launched into a friendly, open conversation that resulted in the 
driver insisting that we did not have to pay. (We did anyhow.) I myself was even 
(momentarily) brought into the ‘inside’ of the Kurdish circle one evening. I was with 
a friend at her house, helping her with her English homework. I was translating a 
word for her, but when I said it in Arabic, I said it much more heavily than it was 
supposed to be pronounced. She threw back her head,laughing and said “Wallah, inti 
kurdīya (By God, you’re Kurdish)!” Though mocking, it was funny precisely because 
she herself was Kurdish, and by calling me Kurdish she also made me a bit more like 
her, a bit less foreign.  
 There were similar sorts of disconnections and connections on lines other 
than ‘religious’ and ‘ethnic’ ones. Actively belongi  to a non-Bacthist party was a 
rather distinguishing mark. One informant’s father ad been an active member of the 
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Communist party in Syria before his death, and the son had followed in his footsteps. 
Being too vocal as a member of a semi-oppositional party122 could potentially be 
dangerous, but he was quietly proud of his political difference, as it made him part of 
a small and separate group of people. Also, as I mentioned, I met a couple of people 
who proclaimed to be atheists. This was a particularly differentiating label to apply to 
oneself, as most Syrians were untroubled with people having a different religion as 
long as they had one. These few tended to keep their beliefs (or lack thereof) to 
themselves, only sharing it with their closest friends, though rarely their family. I 
myself rarely felt comfortable telling people I was n atheist, usually passing myself 
off as Catholic. Twice, however, I told someone I had no religion and found them 
replying that they were the same. One—an older gentleman and formally a 
Christian—had even begun by asking me with overly wide eyes (in English), “So, 
what sect of Christianity do you belong to?” and the fact that e was mocking the 
religion was quite evident from his tone. In this case and the other, the person stood 
up and shook my hand upon discovering we shared something in common in the 
midst of a sea of religiosity. Both times, I was reminded of secret handshakes that 
grant admission to elite clubs and societies. These Syrians made it clear that (in some 
ways) they were not like other Syrians.  
 Even the idea of being Syrian could be a differentiating characteristic in 
certain moments. I was friends with a group of young men and women (whom we 
shall meet in greater detail in Chapter 7) who came from a variety of different 
backgrounds. Three of them were Kurdish. However, one evening, one of them was 
describing the other two to me, saying that he and one of the other two were Kurdish, 
but that the third was Syrian (though none spoke Kurdish and all had been born in 
Damascus). I asked what he meant and, struggling to explain, he told me that it had 
something to do with one’s devotion to a place or an ideal. The first two would hold 
themselves to be Kurdish more than their national identities, but in his heart, the third 
would place himself with Syrians above his Kurdish counterparts. For instance, if the 
Kurds somehow managed to get an independent Kurdistan, the third would be the 
only one not to go live there, because he was attached to Syria more. Indeed, the third 
                                                
122 Given that the Bacth Party is given half the seats of Parliament and the sole ability to nominate 
presidential candidates in the country’s constitution, opposition parties, especially ones that are along 
the Communist-Socialist lines, are of little real threat. 
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one himself later told me that while he loves the id a of a Kurdistan, he would never 
live there because he loved Damascus; all of his family and life were in that city.123 
Thus, even between three similar young men who had similar life experiences, there 
were lines drawn that disconnected them. Further, such an analysis again 
problematizes our anthropological notion of scale. While we might see scalar or even 
categorical (‘ethnic’ versus ‘national’) differences between Kurdish and Syrian 
labels, these informants perceived them as being variable, depending not on some 
pre-figured ordering of one ‘over’ the other, but ra her on how an individual chose to 
enact and activate them. 
However, having or acquiring a ‘Syrian’ label could also be an inclusive 
measure. One afternoon, a friend was trying to tell m  a joke and asked me what 
another name for the president (al-ra’ īs) was. I did not immediately realize it was a 
joke and so flippantly answered with the phrase that I d often heard (alternating 
with “Doctor”) epithet for the president (Hafez and Bashar): ibn sharmūtah (‘son of a 
whore’). My friend’s intended joke was forgotten as she burst into laughter, saying 
that I was becoming Syrian (inti sacireh sūrīyah).124 Again, for a foreigner to 
‘become Syrian’ made her somewhat less of an outsider than she was before. In 
calling the president an ibn sharmūtah, I was indicating that I had entered into some 
form of a shared ‘Syrian’ framework.  
 
Memories of Conflict 
 
Most people I knew could readily come up with some sp cific sub-category that they 
belonged to (or could make themselves belong to) and made them distinct from other 
categories in Syria. Most of them would assure me that, while there was not usually 
much violence along these various lines of distinctio , there had been some. As I 
have noted above, there had been long-standing difficulties between the regime and 
the Kurdish population in the north. During my trip to that area of the country, I 
noticed that there were not nearly as many statues and posters of the presidents in 
                                                
123 Note the use of ‘Damascus’ versus ‘Syria’ in the two accounts. While the initial speaker was 
associating him with a broad, general group of people, the second was more specific about which 
group he wished to belong to. 
124 I told this story to a Jordanian friend of mine in Edinburgh after I returned from Syria. She too 
burst into laughter and told me that I had become “Arabic.” 
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windows and public squares as in Damascus and othertowns we had passed through. 
I asked a (half-Kurdish) friend from the area why tat was, and he said that there had 
been anti-regime riots several years ago and the locals had torn down the statues. The 
regime had not bothered to replace them, he said, because they would just be torn 
down again. These clashes may have been fueled by political and economical reasons 
as much as an emotive ‘identity’ ones, but when my informant described it to me, he 
couched it only in terms of a clash of identities (Kurdish vs. Arab/Alawi).  
 I heard a similar description regarding a violent upheaval in the small city of 
Suweida in 2000. This conflict did not involve the regime, but was between the 
majority Druze population of the city and the Bedouin Sunni population who had 
been leading a semi-nomadic existence in the region for generations. The two sides 
used machine guns, grenade launchers and road blocks to attack each other. The 
violence even spread to attacking various individual Bedouin families who had long-
since settled in nearby villages. Over the course of three days, 20 people died and 
200 more were injured, despite the presence of Syrian military forces attempting to 
restore peace (Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 2000). The violence potentially had 
long-term roots in neighborly dissent, given that much of the tension between the 
groups seems to have stemmed from continuous and disputed overlaps of Bedouin 
grazing ground and Druzi orchards and vineyards, but when other Syrians narracted 
the event, it became one of identity conflict. The category of ‘Syrian’ as a cohesive 
insider group did not feature and thus did not exist here. This narraction also had 
another lateral commentary in it, however; namely that he regime did not have the 
power to immediately quell the violence. This questioned the effectiveness of the 
regime’s ability to regulate its population, and thus cast quiet doubt on their 
appropriateness as leaders.  
 But these memories of violence between people who might be ‘the same’ in 
other narractions were not limited to events within Syria alone. Syrians also recalled 
various conflicts in Iraq, describing the tensions between groups of people (Shi’as, 
Kurds, Sunnis, etc.) as they tried to come to terms on a new government. But even 
more poignant were the memories of the civil war and recent frictions in Lebanon. 
These countries were said to be tearing themselves apart because they consisted of 
such fragmented people. In fact, I was told, their problem was precisely that they 
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were not ‘a people’—they were an artificial amalgamation of distinct categories of 
people who have no reason or desire to work together (hearkening back to the 
European intrusion narractions). “And Syria is not s  different, with all the different 
categories of people living in a single space, vying for power, money, dominance, 
prestige, and so on.” According to Syrians’ self-descriptions, their country existed in 
a similar state of constant tension, with different groups straining to break away from 
the others, to gain some form of control over themslves, others and resources.  
My informants told me that the only reason that Syria had not ripped at the 
seams thus far was because there was a strong hand keeping everyone in check; i.e. 
the Asad regime.125 As much as Syrians may have differentiated themselve  from 
their leaders, they said they were sure that if that rigid control were to slacken, the 
country would slip into chaos. An image was presented where, if one string of the 
web of tension snapped, the whole system would be don  for.  
 
It’s that Bedouin mentality, the desire for vengeance if you’ve been 
wronged. We all have it at heart, we all came from them, and if the regime 
falls we will all start by taking revenge on those who wronged us—the 
Alawis. And then it will go to hell from there. People turning on each other, 
lots of blood. 
  
The violence that raged and has raged in neighboring countries would, my friends 
assured me, be nothing in comparison to the hell that Syria would become (sūriya 
rāh tsīr mitl al-jehnum). “So the regime needs to be hard and strong (qāsi ū qawi). 
We are hard people and it takes an even stronger hand to keep us from killing each 
other.”126 The differences, the lines of disconnection were narracted to be so strong, 
that if they were given free reign, people feel that t ey would turn on each other in 
unstoppable violence. The irony was that the people who were said to be currently 
holding such hell in check themselves belonged to one of the very groups enmeshed 
in the web of tension in the first place. The regime, as an extension of the Alawis and 
therefore fully implicated in the potential conflict as a people (shacb), did not 
                                                
125 Dresch (1984:45-6) notes similar descriptions of tribal leadership in Yemen: “Much of what people 
in tribal Arab societies say about local politics can seem thoroughly contradictory; on the one hand the 
values of opposition at every level are extolled anthe idea that wrongs be righted only by the 
temporary coalitions of ‘brothers’ against outsiders, but on the other hand constant squabbles are 
condemned and someone powerful is looked for to end them by cracking heads together.” 
126 See Ibn Khaldoun (2005) for similar descriptions (from the 14th century CE) of the inherent human 
need for a strong leader to keep violence at bay. 
 
176 
necessarily have any more right to rule than any other group of people. But then 
again, they had no less right. Either way, what wasforegrounded here was the 
importance of someone being in power.127 Other people might have disliked who it 
was in particular, but it was likely they would have found fault with anyone(s) 
occupying the position. In a sense, they had a commn ground (connection) in the 
fact that they all seemed to feel that no one group was inherently fit to rule.  
 
 
Connecting to the Regime 
 
Given the academic and popular pre-occupation with the idea of ‘social identity,’ it 
can be somewhat difficult to examine it as an ethnographic object without getting 
caught in the mire that surrounds it. What might be more intuitive are the sorts of 
interpersonal relations that ordinary Syrians had with their regime, the lines along 
which they were potentially connected (and so implicated!), and the ways and 
moments in which they activated those connections. To do so, I will examine two 
regular and expected (for Syrians) manners of engagi  with the regime that I have 





Reshweh was a very regular and very expected form of interaction with anyone who 
has official status in Syria. Though we, as Euro-American foreigners, grumble about 
the immorality of bribery, especially in any sort of official or political business, it 
was less morally problematic for Syrians. Unlike in other transactions we have seen, 
this form was a two-way exchange, with something being given in return, and was an 
effective economy for getting things done quickly and readily. There was always the 
option not to engage in bribery, as long as one was willing to wait. And, in the way 
that Jean-Klein (in press) describes morality as an aesthetic process, in Syria it was 
also the aesthetics and proper form of the situation that created it as morally 
                                                
127 Though she doesn’t necessarily use similar examples, this kind of statement fits with Wedeen’s 
(1999:92) argument that Syrian “politics of ‘as if’ depends on a self-conscious submission to 
authority.” Or at least, in this case, the awareness of the need for authority. 
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appropriate. As long as it was never blatant, as long as it was done discreetly (indeed, 
one could possibly say that the respective parties were conspiring to keep it out of 
sight), and no one got hurt by it, then it was acceptable. Reshweh often happened in 
dealings with various regime officials or offices, but was not limited to these people. 
I had a friend who was working on a restoration project for an old-style house in the 
Old City. He said that the problem with such a big project was that once people 
realized that you were willing to use bribery to help smooth things over with the 
various ministries involved in restoration, everyone would be coming and insisting 
on being paid. This included even people living in nearby houses, who would hint 
that they would report various shortcuts or problems unless they were given incentive 
not to.  
 Education, too, could be enhanced with bribery. There are several small 
universities and colleges in Damascus and some in Aleppo as well, but the largest is 
the University of Damascus. It is funded by the regime and students can attend free 
of charge, provided they have scored high enough on t e entrance/high school 
exams. The professors and lecturers’ salaries are not bad, but are not necessarily the 
best-paying jobs either.128 I was initially amazed at the levels of bribery my
university-attending friends were either involved in or privy to. These sometimes 
took the form of university students paying other students to do their work for them, 
and in the case of young women, this could involve dates as payments. Sometimes 
students would pay their professors in order to pass a class or graduate, a deal that 
was usually initiated by the students, but occasionally by the professors themselves. 
And this was no small sum. One informant was asked by his professor for a fee of 
5,000 lira ($100) to help him get through the last class before graduation. This 
student chose instead not to graduate until some years later when the professors had 
changed, though he admitted this had more to do with his being angry at being 
singled out than at the idea of having to pay in and of itself. Bribery could also 
involve students taking private and expensive tutoring sessions with their lecturers 
that were all-but-required to pass the course.  
                                                
128 For instance, one informant was offered a full-paid post-graduate course in the UK if he would 
agree to work for the university for ten years after h  finished his degree. He chose to refuse it 
because, he said, they would not pay him enough to afford a decent house or a car.  
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 Or, similar to their actions with other students, young women students would 
sometimes arrange to go on ‘dates’ with their professors. I saw this happen twice. 
Before the first date, each girl enlisted the help of male classmates to set up the time 
and place. The latter would also attend the meeting, to provide appropriate 
introductions and to give the impression to anyone who might be watching (which 
included most everyone in a particular venue) that t is was just a group outing and 
nothing of particular interest. In fact, I was usually invited along to help support the 
appearance of a light-hearted meeting—having more than one woman present, 
especially one who was foreign and known around the neighborhood, would help 
deflect whispers about indecency. On one occasion we went to a café in the Old City 
and on the other to a restaurant. Both were somewhat uncomfortable, for myself, but 
also for the other females, who were nervous, talking little and watching the men 
(who dominated the conversation) somewhat hesitantly. The girl’s male friends 
would then split the bill, as a favor to her, which she would later repay by taking 
them out for a meal. I was told that after this initial meeting, it was up to the woman 
to arrange for further meetings. I asked one of my friends what happened afterwards, 
and he grew uncomfortable, shrugged, and said, “Well, you know… But it depends 
really. Sometimes nothing happens after.” I shook my head and mumbled something 
about actually getting an education, at which point he laughed and said, “This is 
Syria. There is no ‘education’ here.” Perhaps. But I would argue that the participants 
were, through this process, refining their techniques of maintaining the proper forms 
in the use of bribery. It also helped to create and reinforce chains of connections, 
making it also a form of wasta’.  
 But reshweh involving the regime was much more common than these other 
moments. There are signs posted in the passport offices at border crossings that read 
“To engage in bribery is to enter prison.” Regardless of this sign, 50 lira notes pass in 
a one-way stream all day long, tucked away in passport  or sometimes concealed in a 
handshake. It is not flaunted by one side or the otr, but takes place quietly and out 
of sight. No eye contact is made when the passport is fi st opened, nor is any 
acknowledgment of the money’s presence, aside from a speeded-up process of being 
passed through. Further, and importantly, the bribery in this sort of official situation 
is restricted to men. The men working at the counters feel odd about taking money 
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from women, turning the situation from an effective economy to an uncomfortable 
issue of pride, as one informant described it. Foreigners, because they generally are 
not well-educated in the proper etiquette of reshweh, frequently go without it, but the 
officers seemed to expect this as well. It is somewhat more regular for foreigners to 
engage in the practice in the Passport and Immigration Ministry (if not common), 
though the gender interaction is still somewhat tricky.  
 It was a useful system though, if one knew how to navigate it. The first time I 
went to get my visa extended, I spent at least two hours in the Ministry, running from 
queue to queue, filling out reams of paperwork in triplicate (which later became 
quadruplicate and, adding to the complications, was ritten in only Arabic and 
French), and getting forms signed by several bored, high-ranking officers who 
seemed to have no job aside from signing forms and did not even glance at what they 
were putting their pens to. After I managed to finally work my way through all of 
this, I handed everything in and was told I would have to come back in a couple of 
days to pick up my passport and new visa. I decided th  next time to try and avoid 
this mass of complications. Having learned about the gender concerns, a male Syrian 
friend (who knew someone who knew someone who worked in the Ministry) offered 
to accompany me and he quietly spoke to one of the men at the desk and slipped him 
the already-filled-in paperwork and my passport, wih 500 lira folded into its pages. 
We then stood in one place for about five minutes while an underling scurried about 
the offices and returned with everything signed, stamped and ready to go.  
 Things generally went smoother in the sections of Ministries that did not have 
to deal with foreigners, as people were more accustomed to how they were meant to 
progress. For instance, while I was in Syria, the country was in the process of 
changing its national identity cards. For the averag  person, applying for a new one 
could involve weeks, with much of that time spent in massive queues. However, 
those willing to place a little money into the right hands could speed the process up 
substantially. If one had enough money, it was not even necessary to leave one’s 
house—in a day’s time, everything would arrive on one’s doorstep. Similarly, getting 
new passports and getting passports renewed could take varying amounts of time, 
depending on the amount of money spent. One informant told me about the day he 




I got there and there was a really, really long queue. I knew I would be there 
for hours. But then I saw a policeman that I knew, walking in the office. He 
came over and asked what I was doing and I told him. He told me I didn’t 
need to wait in the line, that he could help. So I gave him 200 lira ($4) and he 
grabbed my paperwork and walked right to the front of the line and into the 
other office. He took care of everything in about five minutes. When he came 
back I asked him, “What about my thumbprint? Don’t they need that?” He 
said yeah, but that he had just used his own. It didn’t really matter anyway. 
[Laughs] As long as no one ever actually checks. At least the signature was 
mine. 
 
 Which is not to say that people were always happy about engaging in bribery 
and its prevalence throughout Syria. One evening a taxi driver, while passing a police 
officer,129 began to grumble about how all of them made nearly $100-$200 (U.S.) a 
day because of reshweh. He got quite angry about their choosing to fill their own 
wallets at the expense of people like him, who had no real choice but to pay. “If you 
pay, you can go. If not, they will give you trouble.” Bribery, it seems, was only 
something that was appropriate in certain situations, i.e. when it was voluntary and 
got something in return, rather than being mandatory to get out of a ticket one would 




But bribery alone in such situations was not enough. As important as it was to know 
how much to spend here or there and how to appropriately pass it across, it was 
doubly so to know who to hand the money to. There was nothing random or arbitrary 
in how the process was organized. The university girl needed to know fellow 
students who were on friendly terms with the professor. At the borders, the traveler 
needed to know which officers to hand money to and when. And it was only by 
knowing a conveniently-placed police officer that my friend was able to get his 
passport renewed so quickly. “Wasta’” one of my friends told me, “is the most 
important word you can know in Arabic.” Having the right connections made the 
little problems of daily life disappear much more readily than without. It provided a 
                                                
129 The officer was stationed alongside a traffic light. Indeed, all traffic lights generally have a police 
officer manning them as well. When I asked why, a friend told me that it was because no one would 
respect the light if there was not someone there to make sure they respected it.  
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way out of military service or a way into the best jobs or university subjects. But 
connections, as I have noted elsewhere, are continuously being made in the course of 
being activated, an idea that is no less true for wasta connections than it is for 
narracted ones. In the moments when they are not actively being engaged, they exist 
as potentials of connections.  
 Indeed, the story by which I finally figured out how to get my visa involved 
the activation of an entire chain of connections; my problems provided an 
opportunity for the various links to ‘exercise’ their wasta. Upon hearing my visa 
worries, a friend’s husband spoke to a coworker of his who knew someone who 
worked in the Passport and Immigration Ministry. He was the one who then 
accompanied me to the office, where, armed with a name, we were able to go straight 
to the man his friend knew, who in turn directed his underlings to take care of 
everything quickly in return for the subtly-paid fee. All of the initial series of 
conversations had happened without my knowing it. I was only brought in at the end, 
when my friend told me that I was going to the office with her husband. But my 
friend warned me that we did not want to pull these strings too often or overuse them, 
because the more we did so, the more we put my friend in debt to the other two 
parties in the connection. The way was paved for further connections to be made 
along this chain.  
 Perhaps this could be considered as a form of patron-client relationship 
(Schwarz 2004), with the regime bureaucrat in the rol  of patron, my friend’s 
husband as the client and the man in the middle as a client to the former and a patron 
to the latter. The man in the office was certainly  a superior position in regards to 
bureaucratic power and, once properly paid, could provide a unique service for my 
friend (and thus me). He equally had the power to restrict or delay the process, 
should he have been inclined to hinder rather than help. However, I have several 
qualms about applying a patron-client label to thissituation (and others like it 
involving wasta). Indeed, Khoury (1987:22) notes that by the late 1930’s patronage 
was no longer feasible in Damascus due to the massive population influx of people 
from the countryside. He argues that from that time “increasing numbers of people 
sought support and services outside the old framework of patronage.” In terms of my 
own research, I found that such a system does not quite account for the role of the 
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middle man. He was patron to one and client to the o r, but received nothing 
obvious from either transaction. I would argue that what he got was the opportunity 
to activate connections, which would enable him to re-activate either one in either 
direction in the future. In a world where wasta is the “most important” thing one 
could know, such connections are a very real currency. 
 Secondly, patron-client relations, as portrayed in the literature, generally 
assume a set hierarchical direction; it is fairly clear who holds the power and thus 
would enact the patron role. However, while the man in the office may have held 
bureaucratic power, in this situation my friend’s husband held a greater economic 
power (keeping in mind that the former was working with non-Arab foreigners and 
so was less likely to receive r shweh than his counterparts working with Arabs). 
Further, my informant was an employee of roughly equal status in another (non-
regime) office that potentially had some interest for the Ministry officer. That my 
informant was cautious about over-using the connections because he did not want to 
accrue too much potential “debt” (dayn) indicates that the connections may well have 
been reversed at some point with the former “patron” n w acting as a “client” to the 
man who had formerly been his “client.” With the exchange of money and visa, that 
particular transaction had been fulfilled with no debts left hanging; however, because 
my informant had done the asking initially, there remained the possibility of a re-
activation of the connections, with the other side asking for favors. That such a 
moment might arise was made clear when the wasta was activated from the other 
side, though not in asking for favors. For it happens that this chain of connections 
was the same that provided me with the warning about the rumors involving myself 
and a “person who had been in Israel.” What this friendly warning had done, among 
other things, was to reopen the lines of connection, (re)creating and (re)affirming 
their presence. In providing an unasked-for favor, the officer was paving the way for 
a time when he might wish my informant to provide something for him. He was 
preparing the chain to allow himself to become the “cli nt.”  
 “Classic” patron-client relations usually involve a fixed and unequal 
distribution of power. However, Syrian wasta involved men of equal status (if by 
somewhat different measures) who were engaged in moments of power imbalance 
that could shift one was just as easily as the other. Further, making or strengthening 
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the connections themselves could in itself be a currency in these transactions. I would 
suggest, then, that the patron-client model can also be subsumed into the connecting-
the-dots model, whereby the roles of patron and client are only momentarily created 
in the course of a transaction, but the hierarchy the  create is not set in stone. It can 
shift just as easily the other way. It would only be if they were continuously activated 
in one direction that they would gain an effect of permanence, much in the way we 
saw with identity categories.  
 What makes all of this particularly interesting is that if anyone in Syria tried 
hard enough to trace the lines of potential networks f wasta’,130 they would be able 
to find some kind of connection to the regime. Anyoe who went through their 
military service got connections via that time served (meaning service was not 
necessarily all a loss), just as many who managed to dodge their service did so 
because of an already existing (potential) connection. Informants who told 
narractions of international conspiracy and intersped them with ‘contextualized’ 
moments were acknowledging (and thus activating) a personal connection to the very 
regime they were also criticizing. What we can take from this, then, is that no matter 
how far Syrians discursively distanced themselves from the regime (or other 
‘groups’) through the course of narraction and lived experience, everybody had 
connections to that same regime. As disconnected as they may have made 
themselves, they were also inevitably—if potentially—connected. The fact that so 
many of them were willing to activate potential connections, from being complicit in 
reshweh with a regime official or calling up contacts in the Passport Ministry, 
suggests that they were willing to accept the fact tha they were connected. In fact, 
they continuously made themselves so.  
 
Return of the Mukhābarāt 
Agents or Everyday People? 
 
I return now to the secret police, though this time th y will take on a slightly different 
aspect than they had in the previous chapter. The mukhābarāt would seem to most 
                                                
130 I find myself reminded of the game Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon, premised on the ‘six degrees of 
separation’ idea, which posits that there are no more than five intermediaries between any two specific 
people on the planet. 
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strongly embody the violent aspect of the regime, representing its ability to use 
secrecy and force to monitor its own population. If anyone was external to the 
ordinary people of Syria and internal to the regime, it would be these agents. And 
they were ubiquitous, if the rumors are to be believ d; nearly 20% of the population 
of Syria was said to work or have worked for the secret police at some point. It 
indeed seems that “you can’t trust anyone outside of your immediate family.” But 
20% is a lot of people. Granted, much of this percentage is probably concentrated 
within specific networks rather than scattered evenly throughout the populace. But 
even taking that into account, what is the likelihood that an individual Syrian would 
not know at least one person who worked for the mukhābarāt? Or even if they do not 
know one personally, it is very likely that they know someone who knows someone. 
Unlike the elites of the regime, such a massive force cannot be entirely peopled with 
Alawis: the ranks would have to be partly filled by the non-Alawi population. This is 
especially true if the regime wants an effective monitoring agency, because most 
Syrians would be automatically suspicious of anyone with a strange accent.131  
 Part of the insidiousness of mukhābarāt agents is that they are so close to the 
rest of the population. They could be anyone—friends, neighbors, or even family. 
They could very well be people that Syrians might, in other situations, consider to be 
‘insiders.’ And yet, at the same time, they are the kind of people who would betray a 
friend or neighbor to the regime officials. It is a h rd duality to reconcile. People 
were rarely willing to speak about their personal connections to secret police agents. 
They would describe them as family members or friends and then only shyly, or as 
(if) an afterthought, mention who they worked for. The way such informants 
narracted their relations to these mukhābarāt agents was indicative of an ambiguity—
not necessarily in how they related to the agents, but rather how to tell a third party 
about these persons’ status as both ‘inside’ and ‘outside.’  
 As my informants might have predicted, it was I who had more trouble 
balancing the affability of a personable individual with the cold face of the regime. 
On a trip to the north of Syria, I was traveling with two German diplomats and a 
Syrian friend. We drove in the Germans’ car to do some sightseeing, staying at the 
                                                
131 While traveling with Syrians within Syria, I noticed that they had a tendency to dodge questions 
about themselves, including names and where they were from. When I asked why, one informant got 
defensive and said sharply “Because it’s none of their business!” (le’annu mu sheghelhun!).  
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home of a (Syrian) friend of my friend in the town of Hasakah. Shortly after our 
arrival at his house, there was a knock on the door. The two Syrians answered and 
later told me that it was the secret police. They had wanted to let us know that the 
diplomatic license plates had been spotted on our route northward and that, since we 
were staying in Hasakah, local agents would be around to make sure everything went 
smoothly. There was the feeling that they were keeping an eye on us, but also that 
they wanted to keep us safe. The next morning, we and our local friend went out for 
breakfast. There were two mukhābarāt cars with us, one in front and one behind, 
both white and none too subtle. There was no pretens , no attempts to follow us 
surreptitiously; everyone was aware of the situation, making it open and almost 
friendly. When we stopped at a restaurant, our friend told us that one of the officers 
on duty was actually his khāl (mother’s brother) who, upon hearing his nephew was 
hosting the foreigners, asked to have himself assigned to us. As we sat down, the 
uncle and the other agents came in and ate with us and even paid the bill, despite our 
protests. They then proceeded to take us on a tour of their town, excitedly insisting 
on showing us all the best sites and walking around with us at each. It felt more like 
being hosted by family and friends than being followed by a security agency. They 
were even kind enough to radio ahead to each of the small villages nearby that we 
visited so that an escort could pick us up. Of course, this had the ulterior motive of 
continuing to keep track of us, but each set of agents (all in white cars) was very 
friendly and did not play at being secret. When we finally left, they escorted us to the 
edge of the city, waved us off, and even called us on a mobile phone (we had 
exchanged numbers for convenience) to say goodbye. The formidable mukhābarāt 
had been, in this instance, a couple of friendly gus doing their job, but making us 
feel welcome in their town and their country at thesame time.  
 The mukhābarāt, then, could be several things at once. It was an impersonal 
organization that would betray any and everyone to its regime masters. It was 
responsible for snatching ‘dangerous’ people off of the street and throwing them in 
prison without trial or access to the outside world. Informants and agents seemed to 
be reviled and hated for what they did. And yet, it could also be considered as a job, a 
way for regular guys to make money. As individuals, they were portrayed (or 
experienced) as nice, generous people, the kind of pe ple you would probably invite 
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over for dinner. They were not faces of some distant regime, but neighbors and 
family members trying to get by. 
 Sometimes connections with the mukhābarāt were even less official than that. 
According to my informants, at least some of the mukhābarāt activity was more a 
neighborhood vengeance machine than a watchful regime, especially under Hafez al-
Asad. One evening I sat with my friends Yasmeen and Husam in their comfortable, if 
not spacious, New City home, watching television. During a commercial break, 
Husam began telling me about satellite. 
 
Everything is fine now, but several years ago, it was illegal to have an 
unregistered dish. But lots of people, like us, still had them. So we used to 
cover ours during the day and then uncover it and put it in position at night 
when we wanted to watch television. Our neighbors were fine about it, but a 
lot of people had problems with their neighbors repo ting on each other to the 
mukhābarāt. If the mukhābarāt came and caught them, people would be 
heavily fined and lose the dish. Most of that came from jealousy—if the 
police were doing a random search for unlicensed dishes and found one in a 
neighborhood, that guy, after losing his, would probably be pretty quick to 
point out all the other ones nearby because, he would think “Why should they 
get to keep theirs and not me?”  
 
In this case, it was not necessarily that the mukhābarāt themselves had such a strong 
presence, but that bitter neighbors or those with a grudge might report a person just 
to get him or her in trouble. These people reporting o  their neighbors were not 
official members of the force, but everyday men andwomen who would use the 
mukhābarāt as a secretive method of acting on their ire (or wking for personal 
gain—remember the ‘monkeys and bananas’ metaphor). Again we see just how close 
the ‘regime’ can be in the everyday lives of its peo l . These neighbors were not 
formally allied with the ‘outsiders,’ but the narraction indicates that their actions 
made them no longer insiders. But the fact that anyone could potentially be a snitch 
indicated that everyone, at the very least, knew hoand where to go to report on 
their neighbors. The occasional activated connection illuminated the fact that 
everyone had a potential one; if anyone could be thus implicated in the regime, it 





My Aunt’s House 
 
 A final, and rather interesting connection to the mukhābarāt was that the 
popular ‘code name’ for talking about the secret police was to call them ‘my maternal 
aunt’s house’ (beit khālti ). I cannot help but wonder if this code name was used 
somewhat ironically, to emphasize a point. In my experience of Syrian family 
structures, people’s relationships with their mothers’ sisters’ families was generally 
one of affection (Joseph 1994:63). The children of such a family would usually be of 
a different patronymic lineage132 and there were not many, if any, financial or 
protective responsibilities between two sisters and their families.133 It did, however, 
contain the potential for future responsibility, as the children of these sisters were 
part of the pool of marriageable partners (if not “preferred”). I only knew two 
families who kept in very close contact with their maternal aunts’ families. In one 
case, my friend’s mother had three sisters, all of whom were very close (and a 
brother). My friend told me that when one of her aunt’s sons had died, her mother 
had been almost as grief-stricken as the boy’s mother, having considered the boy to 
be almost like a son to her as well. My friend’s older brother was also engaged to 
marry another one of his mother’s sister’s daughters. The sisters were always 
traveling to visit each other, though one lived as far away as Amman. When all 
together, they would mock each other, pointing out the other’s flaws, giving as good 
as they got, and dissolving into laughter (usually t my bewildered expression).134 It 
was a close relationship, with strong, frequently-activ ted connections, but one 
mostly of affection; if one were in need of financial support, she would approach her 
brother and not one of her sisters. 
                                                
132 I am reminded that this might not be the case if FBD marriage prevails and has done so for several 
generations. However, as Eickelman (1989:177) remarks, FBD marriage might be said to preferred but 
is highly variable in actual practice. He cites the av rage percentage of Middle Eastern marriages that 
were FBD as 10-15%, with much higher local percentages in places like Afghanistan and much lower 
in urban areas like Beirut. In my experience, Syrians, especially middle class Syrians, did not adhere 
to this rule. I knew of only one family where this marriage system had been in use for at least two 
generations, and the members of youngest one (in roughly their mid-20’s) were insistent on marrying 
outside the family.  
133 This is in contrast to brothers, where there would be a degree of responsibility and restraint in 
addition to affection. 
134 Indeed, this constant testing was as much a part of their closeness as their mutual affection, a point 
I will return to in Chapter 7. 
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 But relations between sisters could also be strained. The other family I knew 
had an older sister-pair at the center of it, the younger of whom had never been 
married. The older one was in her early 60’s and did not always get along with the 
younger, who tended to be “incredibly moody and very inhospitable. She uses people 
for favors and then never returns them. She can get angry without warning or reason 
and likes to make everyone miserable.” The older on’s daughter (my friend) and her 
mother continued to spend time with and visit the temperamental aunt, but reluctantly 
and only for short periods if they could manage it. They had a social responsibility to 
her though, to keep her company and give her things to do. And the somewhat 
estranged aunt was not always poor company. When she was happy, my friend said, 
she could be your best friend. “But when she is grumpy, we can’t do anything about 
it. My (maternal) uncle could—no, should, since their parents are dead—say 
something to her, but he’s not strong enough. My mom wants to, but can’t. What a 
mess.” According to my friend, then, amongst grown siblings there is a chain of 
responsibility, where it is the parents or the brothers who are meant to chastise those 
who may be out of place, and not a sister, even an older one, and certainly not a niece 
or nephew.  
 So, people’s relations with their aunts would likely be at least affectionate, if 
not always enjoyable. There was no financial responibility or authority expected 
towards or from the aunt, but there would be a degre  of closeness and familiarity. 
By referring to the  mukhābarāt as beit khālti , Syrians were evoking this familiarity 
and familial affection. The mukhābarāt were thus connected to the people they were 
policing; they were known figures, not faceless shadows, as much like ordinary 
Syrians as one’s aunt. Syrians, though, may have also used it as an ironic trope, to 
humorously expose just how unlike a visit to the mukhābarāt was from the 
affectionate, familiar times spent with an aunt. But even if it were meant to be 
tongue-in-cheek, the connections of closeness were narracted through the use of the 
term. 
 What the use of this term also contains is a shifting relationship between 
ordinary Syrians and the mukhābarāt (and through them, the regime). My argument 
for this is premised on the somewhat unconventional use of a female name after the 
word beit; it is unusual to speak of the house of a female relative. That one would do 
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so indicates first that the aunt is married, otherwise she would (traditionally) be 
living with her parents or her brother. It is entirely possible that she would have 
children as well. Further, referring to beit khālti  would suggest that she was not 
involved in a FBD marriage, because were that the cas , she would be married to the 
speaker’s paternal uncle (camm) and the house would more likely be referred to as 
beit cammi. That, at least in informal situations, the house would be referred to as 
one’s aunt’s house, indicates that the speaker is not familiar or close with his aunt’s 
husband. Such an aunt, married to an outsider and mother to his children, would 
occupy a somewhat liminal status. She retains her affiliation to her natal family, who 
will come to her aid or defense if necessary (cf. Gilsenan 1996), but she is also now a 
part of her husband’s family, with ties and loyalty to him. One could never be wholly 
certain what she might or might not reveal to the other family. While she would be an 
insider through affection and close relations, she would also be an outsider, in that 
she was married to one and her loyalty could (and probably should) lie with her 
husband. At the same time, marriages between members of formerly unrelated 
groups were often used to help cement an alliance between the two. And often in 
Arab societies, this means that “one’s wife’s kinsman…should be granted help when 
they demand it” (Dresch 1989:289). Translating thisacross to the mukhābarāt, it 
would put them in a similar duplex status, where they are cast as insiders (members) 
of the ordinary population, but also have loyalty to an external group (the regime) 
and thus are also outsiders. Such a figuration would also account for the informers 
who are not paid members of the mukhābarāt; they have a relationship with the 
regime and their loyalties are dubious, but they ar still neighbors and friends. That 
one does not always know who might be an informer, rely means that friends, 
neighbors and (some) family are all potentially suspect. And the regime itself 
occupies a duplex position, being both outsiders (as the in-law), but also as insiders, 
brought into the kinship network through the ‘marrige’ and now responsible to the 
population should they ask for help. Thus the regim, through the mukhābarāt, shifts 
between being an outsider and an insider. And everyon , through their mutual ‘aunt,’ 
was revealed as implicated in and connected to the regime. And if the agents 
(‘wives’) of the regime were ordinary people, it would follow that the regime (as 
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‘husband’) was not so much a thing-in-itself that existed ‘up there,’ but was 
composed of (and created by) ordinary people.  
 Further, the very use of the term beit khalti returns us to the idea mentioned in 
the previous chapter that the regime can, in some ways, almost be considered as a 
‘house.’ Here that connection is made very explicit, and it lends strong support to the 
idea that middle class Syrians can and do interact with (this arm of the regime) as if it 
were a house, with all the competition and tension that such relations can involve. If 
the regime (or parts of it) can be a house, then th clear lines of who or what the 
regime is continue to shift. 
 
 
Could ‘We’ Do Better? 
 
In light of the connections between ‘people’ and the ‘regime’ that exist alongside (or 
in tandem with?) the disconnections, we are suddenly faced (as Syrians always are) 
with a certain duplexity regarding the nature of the relationship between the two. 
Given that ‘ordinary’ non-regime Syrians engage in the same processes of bribery 
and informing as their regime countrymates, in practice, it suddenly becomes a lot 
more difficult to make a clear distinction between one and the other. With this in 
mind, we can now return to the fact that, despite all of their complaints and 
accusations of immorality against the regime, I never once heard one of my 
informants claim to be able to do it better.135 The critiques merely ended with an 
affirmation that the Alawis were not properly prepared or equipped to do an adequate 
job. Perhaps the implication was there, but it was never formed into an explicit 
comment, nor really hinted at, as far I was aware. This lack reflected, I would argue, 
an uncertainty as to who or which (momentarily created) ‘group’ had any sort of 
legitimate claim to authority, or indeed that any group could have such a claim. A 
rocky past (constantly relived and recreated through narractions) of divisive state-
building and colonial rule intermixed with the more unifying processes of nation-
building (as ‘Arabs’ and as ‘Syrians’) had left peole with no ‘obvious’ place they 
should turn to for leadership. The sometimes tainted, sometimes exonerated mark of 
                                                
135 I would like to thank Alex Smith for first bringing to my attention the importance of whether or not 




the Other could be found (or placed) anywhere. Foreigners provided models for the 
political economy, but were also implicated in unwated and detrimental interference 
in Syrian affairs. A regime put in place by such foreigners was not considered 
legitimate; nor was it legitimate in its own right. But no other, more acceptable, 
options for leadership were offered up. The only thing that seemed to be agreed upon 
was that there was an urgent and ongoing need for the presence of some kind of 
rulers (and critical observers), to keep the tension fr m snapping.  
 To help illustrate what I mean here, let me return briefly to the Bank Manager 
archetype, though this time in a slightly different form. In one version of this story, 
the main figure was described not as a bank manager, but as a military officer. 
However, aside from his position, all of his other specifics remained much the same. 
He was from a backwards village and knew nothing about running a military 
operation. Beyond just being incompetent, this officer would actually steal and hoard 
things for his own benefit, especially food. He would take bread rations that were 
meant for the soldiers and hide them under his bed, to keep for himself and for his 
cow. But like his bank manager counterpart, he was also a somewhat pitiable figure, 
for when I asked the narractor of this story why he stole the bread, I was told that it 
was because he was used to starvation. This poor man spent his entire life eking out a 
meager existence from the land; he never knew wealth or luxury. He spent much of 
his childhood in a constant state of starvation. Suddenly, for the first time in his life, 
he found himself elevated to a position of power, but continued to remember the 
years of hunger. To protect himself, to ensure that he never returned to that state, he 
gathered and hoard as much food as he could. Even if it was detrimental to someone 
else, he wanted to be sure that he and his family would never go hungry again. Here, 
one feels bad for the poor starving boy of the past; it was not his fault. Further, his 
reaction in the present, the abuse of his position, while immoral, is understandable to 
a degree. Who would not do their best to protect themselves from starvation? His 
reaction was portrayed as perhaps being somewhat primi ive—stealing and hoarding 
rather than saving and investing (e.g. in land), but this is a further reflection of the 
ignorance stemming from his shallow background. He is flawed, but excusably so.  
 But are we really talking about food here, about bread and water? This 
particular narraction had a postscript, where its teller explained to me that other 
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people were ‘starving’ now; in fact, everyone who was not an Alawi or working for 
the regime was starving. If we read this story in adifferent light then, perhaps it is 
not that the officer really (or only) starved for fod in his childhood, but rather that 
he and his kin were starved for a measure of politica -economic power that they did 
not possess while scraping out a living as poor mountain folk. This man, and those he 
represents, were suddenly given the opportunity to rise from nothingness into the 
ranks of movers and shakers. They became not only svereign over themselves, but 
over an entire country, and began to steal and hoard n a much broader level. But one 
still feels bad for the officer. One may not agree with his methods and may think him 
somewhat incompetent, yet remains understanding of where he is coming from and 
why he is doing what he is doing. But there is a warning. Now it is everyone lse who 
is starving for the political power, wealth and nouveau prestige that is being 
monopolized by the members of the regime. There is no telling how the officer (or 
the bank manager) got into power—it is presumably by some other means than his 
own; he lacks agency in changing his own position, though does have the ability to 
act once he has been raised up. In these actions, he secured his own ‘food’ but in 
doing so created a situation where a portion of those under him were reduced to 
starvation. Perhaps this was inadvertent or unintended, but it was the outcome 
nonetheless. The pressure of starvation that once filled him is now growing in others. 
But this is not a warning of the potential for a popular resistance or revolution—there 
is no agency for change. The warning was that if any of these now-starving people(s) 
somehow came to power, they would steal and hoard in exactly the same way that 
the members of the current regime do. The Alawis have done and are doing 
despicable and immoral things, but if one understands the reasons and the 
consequences, it seems that that would be true of any ne. Ontologically, ‘We’ 
(ordinary Syrians) are not ‘Them’ (members of the regime), but perhaps We could be 
if the circumstances changed.  
 The obvious challenge to such an interpretation is the narraction’s emphasis 
on the manager/officer’s background. His reactions are only understandable 
insomuch as he is not a civilized, refined being. He does not know any better. And, 
as I noted earlier, part of what such narractions do is to create a disconnection 
between Alawis and non-Alawis based on this distinctio  of prestige. But as I have 
 
193 
also shown, narractions are capable of ‘doing’ multiple and sometimes seemingly 
opposing relations at the same time. This is especially true if we take this archetype 
into consideration alongside one of the previously mentioned descriptions of the 
multiple and precarious tensions that underlie Syrian society. My informants insisted 
that the real problem stemming from the too-many-categories-of-people tensions 
derived from the fact that everyone still had a “Bedouin (i.e. violent) mentality,” 
regardless of where they were from. Everyone had the almost instinctive tendency to 
return to a “primitive” state, not unlike that whic gave rise to the starving officer. 
Bloodshed, retribution and the insurance that one will never ‘starve’ again would be 
foremost on everyone’s minds, should the power structure somehow be altered now. 
Taking all this into account, I would argue that the lack of a “We could do better” 
refrain is an acknowledgment of the fact that peopl do not necessarily think that 
they could, or perhaps would do any better a job as an effective or moral leader than 
the members of their current regime. The question of legitimate authority becomes 
that much more complicated. Maybe no one has it.  
 And if even great and respectable figures like Rafik Hariri and Yassar Arafat 
can be corrupted by politics, then it is to be expected that anyone would be corrupt-
able. The immediately relevant implication of this is that the regime is not (only) 
different and distant. On some levels, the people of the regime are just like, and in 
fact are, ordinary Syrians. That They happen to be in power now and are somewhat 
less than competent in running the country to the satisfaction of all of its citizens is 
not necessarily exclusively their fault. The regime are narracted to be a group of 
people, one that must be as constantly (re)created to exist as any other ‘group,’ by 
themselves and others. They are capable of making the same mistakes and 
susceptible to the same weaknesses as other people and, as such, are not so 
formidable or external at all. And most everyone has or can make connections with 
“members” of the regime, making personal lines thatof connection that cut across 
the differentiations between inside and outside ‘groups.’ The regime is not an 
ideological concept; it is people, just like everyone else. And everyone can be 
implicated in it. 
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7. Everyday Forms of Knowing 
 
Whenever a man is alone with a woman, the Devil makes the third. (Hadīth Ahmad 
and al-Tirmidhi 3118, narrated by Umar Ibn al-Khattāb). 
 
 
Inside and outside, connections and disconnections: as we have seen, these are some 
of the ways in which Syrians narract, understand and ‘do’ politics in the course of 
their everyday lives. Sometimes these politics concer  players and places that are not 
directly present; sometimes they take place in the most intimate spaces of the home. 
The ties that bind and those that separate are as likely (if not more so) to be invisible 
as not, and the aesthetics of an encounter are as important as the dis/connection itself. 
The regime is narracted as external to non-regime Syrians and is also revealed to be 
not so different at all. Narractions point to multiple and seemingly contradictory sets 
of relations at the same time. Nothing in politics stands still. But I would now like to 
turn somewhat away from politics as such, and embark on a comparative effort. 
However, it is not so much a comparison to help make my previous, “less well-
conceived thoughts” (Strathern 1991:53) more accessibl , but rather to explore the 
ways in which certain processes are similar across various ‘traditional,’ 
academically-distinguished spheres. That is to say, I m turning away from the doing 
of Politics towards the doing of Kinship, Friendship and Neighborship (as if these 
were discrete and reified categories). I can perhaps be accused of following a path 
wherein “by virtue of its selectivity, the comparative process itself creates relations 
of similarity and difference” (Strathern 1991:53, paraphrasing Leo Howe). Indeed, 
my inclusion and positioning of this chapter is inte ded to make connections and 
disconnections. But is that not true of all anthropol gy, whether explicitly 
comparative or not? Is that not true of all narractions? 
 As a caveat, I would like to say that this effort is not a return to looking for 
kinship models for society. I am not suggesting that people ‘do’ politics according to 
the ways in which they ‘do’ what they are more familiar with, i.e. kinship or 
neighborhood relations. What I am suggesting is that the ways that people relate to 
each other and how they understand and narract those relations share certain 
similarities across the ‘spheres’ of political and kinship relations. It would seem to 
 
195 
me that, in the case of Syrian understandings of their world, the boundaries between 
these categories dissolve into a field of (equally ccessible) relations.   
 This chapter was sparked when I first began thinking of Syrians’ political 
narractions in terms of conspiracy theory, and how they are reproduced in casual, 
everyday settings.136 While digging through my fieldnotes, I came across a moment 
where one of my informants had been grumbling about the Middle Eastern 
propensity to engage in conspiracy theorizing, despit  also being a perpetrator 
thereof (by relating such stories to me, regardless of whether or not he held them to 
be true). It struck me as I was remembering the conversation that what he had been 
saying did not apply solely to political conspiracies. It was an equally apt description 
for the way that Syrians understood and narracted th ir own lives At that point, I 
began to literally and quite visually (Figure 10) trace out (and thus create) 
connections in my work, not just between elements wi hin the spheres of politics and 
kinships, but also across them. In other words, I found my analysis often involved the 
same processes and analytical ‘dots’ (e.g. ‘Observation’, ‘Secrets’, ‘Authority’, 
‘Knowledge’, etc.) regardless of whether I was considering Politics or Kinship.  
 I like to think that my exploration of and simultaneous engagement in the 
process of connection-making reflect the processes that my informants engaged in. I 
am trying, here, to leave behind ‘foreign’ (to Syrians) models for understanding the 
process of knowledge creation. As anthropologists, we are said to ‘shift scales’ to do 
knowledge. As I have said, I am not convinced that e same is true for my Syrian 
informants. I would argue that their knowledge is derived from the processes of 
making connections and disconnections, of seeing how t ings are related to each 
other and to themselves and making those relations. There are no scales to shift 
through, no immobile fractals, no overwhelming concer s for transparency. It is 
instead on ongoing process of tracing out (or over) lines and dots in an ever-shifting 
system that moves as fast as the speeds of thought and narration. 
                                                
136 I would like to thank Iris Jean-Klein here for posing the deceptively simple question of what I 
would be writing about if not “politics.” What she was suggesting, I think, was that I examine the 




Figure 10: Connecting-the-Dots Mindmap 
 
 As in the political cases presented above, Syrian life also contained within it a 
certain duplexity. Narractions of suspicion and assumptions of the immoral were 
seamlessly intermixed with displays of friendship and ffirmations of the strength 
and love in kinship. I would argue that, in fact, all of these actions were part of the 
same process and cannot be separated in order to match some glorified ideal about 
what kinship and friendship should be. As reciprocity an have a “dark side” of 
asking and taking (Narotzky and Moreno 2002), so too can kinship have both 
positive and negative qualities (or as Salamandra 2004:20 put it, in Damascus, 
“contestation itself [is] a central mode of sociability”). This, I argue, is also best 
(re)presented through the metaphor of Connecting the Dots, with its infinitely 
permeable and continuously recreated boundaries and the constant shifting of one’s 
place within (or outside) them. The constant and continual adjustment of 
relationships, be they in global politics, state economics, or family dynamics, creates 
a sea of relations that is perpetually in motion. Ad yet, this is no perpetual motion 




enchanting idea [for] a mechanism that once set in motion is able to sustain 
its own momentum without further inputs of energy, and one that relies only 
on the conversion of contradictory forces into a product that is greater than 
the sum of its parts—this miraculous machine that produces and perpetuates 
social life. 
 
On the contrary, I would argue that the ambiguous duplexity that I present here is not 
contradictory and there are no obviously distinguishable “parts” to be greater than the 
“wholes.” If “contradictory” connections and disconnections are the “parts,” then the 
“whole” must be the created relationship between two objects. But this relationship is 
nothing more or less than the dis/connections. The “parts” and the “whole” are both a 
process—the same one. However, this is not to be confused with Wagner’s 
(1991:162) “fractal person,” for the process of relating is so momentary and shifting 
that it escapes the rigid bounds of “fractality.” Indeed, unlike a perpetual motion 
machine, the perpetually moving field of relations is a constant project that requires 
constant inputs of energy. It is a system that maintains itself only because the 
participants are constantly participating, observing a d analyzing—i.e. investing time 
and energy. The ‘doing’ of relations requires that people be active and engaged. That 
there is constant motion is both a result of how relations are done and a way by 
which we do them.  
 
 
A Question of Trust: Friends and the Dating Game 
Sharaf Explained (to the Anthropologist) 
 
The question of trust (saqah) came up in many guises during the course of my 
research and was nearly always problematic in both my informants’ experience and 
my understanding of it. What the word actually meant seemed to vary according to 
the person or even the situation, reflecting the problems of definition that academics 
have also encountered when considering trust (Daniel d Knudsen 1995, Seligman 
1997). In one description of it, it is shifting, fragile and constantly sustained, not 
unlike relations themselves (Peteet 1995).137 For Syrians, trust often revolved around 
                                                
137 Julie Peteet (1995) warns us that, because it is needs to be constantly reestablished, trust cannot be 
taken for granted, especially in the case of Palestinian refugees. However, at the same time, she does 
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what people would be willing to say or do with a particular person (or collection of 
people). Thus trust was something that was generated through practical performance, 
the actual act of putting oneself on the line in relation to another person; i.e. the value 
had a physical quality to it. There also appeared to be different types of trust at work 
in different moments; namely that between participants who were directly involved 
with each other, and that of (or by) external parties hat might be invested in a 
particular encounter.138 For example, a father bringing his son into the family 
business might trust his son not to steal, while neighbors seeing a woman they know 
walking with a man in the street might trust that it is a morally appropriate outing. 
Such trust concerns were frequently present in male-female relations. With sisters, 
female kin members, and the maintenance of sharaf (I shall attempt to provide a 
more thorough definition of this term below, but for the moment will gloss it as 
familial honor that is embodied in women’s modesty and virtue and is actively 
protected by men), both of these above forms of trust might be relevant, especially in 
moments where younger sisters might be on their own in a school or university 
setting and thus have unmonitored and potentially unsafe access to men. Outside of 
such precarious settings, familial relations tended to involve constant observation 
over females to ensure that no moral boundaries were crossed (as this would reflect 
poorly on the male’s ability to keep his females safe and virtuous). This constant 
monitoring was discussed not so much as a distrust of the girl,139 but rather of the 
men she might come into contact with. However, the concept of sharaf became ever-
more complicated, as youth tried to incorporate “non-traditional” forms of social 
relations into their conceptualizations of the world handed down from older 
generations. Specifically, this included trying to tackle the problem of dating.  
 Dating was an often problematic topic, both for me and my informants. I 
personally dated a lower-middle class Kurdish-Shami Damascene (as he would 
describe himself) man, who had studied archaeology in university (not one of the 
                                                                                                                                
not question the presence and cohesiveness of trust in kinship relationships and amongst Palestinian 
nationals. 
138 I am not entirely certain, however, that some of this distinction might stem from the fact that the 
words ‘confidence’ and ‘trust’ in English are both translated as the same word (saqah) in Syrian 
Arabic. The English terms contain subtle connotations that vary in each case that are not directly 
present as such in the colloquial Arabic. 




more prestigious degrees such as engineering or medicin ). He welcomed me to his 
home and though his family were somewhat unsure of me to begin with, they soon 
warmed up after they had convinced themselves that we were eventually going to be 
married (something I had not necessarily considered). Dating in general was most 
common amongst the middle classes (and likely upper, though I did not have the 
chance to really meet any of them), mostly centered a ound youth who attended 
university. Not only did these students have at least nough money that they could 
afford to study rather than work, but they also hadregular access to members of the 
opposite sex without official chaperoning. They did, of course, constantly observe 
each other and if there were multiple siblings in school they were always on the 
lookout, but young people had a ready space for engagement that they might not have 
had in earlier times, a rather sticky situation for family reputations and honor in a 
society where personal and familial identity is centered on the comportment of 
females and the ability of males to protect them (Joseph 1994). 
 Early in my research, I was having an impromptu language lesson with some 
friends of mine. We eventually came to the question of sharaf , and I asked for a 
definition. One friend laughed and said to me, “Ask him [pointing to another young 
man] who his sharaf is,” (mīn sharafak?).140 The framing of the concept in this way 
indicated the centrality of the persons involved (and thus their actions) over a more 
abstract understanding, emphasizing the idea of the physicality of morality (c.f. vom 
Bruck 2005:136, and Jean-Klein 2000, specifically the latter’s work on ‘cross-
embodiment’). When I asked, my friends were hard-pressed to tell me what the term 
meant, and could only describe how it worked in practice, as if it were something that 
could not be translated into words but only lived in action. So I turned to the friend 
and asked him who his sharaf was. He gave his friend a withering look, upset at 
having been put on the spot to describe something tat might seem backwards to a 
“modern,” foreign woman. However, he answered, ticking them off on his fingers, 
“My mother, my sisters…and my girlfriend.” There was  pause before the last, 
separating her somewhat from the first two, but ultima ely including her. The first 
friend then took over and told me that this meant tha if any other man ever gave the 
girlfriend a flower, the boyfriend would have to gospeak to the offending man. Such 
                                                
140 Such a question and the answer is reminiscent of the Yemeni saying that “a woman’s honor is her 
husband” (vom Bruck 2005:297, note 6). 
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a reaction was a variation on sharaf surrounding kin, where they said that if a brother 
ever found out his sister was dating someone, he would likely have to beat her. 
Traditionally, they said, it could lead to the sister’s death, but they were under the 
impression that such killings were less common today.141 They seemed to be 
uncertain if and how such values should be enacted in a current setting.  
 In both examples, what was left unsaid, but was pre ent nonetheless, was the 
implicit sex act, the assumption that the giving of fl wers or dating implied the 
couple had already had or were on their way to having sexual relations. But while 
there were clear(er) guides for what to do with an offending kinswoman, things 
became fuzzier with a girlfriend. The mere fact that she was dating already meant 
that the couple was violating someone else’s (her male kin’s) sharaf, at least in the 
case of Muslims. Most of the Christian youth who date  would tell their parents and 
many of the resulting marriages were love matches rathe  than arranged ones. And I 
knew of one Muslim woman whose family knew that shewas often out with a man. 
They were not ‘dating’ per se, but later became engaged to be married. She was 27 
and working independently, but even so, she would generally only go out with him 
when there was someone else present to monitor the situation, be it his mother (who 
was German and unconcerned with her son’s dating habits), an anthropologist, or her 
younger brother. But most Muslim women who dated did their best to make sure 
their families never discovered that fact. I had one friend whose family was quite 
liberal, but she begged me to help her hide the fact th t she was dating a man from 
them and her brother. Young Muslim men were somewhat more flexible in being 
able to date openly, with some (my boyfriend included) happily introducing their 
girlfriends to their family. Others, though, preferred to keep their dating lives secret 
from at least their parents, if not their brothers (a  Salamandra notes, in “premarital 
social and even sexual contact…discretion is key” [2004:52]).  
In Christian dating relationships, the assumption was usually that it would 
eventually lead to marriage on both parts. For Muslim couples, the women would 
often hope that marriage would be the result, thoug not always. Muslim men, 
however, very rarely assumed that a relationship would lead to marriage. The feeling 
was that the kind of woman one dates is not the kind of woman one marries. I knew 
                                                
141 Such honor killings and beatings are most certainly a “dark side” of doing kinship, and are no less 
central to kinship in this setting than the strengthening bonds we might normally associate with it. 
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one young man who went through several girlfriends over the course of the year I 
was in Damascus. He was considered quite the “player.” But despite this, he knew 
the whole time that he wanted to actually marry a distant cousin of his. She was a 
good woman, staying in the house, modest, quiet, and not the type to ever date. In the 
meantime though, couples had to conspire and act carefully to ensure that their 
relationship remained hidden. Morality, as we have se n in other instances of it, had 
to be enacted according to the proper aesthetic (Jean-Klein in press). If the couple 
could manage to keep their secret from her family (and anyone who might be able to 
relate their suspicions to her family), there would be no injury to her relatives’ haraf 
because the immoral act had not happened. It was only upon discovery of the 
relationship that the immoral, damaging act became realized (regardless of whether 
or not their was any such act—see below) and actuated. Thus, secrecy was 
everything. 
 Equally problematic was the trust between the dating couple and the concern 
that if a girlfriend was now embodying a man’s sharaf, then he must take as much 
care of and over her as he would his sisters. A girlfriend constantly had to be 
observed (because one never knew when someone might try to entice her away) and 
encouraged (but not forbidden) to live a quiet life and stay inside or with girlfriends. 
But the worries of transgression were not a one-way street, with only men being 
concerned that their girlfriends might cheat on them. For women in such 
relationships, it was expected that the men they were s eing were not being loyal. A 
number of girlfriends told me that 
 
Arab men are awful for dating—they always have more than one girlfriend at 
a time. Some might have as many as nine or ten. It’s very rare to find one 
who is only dating you (sing.), and if you think so, that probably just means 
he’s good at hiding you (pl.) from each other. 
 
It seems that the expectation of corruption was not limi ed to politics. For women, 
though, there was less pressure for return observation—a woman’s power lay instead 
in her ability to leave, thus relieving herself and simultaneously damaging the man’s 
honor. Regardless, young men would often brag about their multiple girlfriends. I 
knew an Egyptian working in Syria who assured me he had a girlfriend in Cairo, one 
in Alexandria, and one in Damascus. The men would flaunt their sexual prowess; 
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their girlfriends, on the other hand, would often be hurt by such cheating, hoping for 
(if not expecting) fidelity. Perhaps some of this philandering can be explained away 
by the Muslim tradition of polygamy. However, we again return to the proper form 
of morality—in practice, if not law, it is generally considered proper for a husband to 
inform his wives that he has more than one. The fact that dating men would keep the 
fact that he had multiple girlfriends secret from them violated this form.  
 Observation played a large role in dating. Both parties had to be aware that 
they were always being watched, and not just by each other. The neighbors would 
watch to see who came and went and would make their judgments. Friends in the 
street would report back to one of the couple what t eir partner was doing and with 
whom, sometimes as a warning and sometimes as a challenge, but either way serving 
to mind each other’s haraf. “Hassan, do you know that your girlfriend is out wi h 
another man? I saw them sitting in a café just now.” To save face, the boyfriend 
would often reply, “What does he look like?...Yes, that’s her brother—she was 
planning on meeting him for coffee this afternoon.” Brother or not, the boyfriend 
now knew about a possibly offense to his sharaf. Women could be as equally 
involved in minding sharaf. For instance, I knew several Syrian girls living to ether. 
Each of them was attending Damascus University, but their families lived outside of 
Damascus and did not have relatives with whom they could live in the city. One girl, 
Khodoul, was dating a young man and another, Bushra, was friends with him (one of 
the few genuinely platonic relationships I was aware of). Unbeknownst to Khodoul, 
the boyfriend had asked Bushra to keep an eye on her and let him know if she got up 
to anything suspicious. The two girls were friends, but not close, and so Bushra 
agreed to do so, telling the boyfriend of Khodoul’s comings and goings. While both 
of these examples involved the man being warned about possible threats to his 
sharaf, leaving the girlfriend out of the loop, women were just as likely to report to 
(rather than on) other women about the actions of their boyfriends, warning them of 
his being up to something.  
 The relationship between family members and dating could be complicated as 
well. Women did not trust men to be out with any other women aside from his close 
family members, and if they heard reports of him being seen with anyone else, they 
would instantly assume the worst. Men would occasionally entrust their girlfriends to 
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a brother or a close friend, if for example, they did not feel like dancing or going for 
coffee or if they had to travel. I had one female fri nd who had been dating a young 
man who was in Russia for a year of schooling. She enjoyed going out, but was never 
seen without her boyfriend’s brother, who had been assigned and was trusted to keep 
an eye out for her. In a sense, it became as much as or more a test of the trust 
between the brothers as between her and the absent brother. Could and would the 
brother live up to his role as ‘guardian’ or would he become a threat? The rest of 
their circle of friends assumed the younger brother had moved fully into the older 
brother’s place as boyfriend while the two kept up the charade, but no one ever spoke 
of it. In their eyes, the boyfriend’s brother could never live up to the role of her 
brother as an appropriate guardian. The missing brothe ’s sharaf was on the line, but 
there was nothing he could do about it from afar. Similarly, a German girlfriend of 
mine had clandestinely (i.e. her family and his brothers knew, but his parents did not) 
married a Syrian man and there was a running game where the husband insisted that 
his flirtatious brother remain 20 meters from her at all times. It was only half a joke.  
 
Best Friends and Girlfriends 
 
The ambiguous nature of trust was also visible in the ways that people narracted their 
conceptualizations of friendship. One of my networks included a group of young men 
and women, mostly university students about my own age. The group had initially 
been centered around a group of five young men who had met about seven years 
previously. From there, brothers, girlfriends, other male and female friends, and the 
occasional foreigner were incorporated into the greater group, but this core of five 
remained the same (see Table 1). Four were Syrian, the fifth had been born in Syria, 
but was raised in Jordan and had returned to Damascus for study. All were roughly 
middle class, and most were born Muslim (one was Shi’a), though they varied in 
degrees of practicing religion to the point where on  claimed to be an atheist. They 
were very tight knit; “we used to spend every day in the summer together, every 
day.” When I was first introduced to one of these core whom I had not known, my 
friend introduced him as “my best friend [in English]…he is ibn cammi (my father’s 
brother’s son).” It was a metaphor, for none of the fiv  were related by blood, but one 
that was indicative of a strong bond. He considered all four of the others to be his 
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‘cousins’ as well, he said, and called them by the honor-laden term of ‘traveling 
friends’ (rifqātt al-safar).142 The friends were so close that they had narractively 
passed from the realm of friendship into that of family, with all the love, respect, 
responsibility, obligation, quarrels and sometimes competition that kinship might 
imply. By the time I arrived, two had moved to Spain for further education and to 
escape military service.143 Two more were making preparations to also go to Spain 
and both left shortly after I concluded my fieldwork. The fifth was somewhat older 
than the rest and was married with a job and so watched his younger friends go. But 
it was, apparently this last’s recent marriage thatc nged the group dynamic, as he 




As of 2005 Yassar Samir Fakhir Khaled Basil 
Age 28 24 24 24 24 
Married Yes No No No Yes, in 
Spain 
Religion Sunni Sunni Atheist Sunni Shi’a 
Ethnic 
Background 















Residence Damascus Damascus Damascus/ 
Amman 
Spain Spain 
Education Bachelors Bachelors Bachelors Bachelors Masters 
 
Table 1: Description of friend circle 
 
 As far as trust goes, they trusted each other with their very lives. Samir 
asserted to me that there was no one he trusted more than this group—they were 
always welcome in each other’s homes and they would do anything to help each 
other. For instance, when Yassar heard that I (initially a friend of Samir’s) was 
                                                
142 I did not initially understand this phrase, but discovered that traveling companions are (morally) 
considered, like host and guest, to be intricately bound up in each other’s honor, in terms of affection, 
protection and vengeance, if necessary (see Dresch 1989:59-61), though the relations between them 
were symmetrical (as fellow travelers) rather than asymmetrical (as between escort and traveler). 
Dresch (1989:65) describes such a set of relations as being potentially volatile and can “readily 
collapse into the defense of each individual’s honor,” a possibility that, as we shall see, was realizd.  
143 Such a flight was something that all agreed was worthwhile. Of the three remaining in Syria, the 
oldest had already completed his service, one was an only son and so exempt, and the third was 
making plans to follow his friends to Spain.  
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looking for work, he offered to pull some strings (i.e. activate his wasta’) to get me a 
job at his workplace. He knew nothing about who I was; it was a favor for Samir, not 
me. There were, to be sure, occasional arguments and fights between the friends, but 
they always settled. They had even shared girlfriends i  the past—when one was 
bored with a girl, he would pass her on. Or so they flippantly declared.  
 But one evening, a scandal broke out. Samir had been dating Hiba for some 
months and appeared to actually be serious about their relationship (i.e. it was 
generally believed that he was not dating anyone els ). However, as Hiba later 
related to me, Basil’s younger brother had been speculating (out loud) that Fakhir 
was being somewhat more friendly with Hiba than wasacceptable. Fakhir denied any 
such thing, and Samir sided with his friend, instead accusing the younger brother of 
being a liar (kizāb). In doing so, he served to narractively disconnect the younger 
brother, inverting the attack on his own sharaf by challenging the brother’s honor. 
Hiba said that he reacted like that because he belived and trusted his friend. 
However, some weeks later, she told me that Samir had begun subtly warning her 
away from Fakhir, saying that he was the kind of person that used people, that he did 
not have any real friends, just people to drink with. Samir had even gone as far as 
saying that he did not particularly trust or even like his so-called friend, or any of the 
friends in the group. But this sentiment was in contrast to his actions earlier in their 
relationship, where, when he had had to go to work, he had entrusted her to Fakhir’s 
care so she could stay on with us in the café. After th  rumors, Fakhir had begun to 
talk to Hiba in a similar fashion, saying that Samir was his friend but was a boy 
(walad) who had not grown up. It was as if once the suspicion of Basil’s brother 
came to light, the secret of the illicit act came to light and was thus created as real, 
despite it not having happened (yet).144 The challenge was on. In a conversation I had 
with Fakhir at about this time, he too said that he did not have any “real” friends, 
even or especially amongst the group. No of them really knew him.145 To no one’s 
surprise except mine, Fakhir did ultimately try to seduce Hiba away from Samir, 
even asking her to marry him, and she was temporarily swayed though declined the 
marriage offer (according to her at least—Fakhir insisted that nothing of the sort had 
                                                
144 For “what breaks haraf…is said to be calumny or gossip” (Dresch 1989:55). 
145 Gilsenan (1976:206) notes a similar use of this kind of declaration in Lebanon, where men spoke of 
the “secret selves” whose true lives no one could or would understand. 
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ever happened). Samir’s trust in both was shattered, but contrary to his original 
declarations of brotherhood and fast friendship with Fakhir, he chose to openly 
challenge Fakhir’s word and returned to Hiba. The two friends did not speak for 
months, and a year later, their friendship had not yet returned to the full camaraderie 
it had once possessed. 
 There were also instances in the group where members acted in ways that 
denied or defied the trust that one might have in another, most commonly in the 
revealing of another’s secrets. Yassar, for instance, quite openly frowned on the 
whole situation with Hiba, disapproving of the immoral overtones of the 
relationships. However, Fakhir later told me that Yssar had no right to play the 
high-and-mighty moralizer, because he had secretly gone off and married another 
woman without telling his family or his first wife.146 Fakhir was the only one who 
knew, as Yassar wanted to keep the secret close for f ar of his parents and wife 
condemning the second wife and himself.147 However, Fakhir was quite willing to 
tell me. Some months later, I heard other friends telling the ‘secret’ story, but by that 
time, Yassar had already been pressured by his family nd his first wife into 
divorcing the second woman. Other secrets passed throug  the group just as easily, 
with the spreading of “secret” knowledge flowing like an undercurrent under the 
overt insistence of closeness and love. To follow the metaphor, rip tides are 
dangerous, but are no less a part of oceanic processes than the waves flowing towards 
shore. The passing of dangerous secrets was perhaps as much a part of creating and 
maintaining the circle of friendship as the faith and camaraderie. The connections 
and disconnections were part of the same process. Gluckman (1963:308) suggests 
that “talking about one another [is] what help[s] maintain people as a group.” He 
argues that only members of a group have the “right to gossip” about the other 
members, and by participating in the gossip, one ass rts one’s desire to remain an 
active member of the group. ‘Outsiders’ are not permitted to speak ill of the group, 
                                                
146 The two acts were not exactly commensurate, as one involved secretly doing something that was 
technically legal and within the moral code (if not the general habitus), while the other involved 
challenging the sharaf of a close friend through the seduction of his girlfriend. Fakhir was not so much 
equating the two as challenging Yassar’s absolute moral superiority in condemning Fakhir’s actions. 
147 Having multiple wives is very rare in Syria, especially in Damascus. I only heard of three cases of 
Syrians having multiple wives. One was a man in his 70’ , initially from the countryside (rīf), the time 
and location making it more socially acceptable. The other two were younger men, and both instances 
caused a great deal of family scandal when they came to light. 
 
207 
but ‘insiders’ are. This would not be surprising for my informants, who all expected 
the negative undercurrents (i.e. the spreading of secrets). If one wanted to really keep 
something secret, one did not tell anyone. Once reval d, one could trust that the 
word would spread by one’s friends.  
 The disconnections of the group did not stop at sh raf-challenging or secret-
telling. There were also feelings of jealousy towards those of the group (particularly 
Fakhir) who were slightly wealthier than the rest (as there was a quiet jealousy of 
most people in society who had money). And while there was some degree of 
generosity and guesting, each was always aware of the financial indebtedness they 
either had or were owed. Members of the group would borrow and lend money as 
needed (though there was a distinct hierarchy here unlike with wasta’), adding 
occasional and temporary patron-client type relationships to the friendship. This 
could lead to bitterness if not repaid. For instance, Khaled and Fakhir were on barely-
civil terms due to some incident a year or so before I met them regarding large 
amounts of money, with one claiming it had been repaid and the other insisting it had 
not. Despite all this, however, the circle of friends remained very close. When one 
came into town, they would all gather and be inseparable for days on end. Basil 
returned from Spain at one point with his new (Peruvian-American) wife, and the 
other three of the group in town got together and celebrated the newlyweds with no 
end of enthusiasm (if not in quite the “traditional” manner)—including Fakhir and 
Samir working and later dancing together. They fondly recalled their years spent 
together in university and summers spent loafing around. They laughed and joked 
and teased and visited and talked together. I have disproportionately represented here 
the negative aspects of their friendship, but that is intentional, as it is easy to assume 
the positive aspect of friendship relations. But for all the ways in which these ‘good’ 
qualities were enacted, there were as many ruptures as bonds. In the same vein, 
though, they were no less (and perhaps more) good friends for their difficulties. 
 Here we see another instance of the shifting nature of elations, how both 
connections and disconnections contribute to the making of a relationship and the 
ordering of the people in one’s world. The members of this friendship circle were on 
the closest of terms, but still there was a constant challenging of each other, of 
stepping into someone else’s territory or relating hat which should be kept hidden. 
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The status of the relations between them was constantly in flux, being rearranged and 
repositioned through dialogue and action. If the relations themselves were in constant 
motion, it is no wonder, then, that the ways in which people describe them also were. 
As I suggested in the introduction, ambiguity becomes not so much a blurry grey 
area, but a way of traversing between white and black areas—i.e. the positive and 
negative aspects of doing relations (c.f. Briggs 1998: Chapter 3 for a similar use of 
ambiguity). “Trust” between friends became the way in which they framed this 
motion; they discussed the degrees of trust, different varieties of trust (e.g. I trust you 
with my secrets, but not my girlfriend), and even when distrust might be more 
appropriate than trust.  
 What these examples also point to is that even within bonds of close 
friendship, there are spaces and moments of ‘suspicion’ (perhaps not dissimilar to the 
spaces of suspicion that pepper narractions of regim  processes). Or, as in the several 
examples cited above, I would say that my informants’ attitudes involved less 
suspicion than the expectation of the immoral act, n expectation that was revealed to 
be sensible every time trust was betrayed. This is mo t visible in the whispers that 
initially spread about Hiba and Fakhir. It was irrelevant what either party said or 
whether or not there was “proof,” because it was generally known that something had 
happened. The more Hiba, Fakhir or even Samir insisted that there was nothing, the 
more the other members of the group were convinced that they were hiding 
something. Here then, there was no ambiguity on the part of the observers as to what 
was (not) observed; they knew what had happened, which gave them a certain moral 
superiority, temporarily rearranging the structure of the group. Fakhir, specifically, 
reacted to this repositioning by ‘exposing’ another member of the group (Yassar and 
his multiple wives), reasserting some sort of moral equality. And Samir, whose 
sharaf had been tested by his rumored inability to protect his female from another 
male, attempted to redress this imbalance by confronting those doing the talking. The 
knowledge that people had (or generated) of the situations was used to manipulate 
the group dynamic, to place and reposition different members in relation to each 
other. My informants were aware of the constant motion between themselves and 
described it vis-à-vis their shifting narractions. They knew that trust and distrust were 







This tendency to assume and act as if an immoral act had occurred is not limited to 
friendship circles, but also was a regular feature in the ways people narracted and 
‘did’ kinship. I encountered numerous moments where family members would relate 
various suspicions about the things that their kin were involved in. As in the above 
example, such knowledge of the immoral allowed family to negotiate the relations 
between them. Many such narractions also revolved around inappropriate sex acts, 
but not all of them. Below I trace out two such instances of the assumption of the 
immoral and how they were involved in some rather dramatic rearrangements of 
kinship dynamics for the families involved. In both cases, however, we again find 
moments of duplexity, where both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ aspects of kinship 
become visible in their narractions.  
 
Salah and Fatima 
Marital ‘Humor’ 
 
Salah and Fatima had been married for several months when I met them. Salah was 
in his mid-thirties and Fatima would soon be 20. Lower middle class and of Kurdish 
descent (as was she), he owned a small bird shop and the two lived in a small 
apartment above his parents’ house. The marriage was arr nged by their mothers, 
after Salah’s mother had seen Fatima at a wedding and thought her appropriately 
modest. Fatima had just recently discovered that she was pregnant when I met them. 
Fatima was quiet; the family had initially thought her to be extremely shy and 
modest, but after several months, she still did not say more than two or three words 
in an evening, despite continual coaxing on the part of Salah’s younger, unmarried 
sister. One night, Salah’s father commented on how quiet she was and Salah snidely 
remarked that it did not matter if she was present or absent—the amount of 
conversation you got out of her was the same. The two younger siblings confided to 
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me that they had begun to realize that she was really just ‘stupid’ (ghabīya) and had 
no personality (“ma candha shakhsīya” ).  
 I knew the family because I was dating Salah’s younger brother and they had 
welcomed me as an effective daughter-in-law. I spent a great deal of time at their 
house, just as frequently sitting with his sister and mother as my boyfriend himself. 
There were no doubts as to my being with the second s , but there was constant 
joking as to which male in the household I would marry; the pool included the older 
sister’s husband, several uncles, and even the fathr once in a while. However, as I 
noted in Chapter 4, this marriage humor was common whenever I met the parents of 
my friends. When I went to my boyfriend’s uncle’s wedding, there was a game to see 
which male (married or not) could manage to win me away from him, all in good fun 
and laughter. A resource (e.g. a female) placed amongst men could become an 
opportunity for challenges and competition. Even the father, normally reserved, 
joined in, offering to pay off my student loans so I could stay in Syria and marry his 
son. “Either one, really, or if you don’t like them, we can bring in someone else for 
you,” he said to me as his youngest daughter watched with a pretend-shocked 
expression.  
 One evening as the entire family was sitting around, the father came out with 
another line. Salah and I were on polite terms, but rarely spoke more than to say 
hello. However, in a light-hearted moment, his father turned to Salah and said, “You 
know, my son, you really shouldn’t bring your girlfriends home when your wife 
[who was present] is around. Kathleen, you should come to the shop tomorrow 
instead, that would be more appropriate.” The entir family erupted into laughter, 
including Fatima, at both the silliness of the idea itself and the fact that it was the 
father saying it.  
 A couple of months later, the marriage began to ge rocky. Fatima threatened 
to leave a number of times, and did so once or twice, though usually returned. Finally 
she left for good, going to her parents’ house and t lk of divorce started soon after, 
despite the pregnancy. The family would sit up long hours discussing divorce 
processes and who Salah should marry next, much to his chagrin. It came out shortly 
after that Salah had been engaged previously. It had been an arrangement of love and, 
Salah’s younger sister told me, he was still in love with that girl. Something had gone 
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sour between the two, though, and it had been called off. To prove that he was no 
longer attached, he decided to quickly marry someone else (which, his sister said, 
only proved that he was not in fact over her). Within a month, his mother had found 
Fatima and they were married shortly after. “So,” his sister told me, “that’s the real 
problem with their relationship. He’s not over our the other girl and Fatima was just a 
substitute. Of course they’re not happy together. H should just apologize and get the 
first one back.” But the general consensus was somewhat more varied, especially 
with the issue of a child. Everyone agreed, though, that Fatima was silly to have left, 
because Salah was known for his generosity, for his willingness to give without ever 
asking for anything in return. The girl was considered a fool for having given that up. 
Salah’s mother went and tried to talk to Fatima’s mother to see if anything could be 
resolved, but it ended in an exchange of insults.  
 One evening, while everyone was gathered to talk, including the older, 
married sister and her family, Salah said that he had been to see Fatima and they had 
talked. She had not returned with him, but had explained for the first time why she 
was upset. Most of the complaints were about her feeling out of place and far from 
home. But, as he turned to look at me with wide eyes, she had apparently been 
mostly upset that he had been so bold and disrespectful as to bring his mistress to the 
house while she was there! Everyone went silent for a moment as they tried to figure 
out what he was saying and then burst into uproarious laughter as they realized that 
he meant the father’s joking from some months ago. No one could believe that she 
had taken that seriously. However, from her perspective, she had observed the signs 
of an illicit sexual relationship. And not only tha, but it had been flaunted in front of 
her face. While the rest of us took it as a joke, sh  aw through the humor to the issue 
underneath. Given the joking about marriage as well, especially the occasional 
comments about me marrying Salah, it is no small wonder that a new wife would feel 
threatened.  
 
Challenging the Family 
 
Once again, we see a moment where humor works as a pace for testing, for 
challenging a character and a connection—a challenge that ultimately served to 
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distance Fatima from her husband and his family. The joking was a ‘light’ and 
seemingly harmless way to confront what could not be openly addressed, i.e. the 
illicit sex act that existed as a potential connection between Salah and myself. Any 
such act would have, of course, been concealed by us as conspirators and had this 
joke revealed the existence of such an act, it is likely that I would have been the one 
distanced from the family, having so damaged my boyfriend’s sharaf (at the hands of 
his brother, no less; see below). And the secrecy of the potential affair again made it 
all that much more aesthetically immoral. As I said, there had been another instance 
where the father somewhat jokingly suggested that I could marry his older son, but 
that suggestion that I marry Salah was much less immoral than a potential affair 
precisely because it was made in the open. It followed the proper forms. However, 
what the joke suggested was that there was some sort of relationship occurring that 
did not adhere to those forms. The moment of the joke had been precarious for all 
four of us involved (Salah, Fatima, my boyfriend and myself), as it held the 
possibility of being a moment of revelation. As my boyfriend was fond of telling me, 
“people are always watching,” and his family tended to observe me quite closely, 
weighing me up as a future daughter-in-law. Had either Salah or I reacted in a 
suspicious way (looking nervous, frowning instead of laughing, exchanging glances, 
etc.), what had started as a joke might have turned into a cause for worry. Everyone 
except Fatima had, of course, ‘known’ it was a joke, but the undercurrent of 
suspicion, a knowledge of the immoral, was just as known. The joke tested that 
knowledge in a quiet way, creating a challenge to all f our relationships that needed 
to be delicately answered. Surprised laughter was apparently the proper response, 
alleviating worries that the potential relationship between Salah and myself had ever 
been realized. Except, of course, for Fatima. 
 What this joking about the immoral served to do was momentarily upend the 
social dynamics of the family group vis-à-vis its challenge. Because I was a 
participant in the joke itself and the enjoyment of it afterward (by laughing 
appreciatively), I was included within the family circle, marked as someone who 
could take a joke and return them in other moments. Still, it made me aware of the 
potential for people to misinterpret any communication I had with Salah, so I was 
always conscious of maintaining a proper distance from him. Fatima was excluded 
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both from and by the joke. She did not laugh, only smiled when the father made his 
comment, and left for bed not long after. Her very absence in the joke quietly made 
her out to be the fool of the whole affair. Here was her husband’s mistress sitting 
right in front of her, and she did not suspect a thing! She was also portrayed as 
ineffective, having no power to scold or berate her husband for his ill-behavior. I 
cannot help but think that the best response she could have given would have been to 
exaggeratedly begin yelling at her husband. (There were similar jokes made about 
Salah’s sister’s husband and myself, to which her response was usually to begin 
playfully beating her husband about the head or offering to sell him to me.) In merely 
smiling and accepting the joke, Fatima was recreated in a submissive daughter-
/sister-in law position. In contrast, I would regularly be included in family business 
and be asked for advice or input. They commented on how much more engaging I 
was than her, making specific comparisons. In the jok , I even co-opted her place as 
a wife. The joke, which was as much act as words, had such a strong impact on 
Fatima’s knowledge of the family’s social relations that she turned a momentary 
narractive shift into a much more permanent arrangement of relations.  
 The case of Fatima’s improper reaction was oddly relieving for an 
anthropologist enmeshed in the complexities of playful, but very real challenges. 
Gilsenan (1996) describes how humor can be used to alter and rearrange social 
patterns and that there are some people who are less than adept in this play that is not 
all in fun. Fatima was somewhat socially inept, taking as serious what was revealed 
not to be, and reacting both at the time and afterwards in precisely the wrong manner. 
She had not properly ‘read’ the situation and by proving herself incapable of sharing 
in the same social code as the rest of the family, was distanced from all those who 
did understand it correctly.  
 At the same time, the joke revealed other tensions. Fatima was not the only 
one who did not react quite as light-heartedly to the joke as the rest of the family. My 
boyfriend had laughed lightly and grinned, but then got somewhat pensive and 
shortly thereafter offered to drive me home. The comments pointed not only to the 
problems of a marriage, but also to those surrounding brothers. My boyfriend was as 
much at the heart of the joke as Fatima, because of the implication of his inability to 
protect his girlfriend from his brother. The joke was also a test of his sharaf and his 
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ability to maintain it in the face of what might bethe ultimate threat of his older 
brother. But, as in the friendship example, this highlights that when it comes to 
women (and the associated enactment of male honor via her modesty and 
safekeeping), brothers especially are outside a cert in circle of trust. They both help 
someone to maintain his sharaf and simultaneously test it. In fact, the testing may 
well be part of helping him to maintain it, giving him the opportunity to appropriately 
defend his honor and to reveal where any ruptures in his sharaf might lie—a thought 
that speaks volumes when considering the way that politics, too, is ‘done.’  
 Joseph (1994) describes similar tensions that exisalongside with love in 
Lebanese families and are played out in the course of ibling relationships. She 
focuses on the positive and negative psychodynamic pro esses of brothers and 
sisters, but in doing so explains how brothers willsometimes control their sisters, 
mothers, and younger brothers and how this can challenge the father’s authority. She 
argues that a brother “learn[s] to become a patriarch by becoming the man of the 
house in relation to his sister, mother, and younger siblings” (1994:52), through both 
love and power/violence. Central to this is what she calls “connectivity,” meaning 
“psychodynamic processes by which one person comes to see him/herself as part of 
another. Boundaries between the persons are relatively fluid so that each needs the 
other to complete the sense of selfhood” (1994:55). Though the situation with my 
boyfriend’s family was not centered around brother/sister pairs, it reveals similar 
sorts of power tensions that coincide, and are indeed r quired along with, love and 
solidarity in the formation of both individual and familial identity.  
 But in the end, it was revealed (to me) that I wasnot the problem, but rather 
another female whom Salah desired. Thus the theme of th  joke, if not the details, 
proved more accurate than I might have initially guessed. Salah’s younger sister later 
reported to me that Salah and Fatima got back together right before their child was 
born. She had moved back in and the arrival of their baby helped to smooth out some 
of the tensions between them. But six months after that, she left again and had still 
not returned to her husband’s home when I visited a year on from the initial 




Rami, Issam, (George?), and their Father (Abu Issam) 
 
Not all such ‘suspicions of the immoral’ and tests of morality are centered around 
male-female sexuality. The story of the brothers Rami, Issam, (their absent brother) 
George, and their father (Abu Issam) provides one example where a suspicious 
incident in the past was narracted to be the cause of a long-term familial 
rearrangement, as well as opening up other experiences of the “dark side” of kinship. 
The shifting nature of relations here is revealed not only through multiple 
dis/connections of a single narraction, but also thr ugh the presence of two 
competing narractions about the situation. But while in the last example, all of the 
major events took place over the course of a year and I was able to witness both the 
initial joke and the reactions to it, the following example stretches back almost 20 
years. By the time I met the subjects of the story, they had achieved a degree of 
balance and acceptance with each other. However it was a delicate one, and 
sometimes no more than a veneer, quietly shifting one way or the other through the 
course of their everyday interactions. 
 Abu Issam (whose son we met in the section on the gold trade, Chapter 4) 
was born into a family with very little money. He had discovered that he had a 
delicate hand and an innate ability to work gold. He began by making molds for 
children’s earrings and with time began to earn some money. As soon as he could, he 
bought a gold shop and went into retail, as selling gold jewelry to customers was 
more profitable than making it. His shop was in the gold suq of the Old City and 
soon grew to a respectable size. His sons worked in the shop along with him as soon 
as they were able, learning the trade in case they c ose to take it up. A few years 
before I arrived in Damascus, Abu Issam’s wife had died, and in his grief he had 
closed the shop. His son Issam, who had returned from America for his mother’s 
funeral, decided to remain in Syria and re-open the shop for his father. When I met 
them, Abu Issam, nearly 70 years old, still owned the shop, but Issam was effectively 
in charge of the day-to-day running of it. His younger brother Rami was also working 
in the shop, and the two devoted their time and energy to keeping it running 
smoothly. Abu Issam would usually stop by once a day for about half an hour to 
check on things, much to the annoyance of his sons who saw him as interfering just 
for the sake of interfering. They would frequently complain about these visits while 
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he was in the shop, switching to English (which Issam was fluent in and Rami had a 
working knowledge of) so he would not understand. Complaints notwithstanding, the 
atmosphere in the shop was usually jovial with much friendly joking and laughter 
between the family members. 
 The family was doing well for itself when I met them, but the distribution of 
wealth was somewhat uneven. Issam lived with his father—they owned two houses 
and each had their own car. Issam was not married at the time, though he had been 
married and divorced while in the U.S. (with no children). Rami was married with 
two children, and a third was born shortly after I left Damascus. He lived in a house 
that had once belonged to his mother in one of the growing suburbs outside the city. 
His family did not have a car, and his income was les  than that of his father or 
brother as he worked fewer hours and was relatively less involved in the business. 
They also had a brother (George) whom I never met, but featured prominently in the 
stories presented here, and an older married sister whom I met a number of times. 
The family generally got along well, often meeting up on holidays and weekends to 
go out for a meal or just to visit. Like many other gold shop owners, they were 
Christians. 
 
The Brothers’ Narraction 
 
One afternoon sitting at the gold shop, I saw Rami very agitated for the first time, as 
he was normally a light-hearted, charismatic man. He and Issam were talking about 
money and Rami was upset because he felt he was not earning enough. He said (half 
for my benefit and half for Issam’s) that he was only taking home 5000 lira a week 
($100), which only amounted to about 10% of the profits f the shop; in fact, he was 
not even paid in a percentage of the takings, but at a fl t rate which often left him 
earning less than if he were making a percentage. He said this was not fair, as their 
father took half of the profits and Issam the remainder. So Issam, despite not having a 
family to raise, was making roughly four times as much as Rami, and their father, 
who had no one but himself to care for, made five times as much. 5000 lira a week 
was not, Rami felt, sufficient to raise a family on. He could not afford a car even if he 
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wanted one,148 and the only reason he could afford his house was because it was 
already paid for. Issam replied by reminding Rami that his weekly wages had 
increased from 3500 to 5000 lira in the past year and a half, which was a tremendous 
improvement. He also said to me as an aside that “we let him live in the house for 
free.” Rami overheard this and said that was part of the problem—they could make 
him begin paying rent at any time and then he would be in real trouble. “The 
problem, though,” Rami said, “is not with Issam, it’s with our father.” The two then 
began to tell the story from the beginning, Rami doing so in a bitter and angry tone: 
 
 When Issam finished high school, their father had funded him to go study 
and work as an engineer in America, money that, Issam aid, he paid back as 
soon as he was able. While Issam was gone, Rami spent the next 16 years 
working at the shop, because without at least one of the sons around, Abu 
Issam would not have been able to run it. As a result, he had to drop out of 
high school and had never gotten the opportunity to go to college, while his 
hard work allowed his brother to do so. All of his other options for life had 
been ruled out because he had had to devote his life to the shop. He had put 
up with 16 years of their imposing and controlling father and his moods. 
Then their mother had died and Issam came home, and when it was time to 
open up the shop, everything (including the best portion of the profits) went 
to the golden child. Issam said maybe the fault was not only their father’s. 
Their youngest brother George had, when they were younger and Issam was 
gone, been taking some money from the shop, and to this day was not 
allowed back in. The problem for Rami was that when  was young, he had 
liked living the high life, or the appearance of it, and one day his father had 
seen him and some girl driving around in a rented Mercedes. His father 
instantly assumed that Rami too had been stealing, if he was able to afford 
things like that. In the end, it turned out that the girl was actually the one who 
had rented it, and Rami had brought a receipt from the rental company to 
prove it, but the damage was already done. The immoral act (theft) had 
occurred. Abu Issam knew what he knew—by giving cause for suspicion the 
son was already guilty in his father’s eyes (similar to the way a woman seen 
in the streets with a man would be enough to make all the onlookers certain 
that there was an illicit sexual relationship between them). The result was a 
massive rift between father and son. It was George’s initial act that set the 
idea for suspicion into Abu Issam’s head, but it ultimately affected both sons 
(as we saw with the circle of friends—the wisdom of being suspicious is 
enhanced when trust is betrayed). 
 Issam, in contrast, had proved his financial trustwor hiness by paying 
back the large sum of money that his father had lent him to study abroad. 
Given the constant fluctuations of the exact contents of the gold shop, Issam 
                                                
148 At a rough estimate, it would cost a minimum of 1.5 million Syrian lira to buy a car and pay for the 
necessary taxes. At this wage, if Rami were able to save literally ever lira he earned, buying no food, 
not paying for electricity or water, etc., it would still take roughly six years before he could afford ne. 
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said that their father could never be entirely sure as to what he had or did not 
have. This meant that it required a great deal of trust in those you have 
handling your gold, be they sons or otherwise. In the end, while Issam 
effectively ran the shop, it remained their father’s business and Issam had to 
abide by his wishes. Abu Issam only just trusted Rami to work in the shop 
(and never without Issam also present) and so, he insisted that Rami’s wages 
remained low. George was still not allowed to even enter the shop. Issam 
shrugged as if to say it was out of his hands, but it was clear that he 
sympathized with his brother, though not enough to pay him more than he 
was told. There was an almost ominous lack of an “I would pay you more if I 
could” statement from Issam (not unlike the lack of a “We could do better” 
refrain in politics). Despite this, it was clear from both men’s contributions to 
the story that their father (with some help from their brother George) was to 
blame for Rami’s financial situation. 
 
 When the two brothers were jointly narracting the story, Abu Issam and 
George became the external figures, the ones responsible for difficulties. The two 
brothers were (somewhat) united in the joint exclusion of their father. But he was not 
represented as a wholly unreasonable man, for at the heart of his mistrust was the 
suspicion of an act of stealing. Rami, in his retelling, insists that he never took 
anything, but that does not affect the knowledge that his father had, created through 
the connections he made between what he observed and his previous experience of a 
son’s betrayal. George was the immoral figure, their father was the suspicious one, 
Rami was the victim, and Issam was just trying to do his best. Stealing was cast as an 
immoral act, one that was deemed rightly punishable by Abu Issam’s forbidding of 
his youngest son from entering the shop again—that decision was never contested. 
This suspicion of the immoral act and the decrying of stealing as immoral were 
similar to those repeated in narractions of the regim . But here, they presented a 
moment where the otherwise binding aspects of kinship relations were strained and 
tested. With the suspected act, observed in Rami’s rid ng in the expensive car, the 
patterns of kinship were altered. Rami was removed from being inside the boundaries 
of financial trust, reflected in the fact that he was no longer allowed to run the shop 
on his own or even take more than a negligible wage. This distancing placed a great 
deal of tension on Rami and his father’s relationship. There was respect lost on both 
sides, and strain was placed on the other siblings to keep connections with each of 
them active without damaging ties with the other.  
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 It also changed the nature of the father-son relationship somewhat, from that 
of a man teaching his son his trade to that of an employer and a barely-trusted 
employee.149 Rami often described his father solely in terms of m ney (when the 
brothers narracted other stories about their father, it was usually Issam who did so). 
Issam remained the ‘good son,’ who was trusted financially and could thus occupy a 
space as both employee and son without much complication. He was also 
occasionally annoyed by his father, but it was much less than Rami’s outright anger 
because, ultimately, Issam took home only marginally less than their father. Rami 
was also much more prone to being criticized, for while Abu Issam would 
occasionally take him to task for sloppy work, he rarely did so with Issam. Rami’s 
relationship with his father had become much more ambiguous and he was unsure of 
how to navigate that. He was often cold when his father arrived and the two usually 
spoke little more than to exchange greetings. Rami would often take his lunch break 
when their father came in. Nor did he attend family gatherings as often as his 
siblings. In some ways, he became more like an employee than a son. But at the same 
time, such a degree of betrayal and emotion was only possible because Rami was 
family. He was shifted both inside and out. George, on the other hand, though still a 
son/brother, was moved the furthest outside, for his initial immoral act was seen to 
have the cause of the falling apart of the family. 
 The whole situation also placed Issam and Rami in an awkward relation, as 
Rami often did not know if he was to treat his brother as an older brother, who 
deserved familial respect and authority or as a manager who doled out wages at the 
boss’s command.150 The two were normally quite friendly, but in moments such as 
these, the tension between them became visible. Issam’  silence when he could have 
assured his brother that he would have paid him more if he was able to do so hinted 
that his loyalties were split. While he would support his brother on an emotional 
level, on a financial level he seemed to be more devoted to his father’s wishes—he 
                                                
149 Compare this to the situation of Salah above, whose father officially put the title of the family shop 
in Salah’s name when his son began to work there the majority of the time. It was Salah then, and not 
his father, who owned the shop, reducing the possibility of such conflict.  
150 Earlier we saw how non-kin persons were narractively accorded a kin-like status, with friends 
being like cousins. It is rarer to see kin beginning to fall into the rubric of non-kin, but see Jean-Klein 
(2003). Rothenberg (2004:Chapter 4) also points to situations where kin become like non-kin and vice 
versa, but relates it to proximity in space (what she calls ‘social geography’), where Palestinian 
families who were distant from each other and less able to regularly activate their relations were often 
more like strangers than neighbors who lived nearby. 
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too shifted inside and outside the two other men’s realms. Perhaps the most painful 
moment of the entire narraction was when, to try and calm the enraged Rami, Issam 
said that he and their father would never let Rami nd his family starve—the same 
sort of assurances a client has in a patron-client rela ionship. He assured his younger 
brother that they would take care of him in case of any emergencies. Such a comment 
was particularly poignant given that Rami had been in a car accident in a taxi earlier 
in the year and had needed a good deal of money for the doctor and physical therapy. 
While the comment was intended to make Rami feel better, it had the opposite effect. 
It is something one would say to an employee rather than a brother. He sat down, 
crestfallen, having been openly stripped of autonomy and dignity, effectively reduced 




Later that same afternoon, Rami and I walked to an internet café. He was still upset 
from the afternoon’s discussion and as we talked he told me another version of the 
same story I had just heard, a version he was able to tell only when his father and 
brother were not present. 
 
Many years ago, their father had sent Issam to the U.S. to study, work, make 
money, and generally get all the best opportunities. Rami had also wanted to 
go, but his father had urged him to stay, promising to ive him a house and 
work if he wanted it. So Rami stayed behind and, after completing his 
military service, was made responsible for running the shop for 16 years. He 
got married and started his own family, but had to sacrifice other 
opportunities, like those his brother was reveling in. Then there was the 
incident with the rented car. He did not describe it in much detail, but his 
account placed it in a time when he was already married, giving a slightly 
different twist to the girlfriend aspect—especially as they were a Christian 
family and this was not acceptable as it would be under Islam. He admits that 
he was not morally spotless, but focused on the wrongful accusation, glossing 
over the lack of any accusation of the immorality of the girlfriend. After the 
fallout with his father, Rami found work elsewhere. And then Issam came 
back after their mother died and the gold shop had been closed. Eventually 
Issam decided he wanted to go back to the U.S. and their father only 
persuaded him to stay by asking him to reopen the shop—Issam and not 
Rami who had worked there and kept it going for so long. Initially the profits 
were distributed 50/50 between Issam and their father. Rami was then asked 
(by whom was unclear) and allowed to help out at the s op, but he did not 
like the idea of taking pittance. So he went to his father and said, “He’s your 
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son, but so am I, so if we are all going to be a part of this instead of looking 
for other work, it should be 1/3 percent of the profits for each.” [This is 
where Rami’s version begins to differ from the combined one.] He said that 
his father agreed to this arrangement and told Issam of the plan. According to 
Rami, it was Issam and not their father, who said no, that it would remain 
50/50 with Rami taking a much-reduced weekly salary. Issam was the villain, 
not their father. Rami said he was tired of living under the shadow of his 
brother, who always got the better opportunities and had reduced him to 
nothing in the one place that should have been his as he had kept the shop 
together for so long. 
  
In Rami’s telling, the focus of the blame shifted from the father to the brother. The 
suspicious incident of the past was downplayed but kep continually unsettled—it 
had caused problems at the time, forcing him to search for work elsewhere, but it 
seemed in this narraction that father and son had been reconciled in the end. The 
current frostiness between them was the result only f light frustration at Abu 
Issam’s constant checking up on his sons’ work, compounded by the fact that their 
father would not say anything to Issam to make him accept a three-way split. The 
relationship between Rami and his father was somewhat less ambiguous in this 
narraction. They were much more firmly cemented in a father-son set of roles that 
was only temporarily altered by the suspicion of stealing. The suspicion had a great 
impact on their relations, but it was not as long term as the initial telling indicated.  
 The relationship that was revealed to be under greate  strain was that between 
the two brothers. Rami’s version was full of bittern ss and anger toward his older 
brother, beginning with jealousy over his brother’s opportunities to study and work 
abroad, while he was not even able to continue his ducation into university. Issam 
had been given the chance to prove himself financially by receiving a substantial loan 
from his father, where no similar loan or the chance to repay it had been forthcoming 
for Rami. This bitterness played out as a competition between the brothers, as seen 
from the younger (losing) brother’s perspective. The father and George were both 
underwritten characters in this narraction. 
 Not only, then, does brotherhood contain the potential for competition for 
women, but also for a father’s affection, trust and fi ancial support. This 
competition, a ‘negative’ but familiar aspect of kinship, impacts and reforms the 
interaction between siblings, especially in the case of two grown brothers who 
worked together for long hours every day and received regular visits from the figure 
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around whom they were competing. Such tension was compounded by the fact that 
one very clearly held superiority in the workplace, with the ability to tell his younger 
brother what to do as well determine how much money he would receive. In a 
gesture (apparently) of caring and responsibility, Issam assured Rami that he and his 
father would take care of Rami’s family if necessary, but this only added salt to 
Rami’s wounds. In the shop, when it came to matters of work, Rami was deferential 
to his brother, following his lead. Issam counted the money and made all the 
transactions, whereas Rami usually worked at cleaning the gold or resizing jewelry, a 
job that their sister’s son would carry out when he came in to work (as an apprentice, 
rather than someone long-familiar with the trade). Issam always carried the keys. 
 And yet, there were moments outside the running of the shop where Rami 
seemed to style himself as ahead of his brother. Rami w s married and had children, 
he had worked in a variety of different jobs across Syria, and knew many people. But 
most of all, he was personable in a way his brother was not. It was a comparison they 
both often made—Issam had good financial sense, but Rami could get along with 
anyone. This slight shifting of moral “capital” (Bourdieu 1977), achieved through 
joking about their personality weaknesses, helped th m to negotiate a common 
ground while at work by creating a more even space wh re they could be friendly. In 
this realm, Rami prevailed slightly, by virtue of having taken the step into the 
completion of life (i.e. starting a family), having acquired more wasta’, and having 
earned the reputation of being the more generous of the two. (“He’s got a hole in his 
hand; he’s always giving away money to anyone who needs it.”)  
 But even these were only temporary shifts away from the more regular 
pattern of moral and financial authority, whereby Issam activated relationships as 
both as older brother and employer. Interestingly, this authority was reenacted in the 
ways in which the two discussed financial affairs in the shop. While Rami would 
only discuss his version of the story with me privately, Issam would discuss his 
angle, which apportioned some blame on Rami himself, in front of his younger 
brother. While we were all sitting together, Issam said to me (in front of Rami) that it 
was partially Rami’s fault for his money problems. Rami, according to his brother, 
could not hold on to money, had never been able to. He would spend it on all sorts of 
things rather than saving it up. He had a hole in his pocket as well as his hand. Rami 
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nodded as his brother spoke. Issam and his father chose to pay Rami less so as to 
make sure he did not waste his money. Such a restriction was a form of care and 
responsibility, not dissimilar to the case described y Gilsenan (1996:308) where a 
Lebanese man felt he had been betrayed (“eaten”) by his family who had not properly 
restrained him and so let him squander his money. While Rami could only speak 
about his brother’s involvement in hushed tones, Issam could discuss his brother’s 
faults in front of the latter’s face. And Rami said nothing to contradict him, 
exemplifying the social dynamic between the two present and the two absent (the 
father and George) figures. There remained a tension between the brothers, 
influenced and affected in no small part by the competition for and the suspicion of 
their father. Kinship again revealed its competitive, angry, suspicious and bitter side.  
 
 
Who Watches the Watchers? 
Neighbors 
 
Throughout all of these examples of kinship and friendship, I have highlighted the 
regularity of a suspicion/knowledge of the immoral act and the ways in which this 
knowledge can impact the relations and dynamics between groups of people. This 
approach to the world, one that regularly includes su picion, is not limited to political 
or economic ‘conspiracy theories,’ but is also present in and informs the ways that 
people conduct their own lives. But what is central to such an approach to life is that 
there is someone watching, there is an observer who is b th within and outside the 
situation at hand. These observers enact a somewhat ambiguous role, for they are 
involved and uninvolved, passive and active. They ned to be close enough to the 
situation for it to be of interest and yet distant e ough so as not to be actively 
involved themselves (otherwise they become part of the narraction rather than a 
commentator on it). Their role is a passive one in that they are merely watching, but 
it is also active as they analyze situations and then generate and distribute the results 
of their analysis, taking a certain risk in the process. They are not-so silent and not-so 
hidden watchers, and perhaps we might be inclined to label them as gossip-mongers. 
Gossip surely plays a part, but what I might argue is different in this case is the level 
of reflexivity on the parts of both observer and observed. One informant told me that 
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“People here see and notice and talk about everything.” The watched know that they 
are being watched. And the watchers know that they oo are under constant 
observation. The process of observation involves th analysis of situations both 
visible and not, and perhaps more importantly, involves the passing on of knowledge 
and not mere rumor—a knowledge that is tested and created as it related. Even rumor 
has its place, though, as it can be used (like joking) as a means of moving a potential 
relationship from the realm of suspicion to that of he known. And given that 
everyone knows the how the processes of observation, suspicion, and suspicion-
testing work, the fact that people would conspire to keep some relation or incident 
from view, would seem to indicate that they know what they are doing is immoral. 
Invisible acts are dangerous and immoral, but even th  visible (if not ‘public’) is not 
always problem-free arena, for what is observed can contain indications of a further 
immoral relationship behind it. Only when a thing is openly tested can the suspicion 
of the immoral be quieted, and not always then. 
 But who is doing the watching? The easy answer is that everyone is always 
watching. One watches oneself, one’s family, friends, associates, friends’ friends, 
neighbors, and anyone else who might be of the slightest relevance or relation. When 
the situation calls for it (e.g. if a person sees his friend’s girlfriend out with another 
man), one might report back to the more directly interested parties (unless, of course, 
one has one’s own suspicious reasons for not doing so). We have seen how this 
works in some situations between kin, but I have so far left out the presence of 
neighbors and their involvement in the generation of kn wledge of the immoral. 
Outside of the immediate family, neighbors are probably the best-informed as to the 
comings and goings of one’s life. Neighbors live in close proximity and, given the 
very tight arrangement of houses and apartments, are often within easy seeing and 
hearing distance.  
 In vom Bruck’s (1997) work on Yemen, she details how the spheres of 
‘public’ and ‘private’ are not always readily distinguishable. She notes how, in some 
ethnographic instances, the seemingly ‘private’ space of the house can become a 
public one, or in some cases a visible one. She describ  how Yemeni women would 
often cover themselves while hanging up their laundry on their own roofs because 
they were visible to the seeing eyes of neighbors (1997:148). Neighbors, much like 
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kin or friends, monitor each other’s honor and are involved in the creation (or 
destruction) of personal and familial reputations. Though non-kin neighbors might 
not as ‘inside’ as family members, they are still a presence to be constantly aware of, 
especially in a situation where anyone could be a member of the mukhabarāt.  
 However, there is a degree of anonymity to be found in a city of several 
million people that might not be present in a smaller village or town. One’s neighbors 
might be able to observe one’s actions while at home, but with the growing use of 
cars, the limits of where one might go to work or scialize are greatly expanded (see 
Introduction). Even for families without cars, taxis and buses provide a way to 
traverse the wide geographical space of the city. The people one socializes with are 
not contained within a bounded area, so that evening gatherings could take place well 
outside one’s community. Going to a restaurant or café, one would likely not know 
the other customers. People’s work would often be quite a distance from their homes, 
especially those working in ministries, schools or h spitals with a centralized set of 
buildings. Even self-employed people usually had to travel away from their 
neighborhoods to their shops that would be more centrally-located in the city. Just 
going shopping would take people far from home to large, impersonal complexes of 
shops in the center of town.  
 But I was told that the city was not always so impersonal. One upper middle 
class informant spoke of his childhood in Damascus, reminiscing on how he could go 
walking in the streets, even in the New City, and kow everyone he passed. And he 
would go to restaurants and know the other customers, “This table was the Azem’s, 
that table as the Halabi’s, etc.” And while watching a muselsel (mini-series) that 
depicted Damascus at the end of the 19th century, another informant told me that 
everyone used to be very sociable with their neighbors. And not just the people living 
immediately around them, but the whole area. If there was a party, everyone would 
be invited, or those with money would at least send foo  out into the streets so that 
even the poorer members of the neighborhood could share in the festivities. There 
was a responsibility to take care of each other. She said that things were different 
now; people sometimes do not even know who their neighbors were—she herself did 
not. That kind of closeness, she told me, was possible when there were only 
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thousands of people in the city, but with the millions of people in Damascus now, it 
was impossible.  
 And yet, despite that distance, she was always intimately aware of what was 
going on in the home below her. She discussed the scandal of a father who beat his 
children, noted how the foreign daughter-in-law would frequently not eat dinner with 
the rest of the family, how there was always arguin a d screaming, and so on. She 
did not know them by name, but had a knowledge of them nevertheless, based on 
what she had observed. And one evening after she had told me this, I was over 
visiting and there was a knock on the door. It turned out to be the mother and he 
daughter-in-law who lived downstairs. They had locked themselves out of their 
house. My friend welcomed them in and offered them so e food, showing clearly 
that there was still some form of social obligation and responsibility between 
neighbors, even in a big, cold city. In fact, the city sometimes even provided for 
better opportunities to observe one’s neighbors. While Old City homes mostly had 
inward-facing courtyards, apartments in the New City usually reversed this and had 
balconies that overlooked the streets. On warm evenings, many balconies would be 
occupied (especially if they were on busy streets) with family members having tea or 
coffee and watching the comings and goings of passers-by. Perhaps such observation 
was a way to pass the time or to make sure that one’s neighborhood was a safe and 
calm place, but I would argue that it was al o a way in which Damascenes (Syrians, 
Arabs, etc.) engaged in their social surroundings. Observation and analysis of what 
had been observed were not so much activities one did as methods of interacting with 
and generating knowledge about the world. Between distant neighbors it might not 
have much effect on their relations, but the knowledge was being produced anyhow. 
 
Salah’s married sister (as we were discussing the possibility of divorce): 
Maybe we should lower our voices so the whole neighbor ood won’t hear 
what we’re talking about. 
Salah: And what would they do if they did hear? 
Salah’s sister: Just talk, but still… 
 
People were concerned about what neighbors might think and say, and there was 





Where Neighbors and Kin Meet 
 
However, neighbors were not always strangers to each other. Though it was 
becoming ever more difficult in a climate of climbing housing costs, extended 
families often tried to live in relatively close are s of a neighborhood (Jean-Klein 
2003). This residence pattern was especially true of the older generations, who had 
had better access to property, but still was found among younger generations when 
they have the space to occupy nearby. Salah, from the above story, lived with his 
wife in an apartment above his parents’ house. Salah’s uncle (khālhu) lived within a 
five-minute walk from them as well. Salah’s married sister’s house was somewhat 
further away, taking about ten to fifteen minutes in the car, but was much closer to 
her husband’s family. Another family that I knew, somewhat less affluent than 
Salah’s, had several generations living in the same home, and many members of the 
extended family lived in nearby houses in the Old City. If you wanted to meet 
anyone in that section of town, my informant told me, you only had to ask her mother 
or one of her aunts and they could introduce you to everyone and tell you who was 
related to whom and how.  
 Even in the upper middle class, families tried to stay close. My friend 
Yasmeen lived below her mother-in-law, with a maternal aunt and a maternal uncle 
nearby. Yasmeen’s situation was particularly difficult for her, as she did not get 
along with her husband’s mother and the older widowed oman was constantly 
watching her son’s family to make sure they did not get up to anything unsavory. She 
never came down to visit, though her son and grandchildren would go up to see her, 
occasionally taking her food that Yasmeen had cooked. The mother-in-law remained 
an invisible watcher, constantly placing strain on Yasmeen who felt oppressed at the 
continual judging. This, in turn, altered the relationship and created tension between 
Yasmeen and her husband as the two tried to balance where in their lives his mother 
should figure. In these cases, the constant renegotiations that arose from observation 
of kinship overlapped with that of neighbors, with the proximity of the residences 




Abu Hassan: The Damascene Robin Hood 
 
Even if they were not related, some people’s lives w re much more ensconced in a 
neighborhood, where everyone within a small space of the city would know each 
other. Such an area might be as small as a single apartment building or it might cover 
several blocks. As whispers of suspicion and knowledge traveled across the various 
networks within such areas, it could impact the ways that people interacted and 
positioned themselves in relation to each other. Everyday food shopping would 
usually be done close by, and some self-employed people did have shops close to 
home. One’s reputation, then, could cross the lines of home life, social life, and 
employment, giving neighborly observation a greater practical significance, 
something that could play out in unexpected ways (for my informants).  
  
Everyone knows Abu Hassan. Or, everyone knows f Abu Hassan. He is the 
Robin Hood of Rukn al-Diin [a lower middle class are  in the northern part 
of the city, known for having a large Kurdish population and being somewhat 
violent]. He robs from the rich and gives what he takes to the poor and the 
mosques. The mukhābarāt are always trying to get him, but they never can. 
Who is he and where does he come from? No one knows. But I saw him 
once. He had a shaved head and a short beard with abit of grey and wore 
dark sunglasses. He was really big, very strong—like a bodyguard, even 
though he had two bodyguards. They were big and had sunglasses too, and 
they all sat in a car, with Abu Hassan in the middle. But he was respectable 
and in a suit, like a gentleman.151 
 
 My informant had been working with his brother at their shop—not far from 
their home—when they had seen a car with this man pull u  nearby. A couple of 
seconds later, a neighbor of theirs who they knew, but not closely, walked up and sat 
down next to them. They were surprised, but happy to see him, offering him tea. He 
accepted and pointed at the man in the car, saying that that was the (in)famous Abu 
Hassan. The brothers looked at him with awe and then asked what he was doing in 
the area. “He’s here to steal from some of these shops; their owners have money to 
spare and are not very generous,” their neighbor replied. They asked him how he 
knew, and he said that he knew Abu Hassan and was in on the hit. “That’s why I’m 
                                                
151 Abu Hassan was just one of several such figures working across different (often lower-middle 
class, minority) areas of Damascus. Though the storie  about this particular man seem somewhat 
apocryphal, most everyone seemed to agree that these w re real, active figures.  
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sitting here. If I sit here, they will leave your shop alone. I know you two and I know 
you’re nice people and so I’m making sure they overl ok your shop.” The theft took 
place, and the police turned up shortly after. There was a brief chase and my 
informant said he could hear the sounds of guns from urther up the street, but he 
later heard that Abu Hassan had escaped. When I asked my informant’s sister about 
her opinion of the event, she rolled her eyes somewhat and said “Leave me out of it” 
(mā dakhelnī). 
 There are several noteworthy points to be taken from this narraction. First, it 
is an example of how knowledge amongst neighbors could impact other, seemingly 
unrelated, aspects of their lives. Perhaps, had the other shop owners worked harder to 
cultivate good relations with their neighbors, they too would have been spared. 
Second, it demonstrated how the use of violence could create a sense of ‘inside’ in 
the community, formed around a collective pride (Gilsenan 1996) and represented by 
the hero figure of Abu Hassan who existed in opposition to both the ‘rich’ and the 
‘regime.’ By failing to successfully respond, the police were demeaned and lost face, 
while Abu Hassan enacted the role of the ultimate victor. And yet, though my 
informant described the story with pride and as if Abu Hassan was ‘one of the guys,’ 
the fact that his sister dismissed the whole thing as somewhat silly indicates the 
masculine aspect to the whole issue. The men, especially the young men, of the area 
found in Abu Hassan a powerful figure who had come up from the masses of Rukn 
al-Diin and now brought, through his flaunting of law, a sense of pride to what might 
be an otherwise undistinguished group. His sister’s r ply, though, was to dismiss it, 
following her first statement with a saying: walad, huwa walad, hatta iza shaykh al-
balad (a boy is a boy, even if he is the ruler of the land).  
 Finally, this narraction presents an interesting contrast to other discussions of 
stealing and thieves. In many moments where I encountered the epithet of ‘thief,’ it 
was used to denounce someone (namely, the regime), to set them up as in violation of 
a shared moral code. Here, however, stealing moves ut of the space of the immoral 
into the act of a hero. I feel that much of this difference rests on the open quality in 
which Abu Hassan violated the law and on the fact tha he redistributed that which he 
took, rather than hoarding it. As Robin Hood, via his stealing, is a popular challenger 
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to an oppressive leader, so too is Abu Hassan.152 Here, Narotzky’s and Moreno’s 
(2002) “negative reciprocity” (that of taking) was not overlooked by my informants 
(indeed, it was flaunted), and was balanced by a form of “positive reciprocity” (that 
of giving). What Abu Hassan did that the regime did not was to engage in both forms 
and openly, adhering to the moral aesthetic if not the letter of the law. And as we 
have seen in a number of cases, visibility and the act of making one’s actions visible 
and known play a large part in the doing of morality. Because Abu Hassan made his 
actions open and visible, he was following a positive moral form and was thus a 
figure of pride.153 The regime, on the other hand, was a different mater, especially 
through their hoarding of wealth. Abu Hassan met th c allenges to his moral 
authority and honor (in fact, he pre-empted them) by making his actions blatantly 
visible and passing on what he had taken. However, he did not do this in isolation; 
his morality and honor were not created on their own. He required the audience to 
observe, analyze, and present the potential for a test or challenge. Only with other 
people present could the knowledge about him be created and spread. The observers 
created the opportunity for him to answer any suspicions about his character through 
his actions, helping him to maintain his honor. Though they may not have been in on 
the heist, those observing were fully implicated, fully ‘inside’ the process of 
knowledge- and authority-creation. They were responible for the honor of those they 
considered insiders. Much as was the case with friends. And we saw this same 
process of observation and implication with the mukhābarāt and with the regime 
itself.  
 
* * * 
 
What I am suggesting here is that narractions of conspiratorial, suspicious or 
otherwise invisible relations are among some of the ways in which Syrians organize 
and create knowledge about their world, be it concerning global politics, the regime, 
                                                
152 Both stories though also contain indications of hierarchy and unequal distributions of power. In 
both cases, the ‘thieves’ come from a powerless sector of society and are facing the powerful. Both 
men manage to temporarily invert this relationship for themselves, but in doing so effectively 
highlight the continuing powerlessness of the classes they arose from.  
153 Gilsenan (1996) and Layne (1994) also note the importance of a leader being visible and challenge-
able in Lebanon and Jordan respectively. And Arafat nd Hariri were condemned as immoral for those 
acts which they committed (or were narrated to have done) behind the scenes, such as secretly 
ferreting money away or raffling off a dead donkey by keeping its death a secret.  
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or their family and friends. They create momentary lines of connections or 
disconnections between people, that sometimes can be reproduced or made to take on 
a more permanent quality (e.g. Fatima moving out). Such narractions contain within 
them challenges and tests directed at other people’s moral authority and honor, but 
this is not necessarily a negative process.154 These challenges might be injurious, but 
what they do is provide a space for the object of the challenge to prove his moral 
status or maintain his honor. But ultimately this is the kind of thing one only does for 
‘insiders,’ for people who share in a certain moral and social code and are/make 
themselves connected on those lines. In other words, social relations in Syria are 
maintained with both connections and disconnections. Thus, the challenging of a 
brother and the challenging of a regime both indicate and (re)create the brother and 
the regime as ‘inside.’ Challenges are not bad and they are not resistance here; they 
are just the other part of relating. 
 
                                                
154 Contrast this to Bourdieu (1977:63-64) who sees th relationship between brothers as the “weakest 




Conclusion: Connecting the Dots 
 
When I was a teenager, my two younger siblings and I made up a game. Actually, we 
made up several, but on one particular day, we weretrying to figure out to do with 
some stale marshmallows, an empty soda bottle, and the neighbor’s swimming pool. 
What we wound up with was an odd derivation of basell that we dubbed 
‘Mallowball.’ Much like “Calvinball” from Bill Waterson’s Calvin and Hobbes, 
there were rules (for example, hitting a marshmallow into the neighbor’s pool always 
constituted a home run), but many were subject to change at any point during the 
game. This flexibility primarily applied to altering what and how many ‘bases’ there 
were and the order we had to run (connect) them. This became particularly 
problematic when our dog was assigned as one of the bas s—she had a tendency to 
move of her own accord. The same held true for my parents; in fact, they became 
particularly troublesome as bases when they finally figured out the rules of the game 
and their role in it. By understanding and using our wn rules against us, they were 
able to play with us, challenging our ability to successfully score runs by making 
themselves hard to catch. In other words, by (momentarily) ascribing to the same 
framework, they were able to play along and present us with challenges. Though they 
were, in a sense, disconnecting themselves from us by being a nuisance, they were 
only able to do so effectively because they were engaged in our game framework—
they were, in effect, as ‘inside’ the game as we were. Their challenges, for us and 
them, became as much a part of the fun as sending marsh allows into the pool. Our 
parents might have been running away, but they werenot resisting; they connected 
with us through their very disconnectivity. While I am not suggesting that Syrian 
narractions were a light-hearted game, I am suggesting that some of the ways of 
relating that I have (re)presented throughout this the is are not so ‘foreign’ as one 
might initially expect.  
 
 
Narractions, Challenges, and Doing Relations 
 
In the first several chapter of this thesis, I explored how Syrians’ narractions of 
identity-work and conspiracy were a way for Syrians to organize and position other 
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people in relation to themselves. I also used this performative analysis to examine 
how Syrians interacted with and related to their regime. Their narractions challenged 
the regime’s moral and political authority, but also showed how ordinary Syrians 
were all (to some degree or another) connected to and implicated in the regime. The 
final chapters examined how Syrians used similar processes and narractions in 
interacting with other ordinary Syrians, creating groups of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ 
whom they connected with and disconnected from in a rapid, shifting (if not always 
identical) fashion. I showed how challenges were a c ntral part of kinship and 
friendship relations and ultimately were not so much divisive as they were a core part 
of the relationships.  
 Thematically, what many of these narractions had in common was the 
presence of an invisible, inappropriate act, be it a presumed sexual liaison or 
political-economic-military plot to help someone gain nd remain in power. Syrians 
expected and accepted that there were things that took place out of sight and were 
actively hidden. Through constant and critical observation, they were attuned to the 
small indications that pointed to the invisible, allowing them to make assessments 
and relate the resulting knowledge to others. In doi g so, they were (re)creating 
social knowledge in a process that took both people and the unseen relations between 
them as its objects, drawing connections between thse ‘dots,’ and then testing that 
knowledge in various ways. In the case of family and friend relations, observers with 
a degree of vested interest used humor, rumor and reporting to assess the possibility 
of an inappropriate act taking place. Aside from such verbal challenges, there were 
also those that were acted out, e.g. where friends tested each other’s honor by 
actually attempting to seduce girlfriends away. Similarly, the world of politics was 
full of narractive tests and challenges, directed at international forces, the regime, or 
other ‘Syrian’ people. Humor, rumor and even reporting (to the mukhābarāt) were all 
methods by which Syrians spread and created knowledge. Political jokes, conspiracy 
theories and rumors of Mafia-like criminality tested the regime, challenging its 
adherence to the proper forms of a moral aesthetic (while creating a situation where, 
as in Mallowball, regime members were held accountable to the same framework and 
were thus all ‘insiders’). As friends or brothers might have challenged each other’s 
sharaf or a father might have challenged his son’s autonomy, so did Syrians 
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challenge the legitimacy and authority of their regime and the powers that helped to 
put it in place.  
 In that case, I would argue that the political challenges are no more forms of 
‘resistance’ to the regime than the interpersonal ch lenges are ‘resistance’ to family 
or friends. Salamandra (2004) presents a similar argument, showing how 
“contestation itself [is] a central mode of sociability” in Damascene relationships, 
and how in a social context this is not a form of resistance to the state, but a 
challenging of all other Syrians to negotiate power and identity. However, while she 
explicitly concerns herself with “sub-national” identities, I am extending the analysis 
of this mode of sociability into identity categories that could be considered ‘national’ 
or more overtly ‘political’ in nature. The antagonism is as much a part of the 
relations and connections as the solidarity.155 In other words, the challenging and the 
criticism of the regime are not necessarily Syrians ‘re isting’ the oppression of their 
rulers, but are rather negative aspects of their eve yday recreation of the regime.156 
There are, of course, positive and more “statist” (Navaro-Yashin 2002) aspects to this 
relationship as well—some Syrians did attend rallies of their own volition, some 
were beginning to wave Syrian flags, most paid their bills, many used public 
transportation, all were proud of the safety of their streets, they engaged in a state-as-
family rhetoric, etc. But it was the positive and negative aspects, and the duplexitous 
shifting between them, that constituted the process of relating and (re)creating 
relations, connections, and even the state in Syria.   
 
 
Dots and Connections  
 
That I have used social theory only insofar as it advances the understanding 
of [my informant’s] story, rather than made her story serve theory, reflects 
                                                
155 Contrast this to more common ways of looking at kin challenging. E.g. Rothenberg (2004:114) 
says of a community in Palestine: “social relationship  are nurtured carefully in Artas, maintained 
through daily acts of reciprocity and respect, and controlled through gossip and other acts of honor 
maintenance” (my emphasis). She portrays gossip and honor maintenance as controlling factors in 
kinship, guiding the relations that prefigure them, whereas I am arguing that these challenges are 
constructive and even necessary for the doing of personal (and political) relations in Syria.   
156 I am reminded here of Jameson’s (1981:39,41) idea of ‘mediation’ as the “establishment of 
relationships,” with difference being described as “the distinguishing of two phenomena from each 
other, their structural separation, the affirmation that they are not the same, and that in quite specific 
and determinate ways, is also a form of mediation.” 
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my preference for keeping method and theory sensitive to the historical 
exactness and density of human life (Borneman 1998:184). 
 
Like Borneman, when I initially began to think about and write this work, I tried to 
avoid getting tangled up in the theoretical literatu e, preferring to let my ethnographic 
models inform my anthropological ones, rather than vice versa (Jean-Klein and Riles 
2005). I thought about how Syrians would take seemingly independent events and 
people and link them together in conspiracy narractions about politics or girlfriends, 
or how they would divide people into groups in the courses of identity-work. Or how 
they would narract wasta and the mukhābarāt. I made a mobile mind-map on my 
wall, in the hopes that moving the different specific objects around in relation to each 
other would reveal the connections or divisions betwe n them. It was then that I 
realized that I was already engaged in the same model of knowledge production as 
my informants. We were both making connections and disconnections between sets 
of objects. Like Syrians, I was able to reposition my objects at will to suit whatever 
ideas I was considering on a given day. As I described in Chapter 3, I eventually 
realized that this process reminded me strikingly of the children’s game of Connect-
the-Dots, except that my dots were not numbered, an when they represented people, 
I had to consider that those dots were simultaneously involved in observing and 
drawing their own images—a fact that Syrians were well aware of. And it was 
entirely possible that one person’s lines might be another’s dots, i.e. relating-as-
processes and relations-as-objects could each become the other. They were 
duplexitous. For instance someone who observed a couple in the street might see the 
connection that the two were drawing to each other (by being together). However, the 
observer might also objectify this connection as a singular incident (dot) that, when 
analyzed alongside other such dots, would allow them to draw a larger image of an 
inappropriate relationship between the two—(re)creating a relationship-as-object that 
could be tested through appropriate methods (which effect further dis/connections). 
Or, in reflexive moments, Syrians (and I) would analyze the connections that they 
themselves had made (e.g. laughing over their own penchant for conspiracy 
theorizing), turning their own lines into dots. 
 When looking for other models of social knowledge production, I came 
across that of fractals and scales. As I have argued, I do not think this is applicable to 
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the processes I observed in Syria. It does not allow for the shifting nature of Syrian 
narractions or for the momentary quality of the relations being (re)made. Equally 
problematic was the presence of scales that is inhere t within the fractal model, 
requiring the observer to move away or closer in to see the pattern being repeated. 
While Syrians see and recognize such differences as thnicity, religion, the state, the 
international realm, kinship, individual, etc., they do not enact and narract them as 
inherently hierarchical scales, a fact I tried to demonstrate here through the 
awkwardness that arose from the artificiality of the ‘scalar’ chapter arrangement. In 
Syria, it was not that identical processes were being repeated on every scale, but 
rather that the same processes were being repeated with ifferent people. Hence 
Iranians could be inside and outside, as could Alawis, as could one’s brothers. There 
was no one who was not within narractive reach. The connect-the-dots model reduces 
(or expands?) the concept of scale into a single fie d of relations that can and does 
incorporate everyone.  
 Finally, the fractal image is somewhat vague in rega ds to agency. It seems to 
be a pre-determined image that does not allow for active participation in and creation 
of the processes that it would describe. The metaphor of connecting the dots, on the 
other hand, is premised on the idea that people do have agency to actively organize 
and know the world. This could include ‘resistance’ in certain situations, but, I argue, 
does not do so in the ways that ordinary Syrians relate to their state in the course of 
the everyday. In fact, connecting-the-dots could just as easily provide a model for 
more top-down examinations of the state, by examining how agents of the state make 
and reaffirm certain connections in their everyday lives as a  (intentionally activated 
and thus recreated category of) representative of the state.  
 However, this model is not entirely random; it also allows for some structural 
pre-figuring of the field of relations (what I have glossed as ‘potential connections’). 
This is especially obvious when dealing with things like Syrians’ identity-work or 
wasta’. Children, for example, are brought up observing the connections that their 
parents and families make, often resulting in their continuation and (re)activation of 
the same lines. If a father tells his son they are Kurdish (thus [re]recreating a Kurdish 
category of insiders), the son is likely to internalize and repeat this declaration, thus 
adding to its effect of permanence. The same might be true of belonging to a religion, 
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a state, or a family. Identity categories, then, are neither primordial nor (definitively) 
constructed (or imagined), but are continuously being reconstructed. The likelihood 
of certain connections being activated over others d pends on what people have 
learned and observed to be appropriate. Further, I suggested with wasta’ that all 
Syrians could connect themselves to the regime in some way or another. However, 
some people have fewer ‘degrees’ of connection than others. For instance, the cousin 
of the president was much more directly linked to the regime (one degree of removal) 
than my friend’s husband who helped me obtain my visa (two degrees). Indeed, the 
latter would likely be another degree or two of connection away from the president, 
creating a contingent set of  structure-like ‘levels’ to society. But the specifics of 
these levels are arbitrary rather than permanent featur s of the social field, appearing 
and disappearing as rapidly as the activated connectio s that move across them; here 
they are only equated to the state hierarchy becaus that is my focus. From another 
angle, the president is equally as removed from my friend and her family, thus 
momentarily putting him on a ‘lower’ rung in relation to the connections that are 
most important to her. 
 This is not to imply that all ‘dots’ are created equal as far as individual 
narractors are concerned. The connections that one has to the regime or that regime 
officials have to international conspirators is notg ing to be of the same quality as 
one’s connections to one’s sister or brother, especially given Joseph’s (1994) idea of 
connectivity (see Chapter7). But, as she goes on to show, psychodynamic process, 
such as the love, trust, and distrust that I have focused on in Chapter 7, can be a 
central part of the formation and reproduction of broader forms of familial 
organization, specifically patriarchy. In her article, Joseph also argues that kinship 
has for too long been analyzed under the rubric of either psychodynamic processes of 
love that portray an emotive, harmonic picture or social structural processes of power 
and violence (1994:52-54). By examining love and power, she tries to show how they 
are psychodynamic, reproductive of social patterns, a d mutually implicated. There 
is no violence within families without love and vice versa.  
 I have been presenting a similar sort of argument h re. By shifting my focus 
through the family and the state, I am not attempting o merely equate all types of 
relating in Syria, but rather am suggesting that positive and negative connections 
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between individuals and groups are as much a part of the productive process of 
identity as they are divisive. Narractions and action of unity and division, be they 
familial, state, or global in nature, serve to reproduce the very categories and 
structures that they would sometimes seem to rail ag inst. The regime is not 
implicated in one’s self and familial identity in the same way one’s brother is, but the 
processes of social formation and identity that work th ough the combination of both 
positive and negative connections contain too many similarities to be ignored. 
 For all of these various reasons, I suggest connecting the dots as a metaphor 
for understanding how Syrians produce social knowledge. It is surely not without its 
flaws, but allows for those things which seemed to be most central and regular in my 
experience of Syrians’ narractions of their everyday lives: shifting knowledge and 
effects, hidden events and relations, connections and disconnections, challenges, and 
agency among people to (re)create the world.  
 
 
Re(dis)covering the State, Maybe 
 
As I said at the very beginning, this was meant to be an ethnography of the state. By 
avoiding the use of the term throughout and instead r ferring to the Syrian leadership 
apparatus as the ‘regime,’ I both followed my informants’ leads and sought to avoid 
taking certain pre-conceptualizations for granted. Because I was trying to see how the 
state might be (re)created in the course of ordinary people’s everyday lives, it was 
important for me to consider and (re)present it in the same ways Syrians did. I did not 
want to construct something that they themselves did not. Nor did I want to assume 
the sorts of structural and moral divides that I addressed in the introduction, namely 
those between the good people and the evil state. This also meant moving away from 
analysis that centered on the interactions between ‘ruler’ and ‘ruled’ (cf. Borneman 
1998), for to do so would return me to the same dichotomy, just cased in different 
words. I also wanted to avoid relying on the concept of resistance as an easy fall back 
and the automatic reaction to the presence of ‘power’ (cf. Reeves 1995:307).  
 Perhaps it could be argued that I have not left behind the state as we know it 
at all and have merely replaced the word ‘state’ with ‘regime.’ I would disagree, for 
there is a fundamental difference between the Syrian regime as I have tried to present 
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it and how the state is commonly approached in other forums—namely that the 
regime is composed of people, rather than being a collection of institutions and self-
replicating ideologies. In other words, the Syrian state was not (constructed to be) 
some impersonal thing that is ‘up there’ or ‘out there,’ but rather as a collection of 
people who were as likely (or more!) to act for their own benefit than for that of the 
population they were meant to be leading and caring for. The failings of the state 
were not described as structural problems—the constitution itself could be changed at 
will, undermining any sort of structural permanence for the ‘state’ (see page 134, 
note 91)—but as derived from politicians’ corruptness. The members of the 
regime/state were “thieves,” “criminals,” and like the “Mafia,” but they were also, in 
moments, nice or learned people (e.g. Dr. Bashar). The regime was equated with 
members of the Alawi sect, and specific families within that sect, a group seen to 
lack the moral authority or legitimacy to rule. Yet, a  the same time, no particular 
group was narracted to have that authority, especially given the expectation that 
politics could corrupt anyone. As happened with ordinary people, (members of) the 
regime did not always adhere to the proper moral aesthetic. But that they did share 
the same aesthetic as my informants, indicates that they were ‘insiders.’  In short, 
examining the Syrian state from the perspective of Syrians as they engaged it in the 
everyday revealed that it was not a series of processes, institutions, or the like; it was 
a series of people. As such, “ordinary” Syrians hadas large a part to play in creating 
those people as the state as they did in any form of “identity-work.”  The state-as-
people (i.e. regime) was thus (re)constructed in the everyday narractions of Syrians. 
 This is not to say that state figures lacked the ability to affect ordinary Syrians 
in unequal ways. Syrians paid bills, were conscripted into the military, stood in 
queues for new passports or identity cards, and lost their houses in presidential 
decrees. But then again, they shared internet access so not everyone had to pay, 
dodged the military, pulled strings to have official p perwork done for them, bought 
and sold illegal Ottoman coins, and continued to live in their houses after they had 
been repossessed. But I stress that these were not forms of resistance to power; 
Syrians had no desire to topple the regime. They depicted the aftermath of such a 
movement as being far more hellish and violent than anything they had to live with 
currently. Rather, I consider these moments and the narractions of them as tests of 
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the state’s moral and political authority. That thestate is not able to properly respond 
to such tests indicates that (like Abeer who misread the test and revealed her 
ineptitude) members of the regime do not always live up to their roles as leaders and 
protectors.  
 But, and perhaps most importantly, the state-as-people is not external to its 
population. Certain people might have a greater ability to wield political power, but 
“ordinary” Syrians were as much implicated in the processes of this power as 
members of the regime. Through reshweh, wasta, and even things like military 
service, people were able to and readily did activate connections between themselves 
and people working within the state apparatus. Ultima ely, no one was fully 
disconnected from the state. Any sharp lines that we might think to set up between 
state and people, or ruler and ruled, fade in the presence of these lines that criss-
crossed the personal landscape. Ultimately, then, rathe  than a heavily moralistic 
State/People divide, I suggest that the Syrian state w s premised on momentary 
divisions and connections between people. As such, Syrians were just as capable of 
creating positive relations between people (including themselves) as they were at 
creating lines to divide them. The Syrian state becomes just another set of dots in the 
field of relations. And so my ethnography of the state has become an ethnography of 
the connections between people.  
 
 
Bringing it Home 
 
[Conspiracy thinking] assumes there is an order to the messy shape of the 
earth, and that things can be become clear when we can properly see the plan. 
This is what Hetherington has called ‘the will to connect’, the desire to make 
a line of sight which attaches diverse objects in patterned ways (Parker 
2001:204, citation removed). 
 
In that chapter, Parker goes on to argue that conspiracy thinking and the human 
sciences have much in common. Parish (2001:8) suggets that conspiracy theorizing 
is a way of “assembling possibilities and information…in a culture obsessed with 
connections and interpretation,” a description thatcould apply as equally to the 
culture of anthropologists as Syrians. And Boyer (2006:337) outright states that “one 
mode of conspiracy and transparency—ethnography—has sought to reveal another.” 
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This is not meant to demean anthropological processes of knowledge production, but, 
as I suggested in the introduction, opens up the possibility that conspiracy thinking 
can be just as valid a form of knowledge production as our own. Both are processes 
based in participation and observation. Both attemp to trace out connections between 
people and ideas that might not be readily visible. Both are premised, in fact, on the 
idea that there are unseen forces at work in society. Practitioners of both make 
connections from what they observe and produce narractions that relate and 
(re)create certain dis/connections. These narractions are then submitted to friends and 
peers, who will reconsider them and add their own input. Both are reflexive, 
examining their own narractions, relating the speakers to the processes described 
within the narractions, and critically considering other people’s narractions. Indeed, 
though I have been talking around the state, the focus f my gaze in this thesis has 
been as much anthropology as Syrian politics. 
 I am not attempting to directly equate anthropological analysis with 
conspiracy theorizing, though they have their similarities. Instead, I am trying to 
show how both can be considered to be forms of a bro der process of knowledge 
production that I have called connecting the dots. Maurer (2002) suggests that 
anthropological knowledge is obtained through shifting scales. However, I would 
argue that this is only true if we do not consider na ractions to be first-order objects, 
in other words, if we assume that there is some first-o der ‘truth’ that all narractions 
are ultimately referring back to. But it is unimportant to me (as an anthropologist) 
whether or not the U.S. and Israel helped Hafez al-As d into power or whether there 
is such a distinct thing as a ‘Kurd’ or whether some ne’s girlfriend cheated on her 
boyfriend with his best friend. What I consider important is the fact that Syrians 
related these narractions to me. Those narractions are the ‘reality’ that I am taking 
into consideration (i.e. they are my dots). The anthropological knowledge that I am 
producing is derived from y narracting the connections and disconnections that I 
saw taking place between figures who were themselves engaged in the same process. 
Even the literature that I invoke throughout this tesis is a part of making 
connections. I reach across a broad field of dots and connect myself to scholarly 
works on a variety of different peoples, places, and topics.  
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 If I am reflexive enough, I can even say that in the process of describing how 
ethnography is connecting the dots, I myself am actively engaged in doing 
connections vis-à-vis this narraction (i.e. thesis). By citing certain authors, leaving 
authors out, agreeing with some, and arguing against others, I am actively connecting 
and disconnecting myself from these other people (and the theories and 
ethnographies they have produced). They are as muchembedded in my field of 
potential relations as my Syrian informants and myself. And in activating certain 
connections, I am (like my friend’s husband and his wa ta chain) hoping to 
strengthen the potential for those authors to activte them again the other way via 
connecting to and citing my work (for good or ill) n their future writings.  
 And there is most certainly a ‘shifting’ element to anthropology-work. What I 
write here can be read and interpreted in different ways. I myself have been 
intentionally ‘doing’ multiple sets of connections throughout the thesis, some 
explicit, some not: it is an ethnography of the state, but also of ordinary people; I am 
analyzing politics but also kinship, friendship, and anthropology; and so on. I am 
even involved in challenging, disagreeing with other authors’ works at least as often 
as I agree with what has been said before. But I cannot be said to be ‘resisting’ 
anthropology. The challenges are a central part of being involved in the proper 
aesthetic of the anthropological (and academic) community. By this ‘disconnecting,’ 
I am, in fact, revealing just how connected I am and thus am making myself so.  
 
* * * 
 
As Syrians living their lives or doing the state, as ethnographers ‘in the field,’ or as 
anthropologists writing up our analyses, we are always engaged in the act of 
positioning dots in relation to other dots and tracing out the relations between them. 
Using conspiracy theory, identity-work, humor, rumor and literature reviews (among 
other things), we make our connections and present th m to our audiences. Nothing 
and nowhere is out of our reach, not politics, economics, religion, identity, family, 
theory or region of the world. Even the sometimes problematic issue of comparison 
becomes theoretically simple—it is just another act of connecting certain dots. We 
and the field of relations around us are in constant motion. There is no possibility for 
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a truly still ethnographic moment: if we assume a photographic stillness, then we will 
only see ambiguity, rather than the rapid shifting between black and white. It is, I 
would argue, how we already come to know the world…now I just ask that we 
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